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Summary 
Deviation  occurring  in  the  course  of  a  maritime  voyage 
and  its  effect  on  the  carrier's  liability  is  a 
controversial  issue  whether  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
and  the  Hamburg  Rules  or  under  the  COGSA  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States. 
International  Conventions  do  not  contain  any  specific 
provision  dealing  with  unreasonable  deviation,  except 
that  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  provide  a  provision  for 
"reasonable  deviation". 
The  problems  which  arise  from  deviating  ship  have  been 
left  to  the  national  laws  and  the  experience  of  the 
domestic  courts  which  are  devoted  to  their  own  legal 
system  rather  than  to  the  rules  of  the  international 
conventions.  Consequently,  the  national  laws  and 
jurisprudences  of  the  contracting  parties  or  non- 
contracting  parties  have  discussed  the  doctrine  of 
deviation  in  a  variety  of  cases  but  have  presented 
different  solutions  and  therefore  different  consequences 
may  result. 
This  thesis  is  therefore  an  attempt  to  discuss  the 
doctrine  of  deviation  comparatively  and  shed  light  on  the 
effect  of  unreasonable  deviation  on  the  liability  of  the 
maritime  carrier.  - ix 
I  confined  the  scope  of  the  thesis  to  the  field  of 
bills  of  lading  as  an  important  document  for  the  carriage 
of  goods  by  sea,  and  to  the  relevant  points  concerning 
the  charterparty  when  the  bill  of  lading  is  incorporated 
into  the  charterparty.  Therefore,  I  discussed  the 
principles  of  the  bill  of  lading  and  the  scope  of  the 
Rules  in  the  introduction. 
The  thesis  is,  however,  divided  into  six  chapters. 
Chapter  one  is  aimed  at  defining  the  concept  of 
"deviation"  and  clarifying  the  classification  of 
"deviation".  Any  attempt  to  classify  the  terminology  of 
deviation  into  reasonable  and  unreasonable  is  considered 
an  essential  factor  in  deciding  whether  the  deviation 
occurred  in  the  course  of  the  maritime  voyage  is  a 
deviatory  breach  of  contractual  obligations  or  not. 
Chapter  two  is  divided  into  two  sections. 
The  first  one  is  devoted  to  explaining  the  main 
principles  of  the  carrier's  liability  concerning  the 
seaworthiness  and  the  proper  care  of  the  goods  by 
loading,  handling,  and  stowing  the  goods  carried.  I  also 
discussed  the  degree  of  the  seriousness  of  the  carrier's 
fault  or  his  servant  or  agent  and  the  effect  of  serious 
fault  on  the  doctrine  of  deviation  which  might  displace 
the  carriage  contract  when  such  deviation  occurs 
deliberately. X 
Whereas,  the  immunities  of  the  carrier,  whether  under 
the  International  Convention,  i.  e;  The  Hague/Visby  Rules 
and  The  Hamburg  Rules  or,  in  the  national  laws  and  the 
immunities  which  are  based  on  a  contractual  basis,  are 
the  subject  of  section  two. 
I  have  however  reached  the  conclusion,  in  this  chapter, 
that  the  carrier's  liability,  under  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules,  is  based  on  the  principles 
of  presumed  fault  or  neglect.  On  the  other  hand,  I  have 
adopted  the  risk  approach  as  the  best  theory  for 
introducing  an  explanation  for  holding  a  deviating 
carrier  liable  providing  that  the  deviation  is  wrongful 
and  increasing  the  risk  of  loss  beyond  that  permitted  by 
the  contract  and  endeavours  to  prevent  the  carrier  from 
creating  unauthorized  risks. 
Chapter  three  deals  with  the  effect  of  deviation  on  the 
contract  of  carriage  and  its  characteristics  as  a  serious 
breach  of  the  contractual  obligations.  I  have  therefore 
divided  the  chapter  into  two  sections. 
Section  one  is  concerned  with  the  characterization  of 
the  breach  of  contract  of  carriage  by  explaining  the 
distinction  between  the  conditions  and  warranties  under 
the  general  principles  of  the  contract  law,  and  the 
breach  of  fundamental  term  or  the  fundamental  breach, 
while  section  two  is  devoted  to  explaining  the  effect 
of  unreasonable  deviation  on  the  obligations  of  the Xi 
contracting  parties. 
I  have  however  tried  in  this  chapter  to  find  out  a 
legal  characterization  for  unreasonable  deviation.  I 
believe  that  such  a  serious  breach  is  considered  a  breach 
of  the-substantive  rules  and  therefore  the  doctrine  of 
deviation  has  still  the  same  effects  on  the  contractual 
obligations  as  it  was  under  the  pre-Hague  Rules  regime.  I 
also  endeavoured  to  base  such  a  breach  in  the  carriage 
contract  on  the  test  of  reasonableness  which  determines 
whether  or  not  a  breach  of  contract  is  fundamental  or 
material. 
Thus,  any  exaggeration  in  the  drastic  effect  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  should  be  isolated  from  the 
carrier's  duties  to  provide  a  seaworthy  ship  and  to  load, 
stow,  and  discharge  the  cargo  properly  and  carefully.  The 
innocent  party  has  merely  a  right  to  compensation  for 
such  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo. 
Recovery  of  losses  and  damages  resulting  from  an 
unreasonable  deviation  is  the  subject  of  chapter  four. 
This  chapter  is  divided  into  three  sections  which  deal 
with  the  compensatory  nature  of  losses  and  damages  and 
whether  the  innocent  party  is  entitled  to  recover  the 
physical  and  the  economic  loss  by  establishing  the  causal 
relationship  between  the  unreasonable  deviation  and  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  which  could  be  shown  by 
adopting  two  doctrines,  i.  e;  remoteness  and  mitigation  of xii 
damage,  which  have  tried  to  limit  the  damages. 
The  court  is  however  entitled  to  have  a  special  method  to 
estimate  such  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  unless  the 
nature  and  the  value  of  the  goods  have  been  declared  by 
the  shipper  before  shipment  and  inserted  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  the  cargo-owner  is  entitled  to  recovery  for  full 
damages  caused  to  the  cargo  which  may  exceed  the 
statutory  limitation. 
Chapter  five  is  concerned  with  the  procedures  of  action 
for  lost  or  damaged  cargo.  This  chapter  is  divided  into 
four  sections.  These  sections  are  concentrated  on  the 
principles  of  notice  of  loss,  damage  and  delay  in 
delivery,  time  limitation  for  suit,  jurisdiction  clauses, 
and  the  burden  of  proof  under  the  International 
Conventions  and  COGSA.  These  four  points  are,  however, 
classified  into  formal  and  substantive  conditions. 
The  first  three  conditions  are  formal  conditions  which 
the  court  must  enquire  as  a  matter  of  form  that  these 
conditions  have  been  instituted  before  hearing  the  case. 
The  last  condition  is  a  substantive  condition  when  the 
court  must  show  who  bears  the  burden  of  proof  at  a 
particular  point  in  the  litigation. 
Finally  chapter  six  is  devoted  to  describing  and 
analyzing  the  main  principles  of  the  Iraqi  and  Egyptian 
legal  systems  concerning  the  liability  of  the  carrier. xiii 
Iraq  and  Egypt  have  broadened  their  horizons  by 
adopting  the  principles  of  the  International  Conventions, 
i.  e;  Egypt  ratified  the  Hague  Rules  since  may  29th  1944, 
whereas,  the  Iraqi  Draftsman  embodied  the  principles  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules  in  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  in  1983. 
That  indicates  that  both  apply  the  international  rules  in 
order  to  establish  a  joint  understanding  for  the 
principles  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  and  to  obtain  some 
benefit  of  the  precedents  and  experience  of  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  States  in  the  field  of  maritime 
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INTRODUCTION 
The  satellite  navigation  system  is  the  most  rapid 
ter_;  nological  development  in  the  navigation  system  by 
assuring  safety  on  certain  passages  and  representing 
continuous  economy  on  any  particular  voyage  even  with  the 
use  of  navigational  aids,  i.  e;  RDF,  Fathometers,  and 
Raders. 
There  is  no  question  as  to  the  value  of  the  satellite 
navigation  system  aboard  a  vessel,  especially  where  an 
accurate  position  cannot  be  plotted  for  reason  of  bad 
weather  conditions.  The  satellite  system  can  ascertain 
the  main  track  at  all  times.  It  also  can  determine  the 
differences  in  total  mileage  between  one  route  and 
another,  and  the  shortest  route  can  be  properly 
evaluated.  This  system  can  however  give  accurate  advice 
to  the  carrier  in  case  of  changing  the  course  of  a 
maritime  voyage. 
Such  technical  development  in  shipping,  by  using  a 
satellite  navigation  system,  does  not  decrease  the 
valuation  and  the  importance  of  the  doctrine  of  deviation 
in  maritime  law,  but  it  remains  as  an  enigma  under  the 
contract  law  in  general  and  under  the  Admiralty  law  in 
particular. 
Deviation  in  the  course  of  maritime  voyage  has  however 
raised  and  still  raises  a  controversial  discussion 
particularly  as  to  the  effect  on  the  contract  of  carriage 
by  sea,  whether  it  displaces  the  contract  of  carriage 2 
automatically  or  it  gives  an  option  to  the  cargo-owner  or 
any  innocent  party  to  treat  the  contract  as  still 
subsisting  or  to  rescind  the  contract  as  brought  to  an 
end  by  the  fundamental  breach,  unless  such  deviation  is 
to  be  waived. 
These  questions  subsequently  have  given  considerable 
importance  to  the  notion  of  deviation  in  the  course  of 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea  and  developed  by  analogous 
reasoning  to  cover  all  bailment  situationsl  whether  such 
deviation  occurs  in  the  carriage  of  goods  by  Sea,  Air,  or 
Road. 
The  doctrine  of  deviation  extends  beyond  geographical 
deviation  by  covering  non-geographical  deviation.  2 
The  jurisprudence  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  concerning  the  effect  of  unjustifiable  deviation 
upon  a  contract  of  carriage  has  been  stated  in  a  variety 
of  cases  but  not  in  uniform  language.  The  courts  have 
considered  the  deviatory  breach  as  a  serious  breach  to 
contractual  obligations  which  goes  to  the  root  of 
contract.  3 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  were  designed  to  strike  a 
C.  P.  Mills,  "The  Future  of  Deviation  in  the  Law  of  the  Carriage 
of  Goods",  [1983]  4  LMCLQ,  p  587,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Mills,  The 
Future  of  Deviation". 
2-James  F.  Whitehead,  III,  "Deviation:  Should  the  Doctrine  Apply 
to  On-Deck  Carriage?  "  [1981]  6  Mar.  Law.  p  37  at  p  38,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Whitehead,  Deviation". 
3-Lord  Wright,  in,  Hain  s.  s.  co.  v,  Tate  &  Lyle,  [19301  2  ALL  E.  R. 
p  597;  Devlin,  J,  in,  Al  xan  err  v.  Rai  way  Executive  [1951]  2  ALL 
E.  R.  p  442. 3 
compromise  between  the  conflicting  interests  of  the 
shipowner  and  the  cargo-owner  by  creating  uniform  rules. 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  were 
perfect  as  far  as  the  deviation's  issue  was  concerned. 
Lord  Justice  MacKinnon4  has  explained  the  ambiguity 
surrounding  the  deviation  by  saying: 
"The  rule  as  to  deviation  in  the  Hague  Rules  is 
utterly  unintelligible" 
The  considerable  importance  and  justification  either 
theoretically  or  practically  in  choosing  the  topic  of 
"The  Effect  of  Deviation  Occurring  in  the  Course  of 
Maritime  Voyage  on  the  Liability  of  the  Carrier"  comes 
out  from  the  lengthy  struggle  between  the  conflicting 
precedents  respecting  the  deviating  carrier  whether  in 
the  United  Kingdom  or  the  United  States. 
Priority  was  also  given  to  a  study  on  bills  of  lading 
and  problems  which  emerged  from  functions  by  the  United 
Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development  Secretariats 
which  indicated  that  the  Hague  Rules  need  revision  and 
should  take  into  account  the  given  needs  of  developing 
countries. 
Any  analytic  study  must  however  consider  the  needs  of 
economic  development,  in  particular  in  developing 
4-Comp  agn{e  Primera  De  Navagazi  na  Panama  V.  Compania 
Arrenda  a  is  D  Monopolin  De  Petroleos  SA.  11940)  K.  B.  p  362  at  p 
368  (C.  A)  . 
5-United  Nations  held  many  conferences  as  respect  as  to  determine 
the  defects  and  amendments  to  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  i.  e;  Working 
Group  on  International  Shipping  Legislation,  UNCTAD  and  UNCITRAL. 4 
countries,  and  make  appropriate  recommendations  by 
putting  forward  an  integrated  theory  for  the  principles 
of  deviation  and  its  consequences  on  the  contract  of 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  Such  a  study  therefore  for  the 
deviating  vessel  and  its  effect  on  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  should  shed  light  on  the  economic  and  commercial 
aspects  of  international  legislation,  i.  e;  The 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  and  on  the 
practical  aspects  of  the  bills  of  lading  which  performs  a 
complex  set  of  functions. 
"UNCTAD"  has  made  these  aspects  of  bills  of  lading 
quite  clear  in  explaining  the  proposals  for  a  complete 
revision  of  the  Hague  Rules6. 
As  far  as  the  economic  aspects  are  concerned  UNCTAD  has 
discussed  the  break  down  in  the  balance  of  the 
relationship  between  cargo-owner  and  carrier  in  the  field 
of  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea. 
The  consequences  follow  any  breach  of  contract 
especially  when  the  goods  carried  are  lost  or  damaged  and 
the  best  way  of  recovering  such  loss  of,  or  damage  to, 
the  cargo,  taking  into  account  the  effect  of  the  economic 
loss  on  the  contractual  relation  of  the  contracting 
parties  or  any  innocent  party  who  has  been  involved  in 
such  a  contract  or  its  consequences7.  Also,  the 
6-United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development/  Geneva, 
Report  by  the  Secretariat  of  UNCTAD,  New  York,  1971,  TD/B  /C.  4/ 
ISL/6/Rev.  1/  p1  at  p  17,  hereinafter  cited  as  "TD/B/C.  4/  ISL/6/ 
Rev.  1". 
7-W.  E.  Astle,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  1981,  p  27,  hereinafter  cited  as 5 
commercial  aspects  of  bills  of  lading  broadly  discussed  by 
"UNCTAD"8  is  that: 
"The  commercial  aspects  would  include  the  part 
played  by  the  bill  of  lading  in  the  course  of 
maritime  trade  as  document  of  title  to  and  a 
receipt  for  goods  as  well  as  a  memorandum 
containing  either  the  contract  of  carriage  or 
its  evidence.  What  requires  consideration  is 
whether  the  bill  of  lading,  as  at  present 
formulated,  satisfies  the  expectations  of  the 
seller,  the  carrier,  the  receiver,  the  banker 
and  the  cargo  insurer,  all  of  whom  depend  upon 
its  contents  for  their  respective  needs". 
The  effect  of  these  aspects  of  bills  of  lading  on  the 
contracting  parties  depends  upon  the  way  of  handling  the 
risks  caused  to  the  cargo  and  distributing  such  loss  of, 
or  damage  to,  the  cargo  by  the  functioning  and 
interpretation  of  the  applicable  bill  of  lading.  The 
phrase  bill  of  lading  is  used  to  define  a  document 
evidencing  the  loading  of  goods  on  a  vessel  and  by  which 
the  carrier  undertakes  to  deliver  the  goods  to  the  holder 
of  the  bill  of  lading  which  is  signed  by  the  carrier  and 
issued  to  a  shipper  of  goods9. 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  do  not  define  the  bill  of 
"Astle,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
8-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1  at  p  17. 
9-E.  R.  Hardy  Ivamy,  Di  t{onary  of  Shipping  Law,  1984,  at  p  7, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Ivamy,  Dictionary  of  Shipping  Law";  TD/B/C 
4/ISL/6/Rev.  1  at  p  5;  S.  Mankabady,  "Comments  on  the  Hamburg 
Rules",  Published  in  the  1Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by 
sea,  1978,  p  27  at  p  41,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Mankabady,  The 
Hamburg  Rules". 6 
ladingl",  whereas,  Article  1  [7)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules 
defines  the  bill  of  lading  as: 
"...  a  document  which  evidences  a  contract  of 
carriage  by  sea  and  the  taking  over  or  loading 
of  the  goods  by  the  carrier,  and  by  which  the 
carrier  undertakes  to  deliver  the  goods  against 
surrender  of  the  document.  A  provision  in  the 
document  that  the  goods  are  to  be  delivered  to 
the  order  of  a  named  person,  or  to  order,  or  to 
bearer,  constitutes  such  an  undertaking". 
The  aim  of  the  definition  of  the  bill  of  lading  under 
the  Hamburg  Rules  is  to  clear  the  ambiguities  over  those 
in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules".  These  ambiguities  may  be 
clarified  by  explaining  the  functions  of  the  bill  of 
lading  and  whether  the  bill  of  lading  is  a  contract  or 
not.  Doubt  has  been  raised  whether  the  bill  of  lading  is 
a  contract  of  carriage12  or  is  merely  a  piece  of  evidence 
10-Astle, 
The  Hamburg  Rules,  at  p  12;  Article  1(b)  of  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  defines  the  contract  of  carriage  which  is 
identical  to  Article  1  (b]  of  the  United  States  COGSA  and  Article 
1[b]  of  the  United  Kingdom  COGSA  1924  and  1971,  as  following: 
"Contract  of  carriage  applies  only  to  contracts  of  carriage  covered 
by  a  bill  of  lading  or  any  similar  document  of  title,  in  so  far  as 
such  a  document  relates  to  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  including 
any  bill  of  lading  or  any  similar  document  as  aforsaid  issued  under 
or  pursuant  to  a  charterparty  from  the  moment  at  which  such  bill  of 
lading  or  similar  document  of  title  regulates  the  relations  between 
a  carrier  and  a  holder  of  the  same". 
11-George  F.  Chandler  III,  "A  Compromise  of  COGSA,  The 
Hague/Visby,  and  The  Hamburg  Rules",  (1984]  15  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  233 
at  238,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Chandler". 
12-Lord  Cottenham  L.  C.  in  the  Dunlop  V.  Lambert  {1839}  6CI.  & 
Fin.  p  600  at  p  627,  where  he  states  that: 
it..  the  consignor  makes  a  special  contract  with  the  carrier,  and 
the  carrier  agreed  to  take  the  goods  from  him,  and  to  deliver  them 
to  any  particular  person  at  any  particular  place,  the  special 7 
endeavouring  to  show  what  that  contract  is13. 
The  most  favoured  trend  concerning  the  characterization 
of  the  bill  of  lading  is  not  considered  itself  as  a 
contract  of  carriagel4,  but  it  may  act  as  evidence  of 
that  contractl5. 
Lord  Bramwell  in  Sewell  v.  Bu  rick"  has  made  that 
quite  clear  by  saying: 
"To  my  mind  there  is  no  contract  in  it.  It  is  a 
receipt  for  goods,  stating  the  terms  on  which 
they  were  delivered  to  and  received  by  the 
ship,  and  therefore  excellent  evidence  of  those 
terms,  but  it  is  not  a  contract". 
contract  supersedes  the  necessity  of  showing  the  ownership  of  the 
goods  and  that...  the  consignor,  the  person  making  the  contract 
with  the  carrier  may  maintain  the  action,  though  the  goods  may  be 
the  goods  of  the  consignee" 
13-Raoul  Colinvaux,  Carver's  Carriage  by  Sea,  {13th,  ed,  1982}, 
Vol,  I,  Para,  84,  p  59,  hereinafter  cited  as  "1  Carver";  Charles 
Debattista,  "  Bill  of  Lading  as  the  Contract  of  Carriage",  (1982]  4 
M.  L.  R.  p  652,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Debattista,  Bill  of  Lading". 
14-David  G.  Powles,  "Action  without  Loss:  The  Consignor's  Right 
against  the  Carrier",  [1977]  J.  B.  L.  p  132  at  p  135,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "  Powles,  Action  without  Loss",  where  he  expressed  the 
basic  elements  of  the  term  "special  contract"  which  was  used  by 
lord  Cottenham  in  Dunlop  v.  Lambert  as  follows: 
"First,  that  privity  of  contract  exists  between  consignor  and 
carrier;  and  Secondly,  that  this  is  sufficient  to  prevent  the 
carrier  from  raising  the  consignor's  lack  of  title  as  a  defence". 
15-Malcolm  Alistair  clarke,  Aspects  of  the  xaQue  Rules,  A 
Comparative  Study  in  English  and  French  Law,  1976,  p  79, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Clarke". 
16-{1884]  10  App.  Cas,  p  74  at  p  105;  Per  Lush  J,  in,  Crooks  v. 
Allan  {1879}  5  Q.  B.  D.  p  38  at  p  40;  Maas  S.  S.  Co.  V.  S.  Whinn 
[1912]  A.  C.  p  254  at  pp  261,264,270;  Goddard,  J,  in,  MLp, 
Ardennes,  [1950]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  517;  Captain  V.  Far  .  ritte 
sß.  (1978]  A.  M.  C.  p  2210  at  p  2215. 8 
The  contract  of  carriage  may  be  concluded  without  any 
writing  at  al117,  and  the  bill  of  lading  therefore  does 
not  necessarily  draw  any  stage  in  the  development  of  the 
contract.  18  The  modern  form  of  bill  of  lading  has  however 
different  functions  depending  upon  the  principal  purpose 
of  the  bill  of  lading  which  may  be  described  as: 
"a"  An  Evidence  of  the  Contract 
As  we  have  explained  before  in  characterizating  the 
bill  of  lading,  it  is  not  a  contract  of  carriage  but  it 
may  be  regarded  as  an  acknowledgement  of  taking  over  the 
goods  to  be  carried  on  a  certain  vessel. 
That  means  that  the  bill  of  lading  is  considered  as 
prima  facie  evidence  that  a  contract  has  been 
concluded.  19 
17-Per  Lord  President  Clyde,  in,  Harland  &  WWlf  V.  Burns  &  Laird 
Lines,  1931  S.  C.  p  722. 
18-Per  Devlin,  J,  in,  Py  n  CO-Ltd-  V.  Sc  ndi  a  Navigation  Co.  Ltd 
(1954]  2  Q.  B.  p  402  at  p  419. 
19-David  M.  Walker,  Principles  of  Scottish  Private  Law,  t3rd,  ed, 
Vol,  II,  1983),  p  341,  hereinafter  cited  as"  Walker,  Private  Law, 
Vol,  II";  Sir  Alan  Abraham  Mocatta,  Sir  Michael  J  Mustill,  and 
Stewart  C.  Boyd,  Scrutt-nn  on  Charterparties  and  Bi  ]j  of  Laing, 
(19th,  ed,  1984),  p  55,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Scrutton  on 
Charterparties"; 
, £.  S  .  Ardennes  Cargo-Owners 
v.  s.  s.  Ardennes 
lOwners?,  [19511  1  K.  B.  p  55,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  bill  of  lading  not  being  in  itself  the  contract  between 
shipper  and  shipowner,  though  evidence  of  its  terms";  ER  Hardy 
Ivamy,  Payne  &  ivamy's  Carriage  of  Goo  s  by  Sea,  (12th,  ed,  1985), 
p  72,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Payne  &  Ivamy",  where  they  state 
that: 
"Where  the  charterer  puts  the  ship  up  as  a  general  ship,  the 
contract  of  carriage  will  in  each  case  be  evidenced  by  the  bill  of 9 
Article  1  (b)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  states  however 
that  the  contract  of  carriage  applies  only  to  a  contract 
of  carriage  covered  by  a  bill  of  lading.  That  indicates 
that  the  contract  of  carriage  is  always  concluded  before 
the  bill  of  lading,  which  evidences  the  terms  of 
contract,  is  issued. 
The  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading  will  then  be  in  force 
from  the  inception  of  the  contract  of  carriage20,  if  it 
were  otherwise  then  the  bill  of  lading  would  not  be 
evidence  of  the  contract  but  would  be  a  variation  of  it, 
and  the  parties  do  not  intend  that  the  terms  of  the 
contract  be  changed  because  the  bill  of  lading  does  not 
necessarily  mark  any  stage  in  the  development  of  the 
contract.  2]. 
If  there  is  a  discrepancy  between  the  contract  of 
carriage  and  the  terms  included  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
then  priority  will  be  given  to  the  document  creating  the 
contract  rather  than  to  the  document  evidence  it.  22  For 
instance,  where  the  contract  of  carriage  did  not  contain 
any  conditions  which  allowed  the  vessel  to  deviate  from 
the  agreed  or  customary  route,  then  nothing  could  change 
lading  given  to  each  shipper,  irrespective  of  terms  of  the  charter- 
party,  except  where  there  is  an  express  agreement  to  the  contrary". 
20-Lush  J,  in,  Crooks  v.  811ar  {1879}  5  Q.  B.  D.  p  38  at  p  40; 
Hamilton  j,  in,  inneu  v.  moss  ss  Ca.  (1910)  15  Com.  Cas,  p  114 
at  pp  122-23. 
21-Devlin  J,  in,  The  PyreneCo,,.  _  Ltd.  v.  Scindia  Navigation  Co.  , td 
(1954]  2  Q.  B.  p  402  at  p  419;  Lord  President  Clyde,  in,  Harland 
Wo]  Ltd.  v.  Burns  &  Laird  Lines  Ltd.  1931  S.  C.  p  722. 
22-Debattista,  Bill  of  Lading,  at  p  655. 10 
the  terms  of  that  contract  though  such  a  condition  was 
subsequently  printed  on  a  bill  of  lading23. 
On  the  other  hand,  if  there  is  any  discrepancy  between 
a  bill  of  lading  and  a  previous  oral  representation  that 
could  not  alter  the  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading24. 
Lord  Goddard  L.  J.  in,  Ardennes25  has  resolved  such 
problems  by  providing: 
"Once  the  bill  of  lading  was  not  itself  the 
contract  of  carriage,  oral  evidence  was 
admissible  to  prove  the  existence  of  a  previous 
bargain  or  promise  the  terms  of  which  were  at 
variance  with  the  terms  contained  in  the  bill 
of  lading". 
"b"  A  Receipt  for  Goods  Shipped  on  Vessel 
The  bill  of  lading  is  also  a  document  which 
acknowledges  receipt  of  the  goods  shipped26.  The 
carrier,  the  master,  or  the  agent  of  the  carrier  is  bound 
to  issue  a  bill  of  lading  showing: 
1-  The  leading  marks  necessary  for  the  identification 
23-Ibid, 
p  656. 
24-Per  Lord  Bramwell,  in,  The  Sewell  v.  Burdick  (1884)  10  App.  Cas, 
p  74  at  p  105. 
25-(1951]  1  K.  B.  p  55. 
26-Article  3[4]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Such  a  bill  of  lading  shall  be  prima  facie  evidence  of  the  receipt 
by  the  carrier  of  the  goods  as  therein  described  in  accordance  with 
paragraph  3  (a,  b,  and  c);  Section[3)  of  the  bill  os  lading  Act, 
1855;  Scrutton  on  Charterparties,  p  111;  Paul  Todd,  Modern  Bills  of 
Lading,  1986,  p  14,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Todd,  Bill  of  Lading", 
where  he  states: 
"The  function  of  the  bill  of  lading  have  not  altered  significantly 
since  1855  Act". 11 
of  the  goods27. 
2-  Either  the  number  of  packages  or  pieces,  or  the 
quantity,  or  weight,  as  the  case  may  be,  as  furnished 
in  writing  by  the  shipper28. 
3-  The  apparent  order  and  condition  of  the  goods29. 
The  bill  of  lading  is  prima  facie  evidence  of  the 
receipt  by  the  carrier  of  the  quantity  and  the  apparent 
order  and  condition  of  the  goods  shipped,  and  the  ship 
must  deliver  the  same  goods  as  therein  described.  Whereas 
it  is  considered  conclusive  evidence  when  the  bill  of 
lading  has  been  transferred  to  a  third  party  acting  in 
good  faith30.  The  shipowner  is  however  obliged  by  the 
bill  of  lading  which  is  considered  to  be  conclusive  by 
the  contracting  parties,  unless  the  shipowner  can  prove 
fraud,  or  the  cargoes  have  not  been  shipped31. 
The  shipowner,  or  the  master  is  nevertheless  not  bound 
to  show  both  the  number  of  packages  and  the  weight.  That 
27-Article  3(3]  of  the  COGSA  1971  (Schedule),  and  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules. 
28-Ibid,  Article  3(3]. 
29-Ibid,  Article  3(3]. 
30-Scrutton 
on  Charterparties,  p  111;  1  Carver,  para,  103,  p  74; 
Pane  &  Ivamy,  p  75;  Walker,  Private  Law,  Vol,  III,  p  340;  Fabre 
S.  A.  V.  Mondial  united  Corp.  o(1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  946,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"Assuming  good  order  on  receipt  and  bad  order  on  out-turn,  the 
burden  is  on  the  carrier  to  show  that  the  damage  was  brought  about 
by  an  excepted  cause";  Article  3  (5]  of  the  COGSA  1971. 
31_1  Carver,  Para,  106,  p  77;  Sugar  ommission  V.  Ha  1P  ool  Q 
S.  S.  co.  (1927]  2  K.  B.  p  49;  Goddard,  J,  in,  Lauro  v.  Dr  y  ,a 
(1937]  59  Ll.  L.  R.  pp  110,117;  Hal9bury's  Laws  of-England,  h;  gpj1 
and  Navigation,  14th,  ed,  Vol,  43,1983),  para,  493,  p  331, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "  Halsbury,  Shipping  and  Navigation". 12 
indicates  that  when  the  master  stated  in  the  bill  of 
lading  the  number  of  packages,  then  the  phrase  "weight 
unknown"  will  be  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading  which  has 
full  legal  effect.  32 
The  bill  of  lading  usually  describes  the  condition  of 
the  goods  by  providing  a  general  statement  that  the  goods 
"shipped  in  good  order  and  condition"  especially  when  the 
shipper  insists  upon  inserting  such  a  statement  in  the 
bill  of  lading  and  the  shipowner  or  his  agent  had  an 
opportunity  to  inspect  the  goods  so  shipped.  33  That  means 
that  the  goods  shipped  were  actually  in  good  order  and 
condition  when  delivered  to  the  ship.  34 
It  is  nevertheless  necessary  to  distinguish  between  the 
external  and  apparent  condition  which  is  easy  for  the 
prudent  carrier  to  discover  and  the  non-apparent 
condition  when  the  skilled  carrier  cannot  findout  the 
condition  of  these  goods.  35  Proof  to  the  contrary,  namely 
32  Orkan  Waren  Hanle,  b  H.  V.  Tntergraan  N  V.  [1967]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  82. 
33_1  Carver,  para,  110,  p  82;  The  Tale  De  Panay  [1925]  267  U.  S.  p 
260;  Spa  us  Corp.  v.  S/s  vom,  590  F.  2d,  p  1301  11919},  where  it 
is  stated: 
"Although  a  bill  of  lading  can  establish  prima  facie  that  the 
merchandise  being  shipped  was  in  good  condition,  the  "apparent  good 
condition"  clause  applies  only  to  those  portions  of  the  shipment 
which  are  visible  and  open  to  inspection". 
34-Manhattan  Fruit  V.  Royal  N_-he  lan  x(1959]  A.  M.  C.  p  1200;  Fa  r 
S 
,, 
A.  v.  Mondial  United  Corp,  (1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  946. 
35-Channell,  J,  in,  Compagni  a  Naviera  Vascongada  v.  ChL  hit  lj 
J.  m  (1906]  1  K.  B.  p  237  at  p  245,  where  he  states: 
"I  think  that  "condition"  refers  to  external  and  apparent 
condition,  and  "quality"  to  something  which  is  usually  not 
apparent,  at  all  events  to  an  unskilled  person.  I  think  a  captain 13 
against  the  value  of  the  statement  concerning  the 
condition  of  the  goods  carried  which  contains  on  the  face 
of  the  bill  of  lading,  is  not  admissible  when  the  bill 
has  been  transferred  to  a  third  party  acting  in  good 
faith36,  or  the  goods  have  not  been  inspected  by  the 
carrier  at  the  time  of  loading,  or  the  damage  was  caused 
by  the  inherent  vice  in  the  goods.  37 
"c"  A  Document  of  Title  to  the  Goods 
The  bill  of  lading  is  considered  as  a  representation  of 
the  right  of  the  property  in  the  goods  shipped  which  is 
described  in  the  bill.  38  The  possession  of  the  bill  of 
lading  is  therefore  equivalent  to  possession  of  the 
goods39,  but  not  the  property  of  the  goods  which  is  not 
is  expected  to  notice  the  apparent  condition  of  the  goods,  though 
not  the  quality";  Ponce  [1946)  A.  M.  C.  p  1124,  where  it  is  stated: 
"the  specification  in  the  "shipped  on  board  in  apparent  good  order 
and  condition,  contents  unknown"  constitutes  prima  facie  evidence 
that  on  the  exterior  there  are  no  signs  of  damage";  riano  [1947) 
A.  M.  C.  p  1477. 
36_COGSA  1971,  Schedule,  Article  1[4);  Anthony  Diamond,  "The 
Hague/Visby  Rules"  Published  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971,  Organised  by  Lloyd's  of  London, 
Ltd,  1977,  p  20,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby 
Rules";  Silver  v.  o.  ean  sSo  Ltd  [1930)  1  K.  B.  p  416  at  p  425. 
37-TD/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1  at  p  25,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  material  available  to  the  UNCTAD  secretariat  suggests  that,  so 
far  as  commercial  aspects  of  bills  of  lading  are  concerned,  the 
main  problem  is  that  of  the  status  and  function  of  document  as  a 
receipt,  for  it  is  this  status  which  frequently  affects  is 
negotiability". 
38-Halsbury,  Shipping  and  Navigation,  para,  494,  p  332;  Walker, 
Private  Law,  Vol,  II,  p  342. 
39-Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  81;  Kum  v.  Wah  Tat  Bank  L  d.  [1971]  1  Lloyd's. 14 
united  with  the  bill  of  lading.  40 
In  sum,  it  must  be  admitted  that  the  delivery  of  the 
bill  of  lading,  respecting  seaborne  goods,  is  deemed  a 
symbolic  delivery  of  the  goods.  41  The  carrier  is  then 
entitled  to  deliver  the  goods  to  the  consignee  or  any 
person  holding  a  bill  of  lading.  42  Viz,  the  latter  has  a 
right,  on  the  production  of  the  bill,  to  delivery  of  the 
goods.  43 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  function  of  the  bill  of 
lading,  as  a  document  of  title  to  the  goods,  is  normally 
to  give  delivery  between  consignor  and  consignee  which 
has  already  taken  place  on  loading.  The  real  function  is 
therefore  to  give  the  consignee  a  document  which  he  can, 
to  some  extent,  negotiate44  whether  by  delivery  or 
Rep.  p  439  at  p  440. 
40-Scrutton 
on  Charterparties,  p  187;  Majid  H.  K.  Al-Anbaki, 
Passing  of  Property  in  C.  I.  F.  &  F.  O.  B.  Contracts,  A  Thesis  Approved 
for  the  Degree  of  Ph.  D.,  Glasgow  University,  1978,  p  29, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "  Al-Anbaki,  C.  I.  F.  &  F.  O.  B.  ",  where  he  states 
two  theories: 
"The  first  depends  on  the  intention  of  the  parties; 
The  second  depends  on  the  unification  between  the  right  of 
possessing  the  goods  and  the  bill  of  lading". 
41-E.  Clemens  Horst  CO.  v.  BidApll  Brothers  (1912]  A.  C.  p  18  at  p 
21;  Walker,  Private  Law,  Vol,  II,  p  342. 
42-Trucks  &  Spares.  Ltd.  v.  Maritime  Aaenr!  e4  lSouthamptonl.  Ltd 
(1951]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  345;  Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  43. 
43-Barher  v.  Meyerstein  (1870)  2  C.  P,  p  38,66;  4  HL,  p  317, 
(1865-90]  3  Law  Report  Digest,  p  6176.  ;  Lord  Denning  in  Hai  Tong 
Bank  Ltd.  v.  Rambler  Cycle  Co.  Ltd[1959]  A.  C.  p  576  at  p  586,  where 
he  stated: 
"It  is  perfectly  clear  that  a  shipowner  who  delivers  without 
production  of  the  bill  of  lading  does  so  at  his  peril". 
44-KUM  v.  Wah  Tat_  Bank  Ltd  [1971]  lLloyd's.  Rep.  p  439  at  p  440; 15 
indorsement  and  delivery  of  the  bill  of  lading.  45 
The  indorsee  or  transferee  of  the  bill  of  lading  has 
the  same  rights  and  duties  which  emerge  from  the  bill.  46 
Therefore,  he  will  be  subject  to  the  same  liabilities  as 
if  the  bill  of  lading  has  been  made  with  himself,  and 
also  all  rights  of  suit  should  be  transferred  to  him. 
Consequently,  the  indorsee  cannot  enjoy  better  title  than 
the  holder  of  the  bill  of  lading  himself,  but  if  the 
indorser  has  no  title,  then  he  cannot  pass  one.  47 
The  shipowner,  sometimes,  issues  a  document  called  a 
mate's  receipt48  which  acknowledges  receipt  of  the  goods 
and  states  their  quantity  and  condition  and  also  the  name 
of  the  owner  of  the  goods.  49  These  goods,  which  have  been 
delivered  alongside  the  ship  at  the  port  of  loading,.  will 
Al-Anbaki,  C.  I.  F.  &  F.  O.  B.  p  37,  where  he  states: 
"The  word  "negotiable"  was  not  used  in  the  sense  in  which  it  is 
used  as  applicable  to  a  bill  of  exchange,  but  as  passing  the 
property  in  goods  only". 
45-Walker,  Private  Law,  Vol,  II,  p  342,  where  he  states: 
"But  a  bill  is  not  a  negotiable  instrument  str.  cto  sensu  and  the 
transfer's  title  to  the  bill  and  his  competency  to  dispose  of  the 
goods  therein  are  important  factor  in  the  validity  of  the 
transaction". 
46-Walker,  Private  Law,  Vol,  II,  p  342;  Mankabady,  The  Hamburg 
Rules,  p  43. 
47-Ivamy,  Dicitionary  of  Shipping  Law,  p  11;  Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  81. 
48-Scrutton 
on  Charterprties,  p  175,  Footnote,  46,  where  he 
states: 
"Thus  in  the  port  of  London  a  "mate's  receipt"  in  only  given  for 
waterborne  goods  and  not  for  goods  sent  to  the  decks  by  land.  For 
these  latter  the  corresponding  document  is  the  wharfage  note  issued 
by  the  Port  Authority,  who  receive  a  mate's  receipt  from  the  ship". 
49-A1-AnbaKi,  C.  I.  F.  &  F.  O.  B.  p  92;  1  Carver,  para,  119,  p  89. 16 
be  in  the  shipowner's  possession  and  at  his  risk50. 
The  mate's  receipt  is  however  not  considered  a  document 
of  title,  but  is  only  deemed  as  evidence  of  receiving 
such  goods  by  the  shipowner  and  giving  the  cargo-owner  a 
right  to  have  the  bill  of  lading51.  That  means  that  the 
main  purpose  for  issuing  such  a  receipt  to  the  cargo- 
owner  is  to  expedite  the  preliminary  measures  of  issuing 
the  bill  of  lading  according  to  the  cargo-owner's 
instructions52.  Then,  it  is  not  negotiable,  as  the  bill 
of  lading  is  in  certain  circumstances,  unless  a  custom53 
giving  the  mate's  receipt  such  effect,  or  the  contracting 
parties  have  intended  to  replace  the  bill  of  lading  with 
a  mate's  receipt54. 
Whatever  characterization  is  made  for  the  functions  of 
bill  of  lading.  It  is  still  considered  an  important  and 
50_  ish  Columbia  Co.  v.  Nl  ship  (1868)  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  p  499, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"The  defendant  was  liable  for  the  loss  of  the  machinary,  as 
delivery  to  the  defendant's  servants  alongside  the  vessel  was 
equivalent  to  a  delivery  on  board". 
51-Scrutton 
on  Charterparties,  p  176;  F.  E.  Na  v.  DXs,  Ltd 
(1926]  26  U.  L.  R.  P  184  at  p  189;  Per  Lord  Wright,  in,  Nippon  Yusen 
Kuhaa  v.  Ram  iban  Serowgee  (1938]  A.  C.  p  429  at  p  445;  Jasper 
Ridley,  The  Law  of  the  Carriage  of  Coods  by  land,  Sea  and  _ 
Air, 
(6th,  ed,  1982),  p  115,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Ridley". 
52-Walker,  Private  Law,  Vol,  II,  p  350. 
53_  v.  Wah  Tat  Bank  Ltd  (1971]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  439  at  p  440. 
54_Bryan, 
l  v.  Nix  (1839)  4M&W.  p  775,  (150  E.  R.  p  1634),  where 
it  is  stated: 
"Whether  a  document,  similar  in  form  to  a  bill  of  lading,  but  hiven 
by  the  master  of  a  boat  navigation  an  inland  canal,  has  the  effect 
of  such  an  instrument  in  transferring  the  property  in  the  goods"; 
Evans  v.  Nichol  (1841)  4  Scott's  N.  R.  p  Of  3  Man  &Gp  614 
(133  E.  R.  p  1286). 17 
effective  document  in  transporting  sea-borne  goods. 
As  far  as  the  course  of  the  carriage  of  the  goods  by 
sea  is,  however,  concerned,  the  bill  of  lading  contains 
provisions  concerning  the  contractual  voyage,  i.  e;  the 
port  of  loading,  port  of  discharge,  the  destination  of 
the  goods  and  the  person  to  whom  delivery  is  to  be  made. 
The  contractual  voyage  is  then  an  important  element  in 
limiting  liability  of  the  deviatory  carrier  and  the 
consequences  resulting  from  the  fundamental  breach  by 
deviation. 
The  conception  of  the  voyage  governed  by  the  Hague 
Rules  is  expressed  by  Article  [10]  of  the  Hague  Rules 
which  provides  that: 
"The  provision  of  this  convention  shall  apply 
to  all  bills  of  lading  issued  in  any  of  the 
contracting  states". 
This  Article  has  endeavoured  to  widen  the  scope  of  the 
application  of  the  Rules  to  the  outward  and  inward 
voyages  by  applying  the  Rules  to  all  bills  of  lading 
which  are  issued  in  any  of  the  contracting  states. 
Section  (1)  of  the  United  Kingdom  COGSA  192455  has 
restricted  the  conception  of  the  voyage  by  providing  that 
the  Rules  shall  apply  only  to  outward  voyage.  The  reason 
55-Section  (1)  of  the  United  Kingdom  COGSA  1924  Provides  that: 
"Subject  to  the  provisions  of  this  Act,  the  Rules  shall  have  effect 
in  relation  to  and  in  connection  with  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  in 
ships  carrying  goods  from  any  port  in  Great  Britain  or  Northern 
Ireland  to  any  other  port  whether  in  or  outside  Great  Britain  or 
Northern  Irelan  d". 18 
for  limiting  the  scope  of  Article  (10)  of  the  Hague 
Rules,  by  applying  the  Rules  merely  to  outgoing  voyage, 
because  section  (1)  of  the  COGSA  1924  applies  only  to 
bills  of  lading  issued  in  Great  Britain  or  Northern 
Ireland56. 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  (13)  of  the  United  States 
COGSA  193657  has  adopted  the  same  attitude  of  Hague  Rules 
by  applying  the  Rules  to  inward  and  outward  voyages58 
The  Visby  Rules  have  adopted  a  new  trend  concerning  the 
scope  of  the  Rules  by  widening  the  concept  of  the  voyage 
subject  to  the  Rules.  Article  [5]  of  the  Visby  Rules59 
56-Clark, 
p  18;  Al-Jazairy,  p  158. 
57-Article  (13)  of  the  United  States  COGSA  1936  provides: 
"This  Act  shall  apply  to  all  contracts  for  carriage  of  goods  by  sea 
to  or  from  ports  of  the  United  States  in  foreign  trade". 
58-D,  C.  Jackson,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  and  Conflict  of  Laws", 
Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rut  s  on  the  Carriage  of  Goot19  by  Sea, 
1978,  p  221  at  p  227,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Jackson,  The  Hamburg 
Rules";  Grant  Gilmore  &  Charles  L.  Black,  Jr.,  The  Law  of 
A  mi  a  lty,  (2nd,  ed,  1975)  p  130,  hereinafter  cited  as"  Gilmore  & 
Black";  Schroeder  gros  Inc  v.  The  sa  uri  a[1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1935. 
59-Article  [5]  of  the  Visby  Rules  provides; 
"Article  (10)  of  the  convention  shall  be  deleted  and  replaced  by 
the  following: 
The  provisions  of  this  convention  shall  apply  to  every  bill  of 
lading  relating  to  the  carriage  of  goods  between  ports  in  two 
different  states  if: 
"a"  the  bill  of  lading  is  issued  in  a  contracting  states,  or 
"b"  the  carriage  is  from  a  port  in  a  contracting  state,  or 
"c"  the  contract  contained  in  or  evidenced  by  the  bill  of  lading 
provides  that  the  rules  of  this  convention  or  legislation  of  any 
state  giving  effect  to  them  are  to  govern  the  contract.  Whatever 
may  be  the  nationality  of  the  ship,  the  carrier,  the  shipper,  the 
consignee,  or  any  other  interested  person.  Each  contracting  state 
shall  apply  the  provisions  of  this  convention  to  Bills  of  Lading 
mentioned  above. 19 
has  amended  Article  (101  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  the 
latter  no  longer  applies  unless  the  ports  of  loading  and 
discharge  are  in  two  different  states60.  Accordingly  the 
Visby  Rules  shall  apply  to  inward  and  outward  voyages  to 
or  from  the  contracting  states  as  follows: 
"a"  If  the  bill  of  lading  is  issued  in  contracting 
states. 
"b"  If  the  carriage  is  from  a  port  in  a  contracting 
state. 
"c"  If  the  contract  contained  or  evidenced  by  the  bill 
of  lading  provides  that  these  Rules  or  legislation  of 
any  state  giving  effect  to  them  are  to  govern  the 
contract6l. 
The  United  Kingdom  COGSA  1971  has  applied  the  same 
attitude  as  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  which  set  out  in  the 
schedule  of  this  Act.  In  addition,  COGSA  1971  has  dealt 
with  two  other  types  of  voyages  not  covered  by  the  Visby 
Rules  as  follows: 
(I)  Section  1  [3)  of  COGSA  provides: 
"Without  prejudice  to  subsection  (2)  above,  the 
said  provisions  shall  have  effect  {and  have  the 
force  of  law}  in  relation  to  and  in  connection 
with  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  in  ships 
where  the  port  of  shipment  is  a  port  in  the 
United  Kingdom,  whether  or  not  the  carriage  is 
This  Article  shall  not  prevent  a  contracting  state  from  applying 
the  rules  of  this  convention  to  Bills  of  Lading  not  included  in  the 
preceding  paragraphs". 
60-Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  22. 
61-Article  (5)  of  the  Visby  Rules. 20 
between  ports  in  two  different  states  within 
the  context  of  Article  (X)  of  the  Rules". 
(II}  Section  1  (6]  of  COGSA  provides: 
"Without  prejudice  to  Article  X  [c]  of  the 
Rules,  the  Rules  shall  have  the  force  of  law  in 
relation  to 
"a"  any  bill  of  lading  if  the  contract 
contained  in  or  evidenced.  by  it  expressly 
provides  that  the  Rules  shall  govern  the 
contract....  " 
Consequently,  Section  1  (3]  of  COGSA  1971  purports  to 
apply  the  Rules  to  all  voyages  where  the  port  of  loading 
and  the  port  of  discharge  are  both  within  the  territories 
of  Great  Britain  and  Northern  Ireland.  Whereas,  Section  1 
[61  of  COGSA  purports  to  apply  principles  which  are 
similar  to  Section  5  [6]  {a}  of  the  Visby  Rules,  to  the 
coastal  voyages62. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  made  a  radical  change  concerning 
the  application  of  the  Rules  by  increasing  the  number  of 
voyages  covered  by  the  Rules63. 
Article  (2)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  does  not  make  any 
distinction  between  inward  and  outward  voyages6A  and 
62-For 
more  details  as  to  the  scope  of  the  application  of  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  see,  Hashim  R.  Al-Jazairy,  "The  Maritime 
Carrier's  Liability  Under  the  Hague  Rules,  Visby  Rules  and  Hamburg 
Rules".  A  Thesis  Approved  for  Degree  of  Ph.  D.,  Glasgow  University, 
1983,  pp  156-170,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Al-Jazairy";  Diamond,  The 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  23. 
63-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  'The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage 
of  Goods  by  Sea  ".  Part  III,  [1975-76]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  487  at  pp 
501-502. 
64-Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  44. 21 
provides  that  the  Rules  will  be  applicable  to  all  voyages 
which  emerge  from  the  contracts  of  carriage  between  ports 
in  two  different  states  as  follows: 
"a"  the  port  of  loading  is  located  in  a  contracting 
state; 
"b"  the  port  of  discharge  is  located  in  a  contracting 
state; 
"c"  one  of  the  optional  ports  of  discharge  is  the 
actual  port  of  discharge  and  such  a  port  is  located  in 
a  contracting  state; 
"d"  the  bill  of  lading  or  other  document  is  issued  in  a 
contracting  state; 
"e"  an  agreement  is  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading,  or 
other  document,  for  the  application  of  the  provisions 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules65. 
It  is  quite  clear  from  the  aforesaid  Article  that  the 
Hamburg  Rules  have  adopted  a  flexible  attitude  by  using 
the  phrase  "contract  of  carriage"  instead  of  bill  of 
lading.  This  indicates  that  all  documents  which  are  used 
in  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  i.  e;  shipping  receipt, 
electronic  devices.  etc,  are  subject  to  the  words 
"contract  of  carriage"66. 
The  Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules,  however,  apply 
merely  to  contracts  of  carriage  by  sea  where  the  port  of 
loading  and  discharge  are  in  two  different  states67.  These 
65-Article  [2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
66-Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  44. 
67-Article  (5]  of  the  Visby  Rules  and  Article  (2]  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules. 22 
Rules,  then,  do  not  apply  to  the  costal  voyage  because  it 
is  outside  the  scope  of  the  Rules  which  purports  to  apply 
to  the  trade  between  two  different  countries. 
I  have  therefore  confined  the  field  of  the  study  to 
effect  of  deviation  occurring  in  the  course  of  the 
maritime  voyage  on  the  liability  of  the  carrier  in  order 
to  avoid  conflict  with  any  rules  governing,  separately, 
the  different  modes  of  transport,  i.  e;  by  Air,  Land,  or 
other  type  of  transport  such  as  Multimodal  Transport.  68 
I  have  also  endeavoured  to  avoid  any  ambiguities  or 
equivocations  which  might  arise,  without  limiting  the 
scope  of  the  study  to  the  bill  of  lading. 
However,  I  have  referred,  to  the  relevant  points,  to 
the  charterparty  concerning  the  general  principles  of  the 
deviation  especially  when  the  bill  of  lading  is 
incorporated  into  the  charterparty. 
The  International  Conventions  are  an  effective  element 
concerning  the  carrier's  liability.  As  far  as  the 
deviation  issue  is  concerned,  I  have  considered  the  main 
feature  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier  under  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  with  reference  to 
the  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  and 
their  fruitful  experience  in  this  field  by  studying  the 
precedents  of  the  courts  in  a  given  point. 
I  have  also  discussed  the  problems  which  may  arise  in 
relation  to  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  under  Iraqi  and 
68-United  Nations  Convention  on  international  Transport  of  Goods, 
(1980)  XV  European  Transport  Law,  p  488. 23 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  in  order  to  make  a  common 
understanding  for  laws  of  these  countries  which  adopt  a 
different  type  from  the  International  Convention,  i.  e; 
Egypt  adopts  the  Hague  Rules,  whereas,  Iraq  have  approved 
a  modified  version  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  which  are 
embodied  in  the  Iraqi  Law  of  Transport. 
I  have  therefore  divided  the  subject  into  six  chapters: 
Chapter  One: 
Definition  and  Classification  of  Deviation 
Chapter  Two: 
The  Basis  of  Liability  of  the  Carrier  in 
Connection  with  the  Doctrine  of  Deviation. 
Chapter  Three: 
The  Effect  of  Deviation  on  the  Contract  of 
Carriage. 
Chapter  Four: 
Recovery  of  Losses  and  Damages. 
Chapter  five: 
Procedures  of  Action  for  Lost  or  Damaged 
Cargo. 
Chapter  Six: 
The  Iraqi  Legal  System,  Concerning  the 
Liability  of  the  Carrier,  Compared  with 
Egyptian  Jurisprudence  in  Certain  Points. 
Conclusion 24 
CHAPTER  ONE 
DEFINITION  AND  CLASSIFICATION  OF  DEVIATION 
Deviation  is  a  notion  which  originated  in  the  law  of 
marine  insurance,  before  the  use  of  "held  covered" 
clauses  as  liberal  clauses  and  before  the  use  of  any 
terms  of  stipulation  for  avoiding  the  harsh  results  of 
deviation  in  marine  insurance.  l  The  cargo-owner  had  lost 
the  benefit  of  his  insurance  coverage  when  the  ship 
deviated.  2  This  is  made  quite  clear  by  what  the  Lord 
Chancellor  stated: 
"A  wilful  deviation  from  the  course  of  the 
voyage  insured  is,  in  all  cases  a  determination 
of  the  policy,  it  being  immaterial  from  what 
cause,  or  at  what  place,  a  subsequent  loss 
happens;  for,  from  the  moment  of  deviation,  the 
underwriters  are  discharged".  3 
One  of  the  first  instances  of  the  idea  of  deviation 
that  came  into  the  law  of  carriage  from  marine  insurance 
appears  to  be  the  case  of  Z  v.  Ro  r  4, 
1-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  176;  Sarpa,  "  Note,  Deviation  in  the  Law  of 
Shipping",  (1976)11  J.  of  INT'L  Law  &  Economic,  p  148,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Sarpa". 
2-Steven  F.  Friedell,  "The  Deviating  ship",  [1981]  32  Hastings  L. 
J.  p  1543,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Steven". 
3-Wilson  &  co.  V.  E!  Illnt  (1790)  2  Pat.  p  414;  Bober  -son.  V. 
Laird  [1790)  M.  p  7099,  the  House  of  Lords  held: 
"The  port  must  be  in  the  line  of  voyage,  or  not  materially  out  of 
the  direct  course". 
4-[1807]  2  Bos  &  Pul  [N.  R]  p  455,  (127  E.  R.  p  706);  Arnold  W. 
Knauthe  The  American  Law  of  Ocean  Bi  is  of  Lading,  (4  th,  ed,  1953), 
p  248,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Knauth",  where  he  stated  : 25 
Deviation,  in  the  law  of  carriage  by  sea,  is  of  primary 
importance,  because  many  effects  are  attached  to  it, 
whether  in  the  bill  of  lading  or  in  the  contract  of 
carriage. 
The  carrier  attempted  to  avoid  any  responsibility  or 
liability  through  putting  many  exculpatory  terms  in  the 
bills  of  lading.  These  terms  were  intended  to  give  the 
carriers  the  right  to  deviate-5 
The  United  States  Supreme  Court  laid  down  the  deviation 
doctrine  as  early  as  1813,  in  Oliver  v.  Mary  Land  Ins, 
CZ.  6  and  in  1890  defined  unreasonable  deviation.? 
The  court  subsequently  accepted  any  possible  broad 
interpretation  of  this  concept, 
8  when  it  allowed  any 
departure  from  the  customary  route  as  reasonable 
deviation.  9 
In  1893,  the  United  States  Congress  adopted  the  Harter 
Act  which  purported  to  make  some  compromise  between 
carriers  and  shippers  interests.  It  contains  certain 
provisions  which  limit  the  use  of  exculpatory  clauses  by 
"The  history  of  deviation  in  the  law  of  transportation  is  much 
shorter-It  began  about  1795  in  respect  of  charterparty 
disputes....  Carver  cites  on  deviation  as  far  back  as  1793  but  on 
examination  they  were  all  cases  of  marine  insurance"; 
Compare,  Mills,  The  Future  of  Deviation,  p  587,  where  he  states: 
"Authority  for  the  doctrine  of  deviation  can  be  traced  back  at 
least  to  as  early  as  1800  in  sea  carriage". 
5-Gilmroe  &  Black,  p  177. 
6-11  U.  S.  p  487. 
7-Hostetter.  v.  Park,  137  U.  S.  p  568  (1890];  Knauth,  p  252. 
8-J.  Roger,  "The  Law  of  Maritime  Deviation",  [1972-1973]  47  Tul.  L. 
R,  p  163,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Roger". 
9-Thn  Malcom  Baxter,  j  ,  277  U.  S.  p  323  [1928]. 26 
the  carriers  and  other  provisions  which  limit  the 
carriers'  liability  to  the  cargo-owner. 
Due  to  an  universal  dissatisfaction  with  the  rules  and 
regulations  controlling  the  common  carriage  of  goods  by 
sea,  10  the  International  Convention  for  the  Unification 
of  Certain  Rules  Relating  to  Bills  of  Lading,  was  held  at 
Hague  dated  Brussels  28th  of  August,  1924,  is  usually 
called  the  Hague  Rules.  These  Rules  were  amended  by  the 
Brussels  Protocol  of  23rd  of  February  1968  to  the  Visby 
Rules  and  by  the  Brussels  Protocol  of  1979.11 
In  1978  a  new  convention,  "The  Hamburg  Rules",  was 
signed,  but  it  is  not  valid  because  the  required  number 
of  states  stipulated  in  the  convention  has  not  yet  signed 
it.  12 
10-Roger, 
p  154. 
11-The 
amended  convention  is  usually  referred  to  as  "The  Hague/ 
Visby  Rules" 
12-Adib  Al-Jadir's,  [the  director  of  the  shipping  division,  the 
United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development],  letter  which 
was  addressed  to  me,  dated  the  15th,  March  1984  provides: 
"A-The  following  twenty  seven  countries  signed  the  1978  United 
Nations  Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea[Hamburg  Rules): 
Brazil,  Chile,  Egypt,  Ecuador,  Germany,  Fed.  Rep,  Ghana,  HolySee, 
Madagascar,  Mexico,  Panama,  Portugal,  Senegal,  Singapore, 
Venezuela,  Philippines,  SierraLeon,  Czechoslovakia,  Pakistan, 
Denmark,  Finland,  France,  Norway,  Sweden,  Zaire,  Hungary,  Austria, 
and,  United  States  of  America. 
B-The  following  seven  countries  accessed  the  Hamburg  Rules: 
Uganda  (6  July  1979},  Tanzania  124  July  1979),  Tunisia  (15 
september  19801,  Barbados  (2  February  1981),  Morocco  (12  June 
1981),  Romania  17  January  1982},  Lebanon  14  April  1983). 
C-The  following  two  countries  ratified  the  Hamburg  Rules: 
"Chile  (9  July  1982),  and  Egypt  123  April  1979). 
The  convention  has  not  entered  into  force  because  {20)  countries 27 
The  United  Kingdom  adopted  the  Hague  Rules  in  1924 
which  enacted  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  act.  After 
that  the  enactment  based  on  the  Visby  Rules  is  known  as 
the  Carriage  of  Goods  By  Sea  Act,  1971,  inforce  since 
23rd,  June,  1977.13  This  Act  was  amended  by  the  Merchant 
Shipping  Act  1981  which  implemented  the  Brussels  Protocol 
of  1979. 
The  United  States  elected  to  adhere  by  these  Rules  in 
1936  with  enactment  of  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  act. 
This  chapter  therefore  is  divided  into  four  sections: 
Section  One:  Definition  of  Deviation. 
Section  Two:  Classification  of  Deviation. 
Section  Three:  Deviation  and  Change  of  Voyage. 
Section  Four:  Deviation  and  Delay. 
have  not  yet  ratified  it";  see  Article(30)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
13-Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  26,  footnote,  26.  d,  where  he 
states  the  commencement  of  the  COGSA  1971  by  order  1977  {S.  T.  1977, 
No.  981). 28 
SECTION  ONE 
DEFINITION  OF  DEVIATION 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  do  not 
define  "deviation"  or  its  effect,  but  they  do  explain  the 
meaning  of  "reasonable  deviation".  The  theoretical  and 
practical  definition  of  deviation  will  therefore  be 
explained  in  this  section. 
i-THEORETICAL  DEFINITION  OF  DEVIATION 
The  original  idea  of  deviation14  was  a  geographical 
concept  in  a  particular  course  of  the  designated 
voyage15"  The  word  deviation  was  intended  to  mean  any 
change  or  modification  of  the  geographical  route  of  the 
agreed  course  of  voyage.  16 
14-Webster's 
Third  New  INT'L  Dicitionary  (16th,  ed,  1971),  p  618, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"The  lexicographical  definition  of  the  deviation  is  to  diverge  or 
turn  aside  ......  from  an  established  way  or  toward  a  new  course"; 
Chambers  Every  Day  Dictionary,  1975,  p  191,  states: 
"to  deviate:  to  go  from  the  way,  to  turn  aside  (from  a  course, 
topic,  principle  &  c.  },  to  diverge,  differ,  from  a  standard,  norm, 
&  C.  to  vary  from  typens.  Deviant,  that  which  deviates  (from  an 
accepted  norm),  also  adj,  deviation-deviation  of  the  compass, 
deflection  of  the  magnetic  needle  due  to  the  ship's  magnetism.  [L- 
deviare-atum-de,  from,  via,  the  way]. 
15-Knauth,  p  250;  Sir  Frank  Mackinnon,  "Some  Aspects  of  Commercial 
Law",  A  Lecture  Delivered  at  the  London  School  of  Economics  on  3 
March  1926,  Oxford  University  Press,  p  20,  hereinafter  cited  as  " 
Mackinnon". 
16-William  Tetley,  "Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law  Under  the 
Hague  Rules",  (1963]  9  MC  GILL  L.  J.,  p  53,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law",  where  he  states  : 
"A  deviation  before  the  Rules  was  known  as  a  change  in  the  route  of 29 
In  referring  to  what  the  meaning  of  deviation  is,  in 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea. 
Emerigon17  stated  that: 
"A  vessel  changes  her  route  when  in  place  of 
following  the  customary  way  or  that  allowed  by 
her  contract  she  takes  a  different  one,  but 
still  without  losing  sight  of  the  place  of  her 
destination". 
Payne  &  Ivamy18,  said  that: 
"Departure  from  the  prescribed  or  ordinary 
trading  route  which  the  ship  should  follow  in 
fulfilment  of  a  contract  of  carriage". 
Poor19,  said  that: 
"A  departure  from  ship's  contractual  course". 
Temperly20  said  that: 
"A  departure  from  the  route  by  which  the 
carrier  has  expressly  or  impliedly  contracted 
to  carry  the  goods". 
Tetley21,  said  that: 
"An  intentional  change  in  the  geographical 
route  of  the  voyage  as  contracted". 
the  planned  voyage". 
17-Emerigon  on  Insurance  [1783],  vol  3,  pp  15,94,  Meredith's 
Translation  [1850]  p  576,  quoted  by  Knauth,  p  252. 
18-Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  7. 
19-Wharton  Poor,  Am  ri  an  rail  of  Charterparties  d  Ocean  Bills  of 
fig,  (4  th,  ed,  1964),  p  184,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Poor". 
20-R.  Temperly  &  F.  Martin  Vaughan,  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act, 
1924,  (4  th,  ed.  19321,  p  71,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Temperly". 
21-William  Tetley,  Marine  cargo  lams,  (2nd,  ed,  1978),  p  350, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Tetley,  Marine  Claim". 30 
Walker22  said  that: 
"A  deliberate  and  unnecessary  departure  from 
the  due  course  of  a  voyage  for  even  the 
shortest  time,  or  delay  in  sailing  or 
prosecuting  the  voyage  for  unjustified 
purpose". 
The  second  report  of  the  Secretary-General23  has 
defined  deviation  as: 
"A  departure  by  an  ocean  vessel  from  the 
expected  route  for  the  voyage,  which  is  not 
provided  for  either  by  the  contract  of  carriage 
or  by  trade  customs". 
All  these  definitions  of  deviation  depend  upon  an 
intentional  departure  of  the  vessel  from  a  geographical 
route  as  described  in  the  bill  of  lading.  The  meaning  of 
the  term  "intentional"  is  very  important  and  it  is 
considered  to  be  the  basic  factor  of  the  definitions 
mentioned  above. 
The  second  meaning  of  deviation  is  the  "act  of  erring 
or  transgressing". 
One  commentor  believes  American  Courts  have  relied  on 
this  notion  of  transgression  to  extend  the  doctrine 
beyond  its  geographical  roots24. 
22-David  M.  Walker,  Th.  Oxford  companion  to  Law,  1980,  p  354, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Walker,  Companion  to  law". 
23-Second  Report  of  the  Secretary-General  on  Responsibility  of 
ocean.  Carriers  for  Cargo:  Bills  of  Lading  {document  A/CN.  9/76/Add, 
11,  part  three,  para,  2,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Second  Report  of  the 
Secretary-General". 
24-Sarap,  pp  148,156. 31 
The  third  meaning  of  deviation  is  submitted  as 
deviation  which  occurs  when  the  bailee  exceeds  any 
limitation  placed  upon  his  rights  to  possession. 
"Coote"  has  defined  deviation  depending  upon  this  view 
of  deviation  by  saying: 
"A  bailee{including  a  carrier}who  wrongfully 
fails  to  observe  a  limitation  on  his  right  to 
possession  does  so  at  his  peril,  and  will  be 
liable  for  any  loss  or  damage  to  the  bailed 
goods  which  he  can  not  prove  affirmatively 
would  have  occurred  even  if  that  failure  had 
not  occurred"25. 
In  pursuance  of  an  element  of  volition  one  must  note 
the  considered  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading  and  the 
interests  of  all  parties  concerned. 
It  is  also  true  that  damages  and  losses  caused  by 
deviation  are  deemed  one  of  the  basic  elements  of  the 
definition  of  deviation,  because  deviation  is  not  enough 
ex,  pro_pLi  vim  to  establish  on  behalf  of  the  cargo- 
owner  or  either  goods  which  were  shipped  on  the  vessel  a 
tortious  misconduct  on  the  part  of  carrier.  26 
The  following  points  then  should  be  discussed  : 
1-Definition  of  Deviation  under  the  Hague/Visby  pules 
and  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
2-Terms  of  Deviation  Contained  in  COGSA. 
25-Brian  Coote,  Exception  cause  ,  1964,  p  92,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Coote";  cf.  fix.  V.  Doubleday  {1881}  7  Q.  B.  D.  pp  510-511, 
per  Grove  J. 
26-_11ldomino  v.  Citro  Chemical  Co,  272  U.  S.  p  718  {1927}. 32 
1-DEFINITION  OF  DEVIATION  UNDER  THE  HAGUE/VISBY 
RULES  AND  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  do  not 
define  deviation  or  its  effect,  but  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
do  explain  the  meaning  of  "reasonable  deviation". 
A-  The  Hague/Visby  Rules 
An  examination  of  the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Rules  did 
not  reveal  any  definition  of  deviation,  nor  did  the  Hague 
Rules  explain  the  effect  of  deviation.  27  The  Rules  are 
set  out  only  in  Article  [4]  para  [4]  that: 
"Any  deviation  in  saving  or  attempting  to  save 
life  or  property  at  sea,  or  any  reasonable 
deviation  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  an 
infringement  or  breach  of  this  act  or  of  the 
contract  of  carriage,  and  the  carrier  shall  not 
be  liable  for  any  loss  or  damage  resulting 
therefrom". 
This  Article  has  defined  merely  what  is  not  a 
deviation?. 
The  carrier  shall  not  be  liable  for  any  loss  of  or 
damage  to  cargo  which  occurs  due  to  reasonable  deviation. 
The  Hague  Rules  do  not  supply  any  criterion  of 
reasonableness  of  deviation.  28 
The  Visby  Rules  have  not  amended  the  Article  (4]  of  the 
Hague  Rules,  because  it  has  not  purported  to  change  the 
27-W.  E.  Astle,  Shipping  and  the  Law,  1980,  p  192,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Astle,  Shipping  Law". 
28-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  349. 33 
principle  of  deviation  under  the  Hague  Rules. 
The  historical  meaning  of  "deviation"  is  known  as  any 
alteration  or  modification  in  the  geographical  route  of 
the  planned  voyage.  This  historically-confined 
interpretation  is  concordant  with  a  factual  point,  that 
many  authors  have  explained  their  definition  of  deviation 
depending  upon  the  intention  implies  the  meaning  that  any 
alteration  or  modification  in  the  usual  or  customary 
route  of  the  ship  occasioned  by  negligence  or  an  error  of 
the  carrier  in  the  navigation  of  the  vessel  will  not  be 
enough  to  establish  a  deviation.  29 
The  pursuance  of  the  Hague  Rules  must  be  taken  to 
distinguish  an  intentional  deviation  from  the  case  where 
the  master  is  set  an  improper  course  for  the  ship.  The 
carrier,  in  fact,  is  not  responsible  if  the  master  makes 
any  change,  by  error  or  negligence  in  the  course  of  an 
agreed  voyage  according  to  Article  (4)  para  [a)  of  the 
Rules. 
"B"  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  "UNCITRAL"  discussions  about  deviation  had 
separated  the  conference  into  two  divisions;  one  of  them 
supported  the  view  that  no  special  provision  on  deviation 
would  be  necessary.  This  view  was  adopted  by  Norway, 
France,  Hungary,  Japan,  and  Australia,  but  Nigeria's  view 
held  that  the  term  of  deviation  makes  a  special  defence 
29-Tetley  &  Cleven,  "Prosecuting  the  Voyage",  [1970-71]  45  TUL.  L.  R., 
pp  810-11,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Tetley  &  Cleven". 34 
for  the  carrier;  and  should  depend  on  the  general  burden 
of  proof.  This  view  is  supported  by  Tanzania. 
The  other  states  were  in  favour  of  retention  of  a 
separate  provision  on  deviation,  which  was  adopted  by  the 
United  States,  the  United  Kingdom,  the  Soviet  Union, 
Brazil,  Belgium,  Argentina,  Poland,  India,  and 
Singapore30. 
The  Draftsman  made  a  compromise  of  both  views  in  the 
formulation  of  the  Hamburg  Rules.  This  is  shown  in 
Article  [5]  para  [6]: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable,  except  in  general 
average,  where  loss,  damage  or  delay  in 
delivery  resulted  from  measures  to  save  life  or 
from  reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at 
sea". 
This  Article  explains  the  "measures"  to  save  life  or 
reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at  sea.  The  Hamburg 
Rules  do  not  define  a  deviation,  nor  do  they  contain  a 
specific  provision  for  deviation,  as  far  as  it  would 
depend  on  the  principle  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier 
in  these  Rules. 
When  the  vessel  makes  some  change  or  modification, 
whether  in  her  particular  course  or  in  her  obligation  for 
stowage  of  the  goods  under  deck,  that  constitutes  a  known 
de  viation31  which  is  a  breach  in  the  contract  of 
carriage. 
30-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  "The  tJNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  (part  2)",  (1976]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  346,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Sweeney,  part  2". 
31-Steven,  p  1560. 35 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  confined  the  meaning  of 
deviation,  particularly  in  case  of  a  departure  from  the 
contract  of  carriage,  when  there  has  been  a  loss,  damage, 
or  delay  in  delivery.  Such  happenings  are  sufficient  to 
establish  a  deviation,  unless  the  carrier  can  prove 
otherwise  under  the  general  rules  on  burden  of  proof32. 
At  any  rate,  the  Hamburg  Rules  did  not  stipulate  any 
intentional  departure  from  the  particular  course  of  a 
planned  voyage,  nor  did  they  restrict  the  meaning  of 
deviation  to  cover  the  departure  from  the  geographical 
route,  but  they  extend  their  provisions  to  cover  any 
alteration  or  modification  in  the  carrier's  obligation 
for  stowage  of  the  cargo  under  deck,  when  there  has  been 
a  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo33. 
2-TERMS  OF  DEVIATION  CONTAINED  IN  COGSA 
Deviation  is  not  defined  in  the  carriage  of  goods  by 
sea  act  (COGSA].  COGSA's  deviation  provisions  contained 
in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  Acts,  are 
identical  to  the  deviation  provision  in  Article  (4)  para 
[4]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules34 
32-Abdul  Baki  A.  Falih,  "The  Statutory  Limitation  of  the  Maritime 
Carrier's  Liability  Under  the  Hague  Rules,  Visby  Rules  and  Hamburg 
Rules",  A  Thesis  Approved  for  the  Degree  of  Ph.  D,  Glasgow 
University,  1980,  pp  466-467,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  Falih". 
33-Article  (5)  para(l]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Anthony.  Diamond,  "A 
Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  The  Harnburg 
gam,  A  One-Day  Seminar  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  LTD, 
1978,  p  16,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
34-Roger,  p  156. 36 
The  United  Kingdom  COGSA  1971  adds  the  words  "or  of  the 
contract  of  carriage".  That  means  that  a  deviation 
permitted  by  the  Rules  shall  not  be  considered  to  be  a 
breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage  and  there  are  no 
consequences  either  on  the  Rules  or  the  contract  of 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  35 
Whereas,  the  United  States  COGSA  1936  adds: 
"provided,  however,  that  if  the  deviation  is 
for  the  purpose  of  loading  or  unloading  cargo 
or  passengers,  it  shall,  prima  facie  be 
regarded  as  unreasonable". 
This  article  has  set  out  the  meaning  of  "reasonable  and 
unreasonable  deviation".  It  explains  by  implication  what 
the  consequences  of  the  two  are  to  be.  36 
It  seems  obvious,  that  the  characterization  of 
deviation  which  is  designed  by  "COGSA",  implies 
intentional  change  in  the  geographical  route  of  the 
particular  agreed  voyage. 
The  wording  used  by  COGSA  to  explain  "deviation"  is 
identical  to  the  wording  used  by  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
for  the  same  purpose,  while  the  COGSA  in  the  United 
States  further  defines  the  term  "reasonable  deviation"  by 
inserting  the  additional  provision,  as  mentioned 
previously. 
35-Scrutton  on  Charterparties,  p  453. 
36-Gilmore  &  Black,  PP  158-159. 37 
"ii"  PRACTICAL  DEFINITION  OF  DEVIATION 
The  courts  from  different  countries  have  their  own 
individual  definitions  of  deviation.  They  have  some 
similarities,  as  well  as,  differences  in  their 
definition. 
I  have  confined  the  practical  definition  of  deviation 
to  the  practice  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  jurisprudence. 
1-United  Kingdom  Jurisprudence. 
2-United  States  Jurisprudence. 
1-UNITED  KINGDOM  JURISPRUDENCE 
The  United  Kingdom  courts  have  confined  their  decisions 
to  a  definition  of  deviation  in  a  change  in  the 
geographical  route. 
Departure  from  the  route  so  ascertained  is  justifiable 
if  necessary  to  save  life  or  to  communicate  with  a  ship 
in  distress  as  the  distress  may  involve  danger  to  life.  37 
In  addition,  the  United  Kingdom  judicial  attitude  is  less 
strict  than  the  American  because  the  latter  have  extended 
the  concept  of  deviation  to  any  serious  change  in  the 
conduct  of  the  ship,  for  instance,  deck  cargo  ...  etc. 
38 
An  intention  to  deviate  does  not  vacate  the  policy, 
when  the  vessel  is  lost  before  actual  deviation39,  but  if 
37_searamanga.  v.  damp  (1880)  5  C.  P.  D,  p  295. 
38-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  350. 
39-auchanan.  v.  Hunter  Blair  (1779)  M.  'p  7083. 38 
the  vessel  be  lost  before  she  comes  to  the  dividing  point 
between  the  course  to  the  original  and  to  the  substituted 
port  of  destination,  it  is  an  intention  to  deviate  and 
nothing  more.  40  Namely,  if  a  deviation  mere  intended  but 
never  carried  into  effect,  is  as  no  deviation. 
A  premeditated  intention  to  deviate,  therefore,  amounts 
to  nothing  unless  it  be  actually  carried  into  execution. 
This  rule  is  adopted  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  in  the 
courts  of  the  United  States4Z. 
There  is  a  primary  important  difference  between  the 
effect  of  deviation  on  bills  of  lading  and  on  an 
insurance  policy,  that  mere  increase  or  variation  of  risk 
is  a  deviation  and  invalidates  the  policy  in  marine 
insurance,  but  that  mere  variation  of  risk  is  not 
deviation  in  the  bill  of  lading  and  its  needs  essentially 
displace  the  contract  of  carriage  and  abrogate  the  bill 
of  lading  exceptions.  42 
If  a  vessel  insured  for  one  voyage  sails  upon  another, 
and  the  track  in  the  outset  of  the  voyage  is  the  same, 
and  she  be  taken  before  she  arrive  at  the  dividing  point 
of  the  second  voyage,  the  policy  is  discharged.  43  It  is 
unessential  that  the  insurer  may  not  be  prejudiced  by  the 
deviation,  the  important  thing  is  to  intensify  and 
40-Wooldridge.  v.  Boydell,  1  Dougl,  p  17,  (99  E.  R.  p  141;  James 
Kent,  Commentaries  on  American  Law,  (7th,  ed,  p  1828,  vol  3),  p 
392,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Kent". 
41-Ibid,  p  390;  Foster.  V.  ram  (1746)  2  Str,  p  1250,  [93  E.  R. 
p  1162];  Hays  V.  Modigliani,  2  T.  R.  p  30. 
42-Knauth,  p  250;  Sarpa,  p  147. 
43-Wooldridge.  v.  Boydell,  1  Dougl,  p  17,  [99  E.  R.  p  14]. 39 
substitute  another  risk,  and  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo  must  be  causally  connected  with  the  deviation.  44 
Scots  Courts  have  defined  deviation  when  it  was  held 
that  deviation  of  the  ship  in  the  course  of  the  voyage 
insured,  must  be  wilful  in  order  to  avoid  the  policy,  and 
that  accidental  or  involuntary  deviation  will  not  have 
that  effect45,  but  the  House  of  Lords,  as  the  final  court 
of  appeal  for  England,  Scotland,  and  Northern  Ireland, 
has  constituted  uniform  rules,  because  the  House  of  Lords 
system  is  applicable  to  the  law  and  usage  for  all  these 
countries.  46 
For  instance,  in  Tasker  v.  Cunningham47,  the  Scots 
Court  had  held  three  times  that  the  ship,  when 
destroyed,  was  still  under  the  protection  of  the  policy, 
but  the  House  of  Lords  finally  reversed  their  decision  on 
44-1973  C.  L.  Y.  P  3093. 
45_ 
Q.  v.  McNair  (1790]  2  Pat,  p  244. 
46-Walker, 
on  the  Scottish  Legal  System,  1981,  pp  257-258, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "  Walker,  Scottish  system  ",  where  he  states: 
"The  House  of  Lords  has  been  responsible  for  some  of  the  worst 
misunderstandings  and  confused  law  in  the  Scottish  books,  over  and 
over  again  English  doctrines  have  been  forced  into  Scots  law  by 
English  law  lords  who  did  not  know  or  realise  the  fundamental 
difference  of  principle  and  reason  which  frequently  underlie 
apparent  similarities  of  result,  as  where  remedies  are  granted  in 
circumstances  similar  to  those  justifying  the  corresponding  remedy 
in  English  Law".;  Lord  Watson,  in  the  Currie.  v.  M'Kniaht  (1897]  A. 
C.  p  97  at  105,  where  it  is  stated: 
"the  maritime  Code  which  ought  to  prevail  in  both  countries,  which 
in  my  opinion,  is  neither  English  nor  Scottish,  but  British  Law.  The 
House  of  Lords  has  now  become  the  ultimate  forum  in  all  maritime 
causes  arising  in  the  U.  K". 
47-{1819}1  Bligh,  p  87. 40 
the  ground  that  a  fixed  determination  had  been  formed  to 
change  the  voyage  insured  before  the  loss  took  place48. 
2-UNITED  STATES  JURISPRUDENCE 
The  United  States  Supreme  Court  has  defined  deviation 
as: 
"a  voluntary  departure,  without  necessity  or 
reasonable  cause,  from  the  regular  and  usual 
"4  course  of  a  voyage9. 
American  Courts  have  not  always  required  "intention"  in. 
their  criteria  for  determining  deviation50. 
Weingfeld  D.  J.  in  The  Flying  Clipper51,  noted  that  the 
carrier's  action  was  "voluntary"  as  follows: 
48-David  M.  Walker,  ßeLaw  of  Contracts  and  Related  Obligations 
in  Sco  land,  {2nd,  ed,  19851,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Walker,  The  Law 
of  Contract",  where  he  states: 
"In  respect  of  the  particular  rules  applicable  only  to  specific 
kinds  of  contract,  such  as,  sale,  hire  purchase  or  carriage,  the 
relevant  statutes  are  frequently  common  to  scots  law  and  to 
English,  through  sometimes  having  particular  provisions  applicable 
in  one  legal  system  and  not  in  the  other,  and  almost  invariably 
having  been  drafted  with  the  background  of  English  Law  in  mind  and 
accordingly  using  terms  with  the  connotations  of  English  Law.  In 
these  matters  accordingly  reference  to  English  books  and  cases  is 
necessary,  though  with  constant  caution  lest  there  be 
misunderstanding  of  what  is  basically  a  concept  of  English  Law". 
49-Hostetter.  v.  Park,  137  U.  S.,  p  30,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  word  deviation  in  the  bill  of  lading,  must  be  held  to  give  to 
the  owner  only  a  limited  right  of  departure  from  the  voyage;  and 
that  the  limits  must  be  those  of  necessity,  and  reasonable  regard 
for  the  rights  of  both  the  shipper  and  carrier,  growing  out  of  the 
nature  of  the  principal  contract".;  Constable.  v.  National 
5  .  (1884)  154  U.  S.  pp  51,66.;  The  Wilidomino,  272  U.  S.  p  727. 
50-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  30. 
51_(1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  264. 41 
"In  my  view  it  is  unnecessary  to  base  the 
voiding  of  the  contract  on  the  ground  that  it 
was  the  result  of  the  carrier's  "gross" 
violation  of  its  terms,  or  his  "misconduct",  or 
that  on  deck  stowage  under  a  clean  bill  of 
lading  would  "work  a  fraud"  or  that  the  carrier 
"converted"  the  cargo.  It  is  sufficient  that 
the  carrier's  voluntary  action  in  unjustifiable 
deviation  so  changed  the  essence  of  the 
agreement  as  to  effect  its  abrogation". 
The  deviation  may  thus  be  an  unjustifiable  failure  of  a 
shipowner  to  perform  the  contracted  voyage,  and  may  arise 
not  only  from  a  physical  departure  from  the  course  of  the 
voyage,  but  also  from  the  other  causes,  such  as, 
unreasonable  delay,  or  from  the  failure  of  a  shipowner  to 
furnish  a  vessel  capable  of  performing,  and  ready  to 
perform,  the  voyage.  52 
Deviation  is  however  defined  in,  The  Chester  Vallev53, 
as  follows: 
"A  serious  departure  from  the  contract  of 
carriage  as  to  amount  to  a  different  venture 
from  that  contemplated  and,  therefore,  an 
abrogation  of  the  contract". 
The  Courts  of  the  United  States  have  furthered-  the 
notion  of  geographical  deviation,  when  they  have  extended 
the  concept  to  any  important  alteration  in  the  manner  of 
the  vessel  which  has  expected  cargo  to  increased  risks54, 
52-Malcolm  Baxter.  Jr,  277  U.  S.  pp  320-330  (1927). 
53-[1940]  A.  M.  C.  P  557.;  Shackman.  v.  runard  White  star  Ltd[1940] 
A.  M.  C,,  p  971  at  976,  where  it  is  defined  deviation  as  follows: 
".....  any  conduct  of  a  ship  or  other  vehicle  used  in  commerce 
tending  to  vary  or  increase  the  risk  incident  to  a  shipment". 
54-H.  S.  Morgan,  "Unreasonable  Deviation  Under  COGSA",  (1978)  9  j. 42 
such  as,  over  carriage,  dry  docking  with  cargo  aboard, 
sending  cargo  by  a  different  carrier  and  the  failure  to 
provide  special  stowage  as  specified  by  the  contract  of 
carriage.  55 
In  the  Lafcomo56,  the  court  held  that,  any  departure 
from  the  agreed  method  of  transportation  by  the  carrier 
is  sufficient  to  constitute  a  deviation. 
Likewise,  in  the  Fjyin  Clipper57,  the  ocean  carrier 
conceded  that  the  issue  of  a  clean  bill  of  lading 
obligated  the  carrier  to  stow  the  goods  under  deck  and 
that  stowage  of  the  goods  on  deck  constituted  a 
deviation,  but  mere  negligence  with  regard  to  the  stowage 
or  handling  of  the  cargo  never  constitutes  a  deviation.  58 
Stowage  of  containers  on  weather  deck  without  any 
notation  constituted  a  deviation59,  but  on  deck  stowage 
of  a  container  on  a  container  ship  is  not  deviation-60 
Therefore,  we  could  say  that  deviation  is  : 
"Any  variation  in  the  conduct  of  a  ship  in  the 
carriage  of  goods  whereby  the  risk  incident  to 
the  shipment  will  be  increased,  such  as, 
Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  490,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Morgan".;  Steven,  p  1544. 
55_Sidevrgi. 
a  D_1  Orinoco.  v.  The  North  Empress  [1977]  A.  M.  C.  P 
1140.;  Morgan,  p  49. 
56_[1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  903 
57-[1945]  A.  M.  C.  p  259. 
58-The  Chester  Valley[1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  555. 
59-Encyclopeadia  Britannica.  inc.  v.  Hnngkong  Producer  [1969)  A.  M.  C. 
p  1744. 
60-Dupont  De  Nemours  International  S  .  A.  v.  The  Morena  v.  ga  (1972] 
A.  M.  C.  p  2366. 43 
carrying  the  cargo  on  the  deck  of  the  ship 
contrary  to  custom  and  without  the  consent  of 
"61  the  shipper, 
At  any  rate,  the  concept  of  deviation  implies  that  the 
deviation  causes  an  additional  risk  of  loss  or  damage  to 
the  cargo  not  contemplated  by  the  shipper62.  Where  there 
is  no  loss  resulting  from  an  increased  peril,  the 
doctrine  should  not  be  applicable63. 
SECTION  TWO 
CLASSIFICATION  OF  DEVIATION 
There  are  some  complexities  involved  in  explaining  the 
classification  of  deviation  unless  some  criterion  is  made 
in  the  carrier's  act  for  deviation,  i.  e;  reasonable  and 
unreasonable,  geographical  and  non-geographical 
deviation. 
The  following  points  should  then  be  discussed: 
61-Spartus 
,  orn.  v.  , S/SYafo,  590  F.  ed,  pp  1310-1313(5th.  cir.  1979], 
Quoting,  G.  W.  Sheldon  &  CA.  v.  Hamburg  Amerikanische  pack  fahrt 
BSS.,  28  F.  2d,  pp  249,251,  [3rd.  cir.  1928]. 
62-Ibid, 
p  249,  where  it  is  stated  : 
"Deviation  is  any  variation  in  conduct  of  ship  where  by  risk 
incident  to  shipment  will  be  increased". 
63-meternational  D  ll  no  Co.  v.  M/V  Doriefs[1969]  A.  M.  C.  P  119, 
Compare,  The  Citta  Di  Messina,  169  Fed.  Rep,  p  472  (1969.  S.  D.  N.  Y.  ], 
where  it  is  stated: 
"...  any  deviation  from  the  course  of  navigation  which  experience 
and  usage  have  prescribed  as  the  safest  and  most  expeditious  mode 
of  proceeding  from  one  voyage  terminus  to  the  other  will  cast 
subsequent  loss  of,  or  injury  to,  either  ship  or  cargo  on  the 
shipowner,  without  any  reference  to  the  question  whether  it  had  any 
bearing  on  the  particular  loss  complained  of". 44 
i-Reasonable  Deviation. 
ii-Unreasonable  Deviation. 
iii-Geographical  Deviation. 
iv-Non-Geographical  Deviation. 
v-Quasi-Deviation. 
i-REASONABLE  DEVIATION 
The  main  relevant  international  provision  of  the 
deviation  and  specifically  reasonable  deviation  is 
Article  [4]  para  [4]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
The  reasonable  deviation  doctrine  which  is  adopted  by 
the  Hague  Rules  is,  in  fact,  the  same  common  law 
principle.  64  The  general  maritime  rules  controlling 
reasonable  deviation  was  illustrated  by  the  United  States 
Supreme  Court  in  The  Propeller  Niagara  v.  Cordes. 
65 
It 
noted  that: 
"when  the  carrier  "having  received  the  goods 
for  transportation,  in  the  absence  of  any 
stipulation  as  to  the  period  of  sailing,  the 
master  must  commence  the  voyage  within  a 
reasonable  time,  without  delay,  and  as  soon  as 
the  wind,  weather,  and  tide  will  permit.  After 
having  set  sail,  he  must  proceed  on  the  voyage, 
in  the  direct,  shortest,  and  usual  route,  to 
the  port  of  delivery,  without  unnecessary 
deviation,  unless  there  has  been  an  express 
contract  as  to  the  course  to  be  pursued  and 
where  the  vessel  is  destined  for  several  ports 
and  places,  the  master  should  proceed  to  them 
in  the  order  in  which  they  are  usually  visited, 
64-Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law,  p  54. 
65_62  U.  S.  p  24  (1858}. 45 
or  that  designed  by  the  contract,  or,  in 
certain  cases,  by  the  advertisement  relating  to 
the  particular  voyage.  A  deviation  from  the 
direct  route  may  be  excusable  if  rendered 
necessary  to  execute  repairs  for  the 
preservation  of  the  ship,  or  the  prosecution  of 
the  voyage,  or  to  avoid  a  storm,  or  an  enemy, 
or  pirates,  or  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining 
necessary  supplies  of  water  and  provisions,  or, 
in  the  case  of  a  steamer  to  obtain  necessary 
supplies  of  wood  or  coal  for  the  prosecution  of 
the  voyage  or  for  the  purpose  of  assisting 
another  vessel  in  distress". 
I  will  discuss  therefore  the  following  points: 
1-Reasonableness  as  the  Criterion. 
2-Liberty  Clause. 
3-Exceptional  Perils. 
1-REASONABLENESS  AS  THE  CRITERION 
The  meaning  of  the  term  "reasonable"  has  aroused  real 
controversy.  The  Rule  as  to  deviations  in  the  Hague  Rules 
is  utterly  unintelligible66,  in  as  far  as  the  word 
"reasonable"  is  often  used  loosely.  The  criterion  which 
establishes  "reasonable  deviation"  is  more  complicated  to 
explain  and  apply,  because  the  particular  case  has 
individual  circumstances  in  which  deviations  can  occur. 
67 
66-Per  Lord  Justice  Mackinnon,  in,  The  o  pagnie  Primers  ne  Navage 
%i  oa  Panama  v.  Cpmpani  o  Arrenda  ar'.  1  D  Mono  Polio  ne  Pe  ;  roleas  S 
A  (1940]  1  K.  B,  p  368;  Mackinnon,  p  21,  where  he  states: 
"That  a  deviation  to  save  property,  ought  not  permitted  by  the 
contract  of  carriage,  shall  not  be  deemed  to  be  a  breach  of  it, 
does  add  a  statutory  modification  to  such  a  contract  and  is 
intelligible-and,  as  I  think,  is  the  only  intelligible  passage  in 
the  Rules". 
67-Erik  Chrispeels  &  Thomas  Graham,  "The  Brussels  Convention  of 46 
United  Kingdom  and  United  States  COGSA,  are  identical 
to  the  Hague  Rules  provision.  These  Rules  give  example 
for  the  reasonableness  provided  in  Article  (4)  para  (4) 
that: 
"Any  deviation  in  saving  or  attempting  to  save 
life  or  property  at  sea". 
This  Article  has  created  some  controversy,  because  it 
will  encourage  carriers  to  depart  from  the  contractual 
route,  when  it  is  in  their  own  interests  to  intensify 
their  own  revenues. 
There  is  no  specific  provision  in  the  Hamburg  Rules 
which  is  the  equivalent  of  the  Article  (4]  para  (4]  of 
the  Hague  Rules  which  excuses  the  carrier  from  the  effect 
of  any  reasonable  deviation58.  The  Hamburg  Rules 
particularly  require  that  deviation  from  the  contractual 
course  is  reasonable  when  the  carrier  has  adopted 
measures  to  save  life  or  attempted  to  select  reasonable 
measures  to  save  property  of  third  persons. 
One  can  refer  to  important  cases,  in  the  United 
Kingdom  and  the  United  states  which  act  as  a  guide-line 
in  revealing  the  criterion  of  reasonable  deviation. 
1924  (ocean  bill  of  lading)  Further  Action  Toward  Revision",  11973) 
7  J.  World  Trade,  pp  692-693,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Erik  &  Thomas". 
68-David  M.  Sassoon  &  John  C.  Cunningham,  "Unjustifiable  Deviation 
and  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  In  The  Hamburg  Ales  on  the 
.a 
iageof  Goods  by  Sea,  Edited  By  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  167 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Saasoon  &  Cunningham". 47 
A-UNITED  KINGDOM  JURISPRUDENCE 
The  United  Kingdom  Courts  are  less  strict  than  American 
Courts69,  because  the  term  reasonable  deviation  is  often 
used  loosely  by  the  courts  which  attempt  to  define  what 
establishes  a  "reasonableness". 
The  real  debate  has  been  rather  as  to  the  word 
reasonable;  one  commentator  has  proposed  that  term 
reasonable  is  regarded  as  the  reasonableness  of  the  terms 
of  the  contract,  which  mentions  a  specific  route,  not 
with  the  reasonableness  of  a  deviation.  70 
Attempting  any  exhaustive  definition  of  what  amounts  to 
necessity,  it  may  however  fairly  be  said  necessity  does 
not  mean  absolute  physical  necessity  only,  but  a 
reasonable  necessity  having  regard  to  the  interest  of 
the  shipowners  and  also  of  the  cargo-owners,  and  to  all 
the  other  circumstances  of  the  case.  71 
The  leading  English  decision  reveals  some  criteria  of 
reasonable  deviation  whether  it  had  taken  place  prior  to 
or  after  adoption  of  the  COGSA.  There  is  a  dichotomy  in 
jurisprudence  as  to  what  constitutes  deviation  by 
unseaworthiness  and  which  one  is  justifiable. 
In  Kish  v.  Taylor72,  The  House  of  Lords  adopted  a 
somewhat  rough  rule  by  admitting  any  departure  from  the 
usual  and  customary  course  of  the  voyage  which  was 
69-Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  the  Maritime  Law,  p  55. 
70-Mackinnon,  pp  21-22. 
71-Phelps.  V.  Hill  [1891)  1  Q.  H.  p  617. 
72-[1912]  A.  C.  p  604. 48 
occasioned  by  perils  of  the  sea  for  the  safety  of  the 
ship  and  crew,  even  though  such  perils  may  have  occurred 
from  the  initial  unseaworthiness  of  the  ship. 
Whereas,  Lord  Porter,  in,  Monarch  SS.  Co  v.  Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker73,  said  that: 
"Undoubtedly  deviation  necessarily  made  to 
remedy  unseaworthiness  does  not  amount  to 
unjustifiable  deviation  or  destroy  the  right  to 
rely  upon  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  carriage 
unless  it  is  established  that  the  owners  knew 
of  the  vessel's  state  on  sailing". 
The  carrier,  however,  is  not  liable  if  the  vessel 
becomes  unseaworthy  and  subsequent  departs  from  the  usual 
course  into  a  refuge  port,  as  long  as  the  carrier  has 
exercised  due  diligence  in  making  the  vessel  seaworthy. 
A  deviation  for  necessity  must  be  justifiable  both  as 
to  substance  and  manner.  Nothing  more  must  be  done  than 
what  the  necessity  requires.  The  true  objection  to  a 
deviation  is  not  the  increase  of  the  risk.  If  that  were 
so,  it  would  only  be  necessary  to  give  an  additional 
premium  concerning  the  marine  insurance  cases.  It  is, 
that  the  contracting  party  has  voluntarily  substituted 
another  voyage  for  that  which  has  been  insured.  74 
Where  a  master  receives  credible  information  that  if  he 
continues  in  the  direct  course  of  his  voyage  his  ship 
will  be  exposed  to  some  imminent  peril,  he  is  justified 
in  pausing  and  deviating  from  the  direct  course,  and 
73-(1949]  A.  C.  p  212.;  1949  S.  C.  {HL},  p  1. 
74-Per  Lord  Mansfield,  in,  I,  avabre.  v.  Wilson,  99  E.  R.  p  185. 49 
taking  any  step  that  a  prudent  man  would  take  for  the 
purpose  of  avoiding  the  danger75,  but  where  only  part  of 
the  goods  are  at  risk,  the  master  has  no  right  to  depart 
from  the  agreed  route  for  the  sake  of  such  goods  and  he 
should  carry  on  the  goods  to  their  destination.  76 
The  shipowner  through  his  master  is  therefore  bound  to 
act  with  prudence,  skill,  and  care  in  avoiding  dangers 
and  in  mitigating  the  consequences  of  any  disaster  which 
may  have  happened. 
The  master  is  bound  to  take  into  account  the  interests 
of  all  concerned,  cargo-owners  as  well  as  those  of  the 
shipowners.  77  While  the  master  may  deviate  to  save  life, 
he  may  not  deviate  to  save  property. 
78  As  Scaramanao  v. 
Sämn.  19,  shows  where  the  ship  deviated  to  assist  a  ship 
in  distress,  but  instead  of  merely  saving  the  crew, 
attempted  to  earn  salvage  by  towing  the  distressed  vessel 
into  port,  and  in  the  attempt,  went  ashore  herself  and 
was  lost  with  her  cargo. 
The  Court  of  Appeal  held  that  deviation  was  not 
justifiable,  and  that  the  shipowner  was  liable  for  the 
loss  though  it  was  occasioned  by  perils  of  the  sea,  and 
those  were  excepted  in  the  charterparty. 
Lord  Cockburn  has  concluded  the  main  principle  of 
saving  life  as  reasonable  deviation  when  he  said  that: 
75-The  Tetnnia,  17  E.  R.  p  367. 
76-Notara.  v.  Henderson  [1869-70]  5  Q.  B.  p  345. 
77-Phelps  v.  Hill,  op.  cit,  p  613. 
78-Ibid,  p  613. 
79-(1880)  5  C.  P.  D.  p  295. 50 
"deviation  for  the  purpose  of  saving  life  is 
protected,  and  involves  neither  forfeiture  of 
insurance  nor  liability  to  the  goods  owner  in 
respect  of  loss  which  would  otherwise  be  within 
the  exception  of  "perils  of  the  sea.  And,  as 
necessary  consequence  of  the  foregoing 
deviation  for  the  purpose  of  communicating  with 
a  ship  in  distress  is  allowable,  in  as  much  as 
the  state  of  the  vessel  in  distress  may  involve 
danger  to  life.  On  the  other  hand,  deviation 
for  the  sole  purpose  of  saving  property  is  not 
thus  privileged,  but  entails  all  the  usual 
consequences  of  deviation.  If,  therefore,  the 
lives  of  the  persons  on  board  a  disabled  ship 
can  be  saved  without  saving  the  ship,  as  by 
taking  them  off.  Deviation  for  the  purpose  of 
saving  the  ship  will  carry  with  it  all  the 
consequences  of  an  unauthorized  deviation. 
Where  the  preservation  of  life  can  only  be 
effected  through  the  concurrent  saving  of 
property,  and  the  bona  fide  purpose  of  saving 
life  forms  part  of  the  motive  which  leads  to 
the  deviation,  the  privilege  will  not  be  lost 
by  reason  of  the  purpose  of  saving  property 
having  formed  a  second  motive  for  deviating"80. 
Where  a  departure  by  the  vessel  from  the  geographical 
route  to  a  bunkering  port  for  considerations  of  cheapness 
and  convenience  does  not  necessarily  amount  to 
deviation81.  If  the  shipowners  show  that  all  necessary 
steps  have  been  taken  to  supply  the  vessel  with  adequate 
oil  at  the  commencement  of  the  voyage,  then  the 
shipowners  have  the  right  to  deviate  from  their 
prescribed  route  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  the  fuel82. 
80-Ibid,  p  304;  T.  T.  Bucknill&  J.  Langley,  Ahbo  t'4  Law  of  Merchant 
_S 
jp  and  Seamen.  [13th,  ed,  1892]  p  409,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Abbott" 
81-Reardon  Smith  Line  v.  Black  Sea  Insurance  [1939)  A.  C.  p  562. 
82-Per  Lord  Buckmaster,  in,  shipping  Board  v.  Bunge  &  Born,  Ltd 
(1925)  42  T.  L.  R.  p  175. 51 
It  is  clear  that  a  deviation  would  not  be  reasonable 
merely  because  it  was  convenient  to  the  shipowner.  Its 
reasonableness  must  depend  upon  what  would  be 
contemplated  reasonably  by  both  parties,  having  regard  to 
the  exigencies  of  the  route,  known  or  assumed  to  be 
known,  to  both  parties83. 
Whether  the  question  of  a  deviation  is  reasonable  is 
then  a  question  of  law  or  fact. 
Lord  Atkin84  adopted  the  tests  which  indicated  to  both 
a  question  of  law  and  fact. 
The  majority  of  Lords  said  : 
"Whether  a  deviation  is  or  is  not  reasonable  is 
a  question  of  fact  which  must  be  decided  by 
courts  in  the  light  of  all  relevant 
circumstances  of  each  case"85, 
Whether  deviation  is  reasonable  or  not  has  always  been 
said  to  be  a  question  of  fact.  Viz,  deviation  is  governed 
by  the  individual  circumstances  of  particular  cases. 
Lord  Atkin  has  however  made  that  quite  clear  by 
explaining  which  test  should  be  applied  in  order  to 
constitute  a  reasonable  deviation  as  follows: 
83-Per  Lord  Wright,  J,  in,  Foreman  &  Ellamg,  Ltd  v.  :  Prat  steam 
Navigation  Co,  (1928)  2  K.  B  p  424,  Per  Greer  L.  J,  where  he  states: 
"A  reasonable  deviation  is  a  deviation  whether  in  the  interests  of 
the  ship  or  the  cargo-owner  or  both,  which  no  reasonably  minded 
cargo-owner  would  raise  any  objection  to";  Per  Slesser,  L.  J,  in, 
P-nnno  o  Mango  &_o,  Ltd.  v.  Stag  Line.  L  d(1931]  39  L1.  L.  Rep.  plOl-111. 
84-Stag-Line  Ltd.  v.  Foam  o,  Mango  &  Co.  Ltd  (1932]  A.  C.  p  344. 
65_Ibid,  Per  Lord  Buckmaster,  p  33. 52 
"The  true  test  seems  to  be  what  departure  from 
the  contract  voyage  might  a  prudent  person 
controlling  the  voyage  at  the  time  make  and 
maintain,  having  in  mind  all  the  relevant 
circumstances  existing  at  the  time,  including 
the  terms  of  the  contract  and  the  interests  of 
all  parties  concerned,  but  without  obligation 
to  consider  the  interests  of  any  one  as 
"8  conclusive6. 
Deviation  should  therefore  be  confined  to  the  interests 
of  both  ship  and  cargo,  or  it  should  be  contemplated  by 
both  shipowner  and  cargo-owner87. 
B  -UNITED  STATES  JURISPRUDENCE 
The  American  Courts  have  often  had  a  strict  definition 
of  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  deviation".  Judicial 
controversy  has  been  interested  frequently  in  such 
general  questions  as  the  necessity  or  reasonableness  of  a 
vessel's  departure  and  such  particular  questions  as  the 
amount  and  purpose  of  the  deviation.  Usually  the  courts 
have  not  considered  so  much  the  clause  admitting 
deviation  as  the  scope  of  the  deviation  itself  to  decide 
whether  it  is  reasonable89. 
86-Ibid,  at  pp  343-344. 
87-Temperley,  pp  73-78;  Slesser,  LJ,  in,  Foacoln  Mango  &  Co.  Ltd 
v.  Stag  1  ine,.  L:  td{1931}  39  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  101  at  115,  where  he  states: 
"The  criterion  of  reasonableness  depend  upon  what  would  be 
contemplated  reasonably  by  both  parties  or  assumed  to  be  known  to 
both  parties". 
88-Compare,  Knauth,  p  255,  where  he  said: 
"Under  the  1936  Act,  it  will  always  be  a  question  whether  any 
deviation  is  reasonable  and  hence  excusable.  The  New  Act  therefore 
seems  to  have  enlarged  the  rights  of  the  carrier  in  this  respect". 
89-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  810;  Compare,  Stephan  Dor,  Bill  of  Lading 53 
A  consideration  of  the  principal  cases  in  the  United 
States  proposes  however  some  guide  line  in  explaining  the 
criterion  of  the  reasonableness;  whether  the  deviation 
had  taken  place  before  the  enactment  of  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea  or  taken  place  after  that. 
The  early  cases  extended  the  United  States  Supreme 
Court  definition90,  of  what  constitutes  deviation. 
The  court  held  in  St  Yria91,  that  the  master  was 
justified  in  landing  and  storing  the  Sulphur  cargo 
contraband  by  reason  of  the  outbreak  of  the  war  between 
Spain  and  the  United  States  after  the  vessel's  master 
acquired  knowledge  of  a  declaration  of  this  war.  He  knew 
that  the  cargo  aboard  his  vessel  was  contraband,  and  that 
he  had  acted  reasonably  with  due  regard  to  the  interest 
of  all  concerned,  {the  cargo-owner  and  shipowner}. 
An  emergency  sufficient  to  excuse  a  departure  cannot, 
however,  arise  out  of  circumstances  deliberately  planned 
nor  from  gross  negligence92,  for  instance,  failure  to 
obtain  enough  supplies  of  bunkers  to  carry  the  vessel  to 
a  proper  destination. 
A  causal  relation  therefore  should  be  shown  between  the 
Clausen  and  the  International  Convention  of  Brussels.  1924,  (Hague 
Rules)  1956,  pp  40-42,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Dor",  where  he  states: 
"Some  delegates  remarked  that: 
deviation  authorized  under  the  contract  of  carriage  was  not  really 
deviation;  and  that  reasonable  deviation  could  exist  outside 
contractual  deviation". 
90-Host  tte:  r.  v.  park,  137  U.  S.  pp  30-40  (1890). 
91-186  U.  S.  p  1(1901). 
92_j  T  Wil  domine,  272  U.  S.  727  {1926}. 54 
emergency  circumstances  and  the  disaster  which  caused  the 
damage  to  cargo,  and,  in  the  absence  of  such  evidence, 
the  carrier  is  still  liable  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to 
cargo. 
The  doctrine  of  deviation  should  then  not  be  applied  in 
cases  where  there  has  been  no  loss  or  damage  to  the 
cargo93,  such  as  unseaworthiness  alone  or  deviation 
caused  by  it  displaces  the  contract  only  in  so  far  as 
damage  is  caused  by  the  seaworthiness,  but  all  the 
damages  attributed  to  the  placing  of  an  embargo  on  the 
vessel's  sailing  while  repairs  were  in  progress  for 
unseaworthiness  or  discover  it,  he  will  not  recover  these 
damages.  As  well  as  deviation  by  the  vessel's  master  to  a 
port  of  refuge  to  avoid  a  peril  of  the  sea  it  does  not 
displace  the  contract.  94 
Judicial  interpretation  as  to  what  establishes  the 
concept  of  the  reasonableness  after  the  enactment  of  the 
COGSA  is  more  confined  than  before,  but  what  the  court 
adopted  as  abroad  interpretation  of  the  reasonable 
deviation  in  The  Malcolm  Baxter,  Jr95,  would  have  directly 
conflicted  with  this  decision  in  The  Louise96,  when  it 
was  held  that  where  a  vessel  sails  in  flagrantly 
unseaworthy  conditions  and  is  forced  to  return  to  port 
for  repairs,  she  is  guilty  of  a  deviation,  and  is  not 
entitled  to  retain  prepaid  freight;  the  bill  of  lading 
93-pte  na  i  ßa1  Drilling  Co  v.  M/V  Dori  -f9,  op.  cit,  p  119. 
94-the  Malcolm  Baxter, 
-Zl, 
277  U.  S.  p  323  {1927}. 
95-Ibid,  at  p  323,  by  adopting  somewhat  the  rule  of  Kjjk  v.  Taylor 
(1912]  A.  C.  p  604. 
96-(1945]  A.  M.  C.  p  363. 55 
providing  that  freight  shall  be  retained  ship  lost  or  not 
lost  is  displaced. 
Any  departure  then  from  the  contractual  or  customary 
route  to  the  dry  dock  because  of  unseaworthiness  will  be 
reasonable  if  the  carrier  exercises  due  diligence  to  make 
the  ship  seaworthy  prior  to  sailing  from  the  port  of 
loading  and  the  vessel  becomes  unseaworthy  in  her 
course.  97  On  the  other  hand,  the  carrier  had  no  reason 
for  deviation  after  accepting  cargo  for  discharge  at  a 
port  known  to  be  congested.  98 
The  court  held  in  E.  C.  L.  Snorting  Goods  v.  United  States 
Lines,  inc99,  that  a  deviation  from  the  intended  port  of 
discharge  is  reasonable  when  the  carrier  discovers  that 
the  specific  port  would  be  unable  to  provide  an  adequate 
crew  of  longshoremen  to  unload  the  vessel. 
Deviation  is  however  governed  by  the  individual 
circumstances  of  a  particular  case  and  we  have  to  reveal 
all  the  considerations  of  the  concern  of  all  shipowners, 
carriers,  and  should  consider  the  interests  of  all  cargo- 
owners.  The  court  held  in  The  Manx  Fisherl00,  that  the 
decision  of  the  carrier  to  divert  the  vessel  must  be  made 
with  due  regard  to  the  interests  of  all  cargo  on  board 
the  vessel  and  not  with  regard  solely  to  any  one 
shipment. 
97-y  va  ion  v.  General  Steam  Navigation  Cm  [1959]  A.  M.  C.  p  2233. 
98-Surrendrd  fovernea5}  v.  S.  S.  Hellening  Hero  (1963]  p  1217, 
99-]1970]  A.  M.  C.  p  400. 
100_(1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  177. 56 
2-LIBERTY  CLAUSES 
Deviation  is  always  arising  subsequent  to  the  start  of 
the  voyage.  Merely  intention  to  depart  means  nothing, 
unless  it  is  certainly  carried  into  performancelol. 
The  master  must  proceed  to  the  place  of  destination 
without  stopping  at  any  intermediate  port,  or  deviating 
from  the  customary  and  usual  course,  unless  such  stopping 
or  deviation  be  reasonable102,  such  as  when  the  ship  has 
liberty  to  deviate  from  the  contractual  or  customary 
route,  granted  by  the  bill  of  lading  or  by  the  policy  to 
touch  and  stay,  at  an  intermediate  port  on  the  voyage. 
That  means  that  the  ship's  liberty  to  call  at  any  ports 
should  be  expounded  to  the  vessel's  voyage  and  must  be 
construed  as  referring  to  the  vessel  cou  rse  of  that 
voyage  and  not  for  the  purpose  of  calling  at  any  port.  103 
For  example,  if  the  vessel  loads  at  "A"  and  "B"  for 
discharge  at  "C",  then  the  carrier  wants  to  load  the 
cargo  at  "A",  the  bill  of  lading  should  be  claused  via 
"B",  thus,  if  the  vessel  loads  at  "A"  for  discharge  at  "B" 
and  "C",  the  bill  of  lading  for  the  cargo  consigned  to 
"C"  must  be  claused  via  "B".  104 
If  the  bill  of  lading  contained  therefore  a  clause 
101-Faster.  v.  Wilmer,  93  E.  R.  p  1162. 
102-Abbott,  p  405. 
103_Halabury'5Laws  of  Engtana  Shipping-And  Navigat  ion,  14th,  ed, 
1983),  vol,  43,  para,  433,  p  265,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Halsbury's 
Shipping  and  Navigation;  Kent,  p  389. 
104-Dor,  p  38;  Raoul  Collinvaux,  carver's  Carriage  by  sea,  (13th, 
ed,  vol  2,1982),  para,  873,  hereinafter  cited  as  "2  Carver" 57 
permitting  the  vessel  to  "Proceed  and  sail  to,  and  touch 
and  stay,  at  any  ports  and  places  whatsoever",  even 
though  the  deviation  happened  outside  the  customary, 
usual  and  contractual  course,  it  will  be  of  no  avail 
unless  the  circumstances  in  the  particular  voyage, 
authorize  the  reasonableness  of  such  a  departure105.  For 
instance  most  of  the  bills  of  lading  contains  clauses 
granting  the  ship  the  right  to  call  at  a  port  for  bunkers 
accordingly,  if  a  vessel  calls  for  bunker  at  ports  on  the 
customary  route  of  the  agreed  voyage,  it  will  be  deemed 
reasonable  deviation106, 
As  well  as,  any  that  stay  outside  the  customary 
commercial  course  for  bunker  in  the  emergency 
105-The  T;,  {  Shan  (1953]  A.  M.  C.  p  887;  Franke  V.  MacAndrews__&_ 
CQ-Lt*d  [1929]  A.  C.  p  545,  where  it  is  held: 
"In  the  circumstances  the  route  via  Levants  was  a  usual  commercial 
route  for  the  ship  to  follow,  that  she  was  therefore  on  the 
contract  voyage  at  the  time  when  the  goods  were  lost";  Connolly 
Shaw,  Ltd.  V.  A/S  Det  Nordenf  jeldske  DIs  [1934]  49  L1.  L.  Rep,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"The  deviation  was  justified  under  the  particular  clause  and  it  was 
normal,  in  view  of  the  type  of  voyage  and  the  nature  of  the  cargo"; 
Leduc  &  Co.  v.  Ward  &  Others  (1888)  20  Q.  B.  p  475;  Compare,  _The 
Foreman  &  Ellam4,  Ltd  V.  Fedral  Steam  Navigation  CO  L.  td  (1928]  30 
L1.  L.  Rep.  p  52. 
106-The  San  uis_ppe  (1941]  A.  M.  C.  p  315;  Compare,  The  Thiess  Bros- 
JAW  V.  Australian  Steamshi  .  Ltdd  (1955]  1  Lloyd's  Rep,  p  464,  where 
it  is  held: 
"The  deviation  was  for  the  benefit  of  the  shipowners  and  the 
consequent  delay  was  to  the  detriment  of  the  cargo,  since  time  is 
especially  important  where  there  is  a  possibility  of  heating.  there 
was  no  need  to  obtain  additional  coal,  which  was  the  only  purpose 
of  the  deviation,  in  order  to  complete  the  contract  voyage  safety. 
The  benefit  to  the  defendants  was  outside  the  contract  voyage.  It 
did  not  assist  or  advantage  the  contract  voyage  in  any  way". 58 
circumstances,  the  carrier  will  not  be  responsible  for 
loss  or  damage  caused  to  the  cargo,  when  the  vessel's 
fuel  tanks  have  leaked  in  a  strong  hurricane.  107 
When  the  ship  commenced  her  voyage  with  an  adequate 
stock  of  fuel  for  a  particular  stage108  and  subsequently 
deviated  to  arrange  for  adequate  bunkers  at  intermediate 
ports  on  the  voyage.  This  kind  of  departure  would  be 
deemed  an  authorized  deviation  so  that  the  contractual 
voyage  might  be  performed.  109 
Mackinnon  L.  J  explained  the  situation  of  the  vessel's 
bunker  when  he  said: 
"the  intention  on  sailing  definitely  fixed  the 
stage  of  the  voyage  and  that  the  quantity  of 
bunkers  sufficient  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy 
for  that  stage  must  be  determined  in  view  of 
all  contingencies  which  a  prudent  shipowner 
ought  to  contemplate;  that  in  fixing  that 
quantity  a  shipowner  was  not  entitled  to  take 
into  account  the  existence  of  optional  bunker 
facilities  a.  n  rou  ;  and  that  therefore  the 
vessel  could  not  be  held  to  have  been 
sufficiently  supplied  with  bunkers  for  the 
107-The  Walter  Raleigh  (1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  618. 
108-The  Mak.  don;  a  (1962]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  614. 
109-Halsbury's  shipping  and  Navigation,  para  433,  footnote,  2,  where  he 
states: 
"Where  the  clause  gave  liberty  to  call  at  any  ports  in  any  order 
for  bunkering  and  other  purposes,  it  was  held  that  the  House  of 
Lords  that  stopping  to  land  engineers  who  had  sailed  in  order  to 
watch  the  performance  of  a  "Superheater"  was  not  within  the 
liberty.  All  their  Lordships  agreed  that  the  wo  rd"bunke  ring"  had 
some  limiting  effect  on  the  words  "other  purposes",  but  there  was 
difference  of  opinion  as  to  the  nature  of  this  limiting  effect"; 
See,  Stag  Line  Ltd  V.  Foscolo  Mango  &  Co  Ltd(1932]  A.  C  p  328,  (H.  L); 
cf.  United  States  Shipping  Board  v.  Bunge  Y  Born  Lda  So-  dad 
(1925}  16  Asp  MLC,  p  577,  (HL). 59 
stage  from  Vancouver  to  St.  Thomas,  which  was 
the  next  bunkering  port  fixed  by  the  owners"110. 
The  clause  granting  the  vessel  the  right  to  dry  dock 
with  cargo  aboard  is  frequently  included  in  bills  of 
lading. 
The  American  Court  considered  this  clause  as  it  is  not 
abusive  dry  docking  which  is  permitted  by  the  clause  of 
the  bill  of  lading  or  by  the  commercial  customary  and  the 
carrier  will  not  be  responsible  in  such  circumstances111. 
As  well  as,  for  the  clause  which  entitles  the  carrier 
to  carry  goods  beyond  the  port  of  destination  which  is 
not  provided  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  as  specific  text112, 
but  we  can  reveal  a  general  onus  which  is  mentioned  in 
Article  [3]  rule  [2,8)  and  Article  [4)  rule  (4]  of  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA113. 
110_E,  Timm  &  son..  d  v.  Northumbrian  Shipping  Company.  Ltd(1939]  64 
Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  33. 
111_por, 
op.  cit,  p  47;  2  Carver,  para  1167. 
112-Cunard  Steam  Ship  en.  v.  fuerger[1927]  A.  C.  p  1,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  terms  of  the  original  bill  of  lading  applied  to  the  carriage 
to  the  substituted  destinations,  but  that  in  the  absence  of  special 
protective  provisions  in  the  bill  of  lading". 
113-Article  [3]  rule[2]  provides: 
"Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  4,  the  carrier  shall  properly 
and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow,  carry,  keep,  care  for  and 
discharge  the  goods  carried". 
While  Article(3]  rule(8]  provides: 
"Any  clause,  covenant,  or  agreement  in  a  contract  of  carriage 
relieving  the  carrier  or  the  ship  from  liability  for  loss  or  damage 
to,  or  in  connection  with,  goods  arising  from  negligence,  fault,  or 
failure  in  the  duties  and  obligations  provided  in  this  Article  or 
lessening  such  liability  otherwise  than  as  provided  in  this 
convention,  shall  be  null  and  void  and  of  no  effect.  A  benefit  of 60 
The  authors  have  then  differed  between  themselves  about 
the  validity  of  the  aforementioned  clause. 
Accordingly  one  of  them  considers  this  clause  to  be  not 
valid,  that  if  the  carrier  undertakes  to  transport  the 
cargo  from  the  port  of  loading  to  the  port  of  discharge, 
he  should  load  them  and  be  pursued  over  the  usual  and 
customary  route  between  the  termini.  Other  authors,  argue 
that  this  clause  does  not  contravene  the  provisions  of 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA. 
The  court  has  made  that  quite  clear,  in  the  West 
ßt114,  by  saying: 
"The  call  at  Recife  was  not  a  deviation;  it  was 
permitted  by  the  "liberties"  clause-in  or  out 
of  scheduled  itinerary,  away  from  port  of 
discharge  for  purpose  of  prior  voyage.  The 
reversal  of  Fortaleza  and  Tutoya  was  not  a 
deviation,  it  benefitted  the  shippers  as  well 
as  the  ship  by  decreasing  the  time  of  the 
voyage,  and  was  within  the  "liberties"  clause. 
If  the  COGSA  sec,  4  {4}  applied,  the  deviations 
were  reasonable,  and  were  not  made  "for  purpose 
of  loading  cargo"  because  the  calls  had  been 
contracted  for,  and  without  reference  to  the 
geographical  order". 
The  liberty  conferred  applies  to  every  case  except 
where  it  is  sought  to  be  exercised  out  of  mere  caprice.  115 
It  applies  then  only  in  specified  circumstances  which  are 
not  proved  to  have  occurred.  116 
insurance  in  favour 
demeed  to  be  a  clause 
114-[1951]  A.  M.  C.  p  1, 
115-Per  Bray  J,  in,  B. 
oriental  Steam  Naves  a{ 
116-Per  Lord  Summer,.  C 
of  the  carrier  or  similar  clause  shall  be 
relieving  the  carrier  from  liability". 
505. 
roken  Hill  Proprietary  Co.  Ltd  v.  Peninsular  & 
:  ionS'o  [1917]  1  K.  B.  pp  692-694. 
+nardS  .  Pam  Ship  Co.  v.  Buerger[1927]  A.  C.  p  9. 61 
The  court  might  then  concede  the  validity  of  such  a 
clause,  it  should  be  submitted  to  three  conditions: 
First:  the  carrier  does  not  abuse  his  right. 
Second:  the  carrier  applies  his  right  "reasonably". 
Third:  he  is  able  to  prove  his  absence  of  fault  or  of 
his  agents117. 
Many  bills  of  lading  contain  a  specific  clause 
authorizing  deck  cargo  as  follows: 
"Steamer  has  liberty  to  carry  goods  on  deck  and 
shipowners  will  not  responsible  for  any  loss  or 
damage  or  claim  arising  therefrom". 
In  such  cases  if  the  clause  has  been  fixed  on  the  face 
of  the  bill  of  lading,  the  Hague/Visby  Rules118  and  COGSA 
do  not  apply119,  but  the  carrier  will  not  be  excused  from 
0  his  obligation  under  Article  3  {2}.  12 
Then  that  such  clause  will  be  valid  when  it  refers  to 
the  goods  actually  named  in  the  bill  of  lading  and  must 
be  construed  in  the  light  of  the  commercial  adventure 
undertaken  by  the  shipowner.  121 
117-Dor,  op.  cit,  pp  66-67. 
118-Aetna,  In  ,  Co  v.  Carl  M>  >a  _k 
Co  (19561  A.  M.  C.  p  400;  W,  Saul?  & 
Albion  Cn  V.  Electric  Reduction  Sales  Co  cThe  Mahia)  (1955]  1 
Lloyds.  Rep,  p  265;  Export  Prpiect  Services  v.  Steinfe14  (1975] 
A.  M.  C.  p  765. 
119-Gioandan  Delawanna.  v.  Blijdendlk  (1950]  A.  M.  C.  p  1235;  e 
Solven  s  .  o.  v.  California  (1948]  A.  M.  C.  p  622. 
120-Blanctard  Lumber  Co  v.  S.  S.  Anthony  II,  (1967)  A.  M.  C.  p  103. 
121-Armour  V.  Leopold  (1921)  3  K.  B.  p  473;  per  Lord  Esher,  in, 
)m1yn.  V.  Wood  (1891]  2  Q.  B.  pp  488-91,  where  he  said: 
"The  court  has  no  right  to  imply  in  a  written  contract  any  such 
stipulation,  unless,  on  considering  the  terms  of  the  contract  in  a 62 
The  carrier  could  therefore  ship  goods  on  deck  unless 
notified  by  the  shipper  or  his  agent122,  but  the  problem 
arises  when  the  bill  of  lading  contains  a  general  clause 
of  the  following  type: 
"The  scope  of  voyage  herein  contracted  for 
shall  include  usual  or  customary  or  advertised 
ports  of  call  whether  named  in  this  contract  or 
not,  also  ports  in  or  out  of  the  advertised, 
geographical  usual  or  ordinary  route  or  order, 
even  though  in  proceeding  thereto  the  ship  may 
sail  beyond  the  port  of  discharge  or  in  a 
direction  contrary  thereto,  or  depart  from  the 
direct  or  customary  route.  The  ship  may  call  at 
any  port  for  the  purpose  of  the  current  voyage 
or  of  a  prior  or  subsequent  voyage.  The  ship 
may  omit  calling  at  any  port  or  ports  whether 
scheduled  or  not,  and  may  call  at  the  same  port 
more  than  once,  may  either  with  or  without  the 
goods  on  board,  and  before  or  after  proceeding 
toward  the  port  of  discharge,  adjust  compasses, 
dry  dock,  go  on  ways  or  to  repair  yards,  shift 
berth,  take  fuel  or  store,  remain  in  port,  sail 
without  pilots,  tow  and  be  towed,  and  save  or 
attempt  to  save  life  or  property,  and  all  of 
the  foregoing  are  included  in  the  contract 
voyage",  123 
It  would  seem  difficult  to  depart  from  such  voyage,  but 
reasonable  and  business  manner,  an  implication  necessarily  arises 
that  the  parties  must  have  intended  that  the  suggested  stipulation 
should  exist.  It  is  not  enough  to  say  that  it  would  be  a  reasonable 
thing  to  make  such  an  implication.  It  must  be  a  necessary 
implication  in  the  sence  that  I  have  mentioned";  Svenska  Trakter  v. 
Maritime  Agencies  [1953]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  570. 
122-Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Tnc  v.  Honkong  Producer[1969]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1741. 
123-Gilmore  &  Black,  pp  177-178. 63 
when  the  face  of  the  clean  bill  of  lading  does  not  state 
deck  cargo,  then  the  carrier  has  not  exercised  a  deck 
option  because  such  clause  will  be  contradicted  with  the 
general  principle  which  mentioned  in  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  and  COGSA  in  Article  [3]  para  {2,8},  that  the 
carrier  must  be  very  careful  with  the  loading,  handling, 
stowage,  carriage,  custody,  care  and  discharge  of  such 
goods. 
Any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  during  the  planned 
voyage  arising  from  negligence,  fault,  or  failure  in  the 
duties  and  obligations  provided  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
or  COGSA,  the  carrier  would  be  responsible  for  such  loss 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  in  connection  with  such  lack  of 
care,  even  though  the  bill  of  lading  contains  a  specific 
clause,  covenant,  or  agreement  relieving  the  carrier  or 
the  ship  from  such  liability  because  this  clause  is  null 
and  void.  124 
The  actual  facts  of  what  constitutes  a  deviation  is 
thus  more  important  than  the  clause  itself,  because  the 
courts  have  not  admitted  any  general  liberties  clause 
more  than  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  admit  at  Article  4  (4), 
and  the  courts  must  interpret  such  clause  as  being 
reasonably  construed.  125 
The  court,  however,  in  E.  Q  L,  Sporting  Goods  v.  U.  S. 
=ines126,  held  that  when  a  deviation  is  reasonable  and  is 
124-Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law,  p  64. 
125-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  356. 
126-[1970]  A.  M.  C.  p  400;  Kroll.  v.  Silver  Line  (The  Manxfishert, 
(1954]  A.  M.  C.  pp  177-79 64 
excused  by  the  liberties  clause  of  the  bill  of  lading 
then  it  is  not  considered  a  deviation.  As  well  as,  the 
purpose  and  meaning  of  the  stamped  clause  was  not  to  add 
to  the  discretions  and  power  of  the  master  under  the 
liberties  clause,  but  rather  to  state  an  essential 
element  of  the  contract  of  carriage  such  as  in  transport 
of  seasonal  goods. 
127 
In  referring  to  a  clause  which  permitted  deviation 
"owing  to  war  conditions",  the  court  does  not  excuse 
deviation  for  causes  not  arising  out  of  war  conditions.  128 
Brandon,  J,  however  in  The  Berkshire129,  did  not 
consider  the  question  of  the  validity  of  a  general 
liberties  clause  but  construed  it  restrictively  where  he 
said  that: 
"In  my  view  it  was,  by  discharging  the  goods  at 
an  intermediary  port  and  transhipping  them  into 
another  ship  not  owned  or  operated  by  them,  the 
shipowners  were  making  a  fundamental  departure 
from  the  method  of  performing  the  contract 
contemplated  by  the  parties  at  the  time  it  was 
made"" 
Cargo  carried  on  deck  is  however  subject  to  the  Hamburg 
Rules  when  it  is  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  with  the 
shipper  or  with  the  usage  of  the  particular  trade  or  is 
required  by  statutory  rules  or  regulations. 
130 
127-Singapore  Trader  [1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  883. 
128-The  Blandon  [1923]  A.  M.  C.  p  242;  Surrendra  1overseasl  V.  S.  S. 
Hellen  i-  Hero  [1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  1217. 
129-[1927]  1  Lloyds,  Rep,  p  185. 
130-Article  {9)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 
"1-The  carrier  is  entitled  to  carry  the  goods  on  deck  only  if  such 
carriage  is  in  accordance  with  the  shipper  or  with  the  usage  of  the 65 
Finally,  most  bills  of  lading  reiterate  the  clause 
which  grants  the  vessel  the  right  to  save  or  attempt  to 
save  life131  or  property  at  sea  or  property  at  sea  and  to 
tow  any  ship  in  no  matter  what  circumstances,  which  is 
stated  in  the  Article  4  {2,4}  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
and  COGSA.  The  implied  meaning  in  the  above  clause  that 
the  deviation  should  not  be  construed  more  than 
necessary,  otherwise,  the  exoneration  clauses  should  be 
lost,  such  as,  when  the  vessel  towed  the  disaster  vessel 
farther  than  the  safer  port. 
132  Such  clause  usually  does 
not  expand  in  the  case  of  substitution  of  a  different 
vessel,  i.  e;  in  the  case  of  a  change  of  voyage.  133 
particular  trade  or  is  required  by  statutory  rules  or  regulations. 
2-If  the  carrier  and  the  shipper  have  agreed  that  the  goods  shall 
or  may  be  carried  on  deck,  the  carrier  must  insert  in  the  bill  of 
lading  or  other  document  evidencing  the  contract  of  carriage  by  sea 
a  statement  to  that  effect.  In  the  absence  of  such  a  statement  the 
carrier  has  the  burden  of  proving  that  an  agreement  for  carriage  on 
deck  has  been  entered;  however,  the  carrier  is  not  entitled  to 
invoke  such  an  agreement  against  a  third  party,  including  a 
consignee,  who  has  acquired  the  bill  of  lading  in  good  faith. 
3-Where  the  goods  have  been  carried  on  deck  contrary  to  the 
provisions  of  paragraph  1,  of  this  article  or  where  the  carrier  may 
not  under  paragraph  (2)  of  this  article  invoke  an  agreement  for 
carriage  on  deck,  the  carrier  notwithstanding,  the  provisions  of 
paragraph  1  of  article  5,  is  liable  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
goods,  as  well  as,  for  delay  in  delivery  resulting  solely  from  the 
carriage  on  deck  and  the  extent  of  his  liability  is  to  be 
determined  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  article  (6]  or 
article  (8]  of  this  convention,  as  the  case  may  be. 
4-Carriage  of  goods  on  deck  contrary  to  express  agreement  for 
carriage  under  deck  is  deemed  to  be  an  act  or  omission  of  the 
carrier  within  the  meaning  of  article  [8]". 
131-2  Carver,  para,  1174;  Dor,  p  47. 
132-In  Re  Meyer  (1896)  74  F.  pp  881-897. 
133-William  D.  Winter,  Marine  Insurance  its  Principles  and  Practice, 66 
3-EXCEPTIONAL  PERILS 
Article  4  {2}{c}  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  the  COGSA  in 
the  United  States  and  in  the  United  Kingdom  express  the 
exceptional  perils  as  follows: 
"Perils,  dangers  and  accidents  of  the  sea  or 
other  navigable  waters".  134 
{3rd,  ed,  19521  p  169,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Winter". 
134-The  Hague/Visby  Rules  have  a  number  of  exceptions  provide  in 
Article{4}  as  follows: 
"a"  Act,  neglect,  or  default  of  the  master,  mariner,  pilot,  or  the 
servants  of  the  carrier  in  the  navigation  or  in  the  management  of 
the  ship; 
"b"  Fire,  unless  caused  by  the  actual  fault  or  privity  of  the 
carrier; 
"c"  Perils,  dangers,  and  accidents  of  the  sea  or  other  navigable 
waters; 
"d"  Act  of  God; 
"e"  Act  of  war  ; 
'If"  Act  of  public  enemies; 
"g"  Arrest  or  restraint  of  princes,  rulers  of  people,  or  seizure 
under  legal  process; 
"h"  Quarantine  restrictions; 
"i"  Act  or  omission  of  the  shippers  or  owner  of  the  goods,  his 
agent  or  representative; 
"j"  Strikes  or  lockouts  or  stoppage  or  restraint  of  labour  from 
whatever  cause,  whether  partial  or  general; 
"k"  Riots  and  civil  commotions; 
"1'  Saving  or  attempting  to  save  life  or  property  at  sea; 
"MI,  Wastage  in  bulk  or  weight  or  vice  of  the  goods; 
"n"  Insufficiency  of  packing; 
"o"  Insufficiency  or  inadequacy  of  mar'kes; 
"p"  Latent  defects  not  discoverable  by  due  diligence; 
"q"  Any  other  cause  arising  without  the  actual  fault  or  privity  of 
the  carrier,  or  without  the  fault  or  neglect  of  the  agents  or 
servants  of  the  carrier,  but  the  burden  of  proof  shall  be  on  the 
person  claiming  the  benefit  of  this  exception  to  show  that  neither 
the  actual  fault  or  privity  of  the  carrier  nor  the  fault  or  neglect 67 
These  accidents  are  in  connection  with  navigation  of  a 
vessel  on  the  sea  which  are  not  contemplated  at  the  time 
the  contract  was  made.  135 
An  accident  is  that  which  happens  without  the  fault  of 
any  body,  and  was  not  caused  by  or  contributed  to  by  any 
negligence  or  fault  or  failure  upon  the,  part  of  the 
carrier  or  his  servants.  136  Consequently  a  collision  which 
is  the  fault  of  somebody  is  not  an  accident  of  the  sea,  137 
unless  there  has  been  some  incursion  of  the  seawater,  or 
accidental  action  of  the  waves.  138 
When  the  weather  is  so  exceptionally  severe  as  to  show 
a  peril  of  the  sea139,  then  it  is  not  sufficient  to 
constitute  that  weather  conditions  were  severe.  140  Every 
accident  is  therefore  a  thing  which  occurs,  but  every 
occurrence  is  not  an  accident. 
141 
Namely,  the  perils  which  are  peculiar  to  the  sea,  and 
which  are  of  an  extraordinary  nature  or  arise  from 
irresistible  force  or  overwhelming  power,  and  which 
cannot  be  guarded  against  by  the  ordinary  exertions  of 
human  skill  and  prudence. 
of  the  agents  or  servants  of  the  carrier  contributed  to  the  loss  or. 
damage". 
135-1  Carver,  pars  209;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  195. 
136-b  deb  os  v.  Hill  {1832}  8  Bing,  p  235  1131  E.  R.  p  391]. 
137-Brett  L.  J,  in  , Chartered  Merchant;  1e  Bank  of  India  V. 
Netherlands  Tndi  Steam  Navigation  Co  (1893)  10  Q.  H.  p  530. 
138-Hamilton  v.  Pandorf  (1887)  12  A.  C.  p  518,  per  Bramwell,  p  527. 
139-W.  p.  Wood  A  ro  v.  Hanseatische  Reederi  Akiengesllschaft  (1930) 
37  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  144 
140-Astle,  Shipping  Law,  p  143. 
141-Eenwink  v.  Schmalz,  L.  R.  3  C.  P.  313{1868). 68 
American  jurisprudence  has  however  been  stricter  in  its 
definition  than  English  jurisprudence142  where  Hough  J.  in 
The  Rosalia143,  said: 
"Something  so  catastrophic  as  to  triumph  over 
these  safe  guards  by  which  skilful  and  vigilant 
seamen  usually  bring  ship  and  cargo  to  port  in 
safety". 
Whether  there  is  exceptional  peril  or  not  is  a  question 
of  fact.  144 
The  exceptions  do  not  describe  the  damage,  they 
describe  the  cause  of  the  damage.  It  is  necessary 
therefore  to  see  whether  the  cause  of  the  damage  is  one 
which  is  excepted.  145  The  causal  relation  between  the 
damage  by  the  seawater  and  the  exceptional  perils  must  be 
shown.  146  The  carrier  should  not  escape  liability  for 
cargo  damage  without  establishing  clearly  and 
satisfactorily  the  cause  of  damage  and  their  right  to 
exoneration.  147 
If  a  loss  is  occasioned  by  want  of  due  care  and 
diligence  of  furnishing  a  seaworthy  ship,  the  shipowner 
142-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  195. 
143_264  Fed.  Rep.  p  285  at  p  288,  R.  T.  Jones  Lumber  Co  v.  Rogen  S.  S. 
_ 
Ca.  (1960)  A.  M.  G.  p  46  at  49. 
144-Tetley,  Marine  claim,  p  198. 
145-Lord  Esher,  in,  Pandorf  v.  Hamilton  (1887)  17  Q.  B.  D.  p  675; 
LeeshRiver  Ta  Co.  Ltd  v.  British  Tnei  a  Steam  NavigationSo_(1967] 
2  Q.  B.  p  250. 
146_ßn  v.  Steam  ship  Folmina,  212  U.  S.  p  546;  Mr.  Justice  McNair, 
in,  The  by  ebassa  (1966]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  458. 
147-The 
Caledonia, 
157  U.  S.  pp  124,144;  G.  H.  Renton  &  Co.  Ltd  V. 
Palmyra  Trading  Corporation  Of  Panama  (1957]  A.  C.  p  149. 69 
is  liable  even  if  the  loss  was  occasioned  by  an  excepted 
peril. 
148 
Where  the  weather  was  however  no  more  severe  than  was 
to  be  expected  at  the  time  of  the  year,  on  the  voyage  in 
question,  and  the  breaking  adrift  of  the  barrels  was  due 
to  bad  stowage149  then  the  carrier  was  not  exempt. 
Deviation  from  the  proper  course  of  the  voyage  should 
be  commensurate  with  the  necessity  which  will  justify  the 
deviating  ship.  A  deviation  for  necessity  then  must  be 
justified  both  as  to  substance  and  manner.  Nothing  more 
must  be  done  than  that  the  necessity  requires.  150 
The  master  should  take  into  account  the  interests  of 
all  concerned  when  the  vessel  deviated  from  the 
customary,  usual,  and  agreed  course  of  the  voyage  for  the 
purpose  of  avoiding  a  danger  to  both  ship  and  cargo  were 
exposed.  151 
Article  5{l}  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides  : 
"The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  resulting  from 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods,  as  well  as, 
from  delay  in  delivery,  if  the  occurrence  which 
caused  the  loss,  damage,  or  delay  took  place 
while  the  goods  were  in  his  charge  as  defined 
in  Article,  4,  unless  the  carrier  proves  that 
he,  his  servants  or  agents,  took  all  measures 
that  could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
occurrence  and  its  consequences". 
148-Walton  J,  in,  Blackburn.  v.  Liverpool  Brazil  &  River  Plaka 
Steam  Navigation  Co.  (1902]  1  K.  B.  p  290;  Notara.  v.  $Pndersan 
(1872)  L.  R.  7  Q.  B.  pp  235-36;  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  163. 
149-Cooper  Stewart  Engineering  Co.  Ltd  v.  reanadian  Pacific  Railway 
Cu.  (1933]  45  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  246. 
150-Lavabre  v.  Wilson,  1  Dougl,  p  291(99  E.  R.  p  185]. 
151-The  T  ,  tonia.  in  Re-Duncan  v.  aster,  8  Moo.  N.  S.  p  411(17  E.  R. 
p  3661. 70 
Accordingly,  the  catalogue  of  exceptions  contained  in 
Article  4{2}  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  was  not  adopted  by 
the  Hamburg  Rules  but  an  affirmative  rule  is  selected  for 
responsibility  based  on  presumed  fault. 
The  problem  has  arisen  thus  where  the  carrier's 
negligence  combines  with  excepted  peril  to  cause  the 
damage.  The  Hamburg  Rules  state  that  the  carrier  will 
only  be  liable  for  that  proportion  of  the  damage  caused 
by  his  fault  or  negligence  when  Article  5  {7}  provides: 
"Only  to  the  extent  that  the  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery  is  attributable  to  such  fault 
or  neglect  that  the  carrier  proves  the  amount 
of  the  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  not 
attributable  thereto"152. 
152_J.  F.  Wilson,  "Basic  Carrier  Liability  and  the  Right  of 
Limitation",  Published  In  The  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Ana.  Edited  By  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  137,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Wilson". 71 
COMMENT 
One  can  conclude  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that 
both  English  and  American  jurisprudence  concerning  the 
judicial  interpretation  of  the  term  reasonable  that  it  is 
frequently  used  loosely  and  governed  by  the  circumstances 
of  the  particular  case  in  the  light  of  analogous 
precedents. 
Greer  L.  J.  in  Foscolo.  Mango  v.  Stag  Line153,  where  he 
said: 
"did  not  think  the  words  of  Rule  4  Article  {4} 
of  the  COGSA  are  confined  to  deviation 
"reasonably  necessary  to  avoid  imminent  peril" 
but  he  thought  that  Rule  4  is  to  be  read  as 
enlarging  the  area  in  which  a  deviation  will 
not  be  deemed  to  be  a  breach  of  the  contract". 
Whereas  Lord  Atkin154  indicated  that  the  "true  test"  of 
the  reasonable  deviation  "when  the  prudent  man  considers 
the  interest  of  both  the  shipowners  and  the  carrier  and 
all  the  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  deviation  took 
place". 
American  courts  have  nevertheless  purported  to 
translate  the  "Ixia"  rationale  more  narrowly,  then  such 
deviation  may  be  construed  as  unreasonable,  where  the 
departure  was  foreseeable  by  the  carrier  at  the  time  of 
the  performance.  A  new  consideration  was  established  by 
American  decisions  when  the  court  held  that: 
153_[1931]  2  K.  B.  p  68. 
154_Foscolo  Mango  &  Co  v.  Stag  Line  Ltd  (1931]  41  LI.  L.  Rep.  p 
165{H.  L},  hereinafter  cited  as  "Ixia". 72 
"The  decision  of  the  carrier  to  divert  the 
vessel  must  be  made  with  due  regard  to  the 
interests  of  all  cargo  on  board  the  vessel  and 
not  with  regard  solely  to  any  one  shipment"155. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  in  Article  5{6}  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable,  except  in  general 
average  where  loss,  damage  or  delay  in  delivery 
resulted  from  measures  to  save  life  or  from 
reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at  sea". 
If  we  want  to  apply  these  Rules  on  the  "Ixia",  then, 
the  carrier  will  be  unable  to  prove  that  he  took  all 
measures  that  could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
occurrence156.  Accordingly,  whether  deviation  is 
reasonable  or  not  has  always  been  said  to  be  a  question 
of  fact.  That  means  that  deviation  is  governed  by  the 
individual  circumstances  which  actually  exist157  of  the 
particular  cases  and  the  carrier  must  consider  the 
interests  of  all  cargo-owners  and  benefit  both  shipowners 
and  cargo  interests. 
Where  the  ship  deviates  from  the  customary,  usual  and 
agreed  course  of  the  voyage  and  such  departure  is  covered 
by  the  liberty  clause  then  the  deviation  becomes  part  of 
the  contract  voyagel5ß.  The  most  important  thing  is 
155-Kroll  v.  Silver  Line  (Mang  Fish  -r1, 
[1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  177. 
156-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules  ,p  17. 
157-Per  Lord  Herschell,  in,  ilk.  v.  Raumond  &  Reid  [1893]  A.  C.  p 
29,  where  he  states: 
"When  I.  say  the  circumstances  which  actually  exist,  I,  of  course, 
imply  that  those  circumstances,  in  so  far  as,  they  involve  delay, 
have  not  been  caused  or  contributed  by  the  consignee". 
158-Mackinnon  J,  in,  walleins  Rederij  A/a,  v.  WM.  H.  Muller  &&  Co_L 73 
therefore  not  what  is  the  route  prescribed  by  the  bill  of 
lading,  whether  by  custom  or  usual,  but  whether  it  is 
permissible  when  once  that  route  was  ascertained  to 
deviate  from  it.  159  Viz,  that  the  two  parts  of  the  bill  of 
lading,  the  described  voyage  and  the  liberty  to  deviate, 
must  be  read  together  and  reconciled.  A  liberty  to 
deviate,  however  generally  worded,  could  not  frustrate 
but  must  be  subordinate  to  the  described  voyage.  I60 
If  there  is  then  a  conflict  between  general  printed 
conditions  and  special  written  conditions,  the  general 
words  must  be  limited  so  that  they  shall  be  consistent 
with  and  shall  not  defeat  the  main  object  of  the 
contracting  parties.  161  Generally  the  courts  have  not 
considered  so  much  the  clause  admitting  deviation  as  the 
scope  of  the  deviation  itself  to  determine  whether  it  is 
reasonable  or  not. 
English  courts  have  narrowly  construed162  "liberties" 
clause  more  than  the  American  courts  which  have  construed 
Batavia  [1927]  2  K.  B.  p  106;  Reardon  Smith  Line,  Ltd  V.  Black  SP  & 
Baltic  General  Insurance  Cn  Ltd  (19391  A.  C.  p  562. 
159-Leduc  &  Co  v.  Ward  {1888}  20  Q.  B.  D.  p  475;  Glynn  v.  Margetson  & 
[1892]  1  Q.  B.  p  337;  [1893]  A.  C.  p  351. 
160-Per  Viscount  Summer,  in,  Frenkel  v.  Macandrews  (1929]  A.  C.  P 
562;  Connolly  Shaw,  Ltd  v.  A/S  Derr  Norden  Pjeidske  D/S  (1934]  49 
Ll.  L.  Rep.  pp  183-190. 
161-Per  Lord  Morton  of  Henryton,  in,  Renton  v.  Palmyra  Trading  Corp 
(1957]  A.  C.  p  168. 
162-Mr.  Justice  Brandon,  in,  Berkshire  [1974]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  185, 
where  he  gives  support  to  this  principle  by  giving  a  narrow  reading 
to  deviation  clauses;  Compare,  Ha  ji  Ali  Akbar,  v.  Anglo-Arabian 
r-o{1906}  11  Com.  Cas,  p  219. 74 
the  liberties  clauses  in  a  broader  sense  in  the  light  of 
the  carrier's  duty  to  properly  and  carefully  transport 
the  goods.  163  It  would  appear  that  even  under  a  voyage 
clause...  a  deviation  occurs  when  the  liberties  conferred 
by  the  clause  are  pushed  beyond  reasonableness  in  the 
light  of  the  carrier's  duties  to  cargo.  164 
An  analysis  of  the  exceptional  perils  leads  however  one 
to  the  conclusion  that  many  of  the  reasons  for  deviations 
correspond  to  excepted  perils165  under  Article  4  {2}  of 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA. 
These  immunities166  make  the  carrier  escape  from 
liability  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  arising  from  any 
cause,  except  where  such  damage  occurred  by  the  fault  of 
the  carrier  or  his  servants  and  where  the  cargo  has  been 
damaged  or  lost  during  the  deviation-167  Consequently  any 
loss  caused  by  unreasonable  deviation  is  not  excused  by 
Article  4  {2}.  168 
Finally,  the  Second  Report169  and  its  findings,  are 
163-Hellenic!  Lines,  Ltd  v.  United  States,  512  F.  2d,  p  1196,  (2d 
cir.  1975);  Article  3{2)  of  COGSA  of  the  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
164-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  178. 
165-Lord  Chorly  of  Kendal  &  C.  T.  Bailhache,  The  Law  of  ne 
Insurance  and  Average.  1961,  vol  9,  para,  478,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"9  Arnould" 
166-David  M.  Walker,  Principles  o  Scottish  Private  saw,  (3rd,  ed, 
vol  II,  1983),  p  346,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Walker,  Private  Law". 
167-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  180;  Lord  Chorley  &  Giles,  Shipping  Law, 
(7th,  ed,  1980)  p  208,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Chorley  &  Giles";  Lord 
Maugham,  in,  Hain  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Tate  &  Lyle  (1936)  52  T.  L.  R.  p  617 
168-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  180. 
169-Second  Report  of  The  Secretary-General,  pp  18,19,27,28. 75 
summarized  as  follows: 
"Second,  while  the  exemption  from  carrier 
liability  for  deviations  to  save  life  at  sea 
has  created  little  controversy,  the  exemption 
for  deviations  to  save  property  has  been 
criticized  because  it  might  encourage  carriers 
to  deviate  when  it  is  in  their  own  interests  to 
do  so,  to  the  detriment  of  the  cargo. 
Third,  the  exemption  from  liability  for  any 
reasonable  deviation  has  proved  difficult  to 
construe  and  apply.  No  specific  formulation  of 
what  constitutes  a  reasonable  deviation  has 
evolved  from  case  law,  largely  because  of  the 
widely  varying  circumstances  in  which 
deviations  can  occur.  Moreover,  it  is  not  clear 
under  Article  4{4}  of  the  Brussels  Convention 
which  party  should  bear  the  burden  of  proving 
the  reasonableness  of  a  deviation". 
ii-UNREASONABLE  DEVIATION 
Article  4  {4]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  implied  the 
meaning  of  unreasonable  deviation  by  explaining  the  term 
"reasonable  deviation"  without  supplying  criteria  for 
what  constitutes  the  reasonableness.  170  A  proviso  which  is 
not  mentioned  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  was  attached  to 
the  Article  4  [4]  of  the  United  States  Cogsa  as  follows: 
"Provided,  however,  that  if  the  deviation  is 
for  the  purpose  of  loading  or  unloading  cargo 
or  passengers  it  shall,  prima  facie,  be 
regarded  as  unreasonable". 
170_A 
-lan  it  Mutual  v.  Poseidon  (19631  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  668,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"There  is  no  question  about  the  fact  that  prior  to  the  enactment  of 
the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  act,  the  doctrine  of  unjustifiable 
deviation  was  firmly  entrenched  in  maritime  law". 76 
The  tacit  understanding  of  this  added  proviso  and  the 
implied  duty  on  the  owner  of  the  vessel  seems  to  be  that 
the  vessel  should  proceed  without  unnecessary  deviation 
in  the  customary,  usual  and  agreed  voyage171  and  the 
carrier  should  not  permitted  to  depart  from  such  a  course 
for  the  purpose  of  increasing  his  own  profits. 
Deviation,  which  is  against  the  interests  of  any  party 
to  the  contract  of  carriage,  prima  facie  is  regarded  as 
unreasonable.  The  absence  of  the  element  of  joint 
interest  may  well  be  an  important  indication  of 
unreasonable  deviation  without  being  conclusive.  172 
An  unreasonable  deviation  changes  then  the  nature  of 
the  voyage  so  essentially  as  to  constitute  an  entirely 
different  venture  from  that  contemplated  by  the 
contracting  parties,  173  because  deviation  will  change  the 
peculiar  nature  of  a  maritime  adventure  which  concern  the 
contracting  parties  jointly.  174 
Article  5[l)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  resulting  from 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods,  as  well  as  from 
delay  in  delivery,  if  the  occurrence  which 
caused  the  loss,  damage  or  delay  took  place 
while  the  goods  where  in  his  charge  as  defined 
in  Article  4,  unless  the  carrier  proves  that 
he,  his  servants  or  agents  took  all  measures 
that  could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
occurrence  and  its  consequences". 
171-Davis  v.  a  t,  6  Bing,  p  715(130  E.  R  p  14561. 
172-Per  Lord  Macmillan,  in, 
, 
Ix,  ip,  (1932]  A.  C.  p  328  at  350  {H-L}, 
173-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  818. 
174-Tate  &  Lyle.  Ltd  v.  Hain  S.  S  Co.  Ltd  [1936]  55  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  178. 77 
We  can  reveal  that  the  Hamburg  Rules  have  recovered  any 
loss,  damage  or  delay  caused  by  deviations,  which  are 
supposed  to  be  unreasonable  unless  the  carrier  can  prove 
otherwise.  The  Hamburg  Rules  are,  however,  more 
advantageous  regime  for  cargo  in  the  event  of  carrier 
misconduct  and  they  are  not  in  fact  more  favourable  to 
the  carrier175. 
The  criteria  which  are  made  by  the  carrier's  act  for 
reasonable  deviation  may  control  an  unreasonableness 
where  the  deviation  is  not  reasonable.  The  criterion  of 
reasonableness  can  sometimes  be  used  to  govern  an 
unreasonable  deviation  but  not  vice-versa  because  the 
carrier's  act  which  is  not  reasonable  should  be 
unreasonable. 
UNITED  KINGDOM  AND  UNITED  STATES  JURISPRUDENCE 
The  United  Kingdom  and  The  United  States  Courts  have 
already  explained  the  meaning  of  the  term  unreasonable 
deviation  in  the  light  of  analogous  precedents  of 
particular  cases. 
In  the  Lousie176  the  court  held  that  where  a  vessel 
began  her  voyage  in  a  flagrantly  unseaworthy  condition 
and  is  forced  to  return  to  port  for  repairs,  that  is 
175-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  180. 
176_(1945]  A.  M.  C.  p  363;  Lord  Porter,  in,  Monarch  S.  S  Co  V. 
Karlshomns  Oljefabriker  (1949]  A.  C.  p  196  at  p  210,  where  he  said: 
"Undoubtedly  deviation  necessarily  made  to  remedy  unseaworthiness 
does  not  amount  to  unjustifiable  deviation  or  destroy  the  right  to 
rely  upon  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  carriage  unless  it  is 
established  that  the  owners  knew  of  the  vessel's  state  on  sailing" 78 
sufficient  to  establish  a  voluntary  deviation.  The 
prudent  shipowner  ought  then  to  contemplate  all 
contingencies  of  the  sufficient  quantity  of  bunkers  to 
make  the  vessel  seaworthy  for  a  specific  stage  at  the 
time  of  performance  of  her  voyage.  177 
While  the  damages  were  caused  by  the  placing  of  an 
embargo  on  the  vessel's  sailing  where  repairs  were  in 
progress,  the  carrier  shall  not  be  responsible178  because 
it  is  within  the  exception  of  the  bill  of  lading.  179 
Whereas  any  departure  from  the  customary,  usual  and 
agreed  course  of  voyage  after  the  United  States  placed  an 
embargo  on  cargo  shipment  to  Castro's  regime  was 
sufficient  to  establish  an  unreasonable  deviation  because 
the  political  situation  for  Castor's  regime  was  well 
known  to  every  one  concerned  when  the  bill  of  lading  was 
issued.  180 
Likewise,  any  deviation  in  the  conduct  of  the  ship  and 
return  of  the  cargo  to  the  port  of  departure  in  order  to 
avoid  port  of  discharge  because  it  was  too  congested 
would  be  sufficient  to  constitute  unreasonable  deviation 
where  the  congestion  was  well  known  and  expected  by  both 
the  shipper  and  the  carrier  at  the  time  the  contract  was 
177-TiMM  v.  Northumbrian  (1939]  64  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  33. 
178_Repubtic 
o  an  v.  French  OvP  . seas  Carp,  Reported  by  the 
official  report  under  the  title  of  the  "  ?  colm  Baxter.  Jr",  277 
U.  S.  pp  323-333. 
179-ýnterna_in 
a1  aper.  Co  v.  TheeGGrac±e  D.  Chi,  248  U.  S.  p 
387;  Standard  Varnish  wo  kQ  v.  The  Bris,  248  U.  S.  p  392;  A  lanwilde 
Transport  CoMv.  Vacuum  Oil  Cn,  248  U.  S.  p  377 
180-Ruth  Ann  (1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  117. 79 
made.  181 
The  fundamental  obligation  of  a  common  carrier  is,  of 
course,  to  deliver  the  cargo  to  the  port  of  destination 
set  forth  in  the  bill  of  lading  and  not  to  some  other 
place  unilaterally  selected  by  it.  182  Viz,  in  the  absence 
of  express  liberties  the  shipowner  by  his  master  should 
be  proceeded  from  the  port  of  departure  to  the  port  of 
destination  by  the  customary,  usual,  and  described  course 
of  voyage.  Otherwise  he  will  be  responsible  for  any  loss 
and  damage  to  cargo  which  may  be  ascertained  from  it. 
Deviation  then  which  is  not  in  any  way  connected  with  the 
contract  voyage  of  its  purpose  can  not  be  said  to  be  a 
deviation  within  the  terms  of  the  contract. 
183 
Lord  Macmillan,  in,  "Ixia"184  has  concluded  that: 
"The  reasonableness  of  an  act  must  be  judged  in 
relation  to  the  circumstances  existing  at  the 
time  of  its  commission  and  not  by  any  abstract 
standard.  The  Act,  too,  must  be  considered  as  a 
whole,  in  the  light  of  all  the  attendant 
circumstances.  A  conclusion  so  reached  that  a 
particular  act  was  reasonable  or  unreasonable 
is  in  general  a  conclusion  of  fact,  it  is  an 
inference  of  fact  from  a  given  set  of  facts". 
These  principles  above  seem  to  me  leave  no  room  for 
doubt  that  whether  deviation  is  or  is  not  reasonable 
181-The  o  nan,  276  F.  418  {S.  D.  N.  Y.  1921};  Siurrendra  roverseasl  v. 
S.  S:  Hellening  Hero  (1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  1217. 
182-Fadex  Chemical  Co  v.  Lorentzen  (1944]  A.  M.  C.  pp  940,941. 
183-Kinsella,  J,  in,  Thiess  Bros,  Ldv.  Australian  S.  S.  Ltd  [19551 
1  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  459  at  p  463 
184-(1932)  A.  C.  p  328  at  349  (H.  L}. 80 
appears  a  question  of  fact185,  in  which  both  parties, 
shipowner  and  cargo-owner  have  considered  all  the 
individual  circumstances  existing  at  the  time  the 
contract  was  made.  There  is  no  doubt  that  the  intentional 
or  the  wilful  misconduct  should  be  an  essential  element 
in  the  determining  of  an  unreasonable  deviation.  186 
American  courts  have  incorporated  intention187  and  it 
is  considered  to  be  the  basic  factor  of  the 
unreasonableness.  188  That  means  that  when  the  carrier 
makes  some  change  or  modification  in  the  particular 
course  of  voyage  by  error  or  by  negligence  or  if  he  even 
makes  a  transgression,  189  these  will  not  be  considered 
unreasonable  deviation. 
Gross  failure  to  exercise  due  diligence,  where  the 
ocean  carrier's  gross  negligence  or  wilful  and  wanton 
misconduct  in  furnishing  an  unseaworthy  vessel,  has  been 
held  not  to  establish  an  unreasonable  deviation.  190 
Whereas,  gross  failure  to  stow  properly,  such  as, 
stowage  of  goods  on  deck,  has  been  held  to  amount  to 
185-Ibid,  Per  Lord  Russell  of  Killowen,  p  346. 
186-Compare,  1  Carver,  para  288,  where  he  states: 
"The  law  applicable  to  marine  insurance  is  different  in  this 
respect,  from  that  applicable  to  Sea-Carriage  deliberation  is  an 
unnecessary  element  in  the  constitutes  of  deviation" 
187-Walker,  Companion  to  Law,  p  628. 
188-Compare,  The  Sitvercy  rPs  ,  [1943]  A.  M.  C.  p  510. 
189-Compare,  Sarpa,  p  156,  where  he  stated: 
"The  transgression  aspect  of  deviation  which  is  considered 
fundamental  departure  from  the  terms  of  the  affreightment  contract, 
to  have  the  some  effect  as  a  deviation". 
190-  leg  n  Int"  Steel  v.  John  Weverhaeuaer,  [1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  33. 81 
unreasonable  deviation.  191  That  does  not  mean  however  any 
goods  carried  on  deck  are  an  unreasonable  act  where  the 
ocean  carrier  may  justify  on  deck  carriage  by  showing 
that  such  stowage  was  warranted  by  universal  custom,  or 
the  agreement  of  the  shipper,  or  the  reasonableness  of 
the  deviation.  192 
The  line  between  the  intentional,  voluntary  and 
misconduct  actions  and  the  negligence,  fault  and 
transgressions  of  the  carriers'  acts  in  particular  voyage 
however  are  very  close  and  important,  because  any 
characterization  of  the  carrier's  act  as  intentional  or 
willful  misconduct  should  be  the  essential  element  in  the 
determining  deviation  and  would  be  sufficient  to  amount 
to  unreasonable  deviation.  193 
If  the  carrier's  act  was  due  to  negligence  of  the 
vessel's  master  or  crew,  then  it  should  be  classified  due 
to  lack  of  proper  and  customary  care  of  the  cargo  and 
Article  4  [2]  of  COGSA  should  have  applied.  194  Further 
more,  mere  intention  or  wilful  misconduct  is  not  enough 
to  amount  to  unreasonableness195  and  the  causal  connection 
191-Morgan,  pp  482-83. 
192-Dupont  Nemours  International  S.  A  V.  The  Marmacvega  (1974] 
A.  M.  C.  p  67. 
193-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  820. 
194-See  infra  chapter  II  for  an  explanation  of  this  point  in  more 
detail;  Roger,  pp  181-82. 
195-Compare  between  The  Flying  clipper  (1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  259,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"Carrier  responsible  for  all  loss  or  damage  occurring  during  or 
after  an  unjustifiable  deviation,  whether  or  not  caused  by  the 
deviation",  and  Atlantic  M  tu  Ins.  Co  v.  Poseiden  Schiffahrt 
(1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665;  375  U.  S.  p  819  (1963),  where  it  is  stated: 82 
between  the  deviation  and  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo 
should  be  shown,  196  and  it  will  be  important  to  notice 
that  loss  or  damage  is  suffered  by  the  deviation  itself 
and  not  by  any  reason  or  act  independent  of  the 
deviation.  197  Then  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for 
such  loss  or  damage  incurred  from  the  unreasonable 
deviation  except  where  the  carrier  showed  that  the  loss 
or  damage  must  have  occurred  in  any  event  whether  the 
vessel  had  deviated  or  not-198 
Finally,  the  Rule  of  an  unreasonable  deviation  in  the 
United  Kingdom  courts  is  quite  strict;  more  so  than  in 
American  courts.  199  That  depends  upon  individual 
circumstances  in  particular  cases  of  geographical  and 
non-geographical  deviation,  such  as,  over  carriage,  dry- 
docking  with  cargo  aboard  and  stowage  on  deck  of  cargo 
shipped  under  clean  bills  of  lading.  200 
"Carrier  can  in  no  event,  even  if  he  has  recklessly  violated  the 
contract  and  such  violation  caused  damage  or  loss,  be  held  liable 
above  the  limits  of  Article  IV[5]". 
196-Willdomino,  272  U.  S.  p  718,  where  it  is  stated: 
"A  causal  relation  must  be  shown  between  the  unseaworthiness  and 
the  disaster  which  caused  the  damage  to  cargo  and  in  the  absence  of 
such  showing,  the  shipowner  is  still  entitled  to  the  protection  of 
the  Harter  Act";  Malcolm  Baxter.  Jr,  277  U.  S.  p  323;  Davis  v.  Garrett, 
6  Bing,  p  715,  (130  E.  R.  p  1456];  Abbott,  pp  407-408;  Knauth,  p  258; 
Compare, 
-Thorley  v.  Orehi4  .S  no  [1907]  1  K.  B  p  660  at  p  664. 
197-Poor, 
p  192. 
198-Swinfen  Eady  L.  J.  &  Phillimore  L.  J.  in,  James  Morrinnn  &  Co. 
ILt4  v.  Shaw  Savil1  &  Albion_  TA-8  (1916]  2  K.  B.  p  783  at  pp  795, 
800,  respectively;  The  Bark  nelaware,  81  U.  S.  p  779,14  Wall,  p  579 
at  p  598. 
199-Morgan, 
p  482. 
200-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  350. 83 
iii-GEOGRAPHICAL  DEVIATION 
The  United  Kingdom  jurisprudence  has  confined  the 
concept  of  the  unreasonable  deviation  to  the  geographical 
departure  from  the  described  route  of  the  voyage201  while 
the  United  States  jurisprudence  has  extended  the  concept 
of  unreasonable  deviation  to  any  serious  change  in  the 
conduct  of  the  vessel.  202 
As  a  matter  of  principle,  the  duty  and  the  implied  or 
the  express  obligation  of  the  shipowner  to  carry  and  to 
transport  the  goods  which  are  shipped  on  his  vessel  by 
proceeding  from  the  port  of  shipment  to  the  port  of 
destination  without  unreasonable  departure,  unless  he  has 
expressed  stipulations203  to  the  contrary  in  the  contract 
or  exceptional  perils  have  taken  place.  204 
Viz,  the  shipowner  has  a  fundamental  obligation  to 
transport  the  goods  by  the  usual,  customary,  and 
described  route.  That  does  not  mean  geographically  the 
shortest  route  between  two  points,  instead  the  carrier  is 
contracted  to  take  the  direct  route.  205  if  the  shipping 
201-Sarpa, 
p  149. 
202-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  350,  where  he  states: 
"This  is  a  dangerous  practice  which  has  no  foundation  in  the  Hague 
Rules  and  in  consequence  the  American  jurisprudence  is  often 
confusing  and  contradictory". 
203-The  W_s  point  (1951]  A.  M.  C.  p  1505. 
204-The  Maggi  Hammond  v.  Borland,  9  Wall,  76  U.  S.  pp  435-461. 
205-Achille  Latr  Fu  Cioacchino  &  C.  v.  Total  Societa  Italiana  Per 
Anion  [1968]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  247;  Mr.  Dickford,  in,  Evans  v. 
Cunard,  [1902]  18  T.  L.  R.  p  374  at  p  375;  Compare,  The  Niagara  v. 
Cords,  21  How,  62  U.  S.  p7  at  23,  where  it  is  stated: 
"After  having  set  sail,  he  must  proceed  on  the  voyage,  in  the 84 
route  is  not  mentioned  in  the  contract  that  the  route  is 
the  direct  geographical  route,  206  then  it  will  be  affected 
by  the  customary  and  usual  route  in  both  United  Kingdom207 
and  United  States.  208 
It  is  necessary  to  inquire  what  is  and  what  it  is  not 
the  customary  and  usual  route209,  and  if,  in  some  cases, 
there  is  more  than  one  usual  route  between  the  port  of 
departure  and  the  port  of  destination,  which  one  will  be 
direct,  shortest  and  usual  route  to  the  port  of  delivery,  without 
unnecessary  deviation,  unless  there  is  an  express  contract  as  to 
the  course  to  be  pursued;  and  where  the  vessel  is  destined  for 
several  ports  and  places,  the  master  should  proceed  to  them  in  the 
order  in  which  they  are  usually  visited,  or  that  designed  by  the 
contract,  or,  in  certain  cases,  by  the  advertisement  relating  to 
the  particular  voyage";  Wi.  lldomino  v.  riitt  ro  Chemical,  Co.,  71  L.  ed. 
272  U.  S.  pp  717-728;  Compare,  naav  (1932]  A.  M.  C.  p  123. 
206-Lord  Porter  in  Reardon  Smith  Line.  Ltd  v.  Black  Sea  &  Baltic. 
General  Ins  Co.  rd  [1939]  A.  C.  p  562  at  p  584,  where  he  said: 
"If  no  evidence  be  given,  that  route  is  presumed  to  be  the  direct 
geographical  route". 
207-Ibid, 
p  562  at  p  584;  Davis  v.  Garrett  (1880)  6  Bing,  p  716  at 
725  (130  E.  R.  p  1450),  where  it  was  said: 
"The  word  usual  and  customary  being  added  to  the  word  direct,  more 
particularly  when  the  breach  is  alleged  in  "unnecessarily 
deviatious  from  the  usual  and  customary  way",  must  be  held  to 
qualify  the  meaning  of  the  word  direct,  and  substantially  to 
signify  that  the  vessel  should  proceed  in  the  course  usually  and 
customary  observed  in  that  her  voyage". 
208-r,  lumbian  Tn4  o  V.  Catlett,  25  U.  S.  12  wheat,  p  383  at  pp  387, 
388;  Ho4  r  v.  Ems,  137  U.  S.  p  30  at  41;  The  H  nd  ncrer[1935] 
A.  M.  C.  p  563;  The  Marianne(1938]  A.  M.  C.  p  1327;  where  it  is  stated: 
"It  is  equally  true  that  a  carrier  may  justify  deviation  from  the 
direct  practical  route  by  proof  of  custom  or  of  a  contractual 
liberty  to  follow  the  course  taken";  The  Tai  Shan  (Fire),  (1955]  A. 
M.  C.  p  420. 
209-Tokuvo  Maru  (1925]  A.  M.  C.  p  1420  ;  Compare,  Weg-  Aleto  (1928] 
A.  M.  C.  p  969  at  p  973. 85 
reasonable  and  other  will  be  unreasonable. 
The  test  of  what  is  usual,  customary,  and  reasonable  in 
a  commercial  sense  may  arise  in  very  different 
circumstances  and  must  be  decided  whenever  it  arises  by 
the  application  of  sound  business  considerations  and  by 
determining  what  is  fair  and  reasonable  in  the  interests 
of  all  concerned.  210  As  well  as,  it  should  be  noted  that 
the  natural  way  is  to  find  out  what  is  the  usual  thing  in 
the  same  line  of  business211,  which  will  be  having  regard 
to  the  nature  and  purpose  of  the  contract  of  the 
carriage. 
210-Per  Lord  Wright,  in,  Reardon  Smith  Line,  Ltd  v.  Blank  Sea 
.& 
Baltic  G  n.  ra1  Ins.  Co.  Ltd[1939]  A.  C.  p  562  at  576;  Per  Lord 
Herschell,  at  p  585;  Lord  Esher,  in,  Leduc  v.  Ward  (18881  20  Q.  B.  D. 
p  475  at  482;  W.  R.  Gra  e&  co.  v.  To_o  Kisen  Kabush;  ki  Kaisha  [1925] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1420,  affirmed,  [1926]  A.  M.  C.  p  862  at  866,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"In  construing  bills  of  Lading,  as  in  construing  other  commercial 
instruments,  it  is  the  right  and  duty  of  the  court  to  look,  not 
only  to  the  language  employed,  but  to  the  subject  matter,  and  to 
the  surrounding  circumstances,  in  order,  to  determine  the  proper 
effect  of  the  language  used,  by  putting  itself,  so  far  as  possible, 
in  the  place  of  the  contracting  parties.  It  has  regard,  therefore, 
to  all  the  prevailing  usages  and  customs  of  business";  Lord  Justice 
Atkin,  in,  U.  S.  Shipping  Board  v.  Bunge  &  Born.  41  T.  L.  R.  p  73  at 
p  75. 
211-Per  Lord  Radcliffe,  in,  Taskirogleu  &  Co.  Ltd  v.  Noblee  Thorl. 
Gx.  M.  B_H.  [1962]  A.  C.  p  93  at  p  122,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Various  objectives  or  phrases  are  employed  to  described  the  point 
of  reference.  I  can  quote  the  following  from  judicial  decisions: 
"recognised,  current,  customary,  accustomed,  usual,  ordinary, 
proper,  common,  in  accordance  with  custom  or  practice  or  usage,  a 
matter  of  commercial  notoriety  and  of  course  reasonable";  Saner 
v.  Maclean  {1883}  11  O.  B.  D.  p  327  at  337;  Gracie  v.  Marine.  Ins. 
. 
C.  Q,  12  U.  S.  8  cranch,  p  75  at  p  83. 86 
As  a  matter  of  commerce,  business  sense  is  frequently 
limited  and  designed  for  the  usual  and  customary  route  as 
to  all  shipping  contracts  made  between  the  owner  and 
shipper  who  have  knowledge  of  such  a  change  of  route  and 
that  all  such  shippers  must  be  held  to  make  their 
contracts  with  reference  to  the  new  route  and  to  accept 
it  as  implied  in  all  bills  of  lading  of  goods  to  be 
carried  between  the  termini.  212 
If  the  shippers  were  then  not  aware  in  fact,  nor  made 
aware  through  notices,  that  does  not  establish  a  custom 
of  departing  from  the  direct  shortest  route  for  the  next 
following  track.  213 
If  the  only  voyage  mentioned  is  however  from  the  port 
of  departure  to  the  port  of  discharge,  it  must  be  voyage 
on  the  ordinary  track  by  sea  of  the  voyage  between  named 
points.  Viz,  it  does  not  mean  an  exact  line,  because  the 
ordinary  track  for  a  steamer  might  be  different  from  that 
for  a  sailing  vessel. 
Then  it  would  have  to  be  taken  into  account  all  the 
surrounding  circumstances  existing  according  to  a 
reasonable  construction  of  the  term  of  the  contract.  214 
Consequently,  the  question  has  arisen  of  the  time  at 
which  the  usual  and  customary  route  will  be  determined. 
212-The  To  wo  Maru  (1926]  A.  M.  C.  p  862  at  p  866;  Pe  n  as  (1933] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1188;  Leduc  v.  yard  (1888)  20  Q.  B.  D.  p  475,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"Whether  mere  Knowledge  of  proposed  indirect  route  by  shippers  is 
binding  on  consignees  of  cargo  who  have  no  notice,  not  decided". 
213-Frederick  L+nk-nbaeh  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  1468  at  p  1469. 
214-Lord  Esher,  op.  cit.  p  481. 87 
The  decisions  in  particular  cases  have  differed  in  this 
point. 
First  of  all  provided  that: 
"It  is  implied  term  that  shipment  shall  be  via 
a  route  which  is  at  the  date  of  the  sale 
contract  a  usual  and  customary  route,  and,  if 
there  is  at  that  date  only  one  usual  and 
customary  route,  by  that  route.  Here  there  is  a 
finding  of  fact  that  the  usual  and  normal  route 
was  via  Suez  and  that  was  the  only  usual  and 
normal  route".  215 
Secondly: 
"In  principle,  it  seems  to  me  that  where  a 
contract  expressly,  or  by  necessary 
implication,  provides  that  performance  or  a 
particular  part  of  the  performance,  is  to  be 
carried  out  in  a  customary  manner,  the 
performance  must  be  carried  out  in  a  manner 
which  is  customary  at  the  time  when  the 
performance  is  called  for".  216 
215-Mr.  Justice  Diplock,  in,  Task!  roQi  nu  &  Co  .  Ltd.  v.  Nobs  ee 
Thorl.  G.  M.  B.  N.  [1958]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  515  at  p  520;  M-issn-r  V. 
Brun  128  U.  S.  p  474  at  p  487,  where  it  is  said: 
"The  circuit  court  has  found  that  there  existed,  at  the  time  of  the 
making  of  the  charter,  a  general  custom  in  the  Atlantic  ports  of 
the  United  States,  with  reference  to  charters  similarly  worded, 
that  a  ship  may  be  ordered  to  any  safe  port  within  the  range  where 
commerce  is  carried  on,  whether  she  can  get  into  it  or  not, 
provided  there  is  an  anchorage  near  the  port,  customarily  used  in 
connection  with  it,  and  where  it  is  reasonably  safe  for  the  ship  to 
lay  and  discharge". 
216-Mr.  Justice  McNair,  in,  Ca  a  an  _oti 
&Ca.  Ltd  v.  E.  T.  .  reen.  Ltd 
(1958]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  P  169  at  p  176;  The  Eugenia  (1964)  2  Q.  B.  p 
226;  The  Archer  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  357  at  pp  358-59,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"It  clearly  appears  that  the  voyage  advertised  by  the  agent  for  the 
ship  and  contemplated  by  the  ship  at  the  time  the  contract  of 88 
Thirdly: 
"The  essential  comparison  is  not  between  the 
situation  existing  at  the  date  of  the  contract 
and  the  situation  existing  at  the  time  of  the 
performance,  but  between  that  which  the 
shipowners  by  their  charter  party  contracted  to 
do  and  that  which,  in  the  event,  had  to  be  done 
in  order  to  carry  the  goods  to  Genoa".  217 
I  am  inclined  to  believe,  as  a  matter  of  construction 
of  the  contract,  that  the  relevant  circumstances  should 
be  shown  to  both  parties  at  the  time  of  contracting  and 
all  its  terms,  express  and  implied  should  be  taken  into 
account  to  be  considered  for  determining  what  constitutes 
a  usual  and  customary  route  in  particular  course  of 
voyage. 
Furthermore,  if  there  were  two  or  more  routes  which 
were  proceeded  as  a  custom  to  reach  a  particular 
destination.  The  inquiry  must  always  be,  what  is  the 
usual  route,  and  a  route  may  become  a  usual  route  in  the 
case  of  a  particular  line  though  that  line  is  accustomed 
to  follow  a  course  which  is  not  that  adopted  by  the 
vessels.  218 
It  is  not  the  geographical  route  but  the  usual  route 
which  has  to  be  followed,  either  alternative  routes  or  a 
affreightment  was  made,  and  on  the  commencement  of  the  voyage,  was 
via  Panama". 
217-Pearson,  J,  in,  Societe  Franco  Tni  .  nne  am  ment  V. 
Sidermore  S.  P  .A 
(1961]  2  Q.  B.  p  278  at  p  298. 
218-Lord  Porter,  in,  Reardon  Smith  Line  TLtd  v.  Black  q  pa  &  Baltic 
.  [1939)  A.  C.  p  562  at  p  584. 89 
customary  route  might  displace  the  geographical  route.  219 
Then  the  direct  route  to  the  port  of  destination  means 
the  ultimate  destination  of  the  goods  which  may, 
according  to  circumstances  be  the  termination  of  the 
voyage.  220 
The  second  report  has  however  concluded  that  the 
identification  of  the  usual  or  expected  route  must  often 
be  based  on  the  customary  practices  of  the  carrier  as  to 
routing  for  the  particular  trade;  and  such  practices  are 
often  very  flexible.  221 
Finally,  the  next  traditional  question  arising  in  this 
case  is  upon  the  nature  and  position  of  the  route.  Is  it 
a  question  of  fact  or  law  in  a  particular  case. 
The  question  of  what  is  or  is  not  the  usual  and 
customary  route,  must  be  itself  resolved  largely  into  a 
question  of  fact.  222  That  depends  on  the  geographical 
position  of  the  route,  which  the  vessel  deviated  to  be 
covered  as  the  result  of  deviation  from  the  direct, 
usual,  or  customary  route,  which  is  to  be  material,  but 
not  necessarily  the  only  material  matters  for 
considerations.  223 
219-Lord  Dunedin  &  Lord  Sumner,  in,  Finkel  v.  MacAndrews  &  Co 
(1929]  A.  C.  p  545. 
220-Ibid,  Lord  Warrington  of  Clyffe,  at  p  566. 
221-Swinfen  Eady  L.  J.  in,  . 7amen  Marr  Son  &  co.  td.  V.  Shaw.  Save 
&  Albion.  Co.  ,  td  (1916]  2  K.  B.  p  783  at  795;  Oliver  V.  TIP. 
Maryland.  Tns. 
_n. 
11  U.  S.  7  cranch,  p  487  at  p  495. 
222-Erik  &  Thomas,  p  693. 
223-Phillmore  J,  in,  Jams  Ma  i5on  &  Co.  v.  Shaw.  Saud  P.  Albion, 
op.  cit,  p  800. 90 
Lord  Radeliffe224  has  concluded  the  main  principle  in 
this  point  as  follows: 
"Whether  all  necessary  facts  have  been  found  it 
remains  a  question  of  law  for  the  court  what  on 
the  true  construction  of  the  contract  are  the 
obligations  imposed  or  whether,  having  regard 
to  the  terms  of  the  contract  and  the 
surrounding  circumstances  of  any  particular 
term  is  to  be  implied.  But,  when  the 
implication  of  term  depends  essentially  upon 
what  is  customary  or  usual  accepted  practice, 
it  is  inevitable  that  the  findings  of  fact, 
whatever  they  may  be,  go  virtually  the  whole 
way  towards  determining  the  legal  result". 
The  question  which  is,  of  fact  or  law,  governing  in 
construing  the  contract  by  all  the  surrounding 
circumstances  which  must  be  taken  into  account,  such  as, 
the  size  and  class  of  the  vessel,  the  nature  of  the 
voyage,  the  usual  and  customary  course,  the  nature  and 
position  of  destination  port  in  question  and  the  nature 
of  the  vessel,  as  a  steamer  or  as  a  sailing.  All  these 
questions,  as  I  think,  are  questions  of  fact  in  each 
case225.  All  the  facts  should  then  be  found  out  at  the 
beginning  and  consideration  given  to  all  these  findings 
224-Taskiroglou  &  Co.  Ltd.  V.  Noble  Thorl,  G.  M.  B.  H  [1962]  A.  C.  p  93 
at  p  122. 
225-W.  R.  Grace  &  Co  v.  Tovo  Eisen  Kabushiki  Kaisha  [1925]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1426,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  propriety  of  any  particular  deviation  is  a  question  of  fact  in 
each  case  and  there  in  no  fixed  rule  for  such  determination.  It  is 
a  question  of  inherent  reasonableness,  and  pertinent  to  the  inquiry 
of  the  surrounding  circumstances,  namely,  the  commercial  adventure, 
which  is  the  subject  of  the  contract,  the  character  of  the  vessel, 
the  usual  and  customary  route,  the  natural  and  usual  ports  of  call, 
the  location  of  the  port  to  which  the  deviation  was  made,  and  the 
purpose  of  the  call  threat". 91 
depend  upon  the  individual  circumstances  in  particular 
cases  according  to  the  COGSA. 
OVER  CARRIAGE 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  have  not  provided  any  specific 
provision  in  considering  over  carriage. 
The  United  States  Courts  have  extended  the  concept  of 
deviation  to  any  serious  change  in  the  conduct  of  the 
ship.  Over  carriage  is  therefore  considered  a  deviation 
and  it  has  the  same  consequences  as  a  deviation226.  That 
dose  not  mean  that  both  deviation  and  over  carriage  are 
identical227. 
Over  carriage  is  enough  to  constitute  a  deviation228 
when  it  has  taken  place  intentionally229,  but  mere 
intention  or  mere  non-delivery  does  not  create  a 
presumption  of  over  carriage  resulting  in  a  deviation230, 
until  the  goods  are  actually  carried  beyond  the 
particular  port  of  destination.  Viz,  any  other 
construction  would  render  cargoes  subjects  to  all  kinds 
of  hazards  which  the  shippers  could  not  foresee  and  could 
226-Surrendra  {overseasl  v.  S.  S  Hellenic  Hero,  (1933]  A.  M.  C.  p  1217 
at  p  1223,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  fundamental  obligation  of  a  common  carrier  is,  of  course,  to 
deliver  the  cargo  to  the  port  of  destination  set  forth  in  the  bill 
of  lading  and  not  to  some  other  place  unilaterally  selected  by  it". 
227-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  33,37. 
228-Padere  Wski  [19441  A.  M.  C.  p  1107. 
229-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  33;  Compare,  Atlantic  Mutual  V. 
Poseidon  [1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  p  667,  where  it  is  stated: 
"a  delay  of  one-half  years  in  delivery  is  in  itself  a  material 
deviation,  regardless  of  fact  of  over  carriage". 
230-Shakman  v.  Cunard  White  Star,  Ltd.  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  971. 92 
not  be  expected  to  insure  against231. 
The  following  points  must  therefore  be  considered  in 
order  to  render  over  carriage  as  a  deviation: 
1-There  must  be  intent  to  breach  the  contract  of 
carriage  by  changing  the  course  of  the  voyage. 
2-There  must  be  some  loss  of  or  damage  caused  to  the 
cargo.  Namely,  intent  to  cause  damage  or  it  is  done 
recklessly  with  knowledge  that  the  damage  will  probably 
result232. 
Consequently,  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for  any 
loss  or  damage  to  cargo  caused  by  over  carriage233.  In  an 
agreement  between  the  cargo-owner  and  carrier,  the  latter 
is  authorized  to  carry  the  goods  beyond  the  port  of 
destination  depending  upon  individual  circumstances  in 
particular  cases234.  For  instance,  where  the  conduct  of 
the  vessel  is  reasonable  and  does  not  defeat  the  object 
of  the  bill  of  lading  to  carry  the  goods  to  a  specific 
destination235,  or  where  the  vessel  was  within  the  limits 
of  the  customary,  practice  and  usual  route236. 
231_Thewe,  t  seta  (1924]  A.  M.  C.  p  1318. 
232-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  37. 
233_  1v 
.  ,y  Pry  (1943]  A.  M.  C.  p  510;  Fadex  chemi-cale.  -Co.  V. 
Lor  .nn  (1944]  A.  M.  C.  p  940;  The  Malcolm  Baxter,  Jr.  277  U.  S.  p 
323  (1928). 
234_ßn 
v.  Palmyra  Trading.  Corp  (19551  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  301; 
Cunard.  S.  S.  Ca  v.  Buerger  (19271  p1  at  2  (H.  L),  where  it  is  stated: 
"In  the  absence  of  special  protective  provisions  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  the  over  carriage  of  the  five  bales....  constituted  a 
deviation". 
235_nadji  Ali  Akbar  &  Sons  v.  An  o-  rabia  gýý.  __n 
&Persian  S.  S=Go,  (1906) 
11  Com.  Cas;  (1906)  95  L.  T.  p  610. 
236_2  Carver,  para,  1166;  The  Blandon  (1923]  A.  M.  C.  p  242;  Eastern 93 
iv-NON-GEOGRAPHICAL  DEVIATION 
Deviation  under  the  United  States  jurisprudence  is  not 
confined  to  a  geographical  deviation.  The  United  States 
courts  have  extended  the  concept  of  unreasonable 
deviation  farther  than  those  pertaining  solely  to  the 
change  of  the  geographical  route  contemplated  by  the 
parties,  when  it  is  considered  that  any  change  in  the 
conduct  of  the  vessel  is  unreasonable  deviation.  For 
instance,  stowage  cargoes  on  deck,  dry  docking  with  cargo 
aboard  and  delay  may  be  another  form  of  non-geographical 
deviation.  237 
All  these  carrier  misconducts  are  considered  in  the 
recent  tendency  of  American  judicial  views,  as  affecting 
the  commercial  venture  as  a  whole. 
238 
Tempest  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  70;  West  A1et-a  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  P  969; 
Liberator  (1938]  A.  M.  C.  p  141;  San  Guiseppe 
[1941]  A.  M.  C.  p  315. 
237-There 
are  numerous  kinds  of  non-geographical  deviation  in 
addition  to  the  kinds  above  mentioned: 
"a-Deviation  by  carriage  on  a  vessel  other  than  the  agreed;  Lord 
Justice  Fry  in,  Dalian  &  Sons  v.  Jolt'  Victoria  &  Co.  Ltd,  6  T. 
L.  R.  p  345,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  was  here  a  deviation  in  a  double  sense.  The  voyage  was 
different  from  that  agreed  upon,  and  the  goods  were  carried  in  a 
ship  different  from  that  contemplated";  The  in.  ess  Ann,  (1925]  A. 
M.  C.  p  1638;  The  Haiti,  (1937]  A.  M.  C.  p  554;  Henry  N.  Longley, 
Common  Carriage  of  Cargo,  1967,  p  111,  hereinafter  cited  as 
Longley". 
b-Deviation  by  carriage  by  Rail;  The  Jean  Jadot,  (1936]  A.  M.  C.  p 
47;  Compare,  The  Ruyfuku  Mars  (1936]  A.  M.  C.  p  1121. 
c-Returning  cargo  to  the  port  of  departure;  The  Pnzman,  276  F.  p 
418  (S.  'D.  N.  Y.  1921). 
238-Roger,  p  172. 94 
"a"  STOWAGE  CARGOES  ON  DECK 
In  the  pre-existing  law,  the  primary  obligation  of  the 
shipowner  is  that  the  goods  should  be  stowed  below  deck 
and  not  on  deck239,  unless  the  bill  of  lading  contains  a 
special  stipulation  to  stow  the  goods  on  deck240,  or  it 
appears  that  the  way  of  stowage  does  not  cause  the  goods 
any  loss  or  damage  at  any  degree241,  or  the  shipowner 
notifies  the  cargo-owner  of  an  on  deck  shipment.  242 
All  these  obligations  must  then  be  conceived  in 
considering  deck  cargo  in  the  light  of  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules243,  because  there  is  no  obligation  in  the  latter 
Rules  that  the  shipowner  undertakes  to  stow  the  goods 
under  deck  even  though  a  clean  bill  of  lading  is 
issued.  244 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  apply  however  when  the  goods  are 
in  fact  carried  on  deck  if  there  is  no  mention  in  the 
bill  of  lading  that  goods  are  as  being  carried  on  deck. 
The  carrier,  in  this  case,  is  then  responsible  for  any 
239-Schoon 
.r  St.  Johns  N.  F  (1923]  A.  M.  C.  p  1131;  Sarnia,  278  Fed  p 
459,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  goods  are  shipped  under  a  clean  bill  of  lading  the 
obligation  is  that  they  are  to  be  put  under  deck,  unless  there  is 
an  express  written  agreement  to  the  contrary  or  a  custom  to  the 
contrary  is  proven". 
240-The  Delaware  v.  Oregon  Iron.  Co,  81  U.  S.  14  Wall,  pp  579-606. 
241-st.  Johns  N.  F.  Shipping  Corp  v.  Companhia  ral  commercial  Do 
Rio  Tom,  263  U.  S.  68  L.  ed,  p  119  (1923). 
242-McCardie,  J,  in,  Armour  v.  Leopold  Walford  [1921]  3  K.  B.  p  473 
at  p  479. 
243-Jod 
v.  Flying  Clipper  (1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  259. 
244-Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law,  p  61. 95 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  and  he  cannot  rely  on  the 
exceptions  catalogue  which  is  set  out  in  article  IV 
{2}{a}  to  {q}  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules.  245 
Deck  stowage  under  the  American  jurisprudence  is 
considered  to  be  a  deviation  in  virtue  of  Article  IV 
[4]246,  because  the  United  States'  COGSA  which  adopted  the 
Hague  Rules  makes  no  attempt  to  define  deviation  which 
encouraged  the  circuits  courts  to  extend  the  concept  of 
deviation  to  cover  any  variation  in  the  conduct  of  a 
vessel  in  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  247 
Whereas,  the  deck  stowage  under  the  English 
jurisprudence  is  deemed  a  breach  of  the  contract  of 
carriage  which  involves  compensation  for  loss  or  damage 
to  the  cargo.  248  This  attitude  is  based  upon  the  grounds 
that  the  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  stow  goods  on  deck249, 
245-James  F.  Whitehead,  "Deviation:  Should  the  doctrine  apply  to 
on-deck  carriage"?,  (1981]  6  Mar.  Law,  p  37  at  p  39,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Whitehead". 
246-Compare,  Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  the  Maritime  Law,  p  63, 
where  he  said: 
"I  believe  it  is  best  to  consider  it  as  a  breach  of  the  contract 
and  to  consider  deviation  as  a  change  in  the  geographical  route  of 
the  voyage". 
247-Whitehead, 
pp  39-40. 
248-Royal 
xchang_  Co.  v.  Dixon  (1887]  12  A.  C.  p  11;  Ridley,  p  126; 
Ivamy,  p  85. 
249-Lord  Watson,  in,  Royal  Exchange  Co.  v.  Dixon,  op.  cit,  at  p  17, 
where  he  stated: 
"In  short,  the  liability  of  the  shipowner,  upon  each  occasion  of 
deck  stowage  under  admitted  practice,  is  precisely  the  same  with 
the  liability  which  he  would  incur,  in  the  absence  of  any  such 
practice,  by  stowing  goods  on  deck,  on  one  occasion,  in  violation 
of  his  contract  to  carry,  and  without  the  knowledge  of  the 
shipper..  ". 96 
unless  there  is  an  express  agreement  or  industry  custom 
provided  otherwise.  The  customary  or  usage  of  the  cargo 
and  trade  is  however  involved  as  a  criterion  for 
determining  whether  deck  stowage  is  reasonable  or  not.  250 
The  rational  consideration  of  this  criterion  depends  on 
the  intended  use  or  design  of  the  deck  on  which  the  goods 
were  stowed  or  design  of  the  port  where  the  goods  will  be 
discharged. 
In  the  absence  of  evidence  of  a  contrary  usage  in  the 
particular  trade,  the  goods  should  be  properly  and 
carefully  stowed  under  deck.  251  If  the  bill  of  lading 
specifically  stipulates  that  the  goods  shall  be  under 
deck  stowage,  a  custom  to  the  contrary  would  not  override 
the  stipulation  and  on  deck  stowage  in  such  circumstances 
would  be  an  unreasonable  deviation.  252 
Scrutton253  concluded  that  for  a  custom  to  be  enforced 
by  the  courts  it  must  be: 
"a"  reasonable;  "b"  certain;  "c"  consistent 
with  the  contract;  "d"  universally  acquiesced 
in;  "e"  not  contrary  to  the  law. 
Deck  carriage  under  a  clean  bill  of  lading  on  a 
specialized  container  ship  counts  as  a  deviation254, 
unless  there  is  positive  evidence  of  a  loading  port 
custom  so  permitting.  255  The  American  court  in  Du  Pont  De 
250-Whitehead,  p  40. 
251-The  n_tawa  v.  Oregan  Iran  co,  81  U.  S.  14  Wall,  pp  579-606. 
252-Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  Inc.  v.  The  Hong  Kong  Producer  & 
Universal  Marine  Corp[1969]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  536  at  544,  Footnote,  12. 
253-Scrutton  On  Charter  Parties,  pp  15-16. 
254_t,  Evans&&SSoon  rpor  amo  u  _hl  Ltd  v.  Andrea  Merzario  Ltd[1976]  1 
W.  L.  R.  p  1078. 
255-  yclopaedia  Britannica  v.  Hong  Kong  Producer  (1969]  A.  M.  C.  p 97 
Nemours  International  v.  Tie  Mormacveaa256,  held  that  deck 
of  a  container  ship  is  exactly  where  container  are 
reasonably  intended  to  be  carried. 
It  seems  to  me  that  container  ships  are  designed  to 
carry  containers  on  deck.  A  clean  bill  of  lading  issued 
by  a  container  ship  does  not  import  that  cargo  will  be 
carried  under  deck257,  and  it  was  not  a  deviation  to  have 
stowed  the  container  on  the  weather  deck.  258 
If  there  is  however  agreement  between  the  shipowner  or 
the  carrier  and  the  cargo-owner  or  the  shipper  stated 
that  the  goods  will  be  carried  on  deck,  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  and  COGSA  do  not  apply259,  but  the  carrier  is  still 
responsible  for  stowing  the  goods  carried  "  properly".  260 
1741  at  p  1742,  where  it  is  said: 
"Stowage  of  containers  on  whether  deck,  without  any  notation  of 
that  fact  on  the  face  of  the  bill  of  lading  constituted  an 
unreasonable  deviation". 
256_[1972]  A.  M.  C.  p  2366. 
257-J.  P.  McMahon,  "  On  Deck  Stowage  of  Container  on  Container  Ship 
not  Unreasonable  Deviation",  (1973]  4  J.  Mar.  L  &  Com,  p  323  at  pp 
327-28,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  McMahon". 
258_Rosenhr+ 
.hv. 
Amer.  Export  Isbraridtsen  Lines(1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  487 
at  p  493. 
259-Deck 
cargo  is  particularly  excluded  by  the  Hague  Rules  under 
Article  1  (c],  where  goods  are  defined  as: 
"goods,  wares,  merchandise  and  articles  of  every  kind  whatsoever 
except....  cargo  which  by  the  contract  of  carriage  is  stated  as 
being  carried  on  deck  and  is  so  carried". 
260-Royal  Exchange  shipping  Co. 
,  v.  Dixion  [1887]  12  App.  Cas,  p  11; 
Svenska  Trak  nr  Aktiebolagct  v.  Maritime  Agencies- 
Ltd, 
- 
(1953]  2  All  E.  R.  p  570;  The  Ponce  (1949]  A.  M.  C.  p  1124,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"Where  goods  are  shipped  on  deck  at  shipper's  risk,  the  carrier  is 
not  relieved  of  due  care  and  attention  towards  the  cargo";  Beck  v. 
Steel  voyage  (1957]  A.  M.  C.  p  1515;  Ivamy,  p  85. 98 
The  shipowner  is  bound  to  notify  the  shippers  or  cargo- 
owners  of  an  on  deck  shipment  when  the  parties  have  an 
agreement  to  stow  the  goods  under  deck.  Then  the  shippers 
or  cargo-owners  who  are  aware  of  the  existence  of  such  a 
practice,  and  do  not  object  to  it,  cannot  be  said  to  have 
consented  to  carry  the  goods  below  deck.  261 
The  Hamburg  Rules  modify  the  COGSA  of  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  United  States  and  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
considering  deck  cargo  under  the  Hamburg  Rules,  the 
carriers  are  authorized  to  stow  and  carry  the  goods  on 
deck  only  if  such  carriage  is  in  accordance  with  an 
agreement  with  shipper  or  with  the  usage  of  the 
particular  trade  or  is  required  by  statutory  rules  or 
regulations.  262  Whereas,  wrongful  stowage  on  deck  will 
still  make  the  carrier  liable  for  damage  resulting  from 
such  a  voyage.  263 
Where  the  shipowner  has  loaded  the  goods  on  deck  under 
a  privilege  reserved  for  him  by  the  general  usage,  custom 
or  practice  of  the  voyage  that  does  not  mean  the 
shipowner  will  be  excused  from  his  obligation,  under 
Article  3  [2]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  to  stow  the  goods 
properly  and  carefully. 
261-Lord  Waston,  in,  Royal  Exchange  Shipping  Co.  v.  cri,  op.  cit, 
at  p  18. 
262-Article  9  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
263-Article  9  [3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  William  Tetley,  "Article  9 
To  13  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rules  on  the 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  Spa,  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  197, 
hereinafter  cited  as"Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules". 99 
"b"  DRY  DOCKING  WITH  CARGO  ABOARD 
The  dry  docking  of  a  vessel  with  cargo  aboard  without 
any  exoneration  clause  establishes  a  deviation  depending 
upon  particular  circumstances.  264  For  instance,  the 
carrier  will  not  liable,  if  the  vessel  becomes 
unseaworthy  and  is  forced  into  dry  dock  after  having 
exercised  due  diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy 
before  sailing  from  the  port  of  departure265,  or  if  the 
commercial  customary  and  usage  of  trade  have  permitted 
such  deviation.  266 
Whereas,  the  departure  from  the  customary,  usual  and 
agreed  course  of  a  voyage  into  dry  deck  without  any 
marine  necessity  is  sufficient  to  constitute  a 
deviation.  267 
DELAY  MAY  BE  ANOTHER  FORM  OF  NON-GEOGRAPHICAL 
DEVIATION 
The  implied  obligation  in  the  contract  of  carriage  on 
the  carrier,  under  the  common  law,  is  to  proceed  upon  the 
agreed  voyage  with  reasonable  despatch  and  diligence268 
which  is  implied  in  Article  3[2)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
and  expressed  in  Article  5[1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
The  ordinary  delay  does  not  amount  to  a  deviation269 
264_2  Carver,  para,  1167. 
265-Levation 
v.  General  Steam  Navigation  Co.  (1959)  A.  M.  C.  p  2233. 
266-Dor,  op.  cit,  p  47;  Indrapura,  238  Fed.  p  853  (1916]. 
267-Poor,  op.  cit,  p193;  Indrapura,  171  Fed,  p929(1909];  Compare,  Greer  L. 
J.  in,  Gosse  Millard  v.  Canadian  Government  (1928]  1  K.  B.  p  717  at  741. 
268-The  Maggie  Hammond  v.  Vierland,  76  U.  S.  pp  435-461,19  L.  ed; 
Walker,  Private  Law,  II,  p  333. 
269-Memphis  Rail  Road  Co  v.  Reeves,  77  U.  S.  10  Wall,  pp  176-192, 100 
because  it  is  well  known  that  every  delay  is  not  a 
deviation.  Whereas,  an  unreasonable  delay  at  another  port 
for  the  purpose  of  taking  the  cargo,  according  to  the 
usage  of  the  trade  to  go  from  one  port  to  another  to 
complete  her  cargo,  is  considered  a  deviation.  270 
Delay  amounts  to  a  deviation  where  it  makes  the  voyage 
a  different  voyage  from  the  contract  one.  271  For  instance, 
when  the  delay  was  constituted  a  different  voyage  from 
that  contemplated  by  being  postponed  rather  than 
prolonged272,  or  the  delay  caused  to  frustrate  the 
commercial  purpose  of  the  contract273  and  when  the  delay 
went  quite  beyond  the  necessities  of  the  situation.  274 
where  it  is  said: 
"The  flood  was  the  proximate  cause  of  the  injury,  and  the  delay  in 
transportation  the  remote  one". 
270-()Iiv, 
r  v.  Maryland  Ins  Co,  7  Cranch,  3  L.  ed,  p  414,  (1810)  11 
U.  S.  p  487;  Atlantic  Mutual  v.  pQ1gJdon  (1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  666, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"because  the  delay  was  unreasonable,  it  was  a  deviation";  TJi 
Willdomino,  272  U.  S.  p  718(1927);  Samuel  Williston,  A  Treatise  on 
the  Law  of  Contract,  (Revised,  ed,  Vol,  IV,  1936,  para,  1079), 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Williston". 
271-Scrutton,  in,  Verren  v.  Anglo-Hutch  Co  [1929]  34  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  210 
at  p  212. 
272-Per  Lord  Atkin,  in,  Brandt  v.  Liverpool  S.  N.  Co.  (19241  1  K.  B.  p 
575  at  p  601,  where  he  said: 
"I  think  this  is  not  a  case  of  prolongation  but  rather  of 
postponement  of  the  voyage...  But  if  it  was  prolonged  I  think  the 
delay  was  such  as  to  substitute  an  entirely  different  voyage  for 
that  contemplated  by  the  bill  of  lading";  2  Carver,  para,  1205. 
273-  r  iah  &  Beningtons,  Ltd  v.  NW  Cacher  Tea.  Co.  (1923]  A.  C. 
p  48;  Universal  Cargo  Carriers  Corp.  v.  Citati  (1957]  2  All  E.  R.  p 
70;  Hong  Kong  ihr  v.  Kawasaki  (1962]  2  Q.  B.  26. 
274-Knauth,  p  263. 101 
v-QUASI-DEVIATION 
Deviation,  geographical  or  non-geographical,  has  always 
occurred  during  the  voyage  between  the  port  of  departure 
and  the  port  of  discharge,  which  voyage  should  be 
prosecuted  without  unreasonable  delay  or  deviation. 
Many  authors  have  called  non-geographical  deviation, 
Quasi-deviation275.  Whereas,  I  have  differed  with  them  in 
that  some  kinds  of  deviation  which  do  not  occur  during  a 
maritime  voyage  but  occur  at  the  destination  port  after 
the  unloading  of  the  cargo,  such  as,  when  the  land 
carriers  agree  to  collect  the  goods  at  the  destination 
port  and  to  deliver  them  to  the  consignee,  or  to  store 
the  goods  until  the  consignee  collects  them,  the  land 
carriers  leaves  the  goods  unguarded,  and  as  a  result  of 
this  the  goods  are  stolen276,  or  if  a  bailee  by  mistake 
sells  the  goods  or  stores  them  in  the  wrong  place,  where 
he  has  agreed  to  keep  the  goods  in  a  specific  place277. 
All  these  misconducts  of  the  carrier  are  called  Quasi- 
Deviation  and  have  the  same  effect  as  any  unreasonable 
deviation278. 
275-2  Carver,  para,  1214-1215;  Morgan,  p  482;  Mackinnon,  p  20; 
Falih,  p  431. 
276-Lord  Justice  Scott,  in,  Rontax  Knitting  Works  Lt  v.  qt..,  7nhnIs 
Garage,  (1943-1944)  60  T.  L.  R.  p  253;  [1943]  2  All  E.  R.  p  690 
277-Liß  v.  Double  Day  [1881]  7  Q.  B.  p  510;  McNair  J,  in,  KQDI= 
v.  Delmer  Prins.  Ltd(1955]  1  Q.  B.  p  291;  Mills,  The  Future  of 
Deviation,  p  588. 
278-Lord  Justice  Denning,  in,  Sp  ing.  Ltd,  v.  Bradshaw  [19561  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  392  at  p  396,  where  he  said: 
"The  essence  of  the  contract  by  a  warehouseman  is  that  he  will 102 
Therefore,  one  can  say  that  geographical  deviation  and 
non-geographical  deviation  are  sui  generis  and  to  keep 
distinct  from  Quasi-Deviation. 
SECTION  THREE 
DEVIATION  AND  CHANGE  OF  VOYAGE 
The  shipowner-is  obliged  to  proceed  and  perform  the 
precise  voyage  described  in  the  bill  of  lading.  279  The 
termini  of  contractual  carriage,  which  should  be 
determined  by  the  bill  of  lading  or  contract  of  carriage, 
should  state  the  ultimate  port  of  destination.  If  the 
vessel  followed  the  agreed  course  of  voyage  from  the 
terminus  a  quo  to  the  terminus  ad  quern,  that  means  the 
vessel  has  been  obliged  to  proceed  according  to  the 
described  course  of  voyage.  280 
An  intent  to  do  an  act  can  never  amount  to  the 
commission  of  the  act  itself.  Thus  an  intention  to 
deviate  or  change  of  voyage  is  irrelevant  and  must  be 
actually  carried  into  effect.  281 
store  the  goods  in  the  contractual  place  and  deliver  them  on  demand 
to  the  bailor  or  his  order.  If  he  stores  them  in  a  different  place, 
or  if  he  consumes  or  destroys  them  instead  of  storing  them,  or  if 
he  sells  them,  or  delivers  them  without  excuse  to  some  body  else, 
he  is  guilty  of  a  breach  which  goes  to  the  root  of  the  contract  and 
he  cannot  rely  on  the  exempting  clause";  Levi  son  v.  Patent  Steam 
Cleaning  (19781  1  Q.  B.  p  69  at  p  81. 
279-Beats=  v.  Haworth,  6  T.  R.  p  531. 
280-fin  v.  Sedgwick  [18931  1  Q.  B.  p  303. 
281-Marine,  Tns.  Co.  of  Alexanriria  v.  John  &  James  H.  Tuker,  3 
Cranch,  p  357,  (5-8  U.  S.  p  466];  Eoster  v.  Wilmer  {1746}  2  Str.  p 
1250,  (93  E.  R.  p  1162);  Hesel 
-on  v.  Al  nu,  1M&S,  p  46  [105 103 
Deviations  from  the  described  voyage,  arise  from  after- 
thoughts,  after-interest,  and  after-temptation.  282  Any 
actual  departures  then  from  the  designed  course  of  voyage 
by  the  contracting  party  will  constitute  a  deviation.  If 
the  vessel  sails  however  on  a  different  voyage  from  that 
described  in  the  bill  of  lading,  then  the  bill  of  lading 
will  be  displaced. 
For  instance,  if  the  vessel  be  taken  before  the 
dividing  point  of  the  voyages,  or  if  the  vessel  had 
discharged  her  cargo,  and  taken  new  freight,  that  would 
have  been  an  act  sufficient  to  alter  the  voyage  and  it 
will  be  established  a  change  of  voyage. 
283  Depending  on 
the  ground  that  there  was  no  inception  of  the  voyage 
which  the  parties  contemplated  by  the  contract. 
284 
Whereas,,  if  the  vessel  departed  from  the  contractual 
voyage  and  proceeded  on  another  one,  but  the  termini  of 
the  agreed  voyage  is  the  same  as  which  the  vessel  sailed, 
that  constitutes  a  deviation.  285 
The  change  of  voyage  is  however  where  the  vessel  sailed 
on  a  different  voyage  from  that  contemplated  by  the 
contracting  parties,  or  where  the  vessel  entirely 
relinquishes  all  the  intention  of  prosecuting  the 
contractual  voyage  after  embarkment.  286 
E.  R.  p  18]. 
282-Lord  Mausfield,  in,  Wooldridgg  v.  Bovdell,  1  Dougl,  p  17,  [99 
E.  R.  p  14]. 
283-Tacker  v.  Cunningham  {1819}  1  B1igh,  p  87  at  97  (4  E.  R.  p  32]. 
284-The  Luson  v.  Ferguson,  1  Dougl,  p  360  [99  E.  R.  p  231). 
285-Kent, 
p  392;  ich  v.  Ryan,  2  H.  BL.  p  343,  (126  E.  R.  p  586] 
286-Lord  Chorley  of  Kendal  &  C.  T.  Bailhache,  The  Law  of  Marine 104 
The  deviation  is  then  a  change  in  the  customary,  usual 
and  agreed  course  of  performing  and  it  has  never  lost 
sight  of  the  voyage.  Viz,  the  identity  of  the  voyage 
depends  on  its  termini  and  that  the  intention  has  been 
deliberately  created  of  abandoning  the  terminus  ad  quem 
of  the  original  voyage.  287 
The  terminus  ad  quem  does  not  per  se  amount  to  a 
change  of  voyage,  but  it  is  an  important  factor  in 
deciding  whether  such  a  change  is  a  deviation  or  a  change 
of  voyage.  For  instance,  where  the  described  route  of  the 
vessel  from  A,  to  B,  C,  and  D.  The  vessel  sailed  with 
intention  to  proceed  directly  to  D,  without  first 
visiting  her  intermediate  places. 
That  means  that  the  vessel  never  sailed  upon  the  voyage 
described  and  also  no  question  was  made  as  to  the  non- 
inception  of  the  voyage,  but  it  was  a  case  of  deviation 
because  the  termini  are  the  same.  288 
Insurance  and  Average,  (1961,  vol,  9],  p  431  hereinafter  cited  as 
"9  Arnould";  Union-Castle  Mail-SS-Co.  V.  Mutaa  Pear  $i  sks  Assen 
[1958]  1  Q.  B.  p  380,  where  it  is  said: 
"There  may  be  a  change  of  voyage  where  the  ship  is  sailing  on 
around  voyage,  although  she  still  proceeds  to  the  original  terminus 
ad  quem";  Compare,  The  Marine  Ins.  Co.  of  Alexandria  v.  70hn  6, 
James  H.  Tuka  r,  3  Cranch  p  357  at  p  372,  {5-8  U.  S.  p  466},  where  it 
is  said: 
"A  voyage  may  be  changed  by  taking  on  board  a  consignment  to  a 
different  port;  and  the  consignment  will  be  evidence  of  the  change, 
or  it  may  be  changed  by  varying  the  plan  of  the  adventure  before 
the  commencement  of  the  risk,  but  a  deviation  takes  place  in  the 
execution  of  the  original  plan.  Therefore,  an  intention  to  alter  the 
voyage  will  destroy  the  contract". 
287-9  Arnould,  p  436,  Footnote,  47. 
288-Lord  Ellenborough,  in,  Marsden  V.  Reid  (1803)  3  East  p  571  at 105 
The  usual  test  for  distinction  between  an  intention  to 
deviate  and  a  change  of  the  voyage  is  whether  the 
ultimate  terminus  ad  quem  remains  the  same.  289  If  the 
termin  of  the  voyage  are  the  same  as  these  described  in 
the  bill  of  lading,  it  was  held  to  be  the  same  voyage 
until  the  vessel  reached  the  dividing  points.  290 
Many  marine  insurance  policies  contain  a  clause 
stating: 
"held  cover  in  case  of  deviation  or  change  of 
voyage  provided  notice  be  given  and  any 
additional  premium  required  be  agreed 
immediately  after  receipt  of  advices". 
The  reasonableness  in  such  a  matter  as  to  the  time  of 
giving  a  notice  depends  upon  the  particular  circumstances 
of  the  case. 
Kennedy,  j,  291  has  concluded  this  case  as  follows: 
"It  was  certainly  a  deviation  from  the  terms 
and  conditions  of  the  policies,  within  the 
p  577  [102  E.  R.  p  716],  where  he  stated: 
"...  the  only  question  is,  whether  there  were  any  inception  of  the 
voyage  insured?  and  I  am  clear  that  there  was  .I  think  that  the 
voyage  insured  to  Palermo,  Messina,  and  Naples,  meant  with  this 
reserve  only  that  if  the  ship  went  to  more  than  one  place  she  must 
visit  them  in  the  order  described  in  the  policy";  KewleY  V.  . yän, 
2  H.  BL,  p  343,  [126  E.  R.  p  586]. 
289-Middle 
_Wood  v.  B  ackes,  7  T.  R.  p  163  [101  E.  R.  P  9111; 
Heselton  v.  Allnutt,  1M&S,  p  46  (  105  E.  R.  p  181;  Egititt  v. 
Loden  General,  Ins.  Co.  Ltd.  (1925]  23  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  243  at  p  245. 
-B=M  v.  Travis  (1827)  7B&C.  p  14  [108  E.  R.  p  6301. 
291-Thames  &  Mersey  Marine  Tn4  Co.  d  v.  H.  T.  Van  Laun  &  Co 
(1917]  2  K.  B.  p  48  at  p  53;  Heselton  v.  Alinutt,  1M&S.  p  46 
1105  E.  R.  p  18]. 106 
meaning  of  those  instruments  and,  I  also  agree 
with  him  that  no  notice  was  given  to  the 
underwriters  of  the  deviation  or  change  of 
voyage  [if  there  was  one]  either  immediately  or 
within  a  reasonable  time  after  the  receipt  by 
the  respondents  of  advices  as  to  the  ship's 
movement  so  as  to  enable  an  additional  premium 
to  be  agreed  upon". 
Finally,  deviation  is  then  not  a  change  of  the  voyage 
and  should  be  contrasted  with  it,  but  if  there  is  no 
change  of  voyage  there  is  a  deviation.  292 
SECTION  FOUR 
DEVIATION  AND  DELAY 
The  implied  obligation  in  the  contract  of  carriage  by 
the  common  law  that  it  is  necessary  that  a  ship  must 
follow  her  course  with  reasonable  despatch  and 
diligence293,  whether  it  is  on  a  contract  of  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea  or  whether  it  is  proceeding  under  a  charter 
party.  294  The  shipowner  and  the  freighter  must  both 
perform  their  respective  duties  in  loading  and 
discharging  the  ship  diligently. 
292-  h  v.  London  General_  Tn.  -R-  Co.  Ltd,  (1925]  23  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  243. 
293-Walker,  Scottish  Private  Law,  p  333;  Chorley  &  Giles,  p  205; 
Pane  &  Ivamy,  p  95;  Dietrich  v.  U.  S.  Shipping  noard-etc  (1925] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1173  at  p  1183,  where  it  is  stated: 
"In  the  absence  of  some  agreement  to  the  contrary,  a  voyage  must  be 
commenced  without  needless  delay  or  deviation,  and  must  be 
prosecuted  with  out  unnecessary  delay  or  deviation". 
294-Anglo-Saxon  Petroleum  Co_  Ltd  v.  Adamastos  Shipping  Co.  Ltd 
(1957]  2  Q.  B.  p  233,  reversed  on  other  grounds  by  (H.  L),  [1959]  A.  C. 
p  133. 107 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA  contain  no  express 
provision  for  the  delay295  or  its  effect. 
296  That  does  not 
mean  that  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  leave  the  cargo-owners 
unprotected.  Then,  such  an  obligation  could  be  implied  in 
Article  3  [2),  which  imposes  a  general  duty  of  care  in 
handling  the  cargo.  297 
Article  5  [2j  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  defines  what  is  to 
establish  delay  when  the  goods  have  not  been  delivered  at 
the  port  of  discharge  provided  for  in  the  contract  of 
carriage  by  sea  within  the  time  expressly  agreed  upon  or, 
in  the  absence  of  such  agreement,  within  the  time  which 
it  would  be  reasonable  to  require  of  a  diligent  carrier, 
having  regard  to  the  circumstances  of  the  case" 
295-Chambers,  p  183,  where  he  stated  the  definition  of  delay  as 
follows: 
"di-  La,  v.  t.  to  put  off  another  time,  to  defer;  to  hinder  or 
retard-  v.  i.  to  pause,  linger,  or  put  off  time:  pr.  p.  delaying; 
pa.  p.  delayed-n.  a  putting  off  or  deferring:  a  lingering: 
hindrance..  ". 
296-Gordon  Pollock,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules,  Part 
II,  "  Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rules.  A  One  Day  Seminar,  Organised 
by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  1978,  pollock,  p  1,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Pollock,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
297-Wilson,  pp  145-147;  gin  v.  Palmyra  [1957]  A.  C.  p  149  at  p 
150,  where  it  is  stated; 
"Article  3  Rule  2,  which  required  the  carrier  "properly"  to  carry 
and  discharge,  for  the  object  of  the  rules  was  to  define  not  the 
scope  of  the  contract  service  but  the  manner  in  which  it  was  to  be 
performed,  and  "properly"  mention  accordance  with  a  sound  system"; 
Whereas,  Section  (48]  of  the  Marine  Insurance  Act,  1906  declares: 
"In  the  case  of  a  voyage  policy,  the  adventure  insured  must  be 
prosecuted  throughout  its,  course  with  reasonable  despatch,  and  if 
without  lawful  excuse  it  is  not  so  prosecuted,  the  insurer  is 
discharged  from  liability  as  from  the  time  when  the  delay  became 
unreasonable". 108 
Miscarriage  to  deliver  the  goods  within  [60] 
consecutive  days  following  the  expiry  of  the  above 
defined  delivery  date  entitles  the  consignee  to  treat  the 
goods  as  lost298. 
The  classification  of  delay  depends  on  a  particular 
case  or  situation.  Positive  and  arbitrary  rules  cannot 
determine  whether  a  delay  is  reasonable  or  unreasonable. 
The  determining  factor  is  the  condition  of  the  goods 
existing  at  a  certain  time,  when  the  ship  is  at  a 
particular  port,  having  considered  all  the  surrounding 
individual  circumstances,  and  all  the  possibilities, 
acknowledged  by  both  parties  at  the  time  the  contract  was 
made299. 
Mere  length  of  time  is  not  in  itself  sufficient  to 
constitute  unreasonable  delay300.  It  is  not  the  nature  of 
the  cause  of  delay  which  matters  so  much  as  the  effect  of 
that  cause  upon  the  performance  of  the  obligations  which 
the  parties  have  assumed  one  towards  the  other301. 
298-Article  5(3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Samir  Mankabady,  "Comments 
on  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rules  on  the 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  32  at 
p  54,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Samir  Mankabady". 
299-So.  i_te  Fran  e  Tunissenne  D'armement  v.  Sindermar  S.  P.  A  (1961] 
2  Q.  B.  p  278. 
300-Lord  Ellenborough,  in,  Grant  v.  King(1802)  4  Esp.  p  175;  170 
E.  R.  p  682. 
301-Lord  Roskill,  in,  Pioneer  Shipping  Ltd  v.  BTD,  Tioxide.  Ltd 
(1982]  A.  C.  p  724  at  p  754  (H.  L);  Knauth,  p  263,  saying  that: 
"Delay  is  not  actionable  unless  the  customary  slowest  voyage 
performance  is  exceeded  negligently;  The  Naiwa  (1925]  A.  M.  C.  p  85; 
The  Iossifogh  (1929]  A.  M.  C.  p  1157;  Michael  J,  Roche  ,  J,  in,  M= 
Eid  (1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  177  at  p  180,  where  they  said; 
"The  decision  of  a  carrier  in  these  circumstances  must  be  made  with 109 
The  proper  test  to  apply  in  order  to  decide  whether 
that  delay  is  reasonable  or  not  depends  upon  the 
commercial  purpose  of  the  venture302  and  the  object  of  the 
voyage303,  if  such  purpose  is  still  the  same  or  is 
frustrated  by  delay.  304  Therefore,  a  mere  delay  without 
increased  risk  does  not  amount  to  a  variation  of  risk.  305 
The  shipowners  have  an  implied  right  to  diminish  the 
damages  caused  by  the  charterer's  default  and  to  load 
additional  cargo.  Then  such  delay  took  place  to  the 
due  regard  to  the  interests  of  all  cargo  on  board  and  the  vessel  as 
well-  not  with  regard  solely  of  any  one  shipment". 
302-Universal-Cargo  Carriers 
Corporation  v.  Kati,  (1957]  2  Q.  B. 
p  401;  Tokuyo  Maru,  (19251  A.  M.  C.  p  1420  at  p  1425,  where  it  is 
said: 
"The  commercial  adventure,  which  is  the  subject  of  the  contract, 
the  character  of  the  vessel,  the  usual  and  customary  route,  the 
natural  and  usual  ports  of  call,  the  location  of  the  port  to  which 
the  deviation  was  made  and  the  purpose  of  the  call  threat". 
303-Jakson  v.  The  Union  Marin  n  Ins.  Co.  Ltd  (1874)  L.  R.  10  C.  P.  p 
125  at  p  129,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  a  ship  is  chartered  for  a  voyage  without  any  definite  period 
for  the  commencement  of  the  voyage,  and  delay  takes  place,  the 
question  is,  whether  that  delay  is  so  great  as  to  frustrate  the 
object  for  which  the  charterer  entered  into  the  charter  party"; 
Williston  &  Thompson",  p  1079. 
304-Cockburn,  in,  The  Company  of  African  Merchants.  Ltd.  v.  The 
British  &  Foreign  Marine  Ins.  Co.  Ltd  (1873)  L.  R.  8  EX,  p  154, 
where  he  said: 
"It  would  be  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  whether  the  purpose  was 
or  was  not  a  trade  of  purpose";  Lush  J,  in,  Ge  eel  v.  Rmith,  L.  R. 
7  Q.  B.  p  404  at  p  414,  where  he  said: 
"Likely  to  continue  so  long,  and  so  to  disturb  the  commerce  of 
merchants  as  to  defeat  and  destroy  the  object  of  a  commercial 
adventure". 
305-Keting 
&  Mellor,  JJ,  in,  The  Company  of  African  Merchants  v. 
The  British  o  eagn  Marine  Tns_  TAd,  op.  cit,  at  p  154. 110 
voyage  by  loading  such  cargo  was  impliedly  authorized  by 
the  charter  party. 
306  If  the  permission  to  delay307  for  a 
certain  length  of  time  is  expressed308,  the  delay  can  be 
lawfully  extended. 
309 
The  intention  of  the  parties  when  they  introduced  in 
the  contract  the  liberty  to  touch  and  stay,  must  not  be 
construed  so  as  to  defeat  the  main  object  of  the 
contract.  310 
306-Mackinnon,  J,  in,  Wallames  Regerij  A/S  v.  W.  M.  H.  Muller  &  Co. 
Batavia  [1927]  2  K.  B.  p  99. 
307-Section(49) 
of  the  Marine  Insurance  Act,  1906,  provided  the 
causes  which  amount  to  a  lawful  excuse  as  follows: 
"1-Deviation  or  delay  in  prosecuting  the  voyage  contemplated  by  the 
policy  is  excused, 
"a"Where  authorized  by  any  special  term  in  the  policy;  or 
"b"Where  caused  by  circumstances  beyond  the  control  of  the  master 
and  his  employer;  or 
"c"Where  reasonably  necessary  in  order  to  comply  with  an  express  or 
implied  warranty;  or 
"d"Where  reasonably  necessary  for  the  safety  of  the  ship  or  subject 
matter  insured;  or 
"e"For  the  purpose  of  saving  human  life,  or  aiding  a  ship  in 
distress  where  human  life  may  be  in  danger;  or 
"f"Where  reasonably  necessary  for  the  purpose  of  obtaining  medical 
or  surgical  aid  for  any  person  on  board  the  ship;  or 
"g"Where  caused  by  the  barratrous  conduct  of  the  master  or  crew,  if 
barratry  be  one  of  the  perils  insured  against. 
2-When  the  cause  excusing  the  deviation  or  delay  ceases  to  operate, 
the  ship  must  resume  her  course,  and  prosecute  her  voyage,  with 
reasonable  despatch". 
308-T1os 
v.  Dahl  Stroem  (1931)  1  K.  B.  p  247  at  p  252;  Per  Lord 
Buckmaster,  in,  Su  Zuki  v.  Beynon(1929]  42  T.  L.  R.  p  269  at  p  274; 
Per  Mr.  Justice,  Mocatta,  in,  Marifortuna  NavieraS.  A.  V.  Government 
of  Ceylon  (1970)  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  247  at  p  251. 
309-  v.  Howling  [1877]  2  Q.  B.  D.  p  182;  Doyle  v.  Powell  (1832) 
4  B.  &  AD,  p  265;  11  E.  R.  p  455. 
310- 
nn  V.  Mara  son  (1893)  A.  C.  p  351;  Sze  Hai  Tong  Bank  v. 
Rambler 
Cycle  .cL 
d[1959]  A.  C.  p  576;  Hindanger[1935]  A.  M.  C.  p  563. 111 
That  means  that  the  clauses  cover  merely  delays  fairly 
ancillary  to  the  prescribed  voyage311  and  the  vessel 
should  not  wait  more  than  a  reasonable  time312.  The 
necessity  then  must  be  justified  both  as  to  substance  and 
manner.  Nothing  more  must  be  done  than  what  necessity 
requires313. 
Most  bills  of  lading,  however,  contain  a  particular 
name  of  port  for  delivery  of  the  goods  to  their 
destination. 
Where  the  carrier  shall  carry  the  goods  from  port  to 
port  or  from  wharf  to  wharf,  an  actual  or  manual 
tradition  of  the  goods  into  the  possession  of  the 
consignee,  or  at  his  warehouse,  is  not  required  in  order 
to  discharge  the  carrier  from  his  liability314, 
The  carrier  should  be  discharged  of  the  goods  in  the 
port  named  or  wharf  designated  in  the  bill  of  lading315, 
taking  into  consideration  that  delivery  of  the  goods  from 
a  ship  must  be  according  to  the  custom  and  usage  of  the 
311-E.  C.  t.  Sporting  Goods  v.  U.  S.  Ljnea(1970]  A.  M.  C.  p  400  at  p  403. 
312-Doyle  v.  Powell,  op.  cit,  p  267  at  p  270,  where  it  is  said: 
"If  the  vessel  had  been  at  liberty  to  stay  a  reasonable  time,  that 
would  have  imported  a  liberty  to  stay  as  long  as  there  was  a 
detention  by  embargo";  Toyo  Kisen  Kabuli  ikiKaisha  [1925]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1420  ;  Dietrich  v.  U.  S.  Shipping  Rnard  (1925]  A.  M.  C.  p  1173. 
313-Lavabre  v.  Wilson,  1  Doug,  p  284,  [99  E.  R.  p  1851;  Phelps  v. 
Hill  [1891]  1  Q.  B.  p  605. 
314-Richardson  v.  Ord  {1859)  23  How,  64  U.  S.  p  28,  where  it  is 
said. 
"The  carrier  is  not  bound  to  deliver  at  the  warehouse  of  the 
consignee,  it  is  the  duty  of  the  consignee  to  receive  the  goods  out 
of  the  ship  or  on  the  wharf". 
315-The  Eddav  (1866)  5  Wall,  72  U.  S.  PP  481-496. 112 
port316,  unless  there  is  force  majeure317  preventing  the 
carrier  from  discharging  the  goods  in  the  agreed  port,  or 
wharf,  such  as,  war318,  civil  commotion319,  strike320, 
detention  by  ice321,  perils  of  sea322,  and  any  delay 
caused  by  something  outwith  their  control. 
323 
If  the  delay  then  is  not  so  great  to  frustrate  the 
commercial  purpose  of  the  venture,  it  will  not  constitute 
an  unreasonable  delay.  Such  as  when  the  delay  caused  by 
the  break  downs  and  repairs324,  or  when  the  delay  is 
316-constable  v.  The  National  S.  S.  Co.  154  U.  S.  p  51;  Halsbury's 
Shipping  And  Navigation,  p  673,  Footnote,  1. 
317-Marifortuna  Naviera  S.  A.  v.  Govt  of  Ceylon  [1970]  1  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  247. 
318-The  Teutonic  (1872}  L.  R.  4  P.  C.  p  171;  The  San  Roman,  L.  R.  5 
P.  C.  pp  301,305  {1873);  Metropoliten  Water  Board  V.  Dick,  Kerr  & 
Co.  [1918]  A.  C.  p  119;  Westralian  Farmers  Ltd  v.  n.  .  Orient  (1939] 
65  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  105;  American  Tabacco  Co.  v.  The  Katinga  Hadj  Patera 
[1949]  A.  M.  C.  p  49;  Affirmed  by  (1951]  A.  M.  C.  p  1933;  Th.  B. 
Portmar{on  appeal)  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  861;  The  Styria  v.  Morgan,  186 
U.  S.  p  1; 
_Enbiricos  v.  Sydney  Reid  &  co.  (1914]  3  K.  B.  p  45. 
319-Longley,  p  92;  Scrutton,  p  92. 
320-Ropner  v.  Ronnebeck  (1914}  20  Com.  Cas.  p  95;  Westoll-  v. 
Lindsay,  1916.  S.  C.  p  782. 
321-Matheos  v.  Dryfus  [1925]  A.  C.  p  654. 
322-Thomas  v.  The  Royal  Exchange  Assurance  (1814)  1  Price,  p  195; 
(145  E.  R.  p  1375);  The  riome  {1871)  L.  R.  3  P.  C.  p  594  at  p  603; 
The  Assicurazieni  Generali  v.  g  ssie  Morris  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  p  652; 
("Arras  v.  London  &  Scottish  Assurance  orp.  Ltd  (1936]  1  K.  B.  P 
291;  Canada  Rice  Mils  v.  Union  Marine  [1941)  A.  C.  p  55;  Associated 
Lead  Manufa 
.  s,  L 
_d.  v.  E  lerman  &  Bucknall  SR.  Co.  Ltd  (1956]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  167;  J.  b-  &''o.  v.  S.  S.  Sabine  How  Aldt(1971]  A.  M. 
C.  p  539;  Pincoffs  Co.  Atlantic  Shipping  Co.  Etc(1975)  A.  M.  C.  p  2128; 
Compare,  Yawata  r&S.  Co.  V.  Anthony  Shipping  Co(1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  1602. 
323-Abbott, 
p  411;  Hellenic  Linea  v.  Embassy  of  Pakistan  (1973)  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  363  {U.  S.  A.  }. 
324-Lord  Kenyon,  in,  Smith  v.  urridge.  4  Esp.  p  25;  [170  E.  R.  p 
628);  where  he  said: 113 
necessary  to  avoid  capture  because  it  will  diminish  the 
risk  not  increase  it.  325  If  the  delay  or  loss  of  or  damage 
to  cargo  on  board  is  however  due  to  unseaworthiness326, 
the  shipowners  will  be  responsible  for  such  delay  or  loss 
of  or  damage  to  cargo  that  has  been  caused  by  want  of  due 
diligence  of  the  owners  in  making  the  vessel  seaworthy 
and  fitted  for  the  voyage. 
327  Mere  existence  of 
unseaworthiness  does  not  prevent  a  shipowner  from  relying 
upon  the  terms  of  exceptional  clauses  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  the  charter  party  and  the  insurance  policy  unless 
some  loss  or  damage  is  caused  by  the  unseaworthiness 
itself.  328 
Mere  delay,  then,  is  not  in  itself  enough  to  establish 
an  unreasonableness,  but  must  result  in  actual  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  delay.  329  Delay  means 
however  delay  of  such  a  serious  and  extensive  character 
as  to  cause  the  performance  of  a  substantially  different 
contract.  330 
"It  was  not  a  voluntary  delay  nor  such  as  amounted  to  a  discharge 
of  the  policy";  Kidston  v.  Monceau  {1902)  7  Com,  Cas.  p  82;  Hong 
Kong  Fir  Shipping  Co.  Ltd  v.  Kawasaki  Ki  sen  Kaisha.  Ltd  [1962]  2 
Q.  B.  p  26. 
325-Hughes  v.  The  Union  Ins. 
_n  _  (1818)  3  Wheat,  p  159;  (16  U.  S.  4 
L.  ed.  p  357]. 
326-Astel,  Shipping  Law,  p  169. 
327-Hong  Kong  Fir  Shipping  Co.  v.  Kawasaki  Ki4  n  Kaisha,  Ltd. 
(1962]  2  Q.  B.  p  26  at  p  72. 
328-Per  Lord,  Porter,  in,  Month  S.  s.  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Knr1shamns 
oljefabriker  (1949]  A.  C.  p  196  at  p  211;  MI  dr.  w  v.  Adams  (1834) 
1  Bing  (N.  C.  )  p  29,  (131  E.  R.  p  1028.1 
329-Koufos  v.  C.  Qzanikow  Ltd  [1969]  1  A.  C.  p  350;  The  Pegase 
[1981]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  175  at  p  183;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  135. 
330-Hodson  L.  J,  in,  G.  H.  Renton  &o  Ltd  v.  Trading  Corp  of 114 
Tindal  C.  J.  331,  has  explained  the  meaning  of 
unreasonable  delay  as  follows: 
"The  voyage  in  the  commencement  or  prosecution, 
becomes  a  voyage  at  a  different  period  of  the 
year,  at  a  mere  advanced  age  of  the  ship,  and 
in  short  a  different  voyage  than  if  it  had  been 
prosecuted  with  reasonable  and  ordinary 
diligence;  that  is,  the  risk  would  have  been 
altered  from  that  which  was  intended  by  all 
parties  when  the  policy  was  effected". 
The  next  question  whether  the  delay  is  or  is  not 
reasonable  is  a  question  of  law  or  fact.  The  court  held 
that: 
1-In  the  Oliver  v.  T  .  Mary  Land  Ins.  Co:  332 
"What  is  a  reasonable  apprehension  of  danger  is 
a  question  of  law  to  be  decided  by  the  court". 
2-In  the  Universal 
Cargo 
Carriers  Corn  v.  Citati333,, 
has  slightly  differed  where  it  is  said: 
"The  assessment  by  the  arbitrator  of  the  period 
of  delay  sufficient  to  constitute  frustration 
was  a  question  of  fact,  and  could  be  attacked 
only  if  he  had  applied  some  wrong  principle  of 
law". 
3-Lord  Denning,  in,  pioneer  Shipping  Ltd  v.  B.  T.  P. 
Tioxide  Ltd,  334  concluded  that: 
"The  assessment  of  whether  a  period  of  delay  is 
sufficient  to  constitute  frustration  is  one  of 
mixed  law  and  fact". 
Panama  [1956]  1  Q.  B.  p  462  at  p  510. 
331_ßt  v.  Larkins(1831)  8  Bing  p  108  at  p  124;  (131  E.  R.  p  342]. 
332_7  cranch,  11  U.  S.  p  487. 
333_[1957]  2  Q.  B.  p  401. 
334_(1980]  1  Q.  B.  p  547. 115 
The  test  of  whether  the  delay  is  reasonable  or  is  not 
is  however  a  question  of  fact335  having  considered  all  the 
circumstances  surrounding336  the  actual  voyage337. 
Before  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA  put  in  force, 
the  term  of  deviation  had  been  used  to  include  delay338. 
It  may  be  collected,  from  numerous  cases,  that  delay 
before  or  after  the  commencement  of  voyage  is  not 
tantamount  to  a  deviation,  unless  it  be  unreasonable339. 
As  a  matter  of  principle,  the  term  "deviation"  implies 
the  notion  of  space  or  locality.  Whereas,  the  term" 
delay",  refers  to  time. 
There  is  frequently  misuse  of  the  term  deviation  to 
335-The  Company  of  African  Merchants  v.  The  British  and  Foreign 
Marine  Ins.  Co.  Ltd{1873}  L.  R.  8  EX.  p  154  at  p  157,  where  it  is  said: 
"It  would  be  a  question  of  fact  for  a  jury  whether  the  purpose  was 
or  was  not  a  trade  purpose";  Pea  on  v.  Commercial  Union  Assurance 
C.  {1876}  1  App.  Cas.  p  498. 
336-Winter,  p  220. 
337-Pollock,  2. 
338_  artlev  v.  Buggin  (1781)  3  Dougl,  p  39;  (  99  E.  R.  p  527.  ];  Hvder 
Abad  v.  Willoughby  (1899]  2  Q.  B.  p  530;  Thames  &M  .  rseyº  Marine 
Tns.  _o.  td  v.  H.  T.  Van  Laun  &  Co.  (1917]  2  K.  B.  p  48. 
339-Phillips  v.  Irving 
(1844)  7  Man  &  G.  p  355;  1135  E.  R.  p  136]; 
Oliver  v.  The  Mary  Land  Inn.  Co.  7  Cranch,  11  U.  S.  p  487;  Williston 
&  Thompson,  1079,  saying  that: 
"A  deviation  may  arise  from  inexcusable  delay";  W'allems  Reaerii 
A.  S.  v.  W.  M.  H.  M  l 
.r  &Co.  Batavia  (1927]  2  K.  B.  p  99;  Effingham 
(1935]  A.  M.  C.  p  319;  International  Drilling  Co.  v.  M/V  Dorie_fs 
(1969]  A.  M.  C.  p  119  at  128,  where  it  is  said  that: 
"Delay  in  carrying  the  goods,  failure  to  deliver  the  goods  at  the 
port  named  in  the  bill  of  lading  and  carrying  them  farther  to 
another  port,  or  bringing  them  back  to  the  port  of  original 
shipment  and  reshipping  them.  Such  conduct  has  been  held  to  be  a 
departure  from  the  course  of  agreed  transit  and  to  constitute  a 
deviation;  Steven,  p  1540,  Footnote,  p  24. 116 
describe  unreasonable  delay340. 
Norway341  made  this  clear  when  it  is  noted  that: 
"Deviation  was  really  a  problem  in  delay  and 
that  no  special  provision  on  deviation  would  be 
necessary". 
The  Second  Report  draw  however  attention  to  suggestions 
that  the  Working  Group  gave  separate  consideration  to  the 
subject  of  delay342. 
We  can  then  conclude  that  every  delay  is  not  classed  as 
deviation  and  there  is  no  need  for  the  fiction  that  an 
unjustifiable  delay  amounts  to  a  deviation343. 
Finally,  Knauth344  suggested  to  apply  Marine  Insurance 
Act  on  the  maritime  carriage  cases  as  follows: 
"As  the  subject  is  transplanted  from  the  field 
of  marine  insurance  to  that  transportation,  it 
would  seem  proper  to  consider  that  the 
legislative  statements  of  the  marine  Insurance 
Act  of  1906  ought  to  be  applied  as  well  to 
transportation  delay  cases". 
Delay  has  therefore  a  particular  definition  which  it 
340_2  Carver,  para,  1205;  Poor,  pp  189-200;  Sarpa,  pp  156-157. 
341-Sweeney,  Part  II,  p  346,  where  he  stated  that: 
"This  view  was  endorsed  by  Hungary,  Japan,  and  Australia.  The 
Norwegian  view  was  also  supported  by  Nigeria  which  held  that 
deviation  presented  the  carrier  on  opportunity  to  make  a  special 
defense  and  that  treatment  of  the  subject  under  the  general  burden 
of  proof  rules  was  sufficient.  The  Nigerian  view  was  endorsed  by 
Tanzania". 
342-Erik  &  Thomas,  p  694. 
343_9  Arnould,  p  433,  Footnote,  29;  Morgan,  p  483;  Hellyen  v.  U  Y-, 
K.  [1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1258  at  p  1260. 
344-Knauth, 
p  263. 117 
has  excluded  from  definition  of  deviation.  As  provided  in 
Marine  Insurance  Act  {1906}  by  section  46345. 
CONCLUSION 
The  deviation  issue  has  a  significant  impact  on  the 
contract  of  carriage.  Any  departure  from  the  contemplated 
voyage,  or  breach  of  the  contract  is  therefore  not 
considered  a  deviation,  without  taking  into  account 
particular  elements  which  constitute  the  doctrine  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation. 
The  following  conclusion  can  then  be  drawn  in 
explaining  the  concept  of  deviation  whether  under  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  or  the  COGSA  of 
the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States. 
1-The  Hague/Visby  Rules  do  not  define  deviation  and  do 
not  provide  any  criteria  for  the  term  "reasonableness", 
or  "unreasonableness",  but  the  Rules  have  construed  only 
what  constitutes  a  reasonable  deviation.  Whereas,  a 
proviso  which  is  not  mentioned  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
and  the  United  Kingdom  COGSA,  is  attached  to  the  United 
States  COGSA,  Article  4  [41  as  a  criterion  of 
unreasonable  deviation. 
2-The  Hamburg  Rules  do  not  define  deviation,  but  they 
explain  in  Article  5  (61  the  measures  to  save  life  or 
reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at  sea  which  depends 
upon  the  principle  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier  in 
these  Rules. 
345-The 
.ia  Di  Messina,  169  Fed.  Rep.  p  472  at  p  475  (1909). 118 
3-The  Hamburg  Rules  are  a  more  advantageous  regime  for 
cargo  in  the  event  of  carrier  misconduct  and  the  Rules 
are  in  fact  more  favourable  to  the  carrier  when  the  Rules 
recovered  any  loss,  damage  and  delay  caused  by  deviation 
which  are  supposed  to  be  unreasonable  unless  the  carrier 
can  prove  otherwise.  346 
4-The  United  Kingdom  courts  have  confined  the  meaning 
of  deviation  in  a  change  in  the  geographical  route. 
Whereas,  the  United  States  courts  have  extended  the 
concept  of  deviation  to  any  serious  change  in  the  conduct 
of  the  vessel  which  has  exposed  cargo  to  increased  risks, 
such  as,  stowage  on  deck,  dry  docking  with  cargo  aboard 
and  delay  may  be  another  form  of  non-geographical 
deviation. 
5-The  liberty  clauses  to  deviate  are  a  part  of  the 
contract  voyage  and  must  be  read  together  and 
reconciled347,  taking  into  consideration  the  main  object 
of  the  contracting  parties  and  should  not  defeat  the 
commercial  purpose  of  the  venture.  348 
6-There  are  many  reason  for  deviations  according  to 
excepted  perils  under  Article  4t2]  in  the  Rules  and  COGSA 
which  make  the  carrier  escape  from  any  liability 
resulting  from  such  reasons,  except  where  such  damage 
occurred  by  the  fault  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants  or 
caused  by  unreasonable  deviation. 
346-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  180. 
347-Per  Lord  Viscount  Summer,  in,  Frame  v.  ManAndrewR,  op.  cit, 
p  562;  Connelly  Shaw  v.  Det  Norden  ¬ieidake,  op.  cit,  pp  183-190 
348-Per  Lord  Morton  of  Henryton,  in,  Renton  v.  Palmyra,  op.  cit,  p 
168;  Tokyo  Mara,  op.  cit,  pp  1425-1426. 119 
7-The  criterion  of  reasonableness  can  sometimes  be  used 
to  govern  an  unreasonable  deviation,  but  not  vice-versa 
because  the  carrier's  act  which  is  not  reasonable  should 
be  unreasonable. 
8-Both  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States 
jurisprudence  concerning  the  judicial  interpretation  of 
the  term  "reasonable"  is  frequently  used  loosely  and  is 
governed  by  the  circumstances  of  the  particular  case  in 
the  light  of  analogous  precedents. 
9-The  United  Kingdom  courts  are  quite  strict  more  than 
the  United  States  courts  in  determining  what  constitutes 
an  unreasonable  deviation. 
10-Both  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  seem 
to  me  to  leave  no  room  for  doubt  that  whether  deviation 
is  or  is  not  reasonable  appears  a  question  of  fact  in 
which  both  parties,  shipowner  and  cargo-owner,  have 
considered  all  the  individual  circumstances  existing  at 
the  time  the  contract  was  made  and  not  by  any  abstract 
standard. 
11-There  is  no  doubt  that  intentional  or  wilful 
misconduct  should  be  an  essential  element  in  the 
determining  of  an  unreasonable  deviation. 
12-any  change  or  modification  in  the  particular  course 
of  voyage  by  error  or  by  negligence  or  if  the  carrier 
makes  a  transgression349,  these  will  not  be  considered 
349-Compare,  Sarpa,  p  156,  where  he  stated: 
"Focusing  on  the  "  transgression"  aspect  of  deviation,  the  courts 
have  held  various  actions,  which  are  considered  fundamental 
departure  from  the  terms  of  the  affreightment  contract,  to  have  the 120 
unreasonable,  but  it  should  be  classified  due  to  a  lack 
of  proper  and  customary  care  of  the  cargo  and  Article  3 
[2]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA  should  have 
applied. 
13-Mere  intention  or  wilful  misconduct  is  not  enough  to 
amount  to  unreasonableness  and  the  causal  connection 
between  the  deviation  and  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo 
should  be  shown  and  it  will  be  important  to  note  that 
such  loss  or  damage  is  not  sufficient  to  constitute  an 
unreasonable  deviation  and  it  must  be  caused  by  the 
deviation  itself  and  not  by  any  reason  or  act  independent 
of  the  deviation.  350 
14-Geographical  or  non-geographical  deviation  has 
always  occurred  during  the  voyage  between  the  port  of  the 
departure  and  the  port  of  discharge  which  should  be 
prosecuted  without  unreasonable  delay  or  deviation.  The 
carrier  should  never  lose  sight  of  the  intended  voyage 
which  differs  from  the  change  of  voyage  where  the  vessel 
sails  on  another  voyage  contemplated  by  the  contract  of 
carriage. 
15-Every  delay  is  not  equivalent  to  a  deviation  because 
the  term  deviation  implies  the  notion  of  space  or 
locality,  where  the  term  delay  refers  to  time.  There  is 
no  need  then  for  a  criterion  which  deems  that  an 
unreasonable  delay  amounts  to  a  deviation.  351 
same  effect  as  a  deviation". 
350-poor,  p  192;  Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  16. 
351-Knauth, 
p  262;  9  Arnould,  op.  cit,  Footnote,  29. 1  21 
16-Many  commissions  of  the  carrier  do  not  establish  a 
deviation,  even  though  there  is  a  delay  in  delivery, 
unless  such  delay  constitutes  a  different  voyage  from 
that  contemplated,  by  being  postponed  rather  than 
prolonged. 
17-  I  have  suggested  a  thorough  universal  definition  of 
deviation  which  absorbs  all  the  elements  of  the  deviation 
which  has  been  classified  as  the  deviation  into 
reasonable  and  unreasonable  as  follows: 
"Deviation  is  a  deliberate  and  serious 
departure  from  the  contract  of  carriage  which 
constitutes  a  different  venture  from  that 
contemplated,  and  causes  some  loss  of,  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  without  necessity  or 
reasonable  cause". 122 
CHAPTER  TWO 
THE  BASIS  OF  LIABILITY  OF  THE  CARRIER  IN 
CONNECTION  WITH  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  DEVIATION 
The  implied  obligation  of  the  shipowner,  under  the 
common  law  rules,  when  he  receives  goods  to  be  carried 
for  reward,  is  that  he  is  responsible  to  transport  and 
discharge  the  cargoes  in  good  condition,  responsible  for 
all  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargoes  while  they  are  under 
his  control,  unless  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  has 
been  caused  by  an  Act  of  God,  the  Queen's  Enemies, 
Inherent  Vice,  Defective  Packing  and  Jettison.  ' 
Thus  the  carrier  will  not  excuse  himself  from 
responsibility  if  he  has  not  exercised  due  diligence  to 
make  the  vessel  seaworthy  when  the  vessel  started  her 
voyage,  or  the  loss  and  damage  has  been  due  to  unfitness 
of  the  vessel  to  carry  the  cargo.  2 
In  1851,  the  United  States  congress  enacted  the  Fire 
statute  which  gave  the  common  carrier3  a  limited 
1-Jasper  Ridley,  The  Law  of  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Land.  S  pa  and 
Bim,  [6th,  ed,  19821,  p  85,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  Ridley". 
2-1  Carver,  para,  20. 
3-The  carriers  by  sea  are  to  be  divided  into  three  classes: 
"a"-Common  carrier: 
is  a  person  who  undertakes  for  hire  to  transport  from  a  place 
within  the  realm  to  a  place  within  or  without  the  realm  the  goods 
or  money  of  all.  Such  persons  as  think  fit  to  employ  him  to  render 
a  person  liable  as  a  common  carrier  he  must  exercise  the  bu  siness 
of  carrying  as  a  pub  lic  employment  and  must  undertake  to  carry 
goods  for  all  persons  indiscriminately  and  hold  himself  out,  either 
expressly  or  by  course  of  conduct,  as  ready  to  engage  in  the 123 
transportation  of  goods  for  hire  as  a  business,  not  merely  as  a 
casual  occupation  pro  hac  vice. 
However,  should  be  noted  that  all  the  shipping  cases  of  the  United 
Kingdom  were  governed  by  the  Bills  of  lading  Act,  1855  and  the 
Merchant  Shipping  Act,  1894,  as  the  subject  of  common  law;  [Ridley, 
p  83;  Watkins  v.  Cottel[1916]  1  K.  B.  p  10  at  p  14;  Nugent  v.  Smith 
{1875}  1  C.  P.  D.  p  19;  Chua,  J,  in,  The  "Golden  Lake",  Singapore 
High  Court,  [1982]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  632  at  p  636). 
"b"Private  Carrier: 
is  defined  to  be  a  person  whose  trade  is  not  that  of  conveying 
goods  from  one  person  or  place  to  another  but  who  undertakes  upon 
occasion  to  carry  the  goods  of  another  and  receives  a  reward  for  so 
doing,  [Watkins  v.  ße1,  op.  cit,  p  14;  Ridley,  p  84]. 
"c"Public  Carrier: 
who  carries  on  the  profession  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  and  who 
is  not  common  carrier.  A  public  carrier  is  not  under  a  duty  to 
accept  goods  for  carriage,  and  is  always  entitled  to  refuse  to 
carry;  but  if  he  accepts  goods  for  carriage  he  is  liable,  in  the 
absence  of  a  special  contract,  to  the  same  extent  as  a  common 
carrier  for  the  safety  to  the  goods.  [Ridley,  p  84;  Lars  Gorton, 
The  Concept  of  the  Common  Carrier  in  Anglo-American  Law,  1971,  p 
74,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Gorton"]. 
The  real  test  of  what  constitutes  a  common  carrier  is  to  be 
determined  by  the  facts  relating  to: 
1-The  business  of  carrying  must  be  habitual  and  not  causal. 
2-The  undertaking  must  be  general  and  for  all  servants  of  the 
public. 
3-He  holds  out,  either  expressly  or  impliedly  that  he  will 
transport  for  hire  as  a  business  the  goods  of  all  people 
indifferently. 
4-He  is  sometimes  described  as  a  person  who  undertakes  for  reward 
to  carry  the  goods  of  such  as  choose  remploy  him  from  place  to 
place.  [The  Liver  Alkali  Co.  v.  Johnson  (1872)  L.  R.  7  EX,  p  267;  9 
EX,  p  338;  Bailhache,  J,  in,  Belfast  Rnpework  Co.  Ltd.  v.  $.  131.1 
(1918]  1  K.  B.  p  210  at  p  212.;  Gorton,  p  77.;  Robert  HutchinAnna-A 
Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Carriers,  vol  I,  [3rd,  ed,  1906),  p  47,  By  S. 
Matthews  and  W.  Dickinson,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Hutchinson,  vol,  I". 
"However,  the  Rules  make  no  distinction  between  common  carriage  and 
private  carriage  because  the  criterion  is  neither  private  nor 
public  carriage,  but  whether  there  is  a  contract  of  carriage 
covered  by  a  bill  of  lading  or  similar  document  of  title".  (Tetley, 124 
exception  for  damage  by  fire  unless  there  is  any  neglect 
on  the  part  of  the  carrier. 
In  1893,  the  Harter  Act  purported  to  make  a  compromise 
between  carriers  and  shippers  interests  by  limited 
exculpatory  clauses  which  were  used  by  the  carrier  and 
limited  the  carriers  liability  for  loss  of  or  damage  to 
the  cargo.  On  the  other  hand  it  outlawed  any  clause  in  a 
bill  of  lading  exonerating  the  shipowner  from  liability 
for  negligence  on  proper  and  careful  loading, 
transporting,  and  discharging  of  cargo. 
The  Harter  Act  not  only  interfered  to  replace  the 
common  law,  but  purported  to  interfere  to  control  the 
laws  of  other  countries  applying  to  ocean  shipments 
moving  into  or  out  of  the  United  States.  4 
Thus  the  Harter  Act  made  very  important  changes  in,  the 
common  law  duties,  rights  and  liabilities  of  the  carriers 
of  goods  by  sea  when  it  intervened  to  limit  the  freedom 
of  contract  which  permitted  the  carrier  to  insert  an 
exceptional  clause  into  the  contract  to  relieve  himself 
from  liability  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo.  5 
The  Hague  Rules  made  a  compromise  for  the  lengthy 
struggle  between  the  conflicting  interests  of  the 
shipowner  and  the  cargo-owner  by  creating  uniform  rules 
and  defining  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  shippers  and 
Marine  Claim,  p  4). 
4-M.  Bayard  Crutcher,  "The  Ocean  Bill  of  Lading  as  Study  in 
Fossilization"[1971)  45  Tul.  L.  R.  p  697  at  710,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Crutcher". 
5-Wilson,  p  137;  Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  1. 125 
carriers. 
The  Rules  endeavour  to  limit  the  rights  of  the  holder 
of  the  bill  of  lading  in  connection  with  the  carrier  and 
others  who  are  not  parties  to  the  original  contract.  Such 
as,  consignees,  bankers  etc.  In  addition  the  Hague  Rules 
aim  to  encourage  quick  settlement  of  disputes  within  one 
year.  6 
The  Visby  Rules  provide  that  the  defences  and  limits  of 
liability  shall  apply  in  any  action  against  the  carrier 
in  respect  of  loss  or  damage  to  goods  covered  by  a 
contract  of  carriage  whether  the  action  be  founded  in 
contract  or  in  tort.?  The  Visby  Rules  also  provide  that 
the  servant  or  agent  shall  be  entitled  to  avail  himself 
of  the  defence  and  limits  of  liability  which  the  carrier 
is  entitled  to  invoke  under  this  convention.  These 
defences  and  limits  are  not  available  to  the  servants  or 
agents  of  the  carrier,  if  it  is  proved  that  the  damage 
resulted  from  an  act  or  omission  of  the  servant  or  agent 
done  with  intent  to  cause  damage  or  recklessly  and  with 
knowledge  that  damage  would  probably  result.  8 
The  Visby  Rules  state  that  the  carrier  and  the  ship 
shall  in  any  event  be  discharge  from  all  liability 
whatsoever  in  respect  of  the  goods  unless  suit  is  brought 
within  one  year  of  the  goods  delivery  or  the  date  when 
they  should  have  been  delivered,  but  the  difference 
between  the  Visby  Rules  and  the  Hague  Rules  is  that  the 
6-Samir  Mankabady,  p  30. 
7-Article  [31  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
8-Ibid. 126 
Visby  Rules  allow  that  the  limited  time  for  suit  be 
extended  if  the  parties  so  agree  after  the  cause  of 
action  has  arisen.  9 
Both  the  Hague  and  Visby  Rules  have  been  criticised  by 
the  developing  countries  because  these  Rules,  especially 
the  Hague  Rules  were  imposed  upon  them  before  they  had 
gained  their  independence  and  they  felt  that  their 
interests  were  not  taken  into  account,  10 
The  United  Nation  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development 
[UNCTAD]  secretariat  had,  however,  noted  basic  weakness 
in  the  Hague  Rules  and  indicated  the  need  for  a  revision 
of  the  Rules. 
The  UNCTAD  was  expected  to  take  into  account  the 
particular  needs  of  the  developing  countries11  when  it 
stated: 
"The  Working  Group  shall  review  the  economic 
and  commercial  aspects  of  international 
legislative  and  practices  in  the  field  of  bills 
of  lading  from  the  stand  point  of  their 
conformity  with  the  needs  of  economic 
development  in  particular  of  the  developing 
countries  and  make  appropriate  recommendations 
as  regards,  inter  alia,  the  following 
subjects"12 
"a-Uncertainties  arising  from  voyage  and 
9-Article  [1]  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
10-Samin  Mankabady,  p  30.;  Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  7. 
11-John  D.  Kimball,  "Shipowner's  Liability  and  the  Proposed 
Revision  of  the  Hague  Rules",  [1975]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  217  at  p 
234,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  Kimball". 
12-UNCTAD  Secretariat,  Bills  of  Lading,  U.  N.  Doc.  Td/B/C.  4/ISL/6/ 
Rev  1,  [1971]  p1,  hereinafter  cited  as  "TD/  B/  C.  4/  ISL/  6/  Rev 
1".;  Sinha  Basnayaka,  Origins  of  the  1978  Hamburg  Rules,  [1979]  27 
Am.  J.  Comp.  Law,  p  353,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  Basnayaka". 127 
ambiguous  wording  in  certain  areas  of  Rules, 
which  lead  to  conflicting  interpretations,  such 
as,  the  allocation  of  responsibility  for  loss 
or  damage  to  cargo;  and  the  burden  of  proof 
which  interested  by  both  the  carrier  and  cargo- 
owner; 
b-The  continued  relation  in  bills  of  lading  of 
exoneration  clauses  of  doubtful  validity,  and 
the  existence  of  restrictive  exemption  and  time 
limitation  clauses  in  the  terms  under  which 
cargo  is  deposited  with  warehouse  and  port 
authorities; 
c  -Exceptions  in  the  Hague  Rules  which  are 
peculiar  to  ocean  carriage,  in  cases,  where  the 
liability  should  logically  be  borne  by  the 
ocean  carrier,  such  as  those  which  excuse  him 
from  liability  in  respect  of  the  negligence  of 
his  servants  and  agents  in  the  navigation  and 
management  of  the  vessel,  and  in  respect  of 
perils  of  the  sea.  etc. 
d-The  uncertainties  caused  by  the 
interpretation  of  terms  used  in  the  Hague 
Rules,  such  as,  "  reasonable  deviation",  due 
diligence",  "properly  and  carefully",  "in  any 
event",  "loaded  on",  "discharge". 
e-The  ambiguities  surrounding  the  seaworthiness 
of  vessels  for  the  carriage  of  goods; 
f-The  abysmally  low  unit  limitation  of 
liability; 
g-Manifestly  unfair  jurisdiction  and 
arbitration  clauses; 
h-The  insufficient  legal  protection  for  cargoes 
with  special  characteristics  that  the  require 
special  stowage,  adequate  ventilation,  etc;  and 
cargoes  requiring  deck  shipment; 
i-Clauses  which  apparently  permit  carriers  to 
divert  vessel,  and  to  tranship  or  land  goods 
short  of  or  beyond  the  port  of  destination 
specified  in  the  bill  of  lading  at  the  risk  and 
expense  of  cargo-owner; 
j-Clauses  which  apparently  carriers  to  deliver 128 
goods  into  the  custody  of  shore  custodians 
terms  which  make  it  almost  impossible  to  obtain 
settlement  of  cargo  claims  from  either  the 
13  carrier  or  the  warehouse". 
The  "UNCTAD"  Report  was  adopted  in  1971,  and  invited 
the  United  Nations  Commission  On  International  Trade  Law 
(UNCITRAL)  to  determine  the  defects  and  the  amendments  to 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules.  14 
In  pursuing  that  task,  "UNCITRAL"  has  regarded  the 
following  subjects: 
"a-responsibility  for  cargo  for  the  entire 
period  it  is  in  the  charge  or  control  of  the 
carrier  or  his  agents; 
b-the  scheme  or  responsibilities  and 
liabilities,  and  right  and  immunities, 
incorporated  in  article  [III]  and  [IV]  of  the 
convention  as  amended  by  the  protocol  and  their 
interaction  and  including  the  elimination  or 
modification  of  certain  exceptions  to  carrier's 
liability; 
c-burden  of  proof; 
d-jurisdiction; 
e-responsibility  for  deck  cargoes,  live 
animals,  and  transhipments; 
f-extension  of  the  period  of  limitation; 
g-definition  under  article  [I]of  the 
convention; 
h-elimination  of  invalid  clause  in  bills  of 
lading; 
i-deviation,  seaworthiness  and  unit  limitation 
of  liability".  15 
13-M.  J.  Shah,  "The  Revision  of  the  Hague  Rules  on  Bills  of  Lading 
Within  the  UN  System-Key  Issues",  Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  on 
the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea,  Edited,  By  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p1 
at  p  8,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Shah". 
14-Kimball,  p  234. 
15-Samir  Mankabady,  p  31;  Shah,  p  20. 129 
A  draft  convention  prepared  by  the  Working  Group  was 
reviewed  by  "UNCITRAL"  which  in  may  1976  approved  a  draft 
convention  on  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  This  Draft 
Convention  and  Draft  Provisions,  were  the  basis  for 
consideration  at  the  U.  N.  conference  on  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea,  1978.16 
One  can  reveal  from  the  provisions  of  the  Hamburg  Rules 
in  respect  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier  that: 
1-The  Hague  Rules  "Catalogue"  of  the  carrier's 
disreputable  exceptions  has  been  removed,  because  the 
carrier  can  avoid  liability  if  he  proves  that  he,  his 
servants  or  agents  took  all  measures  that  could 
reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the  occurrence  and  its 
consequences.  " 
This  means  that  the  Hamburg  Rules  depend  upon  the 
general  rule  of  liability  as  a  standard  of  reasonable 
care  instead  of  the  express  provisions  in  the  Hague  Rules 
as  follows: 
a-To  exercise  due  diligence  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy 
before  and  at  the  the  beginning  of  the  voyage; 
b-Properly  and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow,  carry, 
keep,  care  for,  and  discharge  the  goods  carried.  18 
2-The  Exceptional  provision  for  fire  has  been  displaced 
in  the  Hamburg  Rules  that  the  carrier  is  liable  if  the 
claimant  proves  that  the  fire  arose  from  fault  or  neglect 
16-Basnayaka, 
p  355.;  Diamond,  "The  Hague/Visby  Rules",  p  8. 
11-Article  5  [1.  ]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
18-Article  3  [1]{a,  2}  of  the  Hague  Rules. 130 
on  the  part  of  the  carrier,  his  servants  or  agents.  19 
3-The  carrier  is  liable  with  respect  to  live  animals, 
unless  the  loss,  damage  or  delay  arose  from  any  special 
20  risks  inherent  in  their  carriage. 
4-The  term  "reasonable  deviation"  has  been  removed  in 
the  Hamburg  Rules  when  it  stated  that  the  carrier  is  not 
liable,  except  in  general  average,  where  loss  or  damage 
or  delay  in  delivery  to  the  goods  resulting  from  measures 
to  save  life  or  reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at 
sea. 
21 
5-The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo 
carried  on  deck  contrary  to  agreement  with  the  shipper, 
usage  or  regulation  and  resulting  solely  from  the  deck 
carriage.  22 
I  will  explain  two  of  the  most  important  points  in  more 
detail  as  follows: 
Section  One:  The  Basis  of  Liability  under  the 
International  Conventions  and  in  Relation 
to  Certain  Countries. 
Section  Two:  The  Immunities  of  the  Carrier. 
19-Article  5  [4]{a,  1)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
20-Article  5  [5]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
21-Article  5  [6]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
22-Article  [9]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 131 
SECTION  ONE 
THE  BASIS  OF  LIABILITY  UNDER  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS  AND  IN  RELATION  TO  CERTAIN  COUNTRIES 
The  liability  of  the  carrier  extends  merely  for  the 
period  of  the  carriage,  but  if  the  goods  are  still  in  the 
possession  of  the  carrier  before  the  beginning,  or  after 
the  end  of  the  voyage  and  the  vessel  has  arrived  at  the 
port  of  destination,  especially  when  the  parties  have 
expressed  that  in  the  contract,  then  the  common  carrier 
and  probably  the  public  carrier,  is  liable  for  any  loss 
or  damage  to  the  goods,  either  during  the  period  of 
carriage  or  when  the  goods  are  in  his  possession,  as  an 
insurer  for  the  safety  of  the  goods  unless  such  damage  to 
the  cargo  is  due  either  to  an  Act  of  God,  the  Queen's 
enemies,  the  Fault  of  the  owner  or  shipper,  the  Inherent 
vice  of  the  cargo,  Jettison  and  in  the  case  of  Fraud  by 
the  cargo-owner  or  the  shipper23. 
The  implied  obligation  that  the  carrier  will  be  liable 
for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  gross 
negligence24,  such  as  unseaworthiness,  even  though,  such 
loss  or  damage  results  from  the  excepted  perils  which  are 
mentioned  above25,  implies  there  is  warranty  in  every 
contract  for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  when  the  vessel 
is  seaworthy26.  The  implied  warranty  is  just  as  binding 
23-Ridley,  pp  81-82. 
24-Article  3  [8]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
25-Siordet  v.  Hall  &  Others  (1828)  4  Bing,  p  607  [130  E.  R.  p  902]. 
26-This  principle  was  early  established  in  the  United  States 132 
as  the  express  warranty27,  unless  such  warranty  is 
expressly  excluded.  28  For  instance,  the  shipowner  is 
bound  to  supply  a  ship  reasonably  fit  for  the  purpose  of 
a  particular  voyage  which  has  undertaken. 
29 
I  will  however  recall  the  following  points: 
i-The  Basic  Duties  to  Make  the  Ship  Fit  for  the  Purpose 
of  a  Particular  Voyage. 
ii-Serious  Fault  and  the  Doctrine  of  Deviation. 
i-THE  BASIC  DUTIES  TO  MAKE  THE  SHIP  FIT  FOR  THE 
PURPOSES  OF  A  PARTICULAR  VOYAGE 
We  must  first  find  out  the  basic  duties  that  make  the 
ship  fit  for  the  particular  voyage  and  which  exempt  the 
ship  from  any  deviation  or  delay  which  may  happen  during 
the  period  of  carriage  and  then  make  a  suitable 
courts,  such  as,  The  Edwin  T.  Morrison,  [The  Brads  ey  Fertilizer  Co  . 
v.  The  Edwin  I.  Morrison],  153  U.  S.  p  199  (1894)  p  688;  I.  h.. 
Caledonia.  157  U.  S.  p  124,39  L.  ed.  p  644  (1895);  "Tosephene  W. 
Wuppermann  v.  Th  .a 
ib  p  inre,  170  U.  S.  p  655(1898},  42  L.  ed.  p  1181. 
27-Bankes  L.  J.  in.  Rank  of  Australasia  v.  Clan  Line  Steamers,  [1916] 
1  K.  B.  p  39  at  p  56. 
28-Mathew.  J.  in.  Morris  Oceanic  SS.  Co.,  16  T.  L.  R.  p  533  at  p  534; 
Day,  J,  in,  Ta.  rsall  v.  National  S.  S.  Co.  (1884]  12  Q.  B.  D.  p  297  at 
p  300,  where  he  states: 
"Where  there  is  a  contract  to  carry  goods  in  a  ship  there  is,  in 
the  absence  of  any  stipulation  to  the  contrary,  an  implied 
engagement  on  the  part  of  the  person  so  understanding  to  carry  that 
the  ship  is  reasonably  fit  for  the  purposes  of  such  carriage".; 
Compare,  Cockburn,  C.  J,  in  Stanton  v.  Richardson  (1874)  L.  R.  9  C.  P, 
p  390  at  p  391. 
29-:  Stanton  V.  Richardson(1872)  L.  R.  7  C.  P.  p  421  at  p  426,  [affirmed 
by  (1874)  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  p  3901. 133 
recommendation  through  the  discussion  of  the  following 
subjects: 
1-Under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
2-Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
1-UNDER  THE  HAGUE/VISBY  RULES 
The  carrier  is  bound  to  exercise  the  following  duties 
under  the  Hogue  Rules: 
"A"Exercise  Due  Diligence  to  Make  the  Vessel  Seaworthy. 
"B"Load  the  Cargo  Properly  and  Carefully. 
"C"Stow  the  Cargo  Properly  and  Carefully. 
"D"Discharge  the  Cargo  Properly  and  Carefully. 
"A"  EXERCISE  DUE  DILIGENCE  TO  MAKE  THE  VESSEL 
SEAWORTHY 
Article  3  [1]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  provide  that: 
"The  carrier  shall  be  bound  before  and  at  the 
beginning  of  the  voyage  to  exercise  due 
diligence  to: 
a-Make  the  ship  seaworthy. 
b-Properly  man,  equip  and  supply  the  ship. 
c-Make  the  holds,  refrigerating  and  cool 
chambers,  and  all  other  parts  of  the  ship  in 
which  goods  are  carried,  fit  and  safe  for  their 
reception,  carriage  and  preservation". 
The  nature  basis  of  the  obligation  of  the  shipowner's 
duty  to  furnish  a  seaworthy  vessel,  before  the  Hague 
Rules  came  into  force,  was  implied  warranty30,  but  after 
30-Dewey  R.  Villareal.  Jr,  "The  Concept  of  Due  Diligence  in  Maritime 
Law",  (1971]  2  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  763,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Villareal". 134 
that  becomes  the  duty  of  the  shipowner  to  exercise  due 
diligence  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy.  31 
The  phrase  "exercise  due  diligence"  to  make  the  ship 
seaworthy  which  originated  in  the  Harter  Act32  is  adopted 
by  the  Hague/visby  Rules,  because  it  is  clearer  than 
"reasonable  diligence"  or  all  "reasonable  means". 
Cadwallader,  is  quite  right  when  he  makes  a  distinction 
between  the  two  words: 
("due"  places  a  greater  burden  on  the  shipowner 
than  "reasonable"  in  so  far  as  latter  term 
permits  the  court  to  look  at  the  surrounding 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case  rather 
than  what  might  have  been  achieved  without 
impossible  efforts  by  a  prudent  carrier).  33 
That  does  not  require  the  shipowner  to  be  personally 
diligent,  but  that  diligence  shall  in  fact  have  been 
exercised  by  the  shipowner  or  by  those  whom  he  employs 
for  the  purpose.  34  In  addition,  that  those  words  are  the 
uttermost  that  can  be  required  of  the  shipowner  and  the 
carrier  to  use  diligence  in  inspecting  the  ship  before 
the  start  of  her  voyage35  and  should  be  given  the 
31-Astel,  p  52. 
32-Villareal,  p  765. 
33-F.  J.  J.  Cadwallader,  "  Seaworthiness-An  Exercise  of  Due  Diligence", 
Published  in  the  Speaker's  Papers  for  the  n211  o  Lading 
Conventions  Confer  n.  e,  organized  by  Lloyd  of  London  Press  in  New 
York,  1978,  p  3,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallader,  Seaworthiness"t 
Compare,  lCarver,  para,  500. 
34-Dobell  v.  Steam  Ship  Rossmore  Co.  E1895]  2  Q.  B.  p  408;  Paterson 
steamshi  .  Ltd  v.  Robinhood  Mills,  Ltd  (1937)  58  LL.  L.  Rep.  p  33  at 
p  40;  The  To1midis  (1913)  1  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  530  at  p  538. 
35-Knauthe  p  185. 135 
meaning  attributed  to  them  prior  to  the  Hague  Rules36. 
Due  diligence  may  however  defined  as  follows: 
"All  that  attention  to  his  duties  to  provide  a 
seaworthy  ship  as  is  properly  to  be  expected  of 
"37  a  carrier  of  goods  by  sea. 
Consequently,  the  carrier  warranted  to  the  shipper  that 
the  vessel  which  has  undertaken  to  carry  the  goods,  was 
seaworthy38.  Then,  what  is  the  meaning  of  seaworthy  and 
what  constitutes  unseaworthy?  39 
The  ambiguities  surrounding  the  seaworthiness  of  a 
vessel  for  the  carriage  of  goods  means  that  the  judicial 
definition  of  many  courts  can  not  be  specific  defining 
what  constitutes  a  seaworthiness.  Thus  some  courts 
restrict  the  meaning  of  seaworthiness  depending  upon  some 
elements  which  constitute  a  seaworthy  as  the  Supreme 
Court  said: 
36-Mun.  ast.  r  Cantle  (1961]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  57. 
37-Cadwallader,  p  3.:  Villeareal,  p  767,  where  he  states  that: 
"The  basic  definition  of  due  diligence  is  the  use  of  all  reasonable 
means  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy". 
38-The  Caledonia,  157  U.  S.  p  124. 
39-The  south  Warke,  191  U.  S.  p1  at  p  8,  where  the  supreme  court 
quoted  with  approval  the  language  of  Bouvier's  Law  Dictionary  when 
it  is  defined  seaworthiness  as  follows: 
"The  sufficiency  of  the  vessel  in  materials,  construction, 
equipment,  officers,  men  and  out  fit  for  the  trade  or  service  in 
which  it  is  employed".;  Walker,  Companion  to  Law",  defines 
seaworthiness  as  follows: 
"Seaworthiness  means  that  the  ship  is  in  a  fit  state,  as  to 
repairs,  equipment  and  crew,  and  in  all  other  respects,  to 
encounter  the  ordinary  perils  of  her  voyage". 136 
"To  constitute  seaworthiness  of  the  hull  of  a 
vessel  in  respect  to  cargo,  the  hull  must  be  so 
tight,  stanch,  and  strong  as  to  be  competent  to 
resist  all  ordinary  action  of  the  sea,  and  to 
prosecute  and  complete  the  voyage  without 
damage  to  the  cargo  under  deck'"4o. 
Other  courts,  defined  the  terms  "seaworthy"  depending 
upon  a  competent  and  adequate,  master  and  crew41.  Where 
crew  was  both  inadequate  in  number  and  inadequately 
trained  to  handle  an  emergency  fire  situation,  vessel  was 
unseaworthy42. 
Tetley43  defines  seaworthiness  as: 
"The  state  of  a  vessel  in  such  a  condition, 
with  such  equipment,  and  manned  by  such  master 
and  crew,  that  normally  the  cargo  will  be 
loaded,  carried,  cared  for  and  discharged 
properly  and  safely  on  the  contemplated 
voyage". 
40-Dupont  v.  Vance,  60  U.  S.  (19  How}  162,15  L.  ed.  p  584  (1856).; 
Stanton  v.  Richardson  (1874)  L.  R.  9  C.  P.  p  390,  where  it  is  said: 
"The  ship  would  not,  without  new  pumps  and  with  a  reasonable  cargo 
of  wet  sugar  on  board,  have  been  seaworthy".;  The  President  Manor, 
(1972]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  385  (United  States  District  Court, 
Northern  District  of  California].;  The  Anadia  Forest  (1974]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  563  at  p  567  (United  States  District  Court,  Eastern 
District  of  Louisiana]. 
41-The  Hong  Kong  Fir  (1961]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  159  (1962]  2  O.  B.  p 
26.;  The  Ma  edo  is  (1962]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep  p  316  at  p  317.;  Un  on  of 
Indian  v.  N.  V.  Reederij  Amsterdam  [1963]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  223, 
where  it  is  said: 
"That  defendant  had  exercised  due  diligence  to  make  Amstelslot 
seaworthy  because  they  employed  skilled  and  competent  persons  to 
carry  out  necessary  inspections  and  those  persons  carried  out  those 
inspection  carefully  and  competently". 
42-Cerro  Sales  v.  Atlantic  Marine  Enterprises  (1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  375. 
43-Tetley,  Marine  Cargo  Claims.  p  157. 137 
Then,  the  vessel  should  be  fit  in  design,  structure, 
condition,  equipment  and  also  she  should  have  a 
sufficient  and  a  competent  master  and  crew.  44  However, 
the  real  test  of  seaworthiness  is  whether  the  vessel  is 
reasonably  fit  to  carry  the  cargo  which  she  has 
undertaken  to  transport.  45  That  means  that  an  obligation 
to  supply  a  seaworthy  ship  is  not  equivalent  to  an 
obligation  to  provide  one  that  is  perfect,  but  it  means  a 
degree  of  fitness  which  it  would  be  usual  and  prudent  to 
require  at  the  start  of  her  voyage.  46 
Seaworthiness  does  not  require  that  a  vessel  be  of  the 
latest  design  for  "ships  well  built  in  their  time  may 
still  carry  cargo  unless  they  become  so  clearly  out  of 
fashion".  47  In  other  words,  to  be  seaworthy  vessel  must 
be  kept  up  to  date48,  namely,  one  can  say  that  a  vessel 
44-1  carver,  para,  146. 
45-TheSjlvi  a,  171  U.  S.  p  462  at  pp  464-465  (1898).,  -  Joseph  J. 
Martin  v.  Steam  Ship  South  wad"SouthWark",  191  U.  S.  p1  (1903); 
The  iso  [1980]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  469  at  p  476,  where  it  is  stated 
that: 
"Friso  was  unseaworthy  because  she  lacked  adequate  stability" 
46-Blackburn,  J.  in.  Readhead  v.  The  Middland  Railway  Co.  (1867) 
L.  R.  2  Q.  B.  p  412  at  p  440.;  Channell.  J.  in.  McFadden  v.  Blue  Star 
Line  (1905]  1  K.  B.  p  697.;  The  statement  was  also  approved  by 
Scrutton  L.  J.  in.  Breadlev  v.  Federal  S.  .C 
(1926]  2  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p 
446  at  p  454. 
47-The  Pacific.  Fir,  57  F.  ed.  p  965.;  [1932]  A.  M.  C.  p  738(2d.  cir.  ). 
48-United  States  District  Court,  Southern  District  of  New  York, 
..  Irish  S  ruc.  "  (].  976]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep  p  63  at  pp  69-70,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  British  Admiralty  sailing  directions  with  which  the  vessel  was 
equipped  were  out  of  date,  and  the  failure  to  have  the  latest 
edition  without  the  United  States  publication 
constituted 
an 
unseaworthy  condition".;  The  W.  W.  Bruce,  94  F.  2d,  pp  834,838 138 
is  seaworthy  if  she  conforms  to  the  requirements  of  her 
class.  49  However,  that  does  not  mean  any  conformation 
between  the  seaworthy  of  the  ship  and  her  classification 
if  a  vessel's  structure,  fittings,  or  stowage  do  not 
comply  with  the  measure  of  proper  conditions  provided  by 
the  classification.  50 
Therefore,  it  will  be  noted  from  the  precedents 
mentioned  above  that  seaworthiness  is  not  an  absolute 
obligation  but  a  relative  term51,  in  that  it  depends  on 
the  kind  of  adventure  contemplated,  particular  voyage 
undertaken,  the  cargo  to  be  carried  and  its  stowage.  52 
Thus  if  the  ship  is  reasonably  fit  to  carry  the  goods 
agreed  upon,  then  the  perfection  of  the  vessel  is  not 
necessarily  required  and  in  this  case,  the  ship  is 
seaworthy.  53 
(2d.  cir.  1938) 
49-The  Advance,  67  F.  2d.  p  331;  [1933]  A.  M.  C.  p  1617. 
50-The  Folmina,  212  U.  S.  p  354  at  p  359,53  L:  ed.  546  (1909), 
where  it  is  stated  that: 
"Even  had  a  state  of  actual  seaworthiness  been  certified  in  the 
present  case,  this  court  would  have  been  at  liberty  to  disregard  it 
if  the  certificate  showed  that  actual  seaworthiness  was  merely  the 
inference  of  the  lower  court  upon  insufficient  evidence". 
51-Longley,  p  43.;  Reeadhead  v.  Midland  Railway  Co.  {1869)  L.  R.  4 
Q.  B.  pp  379,383.;  Poor,  p  166.;  Compare,  1  Carver,  para,  145.; 
Astle,  p  53.;  Malcolm  Alistair  Clarke,  Aspects  of  the  Hague  Rule4, 
1976,  p  125  hereinafter  cited  as  "Clarke". 
52-Astle,  pp  59-60.;  Villareal,  p  773.;  Song-Sang  Hyun,  A. 
Comparative  Study  on  Maritime  Cargo  Carrier's  Liability  in  Anglo-. 
American  and  French  Law,  1970,  pp  17-19,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Hyun". 
53-The_  Sagamcre(1924]  A.  M.  C.  p  961  (2d.  cir).;  The  Naples  Maru 
[1939]  A.  M.  C.  p  1087  (2d.  cir).;  ].  Gerber  &  Co,  v.  SS.  Sabin. 139 
Article  [2]  of  the  COGSA  1924,  in  the  United  Kingdom 
provides: 
"There  shall  not  be  implied  in  any  contract  for 
the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  to  which  the  Rules 
apply  any  absolute  undertaking  by  the  carrier 
of  the  goods  to  provide  a  seaworthy  ship".  54 
Instead  of  the  absolute  undertaking  at  common  law  which 
is  cancelled  by  the  Hague  Rules55,  Article  3  [1] 
constitutes  an  obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence  to 
make  the  ship  seaworthy.  56 
Since  cargo-worthiness  is  included  in  the  concept  of 
seaworthiness57  the  obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence 
covers  the  stage  from  at  least  the  beginning  of  loading58 
until  the  vessel  starts  on  her  voyage59,  which  means  at 
Howaldt  [1971)  A.  M.  C.  P  539. 
54-Astle,  p  23. 
55-Cedric  Barclay,  "Technical  Aspects  of  Unseaworthiness"[1975]  3 
LMCLQ,  p  288,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Barclay". 
56-Scrutton, 
p  411.;  J.  Bes,  Chartering  and  Shipping  Terms,  1975, 
vol,  ].,  p  166,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Bes". 
57-Barclay,  p  288,  states  that: 
"Cargo-worthiness  follows  initial  seaworthiness  of  the  hull,  but 
also  implies  seaworthiness  in  relation  to  the  functions  to  be 
performed".;  Mao-Ching  Huang,  "The  Impact  of  Containerization  on 
Carrier's  Liabilities  and  Rate  Regulations  in  International  Liner 
Shipping  with  Emphases  on  United  States,  Japanese  Trade", 
University  of  Washington,  1975,  pp  73-76,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Huang". 
58-Channell,  J,  in,  McFadden  v.  Blue  Star  Line  (1905]  1  K.  B.  p  697. 
59-Maxine  Footwear  Co.,  td.  v.  Canadian  government  Merchant  Marine, 
Lid  (1959]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  105.;  [1959]  A.  C.  p  589  at  p  603,  where 
it  is  stated: 
("The  word"before"  can  not  in  their  opinion  be  read  as  meaning  at" 
the  commencement  of  the  loading".  If  this  had  been  intended  it 
would  have  been  said.  The  question  when  precisely  the  period  begins 140 
the  departure  with  respect  to  those  things  which  might 
affected  during  the  loading.  Thus,  if  the  carrier  stops 
or  calls  at  any  intermediate  port  to  load  further  cargo 
or  if  the  vessel  becomes  unseaworthy  after  she  commences 
of  her  voyage,  then  paragraph  {I}  of  Article  (3)  does  not 
relate  to  a  period  after  the  voyage  has  started.  60 
The  United  States  courts  stated  that  the  failure  to 
inspect  the  hull  and  repair  the  damage  before  continuing 
on  the  voyage  could  only  amount  to  an  error  in  the 
management  or  navigation  of  the  ship.  61 
MacNair  J.  in  the  Chyebassa62,  made  this  clear  when  he 
said: 
"That  Article  IV,  Rule  I,  only  applies  to  the 
obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence  to  secure 
initial  seaworthiness  "before  and  at  beginning 
of  the  voyage".  In  accordance  with  the 
provisions  of  paragraph  {I}  of  Article  [III) 
which  occur  at  the  end  of  the  first  sentence  of 
Article  IV,  Rule,  I.  Exempt  that  by  the  Rules 
does  not  arise  in  this  case,  hence  the  insertion  above  of  the  words 
"at  least"].;  Compare,  The  Marilynl,  "United  States  District  Court, 
Eastern  District  of  Virginia,  Norfolk  Division",  (19721  1  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  418  at  p  429.;  The  H 
_Lleni 
Dolphin  [1978]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
336  at  p  340,  where  it  is  stated  that: 
"The  plaintiffs  have  failed  to  prove  that  the  vessel  was 
unseaworthy  before  the  commencement  of  the  voyage";  Hashim  R.  Al- 
Jazairy,  "The  Maritime  Carrier's  Liability  Under  the  Hague  Rules, 
Visby  Rules  and  Hamburg  Rules",  A  Thesis  Approved  for  the  Degree  of 
Ph.  D.  Faculty  of  Law,  University  of  Glasgow,  1982,  p  62, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Al-Jazairy". 
60-The_Maredonia  (1962]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  316  at  p  317. 
61-Astle,  pp  59,77,  states  with  approval,  The  Del  Sued. 
62-[1966]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  450  at  p  457.  Affirmed  on  this  point  by 
C.  A.  Sellers,  Danckwerts  and  Salmon,  L.  JJ.  at[1966]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
193  at  p  194. 141 
the  absolute  obligation  to  secure  seaworthiness 
at  this  stage  is  altered  to  an  obligation  to 
exercise  due  diligence  to  secure  seaworthiness, 
the  rules  do  not,  so  far  as  is  material  for 
present  purposes,  alter  the  position  as  it 
existed  before  the  Act  at  common  law". 
In  other  words,  the  Hague  Rules  substituted  a  lower 
measure  of  obligation  to  protect  the  carrier  against 
latent  defects63  making  the  vessel  unseaworthy64. 
The  shipowner's  duty  to  furnish  a  vessel  does  not 
require  it  to  be  seaworthy  for  the  whole  voyage 
contracted  for.  It  would  be  enough  if  the  vessel  were,  at 
the  start  of  each  stage  of  the  navigation  properly  manned 
and  equipped  for  it65.  Then  the  principle  of 
seaworthiness  by  stages  is  not  limited  to  the  bunkering 
of  the  vessel". 
Nevertheless,  unseaworthiness  is  not  enough  itself  to 
find  the  carrier  responsible67,  but  there  must  be  some 
63-The  Walter  Raleigh  (1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  618  at  p  619,  where  it  is 
stated  that: 
"A  latent  defect  is  one  that  could  not  be  discovered  ". 
64-Per  Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm,  in,  Riv  rR  one  Meat  Co.  v. 
Lancashire  Shipping  Co.  [Muncaster  Castlel,  (1961]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
57  at  p  87.;  Cadwallader,  p  8.;  Compare,  Hobhouse,  in,  The  Torenia 
[1983]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  210  at  p  230,  where  he  states: 
"The  unseaworthiness  was  not  latent  nor  was  it  undiscoverable  by 
due  diligence.  Due  diligence  was  not  exercised];  1  Carver,  para,  162. 
65-Dixon  v.  saw,  5  M.  &  W.  p  405  at  414  [151  E.  R.  p  172  at  p 
176].;  Thin  V.  Richards  &  co  (1892)  2  Q.  B.  p  141  at  p  143. 
66-Longley,  pp  58-59.;  The  Older  (1933]  A.  M.  C.  p  936  (2d.  cir).; 
Compare,  Lord  Wright,  in,  Northurn  Bri  Shipping  Co.  v.  E.  Timm-& 
Son,  Ltd[1939]  A.  C.  p  397  at  p  404.;  Yawata  T&  S.  Co.  v.  Anthony 
shipping  Co.  [1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  1602. 
67-Huang,  p  76,  where  he  stated: 142 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  resulting  from  it.  The 
causal  relation  between  the  two  must  be  shown  and  the 
unseaworthiness  must  be  the  cause  of  the  loss  of  or  the 
damage  to  the  cargo68. 
"B"  LOAD  THE  CARGO  PROPERLY  AND  CAREFULLY 
It  is  clear  from  Article  [1]{b}{e},  II,  III,  rule,  {2} 
that  the  Rules  apply  during  loading  and  discharge69.  A 
proviso  of  Article  3  (2]  "subject  to  the  provisions  of 
Article  [4]",  which  is  mentioned  to  the  original  Hague 
Rules  text  and  the  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  is  not 
attached  to  the  United  States  COGSA. 
It  is  of  first  importance  in  explaining  the 
circumstances  which  are  attached  to  the  shipowner's  duty 
that  he  shall  properly  and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow, 
carry,  keep,  care  for  and  discharge  the  goods  carried. 
Lord  Somervell,  in,  Maxine  Footwear  v.  Canadian 
"Under  the  Harter  Act  the  carrier  loses  the  benefit  of  the 
exemptions  if  the  vessel  is  unseaworthy  in  any  particular  voyage, 
even  if  there  is  no  connection  between  the  seaworthiness  and  the 
loss  or  damage". 
68-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  151.;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  156.;  1 
Carver,  para,  141;  Kish  v.  Taylor  (1912]  A.  C.  p  604.;  Maxine 
Footwear  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Canadian  Government  Merchant  Marine  Ltd.  (1959] 
2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  105,  where  it  is  said; 
"Goods  were  damaged  and  lost  owing  to  unseaworthiness  resulting 
from  the  failure  to  exercise  due  diligence  during  the  required 
period  and  that  therefore  shipowners  were  liable".;  Hiram  Walker 
v.  Dover  May.  Co.  (1950]  83  L1.  L.  Rep  p  84.;  The  To  dfs  (1983]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep  p  530  at  p  540.;  J.  Hobhouse,  in,  The  Torenia  (1983]  2 
Lloyd's  Rep.  p  210  at  p  234.;  Mormackite  (1958]  A.  M.  C.  p  1497.; 
Hyun,  p  19. 
69-1  Carver,  Para,  349.;  Tetley  Marine  Claim,  p  256. 143 
Merchant  Marine70,  said: 
"Article  [3]  rule  {1}  is  an  overriding 
obligation.  If  it  is  not  fulfiled  and  the  non- 
fulfilment  causes  the  damage,  the  immunities  of 
Article  [IV]  can  not  be  relied  on.  This  is  the 
natural  construction  a  part  from  the  opening 
words  of  Article  [IV],  Rule{2}.  The  fact  that 
that  Rule  is  made  subject  to  the  provision  of 
Article  [IV]  and  Rule  {1}  is  not  so  conditioned 
makes  the  point  clear  beyond  argument". 
Accordingly,  when  the  carrier  wants  to  rely  on  the 
exceptions  in  Article  [4]  rule  [2),  he  must  first  show 
that  he  has  exercised  due  diligence  to  make  the  ship 
seaworthy  and  he  has  been  careful  in  accordance  with 
Article  [3]  Rule  (2),  such  as,  showing  reasonable  care  in 
loading.  etc.  the  goods71.  The  carrier  or  shipowner  is 
responsible  for  the  procedure  of  the  loading. 
However,  when  does  loading  begin?  and  when  do  the  Rules 
begin  to  apply? 
There  are  important  elements  between  the  two  points  to 
join  them  together,  because  in  order  to  know  when  the 
Rules  begin  to  apply  we  must  first  know  when  the  loading 
begins. 
There  is  an  opinion  that  the  loading  will  begin  "from 
the  time  the  goods  are  received  into  tackle  for  lifting 
on  board  the  vessel  and  does  not  cease  until  the  goods 
are  released  from  the  discharging  tackle"72.  That 
70_11959)  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  105  at  p  113.;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p 
262. 
71-Clarke,  p  140;  Walker,  Private  Law,  p  352. 
72-Astle, 
p  80.;  J.  Roche,  in,  Goodwin.  Ferreira  &  Co.  v.  Lamport 144 
means  that  the  scope  of  the  carrier's  liability  is 
limited  to  "tackle  to  tackle"  period.  73 
This  principle  created  an  important  question  that  which 
tackle  is  used  to  lift  the  goods? 
If  the  ship's  tackle  is  used  or  the  carrier  is  doing 
the  loading  with  shore  personnel,  then  loading  will  begin 
and  the  Rule  apply  when  the  tackle  is  hooked  onto  cargo. 
However,  if  the  shore  tackle  is  used  then  the  loading 
will  begin  and  the  Rules  apply  when  the  cargo  crosses  the 
rail. 
74 
Devlin.  J.  rejected  this  argument,  in  order  to  apply 
the  Rules  over  the  whole  period  of  loading  and 
discharging  because  the  Rules  are  not  restricted  the 
period  of  time  in  so  far  as  to  apply  to  the  contract  of 
carriage.  75 
That  contract  is  from  its  creation  "covered"  by  a  bill 
of  lading,  and  is  therefore  from  its  inception  a  contract 
of  carriage  within  the  meaning  of  the  rules  and  to  which 
the  rules  apply.  76 
&  Holt.  Ltd.  (19391  34  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  192  at  p  194. 
73-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  256. 
74-Pyren  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Scindia  Navigation  Co.  Ltd.  (1954)  2  Q.  B.  p 
402  at  p  403,  where  it  is  stated: 
"While  the  tender  was  being  lifted  onto  the  vessel  by  the  ship's 
tackle  and  before  it  was  across  the  rail  it  was  dropped  and 
damaged.  It  was  argued  that  as  it  was  never  loaded  onto  the  ship 
and  therefore,  since  the  accident  occurred  outside  the  period 
specified  in  Article  1(e),  the  Rules  did  not  apply". 
75-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  256. 
76-Devlin,  J,  in,  Pyr 
_n  .  .  o.  d.  v.  scindi  a  av  g  ion  Co. 
Lts1.  (1954)  2  Q.  B.  p  402  at  p  403. 145 
The  view  of  Devlin  J.  depends  on  the  reasoning  of  Lord 
President  Clyde  in  Harland  &  Wolff  Ltd.  v.  Burns  &  Laird 
Lines77,  when  he  stated: 
["The  bill  of  lading  {which  would  otherwise 
have  been  issued  at  or  after  shipment  with  the 
agreed  on  limitations  embodied  in  it}  shall  not 
be  issued,  but  that  instead  there  of  a  non- 
negotiable  receipt,  marked  as  such  and 
embodying  the  limitations,  shall  be  used.  This 
interpretation-  if  sound-  would  leave  ample 
scope  for  the  application  of  the  exemption,  and 
would  do  no  violence  either  to  the  definitions 
or  to  what  is  apparently  the  general  scope  of 
the  Act]. 
As  far  as  the  question  about  the  beginning-point  of  the 
loading  is  concerned,  Devlin,  J,  has  concluded  that  : 
"The  phrase  shall  properly  and  carefully  load 
may  mean  that  the  carrier  shall  load  and  that 
he  shall  do  it  properly  and  carefully,  or  that 
he  shall  do  whatever  loading  he  does  properly 
and  carefully.  The  former  interpretation  phrase 
fits  the  language  more  closely,  but  the  latter 
may  be  more  consistent  with  the  subject  of  the 
Rules".  78 
One  can  conclude  from  the  discussion  in  this  case,  that 
the  carrier  was  responsible  for  loading  before  the  goods 
crossed  the  ship's  rail. 
79 
Therefore,  Mr  Justice  Devlin's  view  that  the  whole  of 
77-1931  S.  C.  p  722  at  p  727. 
78-Py 
enc  Co.  V.  Scindia  Steam  Navigation  Co,  [1954]  2  Q.  B.  p  402 
at  p  417.; 
_ 
G.  H.  Renton  &  Co.  v.  Palmyra  Trading  Corp.  of 
Panama[1957]  A.  C.  p  149  at  p  170;  Micheal  Wlford,  Terence  Coghlin  & 
Nicholas,  J,  Healy,  Time  Charters,  London,  1978,  pp  137-38, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Wilford,  Coughlin  &  Healy". 
79-1  Carver,  Para,  515. 146 
the  contract  of  carriage  is  subject  to  the  Rules,  but  the 
extent  to  which  stage  of  the  carriage  is  brought  under 
the  carrier  undertaking  is  left  to  the  parties  to  decide, 
in  depending  upon  different  systems  of  law,  the  custom 
and  practice  of  the  port  and  the  nature  of  the  cargo80. 
Then,  if  loading  is  from  lighters,  when  does  loading 
begin? 
That  depends  upon  whether  the  carriers  own  or  control 
the  lighters,  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  the  carriage 
and  the  terms  of  the  lighterage  contract81. 
According  to  the  "tackle  to  tackle"  definition  of  ocean 
carriage  in  the  Hague  Rules,  in  the  case  of  the  carrier 
not  owing  or  controlling  the  lighters,  his  responsibility 
commences  at  the  point  when  the  vessel's  tackle  is  hooked 
onto  cargo82. 
The  United  States  court  held  that  the  carrier  was 
responsible  for  cargo  lost  when  a  lighter  capsized  along 
side83. 
However,  the  carrier  should  be  liable  for  any  loss  of 
or  damage  to  cargo  at  least  from  the  beginning  of  loading 
operations  until  the  perfection  of  discharge  unless  the 
carrier  agreed  upon  to  extent  the  period  of  liability 
during  his  control  of  the  goods  [at  the  port  of  loading 
80-ýRvrenc  Co.  v.  Scindia  steam  Navigation  Co,  op.  cit,  p  417.; 
G.  H.  Renton  &  Co.  v.  Palmyra  Trading  Corp  of  Panama,  op.  cit.  p  170. 
81-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  257. 
82-The  E.  T.  Barwick  Mill  v.  Hellenic  (1972]  A.  M.  C.  p  1802. 
83-The  Stow  St_eelweld  (1968)  A.  M.  C.  p  2064  at  p  2073.;  The  Yore 
(1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1094  at  p  1096. 147 
or  discharge]  or  during  his  custody  of  the  goods,  such 
as,  where  the  carrier  discharged  the  goods  in  his 
warehouse. 
Although,  Article  (VII]  of  the  Hague  Rules  permits  the 
carrier  to  contract  out  of  "tackle  to  tackle"  definition 
of  ocean  carriage  in  the  Rules,  when  it  states: 
"Nothing  here  in  contained  in  this  Act  shall 
prevent  a  carrier  or  a  shipper  from  entering 
into  any  agreement,  stipulation,  reservation  or 
exemption  as  to  the  responsibility  and 
liability  of  the  carrier  or  the  ship  for  the 
loss  or  damage  to,  or  in  connection  with,  the 
custody  and  care  and  handling  of  goods  prior  to 
the  loading  on,  and  subsequent  to,  the 
discharge  from  the  ship  on  which  the  goods  are 
carried  by  sea". 
Therefore,  I  am  personally  in  favour  of  Mr.  Justice 
Devlin's  view  that  the  whole  of  the  contract  of  carriage 
which  is  covered  by  a  bill  of  lading  is  subject  to  the 
Rules84,  but  at  what  point  the  goods  are  loaded  on  and 
brought  within  the  carrier's  obligation  that  is  left  to 
the  parties  to  decide. 
Coming  now  to  research  of  the  term  which  used  in 
Article  3  [2)  that  is  "properly  and  carefully". 
This  term  originated  in  the  Harter  Act  which  is  used 
these  words  alternatively85,  that  means  that  the  two 
84-Goodwin,  F  rr_ira  i 
-La.  V.  Lamport  &  Holt  (1939]  34  LI.  L.  Rep.  p 
192. 
85-Section  (1]  of  the  Harter  Act  provides: 
"All  clauses  exonerating  the  carrier  from  liability  for  loss  or 
damage  arising  out  of  "negligence,  fault  or  failure  in  proper 148 
expressions  intending  to  the  same  meaning,  but  they  are 
employed  jointly  in  the  Hague  Rules86. 
Viscount  Kilmuir  L.  C.  87  expressed  his  opinion  as 
follows: 
"The  natural  and  ordinary  meaning  of  "properly" 
in  antithesis  to  "carefully"  in  the  phrase 
"properly,  and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow, 
carry,  keep,  care  for  and  discharge",  is  in 
accordance  with  a  sound  system.  It  has  not  a 
geographical  significance8.  "8 
The  House  of  Lords  accepted  such  sense  of  "properly", 
but  showed  some  differentiation  between  them  when  Lord 
Pearson89  said  that: 
("properly"  meant  in  an  appropriate  manner, 
that  if  "carefully"  meant  merely  taking  care, 
properly  required,  in  addition,  the  element  of 
skill  or  sound  system]. 
Whereas,  Lord  Pearce"  added  that: 
loading,  stowage,  custody  care,  or  proper  delivery"...  are  null. 
Section  2  of  the  Harter  Act  provides: 
"The  clauses  that  are  designed  to  lessen  the  carrier's  obligation 
to  exercise  due  diligence  in  rendering  the  vessel  seaworthy,  and 
also  to"carefully  handle  and  stow  her  cargo  and  to  care  for  and 
properly  deliver  same...  "  are  equally  void. 
86-Francesco  Berlinieri  &  Guide  Alpa,  "Liability  of  the  Carrier's 
Prospect  of  Reform",  Published  in  the  Studies  on  the  Revision  of 
the  Brussels  convention  on  Bills  of  Lading,  1974,  p  79,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Berlingieri  &  Alpa". 
87-Gosse  Millard  v.  Canadian  Government  Merchant  Marine  [19271  2 
K.  B.  p  432  at  p  434;  44  T.  L.  R.  p  143. 
88-W.  Angliss  &  .  o.  1Aus_ralial  Pty.  LD.  v.  P.  &  0.  Steam  Navigation 
C.  [1927]  2  K.  B.  p  456.;  43  T.  L.  R.  p  675. 
89-plbacora  S_R_L.  v.  Westcott  &  Laurance  Line  [1966]  2  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  53  at  p  54. 
90-Ibid,  p  62.;  Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  79.;  Scrutton,  p  424. 149 
["The  word  "properly"  presumably  adds  something 
to  the  word  "carefully"  and  means  upon  a  sound 
system.  A  sound  system  does  not  mean  a  system 
suited  to  all  the  weakness  and  idiosyneracies 
of  a  particular  cargo,  but  a  sound  system  under 
all  the  circumstances  in  relation  to  the 
general  practice  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea]. 
Thus,  the  carrier  must  adopt  a  system  which  is  sound  in 
the  light  of  all  the  nature  of  the  goods91.  Therefore  the 
meaning  of  the  word  has  been  described  as  "tantamount  to 
efficiency"92.  Where  a  vessel's  crew  went  on  strike  after 
part  of  her  cargo  was  loaded,  and  before  a  new  crew  could 
be  obtained  perishable  cargo  spoiled. 
Held,  on  the  facts,  that  the  carrier  was  not  liable 
since  it  had  used  reasonable  diligence  to  obtain  a  new 
crew,  and  was  warranted  in  believing  a  crew  would  be 
obtained93. 
However,  the  duty  of  the  shipper  is  to  bring  the  goods 
along  side  ship  and  the  duty  of  the  carrier  to  load  the 
goods  on  to  the  ship  by  ship's  tackle  unless  there  is  a 
custom  of  the  port  of  loading  to  the  contrary94.  Where 
the  shipper  has  agreed  to  load  the  cargo,  he  has  to  load 
them  properly  and  carefully  and  then  the  Hague  Rules  do 
91-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  37. 
92-Per  Lord  Pearce,  in,  A?  bacnra  s.  R.  L,  v.  w  st  -ott  and  Laurance 
Line  LD  [1966]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep  p  58  at  p  62. 
93-The  Maui  [1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  1299. 
94-Per  Lord  Esher,  in,  Harris  v.  Best.  Ryley  &  Co.  (1892)  68  L.  T. 
p  76  at  p  77,;  Per  Greer  L.  J.  in,  National  Steam  shipCo.  LD.  V. 
s_ociedad  Anonima  Comercial  De  Exportaciony  Importation,  37  Com.  Cas. 
p  283  at  p  290;  Per  Bucknill,  L.  J.  in,  Argonaut  Navigation  Co.  LD. 
v.  Ministry  of  Food  S  .  S..  "Argobec"  [1949]  1  K.  B.  p  572  at  p  580. 150 
not  abrogate  any  agreement  transferring  the 
responsibility  resulting  for  any  of  these  operations  to 
the  shipper.  95 
Therefore,  the  shipper  will  be  liable  for  any  damage  or 
loss  resulting  from  his  failures  to  do  so96,  whilst 
loading,  damages  his  own  cargo,  but  if  the  shipper  while 
loading  his  own  cargo  damaged  other  cargo,  then  the 
carrier  will  be  liable  to  third  parties  who  his  cargo 
was  damaged  by  the  loading  operations.  97 
"C"  STOW  THE  CARGO  PROPERLY  AND  CAREFULLY 
The  due  diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  must  be 
exercised  in  relation  to  the  ship's  worthiness  to 
cargo98.  That  means  that  the  carrier  must  show  reasonable 
care  in  preparing  the  ship99,  that  will  carry  particular 
goods  because  the  warranty,  express  or  implied  of 
seaworthiness  of  a  vessel,  extends  to  unseaworthiness  due 
to  faulty  stowage  of  cargo100. 
This  is  especially  true  when  certain  cargoes  need 
specific  considerations  in  stowage,  such  as,  where  the 
carrier  stowed  wet  cargo  in  a  compartment  containing  dry 
cargo101  or  in  an  unventilated  compartment102  and  that 
95-Scrutton,  p  424. 
96-Ridley,  p  123. 
97-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  258. 
98-Astle,  p  59. 
99-Clarke,  p  140. 
100-Oxford  Paper.  Co.  v.  The  Nidarho?  m  (1931)  282  U.  S.  p  681,75 
L.  ed.  p  614. 
101-Knott 
v.  Botany  Mills,  179  U.  S.  pp  69,73.;  45  L.  ed.  p  90  {1900}. 
102-Longley, 
p  75.;  Chorley  &  Giles,  pp  174-176.;  The  Am  rican 
Tabacco  Co.  V.  s  g.  Katinyo  adsipa__ran  (1949)  A.  M.  C.  p  49,  where 151 
consequently  the  cargoes  were  damaged. 
The  carrier,  therefore,  must  stow  the  goods  in  a  proper 
way  and  condition  in  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the 
goods.  103  Thus,  where  two  pieces  of  cargo  were  lashed  and 
there  were  gaps  in  the  stowage  and  it  was  not  sound  block 
stowage104  then  the  stowage  was  deficient  within  the 
meaning  of  Article  3[2].  105 
Part  of  the  shipowner's  duty  is,  however,  to  stow  the 
goods  properly  and  carefully  not  merely  in  the  interests 
of  the  seaworthiness  of  the  vessel,  but  also  to  avoid 
damage  to  the  cargoes.  106 
Also  bad  or  improper  stowage  does  not  in  itself 
constitute  unseaworthiness  but  it  may  render  the  vessel 
unseaworthy.  107  In  accordance  with  the  nature  of  the  goods 
the  shipowner  has  a  right  to  stow  the  cargoes  on  deck, 
such  as,  railway  engine,  coaches108,  and  timber  cargo. 
Timber  cargo109  is  defined  in  Timber  Regulations  1932110 
it  is  stated: 
"Cheese  should  not  be  stowed  in  an  unventilated  for  peak  or  a  lower 
cross  bunker  for  a  voyage  from  Greece  to  the  U.  S.  ". 
103-Walker,  Private  Law,  p  353. 
104-Black  Wood  Hodge  fIndial  Private,  Ltd.  v.  Ellerman  Li  es; 
Lt,  d[1963]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  454  at  p  467.;  Elder  Damps  _r 
Co.  V. 
Paterson  Zochoniis  [1924]  A.  C.  p  522. 
105-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  37. 
106-Per  Lord  Wright,  in,  the  Canadian  Transport  C.  V.  Court 
Lin  ..  , D[1940]  A.  C.  p  934  at  p943. 
107-Konitoff  v.  Wilson  {1870}  1  Q.  B.  p  377. 
108-Samir  Mankabady,  p  75. 
109-2  Carver,  para,  1142.;  B..  v.  Campbell  and  Ex  Parte  tIo  kos 
[1956]  2  All  E.  R.  p  280. 
110-The  Merchant  Shipping  (Safety  and  Load  Line  Conventions)  Act, 152 
as  follows: 
"A  cargo  of  Timber  carried  on  an  uncovered  part 
of  a  free  board  or  super  structure  deck,  but 
does  not  include  a  cargo  of  wood  pulp  or 
similar  substance". 
That  does  not  mean,  with  regard  to  stowage,  that  the 
shipowner  by  his  master  has  a  right  to  stow  unlimited 
amount  of  the  Timber  cargo  on  deck,  but  it  is  limited  by 
regulation  5{b}  of  the  Timber  cargo  Regulations  1932  as 
follows: 
"....  the  height  of  the  timber  deck  cargo  above 
the  free  board  deck  shall  not  exceed  one  third 
of  the  extreme  breadth  of  the  ship". 
Therefore,  any  exceeding  stowage  from  the  permitted 
height  which  is  limited  to  one  third  of  the  extreme 
breadth  of  the  ship  is  what  establishes  a  contravention 
of  regulation  5[b].  lll  In  the  absence  of  any  contrary 
usage  in  the  particular  trade,  it  is  required  that  the 
goods  shall  be  safely  stowed  under  deck  and  that  the 
master  stow  the  goods  on  deck.  The  carrier  and  the  vessel 
will  be  responsible  for  any  damage  to  the  cargo.  112 
1932,  S.  61{1},  provides: 
"The  Board  of  Trade  shall  make  regulations  .......  as  to  the 
conditions  on  which  timber  may  be  carried  as  cargo  in  any  uncovered 
space  on  the  deck  of  any  load  line  ship". 
Those  regulations  have  been  made  and  they  are  known  as  the  Timber 
cargo  Regulations,  1932. 
111-Cassels,  J,  in,  R  v.  cam  bý  Pl1,  RX  Parte  Nomiken  [1956)  2  All 
E.  R.  p  280  at  p  284. 
112-Ridley,  p  126.;  Mr.  Justice  Clifford,  in,  the  Delaware  v. 
Oregon  Iron  Co,  81  U.  S.  p  579  at  p  604  {1871}  14  Wall.  p  779.; 153 
The  ocean  carrier  failed  to  establish  any  custom  to 
carry  containerized  cargoes  on  deck113.  Then  stowage  of 
containers  on  deck,  without  any  notation  of  that  fact  on 
the  face  of  the  bill  of  lading,  constituted  a  breach  of 
the  carrier's  duty  and  he  will  be  liable  for  full  amount 
of  damage114. 
However,  the  stowage  of  the  containers  on  deck  of  a 
container  ship  was  not  a  breach  of  the  carrier's  duty 
because  the  deck  of  a  container  ship  was  exactly  where 
containers  were  reasonably  intended  to  be  carried115. 
In  so  far  as,  concerns  the  custom  and  usage  of  the 
stowage  on  deck,  the  shipper  who  is  aware  of  the 
existence  of  such  practice  {by  his  own  knowledge,  or  he 
is  justifiably  ignorant  of  the  practice}  and  does  not 
object  to  it,  can  not  be  said  to  have  consented  to 
modification  of  the  contract  embodied  in  his  bill  of 
lading116. 
Therefore,  if  the  shipper  assented  by  accepting  the 
bill  of  lading  at  the  carrier's  option  to  stow  the  goods 
either  on  deck  or  under  deck  then  the  shipper  has  no 
Schooner  St.  Johns.  N.  F.  [19231  A.  M.  C.  p  1131.;  Walker,  Private  Law, 
p  353.;  Ghorely  &  Giles,  pp  176-177. 
113-Whitehead,  p  40. 
114-Encyclopedia  Britannica.  ?  nG  v.  Hong  Kong  Producer  &  universal 
Marine  Corn.  [1969]  A.  M.  C.  p  1741  at  p  1742. 
115-The  Mormacveaa,  (  United  States  District  Court,  Southern 
District  of  New  York,  1972),  [1973]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  267.; 
Rosenbruch  v.  &Merican  Export  rsbrandtsen  Lines,  [1976]  A.  M.  C.  p 
487  at  p  493. 
116-Lord  Watson,  in,  The  Royal  Exchange  Shipping  Co.  Ltd  V. 
W.  J.  Dixon  &  Co  {1886}  12  App.  Cas,  pll  at  p  18;  Delawanna,  Ins  v. 
SS.  Blijdendfi  [1950]  A.  M.  C.  p  1235. 154 
right  to  claim  for  any  damage  resulting  from  such  goods 
carried  on  deck.  117 
Otherwise,  if  the  goods  are  loaded  on  deck  without  the 
shipper's  consent  or  a  clean,  unclaused  bill  of  lading 
calls  for  under  deck  stowage,  and  stowage  is  on  deck, 
then  the  shipowner  becomes  liable  for  damage  occasioned 
by  such  stowage.  118  Where  goods  are,  nevertheless,  shipped 
on  deck  at  the  shipper's  risk,  the  carrier  is  not 
relieved  of  due  care  and  attention  towards  the  cargo119, 
such  as,  the  negligence  being  inadequate  dunnage  and  not 
merely  the  on  deck  stowage.  120 
The  master  is  bound  to  stow  the  cargoes  properly  and 
carefully121  throughout  the  whole  voyage.  That  means  that 
obligation  is  a  strict  obligation122,  but  it  is  not 
perfect  standard  of  care  which  is  not  required  for  the 
goods  carried  during  the  voyage,  123  but  the  carrier  must 
show  all  exercise  of  due  care  and  stow  the  goods  properly 
and  carefully.  124  While  due  diligence  is  only  used  in 
Article  3  [1]  and  Article  4  (1)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
117-Alexandnr  M.  Lawrence  v.  Charles  Minturn,  58  U.  S.  p  100  (1854) 
17  How,  p  58.;  Gould  v.  oliv  r{1837}  4  Bing  (N.  C.  )  p  134  at  p  139 
(132  E.  R.  p  740  at  p  742]  .;  Peter  Helms  [1938]  A.  M.  G.  p  1220  at  p 
1221.;  Walker,  Private  Law,  p  353. 
118-Wright  v.  Marwood(1881}  7  Q.  B.  D.  p  62  at  p  67.;  Idefl  d,  [1940] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1280.;  Sealane[1966]  A.  M.  C.  p  1405. 
119-ponce  (1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  1124  . 
120-Glob_  Snlvent4  Co  v.  SS.  California[1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  674. 
121-Scrutton,  p  424. 
122-Tetley, 
p  261. 
123-ibid,  p  265. 
124-pi 
-h  _1m  &o  Ltd  V.  Fly  ing 
__Trader[1956]  A.  M.  C.  p  1550. 155 
in  respect  of  making  the  ship  seaworthy,  it  does  not 
refer  to  care  for  the  cargo.  Whereas,  there  is  a  number 
of  decisions  depending  upon  the  term  of  "due  diligence" 
for  an  analysis  of  the  carrier's  obligation  to  exercise 
only  due  diligence  to  care  for  cargo.  125 
If  the  shipowners  establish  however  inherent  vice  or 
latent  defect,  it  may  go  some  way  to  negativing  a 
breach126  of  Article  3  [2],  also  a  gradual  deterioration 
is  not  a  latent  defect,  because  a  latent  defect  is  one 
that  could  not  be  discovered  by  any  known  or  customary 
test.  127  Then  such  damage  would  not  be  apparent  on  usual 
examination,  but  could  only  have  been  discovered  by  a 
close  examination  of  the  shipments;  the  carrier  was  under 
no  duty  to  make  that.  128 
The  shippers  impliedly  undertake  under  the  common  law 
and  are  expressly  bound  under  the  Hague  Rules129  not  to 
125-American  Tobacco  Co  v.  S.  S.  Katingo  Hadji  a  ra(1949]  A.  M.  C. 
p  49  at  p  57,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Ordinarily  a  shipper  need  prove  only  that  his  goods  were  loaded  in 
good  condition  and  out  turned  damaged,  in  order  to  recover....  The 
carrier  to  exculpate  itself  by  proving.....  that  it  exercised  due 
diligence  to  avoid  and  prevent  the  harm".;  n  Shick  Shinny(1942] 
A.  M.  C.  p  910  at  p  915. 
126-Sellers  L.  J,  in,  Chris  Food  Stuffs  119631  Ltd.  v.  Nigerian 
National  Shipping  Line.  Ltd  (19671  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  293  at  p  297. 
127-West  ygka  (1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  997  at  p  998. 
128-Lyell.  J.  in,  Chris  Food  Stuffs  {19631  Ltd.  v.  Nigorjan  National 
Shipping  .  in,,  Ltd  [1966]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  677  at  p  682. 
129-Samir  Mankabady,  p  82,  where  he  states: 
Rule  2(1]  of  the  Merchant  Shipping  (Dangerous  Goods)  Rules  1965 
makes  it  unlawful  for  the  shipper  to  ship  dangerous  goods  unless  he 
"has  furnished  the  owner  or  master  of  the  ship  with  a  certificate 
or  declaration  in  writing  that  the  shipment  offered  for  carriage  is 156 
ship  dangerous  goods  without  declaring  to  the  shipowner 
all  the  facts  indicating  that  there  is  such  risk.  130  The 
goods  are  not  always  physically  dangerous,  such  as,  when 
the  ship  is  involved  in  danger  of  forfeiture  or  delay131, 
but  when  the  shipowner  has  consented  to  ship  dangerous 
goods  or  the  nature  of  such  goods  are  known  to  him,  the 
shipper  will  not  be  liable  for  any  delay  or  damage 
resulting  through  shipping  such  goods.  132 
Moreover,  when  the  shipowner  fails  to  prove  a  custom  of 
the  port  to  stow  explosives  on  deck  when  shipped  upon 
clean  under-deck  bills  of  lading,  he  will  be  responsible 
for  any  damages  or  loss  to  the  cargoes.  133 
Lord  Justice  Sellers  has  made  this  clear  when  he 
stated: 
"The  obligation  under  Article  3  [2]  is  to  adopt 
a  system  which  is  sound  in  light  of  all  the 
knowledge  which  the  carrier  has  or  ought  to 
have  about  the  nature  of  the  goods".  134 
If  the  shipowner  and  the  cargo-owner  have  however 
properly  marked  and  labelled  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of 
these  Rules  and  is  packed  in  a  manner  adequate  to  withstand  the 
ordinary  risks  of  handling  and  transport  by  sea  having  regard  to 
their  nature". 
These  Rules  were  amended  in  1968  and  in  1972  {S.  I.  1972/666}  and 
gave  statutory  force  to  the  Blue  Book. 
130_2  Carver,  para,  1108.;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  81. 
131-Per  Atkin.  J.  In.  Mitchell.  cotts  v.  Steel  (1916]  2  K.  B.  p  610 
at  p  614. 
132_2  Carver,  para,  1113. 
133_S  a  an  [1966]  A.  M.  C.  p  1405. 
134-Chris  Food  Stuffs  (1963,  Ltd  v.  Njaf,,  rjan 
- 
National  Shipping 
Line,  Ltd  (1967]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  293  at  p  297. 157 
agreed  that  the  goods  will  be  carried  on  deck,  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA  do  not  apply,  unless  the  bill 
of  lading  voluntarily  adopts  the  COGSA  terms  for 
deckcargo,  these  will  be  applied135. 
Section  1[7]  of  the  1971  Act  made  some  effect  when  it 
provided  that: 
"If  and  so  far,  as  the  contract  contained  in  or 
evidenced  by  a  bill  of  lading  or  receipt  within 
paragraph  {a}  or  {b}  of  subsection  {6}  above 
applies  to  deck  cargo  or  live  animals,  the 
Rules  as  given  the  force  of  law  by  that 
subsection  shall  effect  as  if  Article  1  [c]  did 
not  exclude  deck  cargo  and  live  animals.  In 
this  subsection  "deck  cargo"  means  cargo  which 
by  the  contract  of  carriage  is  stated  as  being 
carried  on  deck  and  is  so  carried". 
An  analysis  of  this  Article,  seems  to  me  to  suggest 
that  it  has  no  chance  of  applying  because  it  stated  that 
"  subsection  shall  have  effect  as  if  Article  [1j  {c}  did 
not  exclude  deck  cargo..  ",  but  Article  1  {c}  of  the  Hague 
Rules  defines  the  "Goods"  to  include  "goods,  wares, 
merchandise  and  articles  of  every  kind  whatsoever  except 
live  animals  and  cargo  which  by  the  contract  of  carriage 
is  stated  as  being  carried  on  deck  and  is  so  carried". 
Diamond136  believes  that  the  only  effect  of  section 
1[73  is: 
"To  render  it  necessary  to  exercise  extreme 
care  in  drafting  a  paramount  clause  lest 
inadvertently  deck  cargo  is  made  subject  to  the 
135_Uniao  DPTransportadores  v.  pcoreanoa  [1949]  A.  M.  C.  p  1161.; 
Pannell  v.  S.  S.  Amarican  yer  (1958]  A.  M.  G.  p  1428. 
136-Diamond,  The  Hague/visby  Rules,  p  26. 158 
Rules  in  circumstances  where  this  was  not 
desired". 
On  the  other  hand,  Richardson137  has  stated  a  different 
view  as  follows: 
"Section  [1]  subsection  (7)  creates  a  rather 
obscure  situation  with  Deck  cargo  and  Live 
stock,  which  were  specifically  excluded  by  the 
1924  Act.  It  now  appears  that,  unless  the 
carrier  makes  it  absolutely  clear  that  he  is 
not  applying  COGSA  1971  to  Deck  Cargo  or  Live 
Stock  in  his  clause  paramount,  he  will  find 
himself  extending  COGSA  1971  liabilities  to 
such  cargo".  138 
However,  when  the  bad  stowage  coincides  with  an  excepted 
peril  of  sea  to  cause  the  damage,  the  carrier  has  to  show 
the  damage  which  has  occurred  from  the  peril  of  the  sea, 
otherwise,  he  will  be  responsible  for  all  the  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  resulting  from  such  a  case139,  unless 
the  jeopardises  would  have  occasioned  the  damage  even  if 
137_J.  W.  Richardson,  "The  Hague/Visby  Rules-Carrier's  View", 
Published  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea 
Act  1971.  Edited  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press.  Ltd,  1977,  Richardson 
2,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Richardson". 
138-John  Maskell,  Messrs,  Norton,  Rose,  Botterell  &  Roche,  "The 
Influence  of  the  New  Rule  on  Contracts  of  Carriage",  Published  in 
the  Hague-Visby  Rules  and  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Ant  1971, 
Edited  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  Ltd,  1977,  Maskell,  2, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Maskell". 
139-Scrutton,  p  230.;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  275.;  Schnell 
-& 
co. 
v.  SS.  Vallesci,  ra[1934]  A.  M.  C.  p  1573  at  p  1578,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  carrier  must  bear  the  entire  loss  where  it  appears  that  the 
injury  to  cargo  is  due  either  to  sea  peril  or  negligent  stowage,  or 
both,  and  he  fails  to  show  what  damage  is  attributable  to  sea 
peril". 159 
the  goods  had  been  stowed  as  required  by  the  bill  of 
lading140. 
Nevertheless,  where  the  damage  to  the  cargo  results 
from  negligence  of  the  shipowners  (including  those  for 
whom  they  are  responsible),  the  shipowners  and  the  ship 
can  not  exempt  themselves  from  liability  for  such  damage 
arising  out  of  negligence141.  Whereas,  mere  negligence 
does  not  establish  liability,  the  causal  relation  that 
the  negligence  caused  or  contributed  to  the  damage  of  the 
cargoes,  must  be  shown142. 
One  can  conclude  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  the 
concept  of  the  doctrine  of  deviation  is  not  restricted  to 
the  geographical  route  but  it  is  extended  beyond 
geographical  route  which  conceived  that  any  change  in  the 
conduct  of  the  vessel  is  deviation.  That  means  that  any 
diversion  in  the  system  of  stowage  for  the  goods  which 
the  parties  are  agreed  upon  is  established  a  deviation. 
"D"  DISCHARGE  THE  CARGO  PROPERLY  AND  CAREFULLY 
The  scope  and  the  meaning  of  the  term  "discharge"  is 
found  out  through  consideration  of  what  is  meant  by  the 
port  or  place  of  discharge,  the  manner  in  which  discharge 
is  to  take  place,  the  party  to  whom  discharge  is  to  be 
140-Cliffor,  J,  in,  The  Delaware  v.  Or  -Qon  Iron  Co,  81  U.  S.  P 
579,  (1871),  14  Wall,  p  779.;  Compare,  Black  Wood  Hodge  1Indial 
Privat..  Ltd.  v.  Ellerman  Lines,  Ltd[1963]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  454.; 
TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l/  p  37. 
141-Globe  Soivent8  Co.  V.  California  (1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  674. 
142-Chester  Vally  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  555. 160 
made,  and  the  question  of  substituted  delivery.  143 
First  of  all,  the  word  "discharge"144  is  used,  instead 
of  the  word  "deliver"  because  the  period  of 
responsibility  to  which  the  COGSA  and  the  Rules  apply, 
ends  when  they  are  discharged  from  the  ship.  145  The 
carrier  is  particularly  obliged  to  play  some  part  in 
discharging  the  goods  from  the  ship.  146 
All  the  bills  of  lading  include  the  name  of  the  port  of 
discharge.  The  carrier  is  bound  to  discharge  the  goods  at 
the  named  port.  147  The  term  "port  or  ports"148  does  not 
mean  only  those  places  which  are  technically  called 
ports,  but  all  the  reasonable  places  within  the  limits  of 
143-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  824. 
144-Walker,  The  Companion  to  Law,  p  362,  where  he  states: 
"Discharge,  as  noun-  the  termination  of  liability  by  and  under 
contract,  a  receipt  for  a  payment". 
145-Per  Lord  Wright,  in, 
_Gosse 
Millard  Ltd.  v.  Canadian  Government 
Merchant  Marine  [1927]  28  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  88  at  p  103. 
146-Devlin,  J,  in,  Pyrene  Co.  Ltd.  v.  $nindia  Steam  Navigation 
C_o.  Ltd.  (1954]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  321  at  p  329. 
147-Walker,  Private  Law,  p  355. 
148-John  Burke,  Jowitt's  Dictionary  of  English  Law,  vol,  II,  1977, 
p  1384,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Burke",  where  he  states: 
"Port:  a  place  for  the  loading  or  unloading  of  ships,  created  by 
royal  charter  or  lawful  prescription.  A  port  is  a  harbour  where 
goods  are  either  imported  or  exported  to  foreign  countries,  as 
distinguished  from  a  mere  harbour  which  is  simply  a  place,  natural 
or  artificial,  for  the  safe  riding  of  ships.  it  is  said  that  every 
port  comprehends  a  city  or  borough,  with  a  market  and  accommodation 
for  sailors.  No  person  may  land  customable  goods  on  his  own  land  or 
elsewhere  than  at  a  port.  ";  2  Carver,  para,  1504,  where  he  states: 
if..  a  place  may  be  a  port,  it  seems  that  it  should  have  somewhere 
for  vessels  to  lie  safely,  and  a  shore  where  goods  may  be  safely 
landed;  also  that  there  should  be  some  conveniences  for  trade,  such 
as,  wharves  and  warehouse;  and  that  it  should  be  a  place  to  which 
vessels  are  allowed  to  come  by  the  government  of  the  country". 161 
the  port  which  ships  may  be  accustomed  to  resort  for  the 
purpose  of  loading  or  discharging.  149  However,  which  port 
is  qualified  to  accept  the  vessel  for  discharging. 
Particularly,  the  port  must  be  one  that  is  usual  safe 
and  commercial.  150  A  port  is  usual  when  it  is  one  of  the 
well-known  and  recognized  ports  of  substantial  size 
during  a  particular  agreed  voyage.  151 
The  carrier's  obligation,  however,  is  to  discharge  the 
cargoes  at  the  named  port  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
Nevertheless,  in  the  case,  where  the  parties  have  agreed 
to  discharge  the  goods  in  a  particular  port,  and  it  is 
revealed  that  the  port  is  inaccessible  or  an  unsafe  port, 
the  carrier  has  a  right  to  discharge  the  shipments  in  any 
reasonable  and  safe  place  which  the  vessel  could  safely 
reach  and  safely  return  from152,  having  taken  into  account 
all  the  surrounding  circumstances  in  a  particular  time 
and  a  particular  case.  153 
149-Lush,  J,  in,  Harrower  v.  Hutchinson  (1867]  L.  R.  4  Q.  B.  p  523 
at  p  534.;  Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  824. 
150_2  Carver,  para,  1538. 
151-McCardie,  J,  in,  The  Rohart  Doller  Co.  v.  RI-nod.  Holman  & 
Ca.  (192O]  4  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  343  at  p  345. 
152-Bailhache,  J,  in,  Limerick.  ss.  c  .  v.  Stott  &  Co.  (1921]  1  K.  B. 
p  568  at  p  575.;  G.  W.  rrace  &  Ce.  Ltd.  v.  ßenera1  S.  N.  Co.  Lt_d.  (1949] 
66  T.  L.  R.  p  147.;  Ronald  Bartle,  Introduction  to  Shipping  Law, 
2nd.  ed,  1963,  p  6,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Bartle",  where  he  states: 
"A  port  where  she  can  enter  and  remain,  whether  for  the  purpose  of 
loading  or  unloading,  without  danger  from  either  physical  or 
political  causes.  If  such  a  danger  exists  the  shipowner  may  require 
another  port  to  be  named  and,  failing  direction  by  the  charterer, 
should  proceed  to  the  nearest  convenient  port". 
153-Morris,  L.  J.  in,  The  Stork  (1955]  2  Q.  B.  p  105.;  (1955)  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  373.;  Sellers,  L.  J.  in,  Leeds  Shipping  Co.  v.  Sow 162 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  carrier  is  justified  under 
all  the  circumstances  which  indicate  his  failure  to 
discharge  the  goods  at  the  port  for  which  they  were 
shipped  merely  because  that  port  was  at  the  moment  of 
their  arrival  inaccessible  on  account  of  ice  for  three 
days  only.  154 
Then  a  mere  temporary  obstacle  will  not  render  a  port 
unsafe155,  unless  its  duration  is  such  as  to  subject  the 
ship  to  inordinate  delay.  156 
Coming  now  to  the  manner  of  the  carrier's  obligation  to 
discharge  the  goods  at  their  destination. 
The  Harter  Act  does  not  define  what  constitutes  a 
proper  delivery157,  but  the  judicial  interpretation  as  to 
what  establishes  the  concept  of  the  proper  delivery  is 
defined  as  a  delivery  made  in  accordance  with  usage  or 
law  of  the  port  of  destination.  158 
Francaise  Bunges  (19581  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  127  at  p  131;  Donaldon, 
J.  in,  The  Hermine  [1978]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  37  at  p  46,  (19791  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  212  at  p  213,  where  he  states: 
"It  was  well  settled  law  that  a  port  was  safe  if  the  vessel  could 
reach  it,  use  it  and  leave  it  without,  in  the  absence  of  some 
abnormal  occurrence,  being  exposed  to  danger  which  could  not  be 
avoided  by  good  navigation  and  seamanship";  Kodros  Shipping  Corp 
v.  Fmpresa  Cubana  de  Fletes(1983]  1  A.  C.  p  736. 
154_  Kn  ,4  ord.  Ltd.  v.  T1  tmann4  &  Co.  [1908]  A.  C.  p  406. 
155_2  Carver,  Para,  1511. 
156_Willmer,  L.  J.  in,  Reardon  smith  Line  Ltd.  v.  M;  nistrv  of 
Agriculture,  sh.  ri_s  &  Food  (1962]  1  Q.  B.  p  42  at  pp  109-110.;  2 
Carver,  para,  1526. 
157_rokuyo  Mar"  (1925]  A.  M.  C.  p  1420  at  p  1424,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  Harter  Act  prohibits  the  insertion  of  any  stipulation  excusing 
a  failure  in  proper  delivery". 
158-Astle,  p  290.;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  287. 163 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  have  defined  the  manner  of 
discharging  the  goods  carried  to  their  destination  as 
"properly  and  carefully".  The  meaning  of  the  term 
"properly  and  carefully"  has  aroused  real  controversy  as 
mentioned  previously159.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
particular  meaning  of  such  a  term  in  connection  with 
discharge. 
The  contract  of  carriage  of  goods  covers  the  period 
from  the  beginning  of  loading  operations  until  the 
perfection  of  dischargel60  unless  the  carrier  has  agreed 
to  extend  the  period  of  liability  during  his  control  or 
during  his  custody  of  the  goods161,  because  there  is  no 
intention  to  apply  the  Rules  after  the  goods  have  been 
properly  discharged  from  ship's  tackle162  in  accordance 
with  the  definition  of  ocean  carriage  in  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  of  "tackle  to  tackle"  period. 
However,  if  the  goods  were  put  into  a  lighter  while 
other  goods  were  being  discharged  into  the  same  lighter 
then  the  discharge  operations  of  these  goods  were  not 
finished. 
They  were  therefore  covered  and  affected  by  the  Rules 
159-Supra,  chapter,  II. 
160-Article  I  [e]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules.;  Devlin,  J,  in,  yen 
Co.  Ltd  v.  sc  ndia  Steam  Navigation  Co.  Ltd.  (1954]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep  p 
321  at  p  329. 
161_Compare,  East  &  West.  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Hassain  Brothers  (19681  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  145  at  p  146,  (Pakistan  Supreme  Court),  where  it 
is  stated: 
"The  carriage  of  goods  under  Hague  Rules  did  not  cease  when  goods 
were  discharged  from  ship". 
162-Article  2,3  t2]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules.;  Astle,  p  49. 164 
and  COGSA163,  because  the  Rules  apply  mere  to  the  contract 
of  carriage  than  to  a  period  of  time164. 
Improper  discharging  will  render  the  carrier 
responsible  under  the  Rules  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo165.  That  means  that  the  ocean  carrier  will  be  still 
responsible  for  damage  resulting  from  the  goods 
discharged  into  the  lighter,  unless  such  damage  is 
occasioned  by  the  negligence  of  the  lighter  operators166. 
This  does  not  imply  meaning  within  the  Rules  that  the 
carrier  is  not  under  the  duty  to  redeliver  the  goods,  but 
only  that  such  obligation  does  not  arise  out  of  the 
provision  relating  to  the  custody  of  the  goods167. 
Lord  Wright168  has  however  defined  a  proper  discharge 
as  follows: 
"Deliver  from  the  ship's  tackle  in  the  same 
apparent  order  and  condition"169. 
163-Roche,  J,  in,  Goodwin  Ferreria  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Lamport  &  Holt. 
Ltd  [19391  34  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  192  at  p  194.;  Falcon  Bridge  Nickel  Mines 
v.  Chimp  Shipping  [1973]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  469  at  p  472. 
164_Coodw 
,  Ferreria  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Lam  o  rt  &  Holt,  op.  cit,  p  192.; 
Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  279. 
165-The  Astri  [1945]  A.  M.  C.  p  1064. 
166-Domestic  Insurance  Co.  v.  Barber  Line[1970]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  49 
at  50  {Philippines  Manila,  Court  of  First  Instance}. 
167-Berlingieri  &  Alpa,  p  119. 
168-Gosse  Millard.  Ltd.  v.  Canadian  Government-  M  .rh  nt 
ße[1927]  28  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  88  at  p  103. 
169_  Tokyo  Mari?  [1925]  A.  M.  C.  p  1420  at  p  1425,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  words  "proper  delivery"  as  used  in  the  Act  "Harter  Act"  can 
not  mean  any  kind  of  delivery  that  may  be  stipulated  for....  it  is, 
perhaps,  competent  for  the  parties  to  make  special  provisions  as  to 
the  mode  of  delivery,  having  reference  to  the  usual  ways  of 
business,  and  the  convenience  or  necessities  of  vessels  in  touching 165 
That  implies  that  where  the  shipowner  puts  the  goods  on 
the  ship's  deck  or  along  side  for  dischargingl70,  he  will 
be  still  under  a  duty  to  take  all  proper  care  of  the 
cargo  until  the  goods  are  discharged  from  the  ship171. 
The  method  of  discharging  is  affected  by  the  custom  or 
usage  of  the  port  of  destination.  The  custom  which  is 
well-known,  so  clear  and  so  uniform  would  be  necessarily 
imported  into  the  contract  of  carriage  and  then  the 
parties  to  such  a  contract  would  be  bound  by  it172.  Such 
as  in  some  cases,  the  discharge  to  a  terminal  operator  or 
to  customs  authorities  may  terminate  the  carrier's 
liability173. 
The  contracting  parties  are  at  liberty  to  stipulate  any 
conditions  for  the  manner  of  discharging174.  Non- 
at  various  ports;  and  in  so  far  as  these  stipulations  are  shown  by 
the  circumstances  to  be  reasonable,  they  may  be  upheld,  as  defining 
what  a"  proper  delivery"  shall  be  and  may  thus  justify  what  might 
not  otherwise  be  held  to  be  a  proper  delivery.  Further  than  this, 
such  stipulations  can  not  go  without  subverting  the  purpose  of  the 
Act". 
170-Ballantyne  &  Co.  v.  Paton  &  Hendry,  1912  S.  C.  p  246. 
171-McNair,  J,  in,  Hang  Fung  Shipping  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Mullion  EL 
C.  Q.  [1966]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  511  at  pp  523-524;  Roskill,  J,  in,  The 
Azuero  [1967]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep,  p  464  at  p  470. 
172-Lush,  J,  in,  Peninsular  &  Oriental  steam  Navigation  nn.  ttd.  v. 
Leetham  & 
-Sons 
Ltd.  (1915]  32  T.  L.  R.  p  153  at  p  155;  A/S  samelling 
v.  Grain  Importers  LEIRE}.  Ltd  (1952]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  313. 
173-Miami  Structural  Iron  Corp.  v.  Cie  National  Beige  De  T  M.  [1955] 
A.  M.  G.  p  1981  (5th.  cir.  1955).;  2  Carver,  para,  1559,  where  he 
states: 
"A  delivery  to  a  certain  other  particular  persons  may  by  virtue  of 
the  custom,  be  equivalent  to  a  delivery  to  the  consignee  himself".; 
Scrutton,  pp  293,299. 
174-fig  v.  Montreal  Shippin  Co.  [1956]  EX.  C.  R.  p  280. 166 
responsibility  clauses  after  discharge  are  invalid  before 
"proper  delivery"175. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  non-responsibility  clauses  are 
valid  after  discharge176. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  United  states  court  of  Appeals 
held  that  the  non-responsibility  clause  which  has 
excepted  the  ship  from  the  responsibility  when  delivery 
is  made  from  the  ship's  deck  is  null  and  void  under  the 
Harter  Act,  unless  the  consignee  do  not  immediately 
177  receive  the  goods. 
That  depends  upon  the  position  in  the  United  States 
that  where  the  COGSA's  provisions  have  ceased  to  apply, 
the  Harter  Act  continues  to  operate  until  "proper 
delivery"  has  been  effected178.  However,  the  bill  of 
lading  provides  the  party  who  is  entitled  to  receive  the 
175-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  282. 
176-Anselme  Dewavrin  v.  Nilsong  &  North-Eastern  Railway  Shipping 
=.  [1931]  39  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  289.;  Bank  of  Indian.  Australia  &  China  v. 
British  India  Steam  Navigation  Co.  Ltd.  (1909]  A.  C.  p  369,  where  it 
is  stated: 
"In  all  cases  and  under  all  circumstances  the  liability  of  the 
company  shall  absolutely  cease  when  the  goods  are  free  of  the 
ship's  tackle,  and  there  upon  the  goods  shall  be  at  the  risk  for 
all  purposes  and  in  every  respect  of  the  shipper  or  consignee".; 
Scrutton,  Note,  4,  p  301,  where  he  states: 
"In  the  absence  of  any  such  express  provision,  the  question  must  be 
decided  by  the  custom  of  the  port  of  discharge;  and,  if  no  such 
custom  can  not  be  proved,  the  general  rule  appears  to  be  "that 
goods  are  delivered  when  they  are  so  completely  in  the  custom  of 
the  consignee  that  he  may  do  as  he  pleases  with  them". 
177-Crystal  v.  Cunard  S.  s.  Co.  (1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  39.;  Monsieur  Henri 
Wines  Ltd.  v.  S.  S,  Covadonga  (1965]  A.  M.  C.  p  740. 
178-Astle,  pp  290,292. 167 
goods  which  are  discharged  from  the  vessel. 
In  practice  and  when  the  contracting  parties  have 
agreed  to  take  special  procedures  in  case  of  the 
discharge  of  the  goods179,  the  carrier  must  notify  the 
consignee  when  the  vessel  has  arrived  and  the  goods  have 
been  discharged.  Also  the  notice  should  determine  the 
specific  wharf,  pier,  or  lighter  where  the  goods  are  to 
be  collected180. 
Rochel8l,  J,  has  made  this  clear  when  he  stated: 
"It  is  an  implied  term  in  all  contracts  such  as 
these  that  the  shipowner  must  wait  for  the 
consignee  to  appear  or  give  orders,  for  a 
reasonable  time  before  taking  the  matter  into 
his  own  hands  and  discharging  the  goods 
himself.  If  he  does  take  the  matter  into  his 
own  hands  and  discharge  the  goods  before  the 
reasonable  time  has  elapsed  he  is  committing  a 
breach  of  contract". 
Whereas,  there  is  nothing  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
supports  this  a  dogmatic  view.  182 
Finally,  the  term  "substituted  delivery"  intends  to  end 
the  carrier's  liability  when  the  shipowner  discharges  the 
goods  at  the  end  of  ship's  tackle  and  are  landed  into 
craft  or  on  quay. 
Under  the  Harter  Act,  a  clause  of  similar  nature  was 
179-2  Carver,  para,  1554,  where  he  states: 
,,  It  is  the  duty  of  the  consignee,  a  part  from  special  custom  or 
contract,  to  use  and  reasonable  diligence  to  discover  when  the  ship 
arrives  with  his  goods  on  board". 
180-Compare,  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  286.;  Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  825.; 
Scrutton,  p  293. 
181-Turner,  Nott  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  The  Lord  Mayor,  Aldermen  &Rg  sses 
of  the  City  of  Bristol  (1928]  31  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  359  at  p  360. 
182-Al-Jazairy, 
p  132. 168 
held  void183.  It  seems  quite  clear  that  the  "COGSA" 
governs  all  the  operations  of  discharging  until  the  goods 
are  discharged  into  the  same  craft  or  lighter184. 
However,  when  the  consignee  owns  or  controls  the 
lighters,  the  carrier's  liability  will  end  at  tackle. 
Otherwise,  the  carrier  will  still  be  responsible  until 
the  cargoes  have  been  discharged  on  land185  and  properly 
separated  and  made  ready  for  delivery  after  the  consignee 
has  been  given  notice  to  take  delivery  within  a 
reasonable  time  for  their  removal186. 
2-UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  Working  Group  on  International  Legislation  on 
Shipping  which  was  established  by  "UNCITRAL",  considered 
two  problems  concerning  the  operation  of  existing  Article 
1  {e}  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
1-Doubt  as  to  whether  the  Rules  apply  to  loss  or 
damage  occurring  during  loading  or  unloading 
operations187" 
183-Ca  e  rpillor  Overs 
eas  S.  A.  V.  . S.  S.  Expeditor  (19631  A.  M.  C.  p  1662 
(2d.  cir  1963). 
184-Astle,  p  292. 
185-Per  Lord  Denning,  M.  R.  Bridge,  L.  J.  and  Sir  David  Cairns,  in, 
The,  "Arawa"  (19801  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  135  at  p  136,  where  they  state: 
"  Where  the  agreement  was  nothing  more  than  a  variation  of  the  bill 
of  lading  contract,  a  variation  as  to  the  place  at  which  delivery 
could  be  taken,  the  terms  of  the  bill  of  lading  contract  all 
applied  so  far  as  th  ey  were  applicable  and  the  bills  of  lading 
exceptions  applied  to  the  whole  of  the  additional  transaction". 
186-Tetley,  Marine  Clai  m,  p  284.;  Tetley&  Cleven,  p  826;  Astle,  p  292. 
187-The  Report  of  the  Secretary  General  offered  a  suggested  draft 
as  follows: 169 
2-The  fact  that  the  existing  Rules  do  not  cover  loss 
or  damage  occurring  prior  to  loading  or  subsequent  to 
discharge  even  while  goods  are  in  the  charge  or  control 
of  the  carrier  or  its  agents.  188 
The  plenary  session  constituted  a  consensus  on  two 
points: 
"1-The  Hague  Rules  should  be  extended  rather 
than  merely  clarified,  so  that  the  carrier 
would  be  liable  for  the  entire  period  during 
which  he  was  actually  in  charge  of  goods. 
2-The  period  of  responsibility  under  the  Hague 
Rules  should  not  begin  prior  to  carrier's 
custody  at  port  of  loading  and  should  not 
continue  beyond  port  of  discharge".  189 
The  Working  Group  discussion  about  the  precision  of  the 
length  of  the  period  of  carrier  responsibility  had 
created  a  diversity  of  views  at  the  conference. 
Norway  190  noted  that  the  period  of  carrier 
"Carriage  of  goods  covers  the  period  from  the  commencement  of 
loading  operations  until  the  completion  of  discharge  of  the  goods 
from  the  ship". 
188-The  Report  of  the  Secretary  General  offered  a  suggested 
modification  of  the  above  suggested  draft,  as  follows: 
"Carriage  of  goods  covers  the  period  from  the  time  the  goods  are 
(in  charge  of)  (accepted  for  carriage)  (received  by)  the  carrier  to 
the  time  of  their  delivery". 
189-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  "The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  (part  1)",  [19751  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  78,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Sweeney,  Part  I  '". 
190-Sweeney,  Part  I,  p  79,  where  he  states: 
[Norway,  presented  a  draft  proposal  as  follows: 
"Carriage  of  goods  covers  the  entire  period  during  which  the  goods 
are  in  the  custody  of  the  carrier  from  the  time  of  receipt  of  the 
goods  at  the  port  of  loading  until  the  time  of  delivery  of  the 170 
responsibility  for  the  goods,  should  be  extended  to  cover 
the  periods  before  the  loading  and  after  the  discharge 
during  which  the  goods  were  in  the  custody  and  control  of 
the  carrier  and  his  agents.  191 
The  United  States  recommended  the  deletion  of  Article 
1{e},  the  "tackle  to  tackle"  rule,  and  could  not 
recommend  a  period  of  carrier  liability  any  less  than 
that  provided  in  domestic  law,  Harter  Act192  which 
extended  the  carrier's  period  of  liability  during  his 
custody  of  the  goods.  Namely,  that  the  carrier  will  be 
responsible  for  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  resulting 
during  the  period  when  the  goods  were  under  the  control 
of  the  carrier,  both  before  loading  and  after 
discharge.  193 
The  United  Kingdom  was  convinced  that  there  was  no 
attempt  to  go  beyond  purely  maritime  carriage  to  some 
sort  of  combined  transport  scheme.  194 
goods  at  the  port  of  discharge"]. 
191-Sweeney,  Part  I,  pp  79-83,  where  he  states  also  The  Argentina, 
The  Chile,  The  Chana,  The  Nigeria,  and  The  Soviet  Union's  view. 
192-Sweeney,  Part  I,  op.  cit,  p  80. 
193-Sweeney,  Part  I,  op.  cit,  p  81,  where  he  states  the  United 
States  suggest  which  is  reformulation  of  the  carrier's  duties  to 
read  as  follows: 
"The  carrier  shall  properly  and  carefully  take  over  load,  handle, 
stow,  carry,  keep,  discharge,  and  hand  over  the  goods  in  his 
charge". 
194-Sweeney,  Part  I,  p  83,  where  he  states: 
"The  United  Kingdom  solution  to  the  problem  as  follows: 
Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  (V]  there  shall  be  no 
liability  on  the  carrier  for  loss  or  damage  to  goods  at  the  port  of 
loading,  during  the  carriage  or  at  the  port  of  discharge  except  in 
accordance  with  these  rules" 171 
The  Drafting  party  reached  agreement  on  the  period  of 
responsibility  as  follows: 
"The  responsibility  of  the  carrier  for  the 
goods  under  this  convention  covers  the  period 
during  which  the  carrier  is  in  charge  of  the 
goods  at  the  port  of  loading,  during  the 
carriage  and  at  the  port  of  discharge"195. 
The  concept  of  this  Article  is  wider  than  the  concept 
of  Article  1{e}  of  the  Hague  Rules  which  has  adopted  a 
narrow  concept  of  the  period  of  the  carrier's 
responsibility.  That  is  quite  clear  from  the  provisions 
of  the  Hague  Rules  which  are  adhered  to  "cover  the  period 
from  the  time  when  the  goods  are  loaded  on  to  the  time 
when  they  are  discharged  from  the  ship". 
That  means  this  Article  covers  only  the  sea  carriage, 
whereas,  the  new  convention  the  "Hamburg  Rules"  covers 
the  period  during  which  the  carrier  is  in  charge  of  the 
goods  at  the  port  of  loading  during  the  carriage  and  at 
the  port  of  discharge.  Therefore,  the  period  of  the 
carrier's  responsibility  under  the  Hamburg  Rules  governs 
different  operations  of  loading  and  discharge  whether  on 
land  or  waterway196  which  are  deemed  to  be  necessary  for 
the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea197. 
195-Article  4[1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
196-Leopold  Peyrefitte,  "The  Period  of  Maritime  Transport  Comments 
on  Article  [4]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  the  Hamburg 
Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  bySaa,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady, 
1978,  p  125,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Peyrefitte". 
197-Mr.  Gordon  Pollock,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules, 
Part  II",  p  pollock  6,  Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rut  a,  A  One  Day, 172 
The  Hamburg  Rules  rejected  the  definition  of  ocean 
carriage  in  the  Hague  Rules  which  is  called  "tackle  to 
tackle"  rulei98,  and  it  joins  the  responsibility  of  the 
carrier  to  the  period  during  which  he  is  in  charge  of  the 
goods. 
Article  4  (2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"For  the  purpose  of  Paragraph  1  of  this 
article,  the  carrier  is  deemed  to  be  in  charge 
of  the  goods: 
a-from  the  time  he  has  taken  over  the 
goods...  ". 
It  is  first  important  to  reveal  the  precise  moment  of 
taking  charge  of  the  goods  because  the  Hamburg  Rules  do 
not  define  the  terms  "in  charge  of  the  goods"  or  "has 
taken  over  the  goods". 
However,  the  authors  have  differed  between  themselves 
as  to  what  constitutes  "taking  over"  the  goods. 
One  of  them  believes  that  the  taking  over  the  goods 
starts  from  the  moment  when  the  carrier  exercises  or  is 
able  to  exercise  his  right  of  checking  the  cargo.  199 
Another  author  believes  that  the  carrier's  responsibility 
is  linked  with  the  supervision  of  the  cargo  which  is  an 
important  element  in  taking  charge  of  the  goods.  200 
I  personally  believe  that  taking  over  the  goods  is  a 
material  fact  which  can  be  proved  by  all  means,  unless 
Seminar,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  1978, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "pollock". 
198-Samir  Mankabady,  p  49. 
199-Peyrefitte,  p  130. 
200-Samir  Mankabady,  p  50. 173 
the  contracting  parties  have  agreed  to  determine  the 
moment  of  taking  over  the  goods.  That  does  not  derogate 
from  the  provisions  of  the  convention.  201 
It  is  quite  clear  from  Article  [233202,  that  the 
Hamburg  Rules  have  a  compulsory  character,  but  it  does 
not  prohibit  such  an  agreement  which  is  appointed  the 
moment  of  taking  over  the  goods  which  is  not  relating  to 
the  scope  of  application  of  the  provisions  of  the 
convention.  203  Namely,  that  any  clause  which  derogates  the 
scope  of  the  provisions  of  the  convention  is  null  and 
void. 
Does  the  convention  apply  the  traditional  terms  of  "a" 
to  properly  and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow,  carry, 
keep,  care  for  and  discharge  the  goods,  "b"  to  exercise 
due  diligence  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy  before  and  at 
the  beginning  of  the  voyage204  or  does  it  not? 
The  argument  in  "UNCITRAL"  was  that  the  carrier's 
positive  duties  should  be  restated  and  that  his  duty  to 
provide  a  seaworthy  ship,  should  remain  throughout  the 
voyage. 
201-Peyrefitte, 
p  131,  he  states: 
"As  the  provisions  of  the  new  convention  have  a  compulsory 
character  (Article  23),  clauses  which  stipulate  different  places 
for  taking  over  the  liquid  will  be  null  and  void". 
202-Article  23  (1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"Any  stipulation  in  a  contract  of  carriage  by  sea  in  a  bill  of 
lading,  or  in  any  document  evidencing  the  contract  of  carriage  be 
sea  is  null  and  void  to  the  extent  that  it  derogates,  directly  or 
indirectly,  from  the  provisions  of  this  convention". 
203-Samar  Mankabady,  p  52.;  Peyrefitte,  p  130. 
204-Article  3  (1,2]  of,  the  Hamburg  Rules. 174 
Whereas,  the  opposite  parties  claimed  that  those 
traditional  terms  would  be  subsumed  under  the  general 
rule  of  the  carrier's  liability-205 
The  two  sets  of  basic  carrier's  duties  which  extend 
throughout  the  vessel,  are  acknowledgedly  subsumed  in  the 
text  of  the  convention.  206  Viz,  that  those  positive  duties 
are  covered  by  the  term  "reasonable  measures",  throughout 
the  voyage,  whether  for  the  exercise  of  due  diligence  to 
make  the  ship  seaworthy  or  for  the  undertaking  of  care 
for  the  cargo.  207  Then,  if  loading  is  from  a  lighter208, 
when  does  the  exact  moment  of  taking  charge  of  the  goods 
begin? 
It  depends  upon  the  circumstances  whether  the  carrier 
own  or  control  the  lighterage  operations  or  not.  In  the 
first  case,  the  carriage  by  lighters  is  deemed  part  of 
the  commencement  of  the  contract  of  carriage.  In  the 
second  case,  when  the  carrier  does  not  own  or  control  the 
lighters  or  it  is  owned  or  controlled  by  the  independent 
contractor,  then  the  exact  moment  of  taking  charge  of  the 
205-Report 
of  UNCITRAL  Working  Group  on  its  Fourth  Session  (A/CN. 
9/74),  where  it  is  drafted  by  Drafting  party  that: 
"perform  all  his  obligations  under  the  contract  of  carriage  with 
care". 
206-Shah,  p  19.;  Compare,  Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  7,  where  he 
states: 
"The  absence  of  any  link  with  traditional  terms  of  reference  will 
seem  an  added,  and  perhaps  almost  gratuitous,  obstacle  to 
intelligibility". 
207-Samir  Mankabady,  p  54.;  Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  11. 
208-Samir  Mankabady,  p  51,  where  he  states: 
"Once  the  carrier  takes  charge  of  the  goods,  he  will  be  responsible 
for  the  lighterage  operations". 175 
goods  begins  at  the  point  where  the  carrier  has  a  right 
to  check  the  contents  of  the  shipment.  209 
The  same  question  may  arise  where  the  containers  are 
involved  in  carriage  by  sea,  especially,  in  the  case  of 
sealed  containers. 
However,  the.  criterion  of  the  moment  of  the  taking  over 
the  goods  by  the  carrier  which  states  that  when  the 
carrier  exercises  or  is  able  to  exercise  his  right  of 
checking  the  container.  In  this  case,  a  partial  exercise 
of  this  right  of  checking,  either  by  the  carrier  himself 
or  by  his  servants  or  his  agents  is  sufficient  to  take 
the  containers  in  his  charge.  As  result,  the  carrier  will 
be  responsible  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  container 
while  he  takes  the  containers  in  his  charge  even  though, 
it  is  carried  from  the  shipper's  warehouse  to  the  port  of 
loading.  210 
Nevertheless,  I  am  in  favour  of  applying  the  same 
criterion  that  the  moment  of  taking  over  the  goods  is  a 
matter  of  fact  which  can  be  proved  by  all  means  and  there 
is  nothing  in'  the  Hamburg  Rules  preventing  the 
contracting  parties  from  determining  which  moment  of 
taking  over  the  container  is  brought  under  the  carrier's 
undertaking. 
The  New  Convention  does  not  define  deck  carriage  and 
the  cases  which  mention  it  do  so  neither  by  the 
Rules  nor  by  practice  because  it  is  not  valid  yet.  The 
209-Peyrefitte,  p  131. 
210-Ibid,  p  132.;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  51. 176 
scheme  adopted  by  the  Hamburg  Rules  is  that  the  carrier 
is  entitled  to  carry  the  goods  on  deck  only  if  such 
carriage  is  in  accordance  with  an  agreement  with  the 
shipper  or  with  the  usage  of  the  particular  trade  or  is 
required  by  statutory  rules  or  regulations.  211 
That  means  that  the  carrier  will  be  in  breach  of  the 
Rules  if  the  goods  are  carried  on  deck212  contrary  to  the 
agreement,  usage  of  trade  or  statutory  rules.  213 
Therefore,  cargo  carried  on  deck  is  subject  to  the 
Rules.  214 
However,  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for  any  loss 
or  damage  to  goods,  as  well  as,  for  delay  in  delivery 
resulting  solely  from  the  carriage  on  deck.  Whether  it  is 
his  fault215  or  an  accident.  216  Where  the  goods  have  been 
carried  on  deck  contrary  to  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
{1}  of  Article  [9]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules217,  even  though  he 
211-Article  9  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
212-Samir  Mankabady,  p  74  at  p  76. 
213-Pollock,  p  7. 
214-Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules,  p  198.;  Pollock,  p  7. 
215-Article  5  [51  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides; 
"With  respect  to  live  animals,  the  carrier  is  not  liable  for  loss, 
damage  or  delay  in  delivery  resulting  from  any  special  risks 
inherent  in  that  kind  of  carriage". 
That  means  that  the  carrier  is  not  liable  in  the  event  of  "special 
risks"  associated  with  the  carriage  of  animals,  in  the  case  of 
loss,  damage  or  delay  in  delivery  without  it  being  the  fault  of  the 
carrier,  see  Pollock,  p  B. 
216-Article  9[3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  182 
at  p  183. 
217-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  "The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage 
of  Goods  by  Sea  (Part  V)"",  [1977]  8  J.  Mar.  L.  &.  Com,  p  167  at  p 
188,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Sweeney,  Part  V". 177 
shows  that  he  took  all  reasonable  measures  to  avoid 
carrying  the  cargo  on  deck  and  the  damages  resulting  from 
such  carriage.  218  Thus,  in  such  a  case,  merely  the  fact  of 
carriage  on  deck  is  sufficient  and  the  carrier  will  be  an 
insurer  against  the  risks  of  on  deck  carriage.  219 
Article  9  [4]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"Carriage  of  goods  on  deck  contrary  to  express 
agreement  for  carriage  under  deck  is  deemed  to 
be  an  act  or  omission  of  the  carrier  within  the 
meaning  of  article  [8]". 
In  accordance  with  this  Article,  if  the  shipper  has 
agreed  with  the  carrier  to  ship  his  goods  below  decks, 
and  the  goods  were  carried  on  deck  contrary  to  the 
agreement,  then  the  shipper  will  recover  for  any  loss  of 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  and  delay  in  delivery  without 
regard  to  the  limitation  set  in  Article  [61.220 
Tetley221  concludes  that  Article  (9)  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules  has  done  nothing  to  clarify  what  deck  carriage  is, 
nor  when  it  may  take  place,  nor  what  the  sanction  will  be 
for  such  carriage.  He,  also,  concludes  that  Article  [91 
has  the  right  to  carry  on  deck,  and  has  diminished  the 
sanction  for  improper  deck  carriage. 
However,  dangerous  goods  as  cargo  had  been  discussed 
during  the  "UNCITRAL"  plenary  in  1976.  There  had  been 
218-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  184. 
219-Pollock,  p  7. 
220-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  182. 
221-Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules,  p  199.;  Supra,  Chapter  I. 
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some  criticism  of  the  Hague  Rules,  that  there  is  a 
failure  to  define  the  shipper's  obligation  and  when  the 
goods  are  to  be  deemed  dangerous  goods  within  the  meaning 
of  Article  (IV]  {6}222. 
There  was  a  consensus  that  it  was  unnecessary  to  state 
a  definition  of  dangerous  goods. 
The  Working  Group  of  UNCITRAL  decided  to  specify  the 
shipper's  obligation  directly,  rather  than  leave  them  to 
be  presumed  from  customary  practices.  They  also  decided 
to  limit  the  master's  discretion  by  the  expression  "as 
circumstances  may  requirei223. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  restated  the  Hague  Rules  provision 
with  respect  to  dangerous  goods  in  different  languages 
with  many  technical  changes224  in  Article  (13]225 
222-Sweeney,  Part  V,  p  170. 
223-Ibid,  p  172. 
224-Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules,  p  201. 
225-Article  (13]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"1-The  shipper  must  mark  or  lable  in  a  suitable  manner  dangerous 
goods  as  dangerous. 
2-Where  the  shipper  hands  over  dangerous  goods  to  the  carrier  or  an 
actual  carrier  as  the  case  may  be,  the  shipper  must  inform  him  of 
the  dangerous  character  of  the  goods  and,  if,  necessary,  of  the 
precautions  to  be  taken.  If  the  shipper  fails  to  do  so  and  such 
carrier  or  actual  carrier  does  not  otherwise  have  knowledge  of 
their  dangerous  character: 
"a"the  shipper  is  liable  to  the  carrier  and  any  actual  carrier  for 
the  loss  resulting  from  the  shipment  of  such  goods,  and 
"b"the  goods  may  at  any  time  be  unloaded,  destroyed  or  rendered 
innocuous,  as  the  circumstances  may  require,  without  payment  of 
compensation. 
3-The  provisions  of  paragraph  (21  of  this  article  may  not  be 
invoked  by  any  person  if  during  the  carriage  he  has  taken  the  goods 
in  his  charge  with  knowledge  of  their  dangerous  character. 
4-If,  in  cases  where  the  provisions  of  paragraph  (23,  sub  paragraph 179 
Accordingly,  the  shipper  is  obliged  to  mark  or  label 
the  dangerous  goods  and  must  inform  the  carrier  of  the 
dangerous  character  of  the  goods  as  to  the  proper 
precautions  to  be  taken  if  this  is  necessary.  226  That 
probably  means  that  if  the  precautions  are  not  well-known 
to  the  carrier,  then  the  shipper  must  state  those 
precautions.  227 
The  Hamburg  Rules,  however,  do  not  affect,  in  respect 
to  dangerous  goods,  the  rights  and  liabilities  of  the 
contracting  parties  in  such  a  case.  228 
On  the  other  hand,  if  the  shipper  fails  to  inform  the 
carrier  of  the  dangerous  character  of  the  goods,  then  the 
shipper  will  be  liable  to  the  carrier  for  the  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  resulting  from  such  goods  and  the 
carrier  is  entitled  to  land,  discharge  and  destroy 
without  indemnity  such  goods  if  circumstances  may 
require.  229  Otherwise,  if  the  carrier  has  taken  the  goods 
in  his  charge  with  knowledge  of  their  dangerous  character 
[b],  of  this  article  do  not  apply  or  may  not  be  involved,  dangerous 
goods  become  an  actual  danger  to  life  or  property,  they  may  be 
unloaded,  destroyed  or  rendered  innocuous,  as  the  circumstances  may 
require,  without  payment  of  compensation  except  where  there  is  an 
obligation  to  contribute  in  general  average  or  where  the  carrier  is 
liable  in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  article  (5]". 
226-Samir  Mankabady,  p  81. 
227-Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules,  p  202. 
228-Mr.  J.  L.  Thomas,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  Part 
III",  Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules.  A  One  Day  Seminar,  Organized 
by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  1978,  p  Thomas,  6,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules  Part  III". 
229-Ibid,  Thomas,  p  6;  Article  13  [2]{a,  b}  and,  para  (3)  of  the 
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then  the  carrier  will  not  be  recovered  from  the  shipper 
in  such  a  case  unless  the  fault  or  neglect  on  the  part  of 
the  shipper  has  caused  some  loss  or  damage. 
Finally,  coming  now  to  the  delivery  of  the  goods  at  a 
destination  which  has  raised  many  questions  about  the 
precise  moment  of  delivery,  the  place  of  delivery  and  the 
methods  of  delivery. 
First  of  all,  the  operations  which  take  place  before 
delivery  are  deemed  to  be  part  of  the  achievement  of  the 
contract  by  virtue  of  article  4  (1),  which  will  be 
considered  when  we  determine  the  moment  of  delivery  which 
depends  upon  the  presentation  of  the  goods  to  the 
consignee  or  his  representative  and  the  readiness  of  the 
consignee  or  his  representative  to  check  the  goods. 
Therefore  any  claim  for  compensation  by  the  consignee, 
must  at  first  prove  that  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  took 
place  before  delivery.  Thus  the  consignee  or  his  surveyor 
has  the  right  to  check  the  goods  prior  to  delivery.  230 
Generally,  the  carrier  is  bound  to  deliver  the  goods231 
230_Peyrefitte,  p  133. 
231-Walker,  Companion  to  Law,  p  349,  where  he  states: 
"Delivery:  Transfer  of  the  possession  of  a  movable  thing  from  one 
person  to  another.  It  may  be  actual,  by  handing  over  the  thing,  or 
constructive,  by  operations  of  law;  which  in  turn  may  be 
symbolic....;  J.  B.  Sykes,  The  Pocket  Oxford  Dictionary,  1978,  p 
746,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Sykes,  Oxford  Dictionary",  where  he 
states: 
"Receive  -  v.  t.  Accept  delivery  of,  take  (proffered  thing)  into 
one's  hands  or  possession...  Then,  the  delivery  of  the  goods  may  be 
happened  where  the  goods  are  delivered  without  being  received  , 
whereas,  the  receiving  the  goods  is  a  material  act".;  see  also, 
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at  the  named  port  as  agreed  in  the  contract  and  not  to 
some  other  place  which  is  selected  by  the  carrier  himself 
contrary  to  the  bill  of  lading.  232 
One  can  apply  here  the  same  rules  as  those  concerning 
the  take  over  of  the  goods  by  the  carrier.  Having  taken 
into  account  that  the  delivery  of  the  goods  is  a  material 
fact  which  can  proved  by  all  means.  Viz,  where  the 
carrier  is  unable  to  deliver  the  goods  at  the  named  port 
by  reason  of  force  majeure.  The  carrier  has  a  right  to 
discharge  the  goods  in  any  reasonable,  safe,  and  nearest 
convenient  port  where  the  vessel  can  unload  the  goods 
without  danger  from  either  physical  or  political 
reasons. 
233 
That  could  be  revealed  by  Article  4  [2]  {b}  ii,  which 
it  is  stated  that  the  carrier  is  considered  to  deliver 
the  goods  when  they  are  put,  by  placing  them  at  the 
disposal  of  the  consignee  in  accordance  with  the  law  or 
with  the  usage  of  the  particular  trade,  applicable  at  the 
port  of  discharge.  Thus,  in  such  a  case  the  voyage  comes 
to  an  end  without  the  approval  of  the  consignee  which  is 
equal  to  delivering  the  goods  to  their  ultimate 
destination  which  is  planned  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
232-Fadex  Chemical  Co.  v.  Lorentzen  [19441  A.  M.  C.  p  940  at  p  941.; 
Ruth  Ann  [19621  A.  M.  C.  p  117. 
233-Bartle, 
p  6. 182 
COMMENT 
The  purpose  of  the  basic  duties  is  to  make  the  ship  fit 
for  a  particular  voyage,  which  is  provided  in  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  as  a  general  principle.  In  practice 
this  differs  from  case  to  case,  depending  upon  the 
surrounding  circumstances  in  a  particular  time  and  a 
particular  case.  Such  duties  are  determined  not  in 
abstracto,  but  in  concreto. 
Seaworthiness  is  not  therefore  an  absolute  obligation 
but  a  relative  obligation  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy 
fit  to  carry  the  goods  agreed  upon234,  what  Article  3  11] 
of  the  Hague  Rules  constitutes  as  an  obligation  before 
and  at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage  to  exercise  due 
diligence  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy. 
The  seaworthiness  which  is  restricted  in  the  Hague 
Rules  to  exercising  due  diligence  to  make  the  vessel 
seaworthy  before  and  at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage,  is 
defined  under  the  new  convention  {The  Hamburg  Rules)  by 
virtue  of  Article  5  (1)  which  covers  the  meaning  of 
seaworthiness  by  the  term  of  "reasonable  measures"  and 
the  implicit  undertaking  should  be  exercised  throughout 
the  voyage. 
Due  diligence  and  reasonable  measures  should  be  however 
234-Viscount  Summer,  in, 
Navigation  c'n.  T.  d(1927j  27 
"In  the  law  of  carriage 
diligence  is  absolute.  But 
state  of  knowledge  and  tt 
time". 
Bradley  &  Sonor  L.  v.  Ee,,  real  Steam 
Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  395  at  p  396,  where  he  states: 
by  sea  neither  seaworthiness  nor  due 
are  relative,  among  other  things,  to  the 
ie  standards  prevailing  at  the  material 183 
exercised  for  each  particular  stage235,  with  respect  to 
the  difference  between  the  conventions.  The  Hague/Visby 
Rules  require  that  the  vessel  should  be  reasonably  fit 
from  the  moment  that  loading  begins  until  the  vessel 
starts  on  her  voyage  at  a  particular  stage,  whereas  the 
Hamburg  Rules  require  that  all  reasonable  measures  to 
make  the  vessel  seaworthy  throughout  the  voyage  at  a 
particular  stage  are  exercised. 
The  principle  of  the  doctrine  of  seaworthiness  by 
stages  is  not  restricted  to  the  bunkers  of  the  vessel.  236 
Such  as,  when  the  vessel  is  supplied  with  adequate 
bunkers  for  a  particular  stage  and  there  is  insufficient 
bunkering  at  an  intermediate  port.  Viz,  at  her 
destination  of  a  specific  stage,  then  the  vessel  is  in  a 
seaworthy  condition  at  this  stage.  Also,  when  the  vessel 
sails  seaworthy  from  one  port  to  others  and  she  needs 
special  equipment  at  her  destination  at  a  particular 
stage  to  be  seaworthy  for  the  next  stage.  237 
Thus,  seaworthiness  for  the  whole  voyage  does  not 
require  that  the  vessel  must  be  bunkered,  equipped  and 
supplied  with  sufficient  crew  for  a  specific  stage. 
The  seaworthiness  is  however  not  a  condition  precedent 
which  entitles  the  party  aggrieved,  when  the 
unseaworthiness  is  ascertained  to  rescind  the  contract.  238 
The  seaworthiness,  which  was  absolute  warranty  at  the 
235-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  164.;  Langley,  p  58.;  Clark,  p  127. 
236_T  v.  Richards  [1892]  2  Q.  B.  p  141.;  The  rlymont(19333  A.  M.  C. 
p  1293  (2d.  cir). 
237-Th.  O  dar[1933]  A.  M.  C.  p  936  (  2d.  cir). 
238_1  Carver,  para,  142,626. 184 
common  law,  is  cancelled  by  the  Hague  Rules.  Article  3 
(1]  constitutes  an  obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence 
to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  and  the  obligation  is 
confined  to  the  state  of  the  ship  before  and  at  the  start 
of  the  voyage239. 
Then,  the  incidence  of  liability  will  be  determined  not 
by  reference  to  the  undertaking  {to  make  the  ship 
seaworthy}  but  by  reference  to  the  cause  of  the  loss  of 
or  damage  to  the  cargo240.  That  does  not  mean  that  the 
carrier  will  escape  from  liability  when  he  does  his  best 
to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy. 
The  general  test,  in  English  Law  is  that  a  prudent 
shipowner  would  have  required  the  defect  to  have  been 
made  good  before  sending  ship  to  sea.  Therefore,  the 
carrier  will  be  in  breach  of  the  warranty,  when  he  is 
ignorant  of  the  defect,  regardless  of  whether  or  not  he 
ought  to  have  discovered  it241.  There  are  many  cases  which 
are  proposed  that  the  seaworthiness  may  sometimes  operate 
as  a  condition242  which  entitles  the  other  parties  to 
repudiate  the  contract243,  or  all  the  stipulations  in  the 
239-Supra,  Chapter,  II,  Section  One.;  Clark,  p  128. 
240-Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  17. 
241-Clark, 
p  126;  Channell,  J,  in,  McFadden  V.  Blue  star. 
yi  ;  e[1905]  1  K.  B.  p  697. 
242-Per  Diplock,  L.  J.  in,  HongKong  Fir  Shipping  Co,  v.  Nsaki 
(1962]  2  Q.  B.  p  26  at  p  71,  where  he  states: 
"The  express  or  implied  obligation  of  seaworthiness  is  neither  a 
condition  nor  a  warranty  but  one  of  that  large  class  of  contractual 
undertakings". 
243-Lord  Atkinson,  in,  Kish  v.  Taylor  [1912]  A.  C.  p  604  at  p  617. 185 
contract  are  cancelled  and  the  shipowner's  position  is 
analogous  to  that  of  a  common  carrier  without 
condition244,  or  entitles  the  party  aggrieved  only  to 
obtain  a  quantum  meruit  for  services  rendered245  or  to 
justify  that  the  delay  must  be  so  great  as  to  frustrate 
the  commercial  purpose  of  the  contract246,  when  the 
shipowners  have  not  provided  a  seaworthy  ship. 
What  is  then  the  difference  between  error  in  navigation 
or  management  and  unseaworthiness? 
The  main  factor  to  determine  whether  the  error  in 
management  or  negligent  navigation  exemption  is  applied 
or  not,  is  whether  or  not  such  an  error  occurred  after 
the  commencement  of  the  voyage. 
On  the  other  hand,  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and 
COGSA  the  unseaworthiness  should  have  occurred  before  or 
at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage  and  must  have  contributed 
to  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  to  deprive  the  carrier 
of  the  exemption,  because  the  seaworthiness  is  a 
condition  precedent  to  the  exemption.  247 
244-Bailhache,  J,  in,  Ford  v.  Compagnie  Furness  (1922)  2  K.  H.  p 
797  at  p  802,804.;  Lord  Summer,  in,  Atlantic  shipping  Co.  v. 
Dreyfus  [1922]  2  A.  C.  p  250  at  p  260. 
245-Lord  Duned,  in,  Atlantic  Shipping  Co.  V.  T)rayfu  ,  op.  cit,  p 
257,  where  he  states: 
"It  is  quite  true  that  the  fact  of  unseaworthiness  does  not  destroy 
the  contract  of  affreightment  into  such  a  doctrine  would  lead  to 
obscured  consequences;  the  goods  might  be  safely  delivered  and  yet 
no  freight  due  under  the  contract,  but  only  a  quantum  meruit  for 
service  rendered". 
246_  ongKong  Fir  Shipping  Co.  v.  Kawasaki  (1962]  2  Q.  B.  p  26. 
247-El  Carol  v.  Greenwood,  "  Problems  of  Negligence  in  Loading, 
Stowage,  Custody,  Care  and  Delivery  of  Cargo;  Errors  in  Management 
and  Navigation,  Due  Diligence  to  make  Seaworthy  Ship",  [1970-71]  45 186 
Then,  if  unseaworthiness  coincides  with  mismanagement 
or  negligent  navigation  to  cause  the  damage  to  the  cargo, 
the  shipowner  escapes  liability  for  damage  to  the  cargo 
only  if  the  error  in  management  or  negligent  navigation 
occurred  following  the  start  of  the  voyage248.  Thus,  if 
the  carrier  can  not  separate  resulting  losses  to  the 
cargo  then  he  will  be  liable  for  resulting  cargo 
damage249. 
If  unseaworthiness  is  not  involved  in  the  cause  of  loss 
or  damage  to  the  cargo,  then  it  is  not  necessary  to 
determine  whether  the  voyage  has  started  before  the 
accident,  whether  it  was  caused  by  error  in  management  or 
navigation,  or  not,  then  such  a  exemption  would  apply250. 
On  the  whole,  seaworthiness  is  a  material  fact  which  can 
be  proved  by  all  means251. 
Unseaworthiness  of  the  ship  may  however  be  enough  to 
occasion  an  unreasonable  deviation  when  the  failure  to 
make  all  the  procedures  of  exercise  due  diligence  to  make 
Tul.  L.  R.  p  790  at  p  802,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Greenwood".;  Morris, 
J,  in,  Herald  &  Weekly  Ltd.  v.  New  Zealand  Shipping  C6.  Ltd  (1947] 
80  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  590  at  p  600. 
248-The-New  Port,  7  F.  2d,  p  452  (1925).;  The  willow  oo  (1936]  A 
M.  C.  p  1852.;  The  Del  Sud,  171  F.  Supp,  p  184  at  p  192  (1959). 
249-The  Walter  Raleigh  (1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  618,  where  it  is  stated: 
"When  two  causes  of  damage  concur  and  one  is  due  to  unexcused 
unseaworthiness,  the  vessel  is  liable  for  resulting  cargo  damage". 
250-Greenwood,  p  804. 
251-Lord  Wright,  in,  Canadain  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Paterson  6.  S.  Ltc  [1934] 
49  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  421  at  p  425.;  Compare,  Elder.  Dempster  Co.  Ltd  v. 
Patersons,  Zo 
. 
hon  s&  Co.  Ltd  (1924]  A.  C.  p  522  ;  [1924]  18  Ll.  L. 
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the  vessel  seaworthy  before  and  at  beginning  of  the 
voyage.  252 
The  House  of  Lords  adopted  somewhat  rough  rule  in  Kish 
v.  Taylor253,  by  admitting  any  departure  from  the  usual 
and  customary  route,  even  though,  initial  unseaworthiness 
gave  rise  to  the  necessity  for  the  departure, 
consequently  it  was  held  that  the  carrier  was  not  liable 
for  deviation.  Whereas,  Lord  Porter,  in,  Monarch  SS.  Co. 
v.  Karlshamns  Objefabriker254,  said  that: 
"Undoubtedly  deviation  necessarily  made  to 
remedy  unseaworthiness  does  not  amount  to 
unjustifiable  deviation  or  destroy  the  right  to 
rely  upon  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  carriage 
unless  it  is  established  that  the  owners  knew 
of  the  vessel's  state  on  sailing". 
The  United  States  Court  has  adopted  the  principle  of 
Kish  v.  Taylor,  in,  the  Malcolm  Baxter,  Jr255,  but  the 
supreme  court  in  the  Willdomino256  held  that: 
"An  emergency  sufficient  to  excuse  a  departure 
can  not  arise  out  of  circumstances  deliberately 
planned  nor  from  gross  negligence". 
Therefore,  any  departure  from  the  customary  course  of 
voyage  for  bunker  or  repair,  when  the  carrier  knew  that 
the  vessel  was  unseaworthy  prior  to  sailing  from  the  port 
252_  11945]  A.  M.  C.  p  363.;  compare,  Brian  Coote,  ExcTntiono 
clauses,  1964,  p  84,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Coote",  where  he  states: 
"Neither  negligence,  unseaworthiness,  nor  delay  is  classed  as  a 
deviation,  nor  do  they  incur  the  consequences  of  one". 
253_119121  A.  C.  p  604. 
254_11949]  A.  C.  p  212.;  1949  S.  C.  p  1(H.  L). 
255_277  U.  S.  p  323,72  L.  Ed.  p  901  (1928). 
256_272  U.  S.  p  718  (1927). 188 
of  departure,  that  will  be  constituted  an  unreasonable 
deviation  and  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for 
deviation.  257  If  the  ship  becomes  unseaworthy  in  her 
course,  and  consequently  it  is  forced  to  deviate  from  the 
usual  and  customary  course  of  voyage  into  dry  dock,  then 
the  carrier  is  not  liable  when  he  exercises  due  diligence 
to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  prior  to  sailing  from  the 
port  of  departure.  258 
Payne  &  Ivamy,  have  adopted  a  different  attitude  by 
saying: 
"Where  the  ship  is  seaworthy  when  she  sails, 
but  becomes  unseaworthy  while  at  sea,  the 
incidence  of  liability  will  be  determined  not 
by  reference  to  the  undertaking  (of  which,  of 
course,  there  has  been  no  breach)  but  by 
reference  to  the  cause  of  the  loss.  If  the  loss 
was  due  to  an  excepted  peril  the  shipowner  will 
be  protected,  otherwise,  he  will  not".  259 
When  the  delay  in  the  voyage  caused  by  the  vessel's 
unseaworthiness  which  was  attributable  to  the  owner's 
default,  because,  he  should  have  expected  that  war  might 
257-Longlely,  p  118. 
258-Roger,  p  170;  Theophilus  Parsons,  A  Treatise  on  Maritime  Law, 
vol,  1,1859,  p  297,  hereinafter  cited  as"Parsons";  Leva  Ana  V. 
General  Steam  Navigation  Co  (19591  A.  M.  C.  p  2233;  The  iib-ratar 
[1938]  A.  M.  C.  p  141  at  p  146. 
259-Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  16.;  The  Torenia(1983]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  210  at 
pp  218-19,  where  it  is  stated: 
"where  the  facts  disclosed  that  the  loss  was  caused  by  the 
concurrent  causative  effects  of  an  excepted  and  a  non-excepted 
peril,  the  carrier  remained  liable  but  only  escaped  liability  to 
the  extent  that  he  could  prove  that  the  loss  or  damage  was  caused 
by  the  excepted  peril  alone". 189 
breakout  and  cause  loss  or  diversion  of  the  vessel,  that 
will  make  the  carrier  responsible  for  any  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  resulting  from  such  delay260 
We  come  now  to  discuss  the  scope  of  the  Rules  through 
the  duties  of  the  carrier  concerning  the  loading,  the 
stowage  and  the  discharge  of  the  goods  properly  and 
carefully  and  of  what  constitutes  a  reasonable  deviation 
or  unreasonable  deviation. 
The  period  of  the  ocean  carrier's  responsibility  is 
limited  by  Hague/Visby  Rules  of  "tackle  to  tackle" 
period,  so  called  "Maritime-Stage".  That  means  that  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  have  no  chance  of  applying  when  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  occurs  before  the  loading 
or  after  the  discharge  even  though  the  goods  are  still  in 
the  control  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants  or  agents, 
unless  there  is  an  agreement  between  the  contracting 
parties  to  extend  the  scope  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  to 
apply  in  such  cases. 
For  that  reason,  the  Working  Group  and  consequently  the 
Hamburg  Rules  have  adopted  a  criterion  which  has  solved 
this  dilemma,  Article  4  (1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides 
that  the  Rules  cover  the  period  during  which  the  carrier 
is  in  charge  of  the  goods  at  the  port  of  loading,  during 
the  carriage  and  at  the  port  of  discharge.  in  accordance 
with  this  concept,  the  scope  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  is 
extended  beyond  the  maritime  stage  and  governs  all  the 
260-Monarch  Steam  Ship  Co.  Ltd,  v.  Kar  5harr  01jefabrik2r(1949] 
A.  C.  p  196  at  p  197. 190 
operations  of  loading  and  discharge  whether  on  land  or 
waterway  which  are  considered  to  be  necessary  for  the  sea 
carriage. 
However,  the  moment  of  taking  over  and  handling  over 
the  goods  is  a  material  fact  which  can  be  proved  by  all 
means  unless  the  contracting  parties  have  decided  to 
determine  the  moment  of  taking  charge  and.  handling  over 
the  goods  which  stand  by  Article  [23]  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules  to  determine  such  an  agreement  which  is  not  related 
to  the  scope  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  which  have  a  compulsory 
character  and  any  stipulation  or  clause  contrary  to  the 
provisions  of  the  Rules  to  derogate  or  extend  the  scope 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules  is  null  and  void. 
One  can  conclude  that  any  breach  of  the  carrier's 
duties  concerning  the  loading,  the  stowage,  and  the 
discharge  of  the  cargoes  properly  and  carefully  or  any 
breach  of  the  reasonable  measures  which  compel  the 
carrier  to  take  care  of  the  cargoes  throughout  the  voyage 
does  not  constitute  a  deviation. 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  concept  of  the  doctrine  is 
restricted  to  the  geographical  route,  but  it  is  extended 
beyond  the  geographical  route  which  implies  that  any 
change  in  the  conduct  of  the  vessel  is  a  deviation.  Viz, 
that  a  diversion  in  the  system  of  stowage  for  the  goods 
which  the  parties  are  agreed  upon  may  constitute  a 
deviation.  Such  as,  in  the  absence  of  an  agreement  or 
industry  custom  for  the  place  of  the  stowage,  the  carrier 
must  have  carried  the  goods  below  deck,  otherwise  it  will 191 
have  amounted  to  an  unreasonable  deviation. 
The  ocean  carrier  conceded  that  the  issue  of  a  clean 
bill  of  lading  has  obliged  the  carrier  to  stow  the  goods 
under  deck,  and  that  stowage  of  such  goods  on  deck 
2  constituted  a  deviation  in  maritime  law61. 
Then  when  the  carrier  voluntarily  varies  from  the 
method  or  place  of  .  carriage  contracted  for,  it  will 
constitute  a  deviation  and  it  will  leave  the  shipper  with 
unknown  risks  against  which  he  has  not  insured  262.  For 
instance,  carrying  a  deck  cargo  of  lily-of-the  valley 
pipes  without  tarpaulins,  which  the  contract  agreed  would 
be  supplied,  was  a  fundamental  deviation  from  the  agreed 
method  of  transportation263.  If  the  term  "on  deck  stowage" 
is  stamped  on  the  face  of  the  bill  of  lading,  it  will  be 
excluded  from  the  application  of  the  COGSA,  but  the 
Harter  Act  is  applicable  to  such  on-deck  cargo  because  it 
is  stricter  than  COGSA264. 
Nowadays,  the  question  arises  whether  the  stowage  of 
containers  on  deck  constitutes  a  deviation  or  not? 
One  can  reason  from  the  surrounding  circumstances  that 
stowage  on  deck  is  treated  as  a  deviation  or  not 
depending  on  the  intended  use,  design  of  the  deck  on 
which  the  goods  were  stowed,  particular  trade  and  the 
custom  of  the  port. 
261_ýon 
_4  &  Guerrero  Corp.  V.  F131g  Cl  nPer  (1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  259. 
262-Francoat-  e1  Corp.  v.  N.  V.  Nederland9ch  (1967]  A.  M.  C.  p  2440  at  pp 
2441,2445. 
263_L.  om"  (1947]  A.  M.  G.  p  284. 
264-Huang, 
p  198. 192 
However  in  the  leading  case  of  Encyclopaedi  a 
Britannica,  Inc.  v.  The  Hong  Kong  Produce265,  it  was  held 
that  carriage  of  containerized  cargo  on  the  deck  of  a 
break-bulk  vessel  was  an  unreasonable  deviation,  unless 
there  is  positive  evidence  of  a  loading  port  custom  so 
permitting.  This  principle  was  not  accepted  in,  The 
Mormacvega266,  where  'the  court  held  that  the  deck  of  a 
containership  is  exactly  where  containers  are  reasonably 
intended  to  be  carried. 
Moreover,  if  the  term  "stow  under  deck  only"  is  stamped 
on  the  container  bill  of  lading  and  consequently,  if  the 
stowage  of  the  container  is  on  deck,  and  the  cargoes  were 
damaged  during  the  voyage,  that  does  not  constitute 
deviation  under  COGSA267 
Mere  negligence  with  regard  to  the  stowage  or  handling 
of  the  cargo  never  constitutes  a  deviation,  but  it  must 
be  shown  that  the  negligence  caused  or  contributed  to  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo268.  Namely,  the  causal 
connection  between  the  on-deck  stowage  and  the  damage 
should  be  proved269. 
Then,  the  soundest  approach  may  be  to  recognize  that 
technological  developments  have  rendered  the  historical 
presumption  of  under  deck  stowage  inapplicable  to  a 
265-[1969]  A.  M.  C.  p  1741  at  p  1742. 
266_[1973]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  267. 
267-Rosenbruch 
v.  Americans  F  Hort  I9hrand  g  Lines  [19761  A.  M.  C. 
p  487. 
268- 
Ches  ter  yal  ey(1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  555. 
269-Whitehead, 
p  43. 193 
container  ship,  and  the  real  question  is  whether  the 
goods  have  been  properly  stowed  and  cared  for  in  the 
circumstances  of  the  particular  case.  270 
Finally,  prior  to  the  adoption  of  COGSA  1936,  in  the 
United  States,  there  was  little  doubt  that  over  carriage 
beyond  and  to  a  different  port  than  the  contracted 
destination  was  a  material  deviation.  271 
The  fundamental  obligation  of  a  common  carrier,  is,  to 
deliver  the  cargo  to  the  port  of  destination  set  forth  in 
the  bill  of  lading  and  not  to  some  other  place 
unilaterally  selected  by  him.  272  Either  by  the  COGSA  or 
precedent  it  has  been  recognized  that  over  carriage 
beyond  the  agreed  port  of  destination  is  an  unreasonable 
deviation.  273 
Mere  non-delivery  does  not  create  a  presumption  of 
over-carriage  resulting  in  a  deviation.  There  are  many 
things  that  could  have  happened  to  the  goods,  for 
instance,  they  might  have  been  stolen  by  someone  after 
loading  and  before  sailing.  274  However,  a  delay  of  one  and 
one-half  years  in  delivery  is  in  itself  a  material 
deviation,  regardless  of  the  fact  of  over  carriage.  275 
270-McMahon, 
p  328. 
271-General  lec  ri.  Co.  v.  Argonaut  S.  S.  Line,  Jc  (1934]  A.  M.  C.  P 
1147. 
272-Fadex  Chemical  Co.  v.  Lorentzen  [1944]  A.  M.  C.  pp  940,941.; 
Ruth  Ann  [1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  117. 
273-Shackman 
v.  Cunard  White  Star  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  971.;  pade  ewski 
(1944]  A.  M.  C.  p  1106  at  p  1108.;  Fadex 
_h  ni.  a1  Co.  v.  Lorentzen, 
op.  cit,  p  940  at  p  941.;  The  west  Aleta  (1924]  A.  M.  C.  p  1318. 
274-Shackman  v.  Cunard  White  Stara  =,  op  cit,  p  971  at  p  977. 
275-Citta  di  Messina,  169  Fed.  p  472  (1909).;  Hermosa[1932]  A.  M.  C. 194 
If  the  shipment  is  not  delivered  to  the  consignee  until 
18  months  after  the  due  delivery  date  then  it  will  be 
considered  an  unreasonable  deviation.  276  In  addition  the 
failure  to  deliver  seasonal  cargo  promptly  has  also  been 
held  a  deviation.  277 
On  the  other  hand,  a  vessel  which  was  diverted  from  the 
agreed  route  because  the  intended  destination  of  a 
particular  cargo,  was  tied  up  by  a  "wild  Cat"  strike  of 
stevedores,  while  unloading  was  held  at  another  port  thus 
causing  a  fire,  explosion,  and  destroying  the  other  cargo 
on  board. 
The  court  held  that  the  proceeding  to  the  other  port 
was  reasonable  and  not  a  deviation  of  which  the  other 
cargo  could  take  advantage. 
278  Also,  it  is  not  a 
deviation,  or  it  is  a  reasonable  deviation  where  the 
vessel  is  prevented  from  reaching  her  destination  and  it 
has  discharged  the  goods  in  a  particular  port  in  view  of 
war  conditions.  279 
However,  if  the  carrier  after  accepting  the  cargo  for 
discharge  at  a  port  known  to  be  congested,  without  notice 
to  the  consignee,  proceeded  to  another  port  where  the 
goods  were  landed,  then  it  constituted  an  unreasonable 
deviation.  280 
p  541. 
276-A 
_l  an  .i.  Mutual  V.  Poldon  [1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665. 
277-Effin  ham  (1935]  A.  M.  C.  p  319. 
278-Ocean  Lab  rty  (1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  1681  at  p  1682. 
279-The  Walter  Raleigh  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  618. 
280-Surrendra  1averseasl  v.  S.  S.  H.  le  lenin  Hern[1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  1217. 195 
If  there  is  a  custom  or  practice  permitting  the  over 
carriage  beyond  the  agreed  port  of  destination  in 
particular  circumstances  then  such  an  action  establishes 
a  reasonable  deviation.  281 
ii-  SERIOUS  FAULT  AND  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  DEVIATION 
The  general  principle  in  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea 
in  respect  to  tortious  liability  is  that  the  master,  crew 
or  independent  contractor,  must  take  reasonable  care  to 
avoid  acts  or  omissions  which  they  can  reasonably  foresee 
as  being  likely  to  damage  so  closely  and  directly 
affected  by  their  act.  282 
They  have  therefore  to  disclose  a  sufficient  degree  of 
proximity  to  give  rise  to  a  duty  of  care  and  disclose 
nothing  which  will  restrict  that  duty  . 
283  As  in  Lord 
Macmillan's  words: 
"The  categories  of  negligence  are  never  closed". 
One  can  reveal  that  the  court  should  not  hesitate  to 
produce  a  new  duty  or  a  new  standard  of  duty  in 
particular  cases.  284 
The  scope  of  the  duty  of  care  in  delict285  or  tort  owed 
281-San  Guiseppe  [1941]  A.  M.  C.  p  315. 
282-  onoghue  v.  Stevenson  [1932]  A.  C.  p  562  at  p  580. 
283-,  7un  nr  Books  Ltd.  v.  V,  hi.  Co.  Ltd.  [1983]  2  A.  C.  p  520. 
284-Marshall,  J,  in,  Lee  Cooper,  Ltd.  v.  C.  H.  Jeakins  1964]  1  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  300  at  p  311;  [1967]  2  Q.  B.  p  1. 
285-Delict  is  used  here  and  throughout  the  thesis  in  generic  sense 
as  a  synonym  of  tort.;  Walker,  Private  Law,  pp521,522,  where  he  states: 
"Delicts:  were  harmful  conduct,  done  intentionally  {dolo}  or 
culpably  {culpa}. 196 
by  a  person  doing  work  is  not  limited  to  duty  to  avoid 
causing  foreseeable  harm  to  persons  or  property  other 
than  the  subject-matter  of  the  work  by  negligent  acts  or 
omissions  to  avoid  defects  in  the  work  itself. 
An  analysis  of  article  [3,4]  of  the  Hague  Rules, 
Article  [3]  of  the  Visby  Rules,  and  Article  [5]  of  the 
Hamburg  Rules,  reveals  that  there  are  certain  provisions 
which  compel  the  carrier  to  take  care  of  the  cargo  and 
there  are  certain  exemptions  exonerating  him  from 
liability. 
For  instance,  Article  3  [2]  of  the  Hague  Rules  binds 
the  carrier  to  care  for  and  carry  the  goods  properly  and 
carefully.  On  the  other  hand,  Article  4  [2]  exempts  the 
carrier  and  the  ship  from  loss  or  damage  arising  or 
resulting  from: 
"a"  Act,  neglect,  or  default  of  the  master, 
mariner,  pilot,  or  the  servants  of  the  carrier 
in  the  navigation  or  in  the  management  of  the 
ship; 
"b"  Fire,  unless  caused  by  the  actual  fault  or 
privity  of  the  carrier; 
"q'  Any  other  cause  arising  without  the  actual 
fault  or  privity  of  the  carrier,  or  without  the 
fault  or  neglect  of  the  agents  or  servants  of 
the  carrier; 
Also,  Article  3  (11  of  the  Visby  Rules  provides: 
Quasi-Delicts:  were  kinds  of  conduct  similar  to  delicts,  differing 
as  being  cases  of  vicarious  liability  such  as  the  liability  of 
shipmasters  .....  The  terms  delict  and  Quasi-Delict  have  been  adopted 
in  scots  law". 
.:  ý, 197 
"The  defences  and  limits  of  liability  provided 
for  in  this  convention  shall  apply  in  any 
action  against  the  carrier  in  respect  of  loss 
or  damage  to  goods  covered  by  a  contract  of 
carriage  whether  the  action  be  founded  in 
contract  or  in  tort". 
Finally,  Article  5  [1]  as  mentioned  previously  and 
Annex  [2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  contain  a  common 
understanding  that  the  liability  of  the  carrier  under 
this  convention  is  based  on  the  principle  of  presumed 
fault  or  neglect  . 
One  can  conclude  from  these  provisions  that  the  carrier 
or  the  shipowner  is  liable  for  his  own  fault  or  privity 
and  for  the  fault  or  neglect  of  his  servants  or  agents 
whether  the  action  be  founded  in  contract  or  in  tort 
{delict}. 
I  will  therefore  summarise  the  following  points: 
1.  The  Nature  and  the  Degree  of  the  Seriousness  of  the 
Carrier's  Fault. 
2:  The  Actual  Fault  or  Privity  of  the  Carrier. 
3.  Vicarious  Liability. 
4.  The  Effect  of  Serious  Fault  on  the  Doctrine  of 
Deviation. 198 
"1"  THE  NATURE  AND  THE  DEGREE  OF  THE  SERIOUSNESS 
OF  THE  CARRIER'S  FAULT 
The  nature  and  the  degree  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
carrier's  fault  have  aroused  real  controversy286  as  to 
what  constitutes  a  fundamental  breach  of  the  contract 
whether  by  an  act  or  omission,  be  it  intentional  or 
unintentional  such  as,  wilful  misconduct  or  gross 
negligence  and  whether  it  is  an  act  of  erring  or 
transgression. 
The  "UNCITRAL'"  discussion  about  the  degree  of 
seriousness  of  the  faults  which  are  committed  by  the 
carrier  or  his  servants  and  agents  created  a  diversity  of 
views  at  the  conference. 
The  U.  S.  S.  R.  delegate  was  in  favour  of  accepting  the 
proposal  of  the  liability  of  carriers,  their  servants  and 
agents  for  intentionally  caused  damage  but  he  did  not 
accept  the  concept  of  damage  caused  recklessly. 
The  French  delegate  inclined  to  make  a  distinction 
between  the  intent  to  cause  damage  and  the  degree  of  the 
misconduct  by  servants  to  impose  carrier  liability,  and 
also  agreed  with  Nigeria  about  recklessness  and 
distinguished  wilful  misconduct  from  "inexcusable 
negligence". 
The  Norwegian  delegate  offered  two  alternative  drafts, 
and  both  alternative  proposals  concluded  as  follows: 
286-Falih,  p  420. 
,,. 199 
"Nor  shall  any  of  the  servants  or  agents  of  the 
carrier  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  such 
limitation  of  liability  with  respect  to  damage 
caused  by  such  an  act  or  omission  of  his 
287  part". 
The  United  States  delegate  opposed  any  special 
provision  for  serious  fault  in  view  of  the  likelihood 
that  there  would  be  temptation  to  litigate  every  damage 
claim  as  wilful  misconduct.  He  noted  that  the  Hague  Rules 
dealt  with  the  consequences  of  carrier  negligence  or 
culpa}  or  simple  breach  of  the  conduct  of  carriage  and 
that  there  did  not  appear  to  be  a  need  to  make  special 
provision  in  international  law  for  the  consequences  of 
intentional  acts  for  dolus).  The  number  of  acts  of 
deliberate  damage  to  cargo  must  be  few  and  the  proof 
thereof  extremely  difficult. 
Further,  the  principal  area  in  which  intentional  torts 
would  be  relevant  would  be  with  respect  to  theft,  the 
proof  of  which  was  often  so  difficult  that  shippers  were 
forced  to  rely  on  the  presumption  of  carrier  negligence 
to  seek  compensation.  He  noted  that  with  respect  to 
deliberate  damage  of  cargo,  shippers  would  use  the 
traditional  common  law  remedies  which  would  permit 
punitive  damages288  which  would  permit  punitive  damages 
287-Sweeney,  part  II,  pp  337-38. 
288-Punitive  damages  or  exemplary  damages  are  not  allowed  in  cargo 
cases  and  can  not  be  given  for  breach  of  contract  which  constituted 
on  the  basis  of  Article  4  (5)  of  the  United  States  COGSA  which 
provides: 
"In  no  event  shall  the  carrier  be  liable  for  more  than  the  amount 
of  damage  actually  sustained";  See,  Robert  B.  Acomb,  Jr,  Damages 200 
and  relaxed  rules  of  consequential  damages  rather  than  to 
place  any  reliance  on  the  Hague  Rules"289. 
Thus,  the  United  States  delegate  wanted  the  subject  to 
be  left  to  national  law  and  not  codified  in  an 
international  convention290. 
The  Visby  Rules291  and  the  Hamburg  Rules292  apparently 
provide  the  same  provisions  regarding  the  categories  of 
misconduct  as  those  provisions  which  require  that  the  act 
or  omission  be  done  "with  intent  to  cause  damage,  or 
delay,  or  recklessly  and  with  knowledge  that  such  loss, 
damage,  or  delay  would  probably  result". 
In  analysing  what  constitutes  and  is  meant  by  these  two 
types  of  misconduct,  it  seems  to  me  that  the  criterion 
which  is  used  by  the  Rules  to  define  the  misconduct  is  a 
subjective  intention  and  thereof  the  misconduct  itself  is 
Recoverable  in  Maritime  Matters,  1984,  p  44,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Acomb,  Damages  Recoverable".;  Charleston  &  W.  C.  y.  v.  rnvil  e 
Furn,  Co.,  237  U.  S.  p  597,59  L.  ed.  p  1137.;  Richard  R.  Sigmon, 
Miller's  Law  of  Freight  Logg  and  Damage  Claims.  4th,  ed,  pp  346- 
347,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Sigmon,  Miller's  Law".;  Compare,  Lake 
Shore,  R.  Co.  v.  Prentice,  147  U.  S.  p  101. 
289-Sweeney,  part  II,  p  338. 
290-Ibid,  p  338. 
291-Article  3  (4)  of  the  Visby  Rules  provides: 
"the  damage  resulted  from  an  act  or  omission  of  the  servants  or 
agent  done  with  intent  to  cause  damage  or  recklessly  and  with 
knowledge  that  damage  would  properly  result". 
292-Article  [8]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  paragraph  [2j  of  Article  [7],  a 
servants  or  agents  of  the  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  the  benefit  of 
the  limitation  of  liability  provided  for  in  delivery  resulted  from 
an  act  or  omission  of  such  servants  or  agent,  done  with  the  intent 
to  cause  such  loss,  damage  or  delay,  or  recklessly  and  with 
knowledge  that  such  loss,  damage  or  delay  would  probably  result". 201 
not  enough  to  determine  the  liability  of  the  carrier  or 
his  servants  or  agents,  but  must  prove  that  he  has  done 
something  wrong293.  On  the  other  hand,  the  term 
"recklessly"  is  a  subjective  realization  implying  a 
deliberate  disregard  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  of  the 
29 
consequence  on  his  conduct4. 
Ackner,  J,  and  professor  Walker,  made  that  quite  clear 
when  they  defined  the  terms  "willful  misconduct"  and 
"recklessness"  respectively  as  follows: 
Ackner295,  J,  said  that: 
"It  is  common  ground  that  "wilful  misconduct" 
goes  far  beyond  any  negligence,  even  gross  or 
culpable  negligence,  and  involves 
a  person  doing  or  omitting  to  do  that  which  is 
not  only  negligent,  but  which  he  knows  and 
appreciates  is  wrong,  and  is  done  or  omitted 
regardless  of  the  consequences,  not  caring  what 
the  result  of  his  carelessness  may  be". 
Professor  Walker296  said: 
293-Barry,  J,  in,  Horabin  v.  British  Airway  Corp  (1952]  2  All  E.  R. 
p  1016  at  p  1020.;  Falih,  p  454.;  Al-Jazairy,  p  261. 
294-Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  15;  (1978]  2  LMLQ,  p  225  at  p 
245. 
295-Rustenburg  v.  Pan  American  World  Airways,  Inc.  (1977]  1  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  564  at  p  569,  affirmed  by  the  court  of  Appeal  (1979]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  19. 
296-David  M.  Walker,  The  Law  of  Delict  in  Scotland,  2nd,  ed,  1981, 
p  43,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Walker,  Delict".;  Diamond,  The 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  246,  where  he  states: 
"I  therefore  suggest  that  :  recklessly"  involves  either; 
"i"a  high  degree  of  subjective  realization  that  damage  will 
properly  occur  or 
"ii"a  deliberate  shutting  of  the  eyes  to  a  means  of  knowledge  which 
if  used,  would  have  produced  the  same  realization". 202 
"A  frame  of  mind  in  which  persons  may  behave, 
an  attitude  of  indifference  to  the  realized 
possible  risks  and  consequences  of  one's 
actions,  in  which  consequences  are  foreseen  as 
possible  but  are  not  desired,  not  a  form  of 
negligence  but  a  cause  of  negligence". 
The  English  writers  have  differed  between  themselves  as 
to  what  constitutes  recklessness297. 
Diamond298  and  Musti11299  have  adopted  the  view  that  the 
term  recklessness  has  a  subjective  realization. 
Powles300  has  adopted  Megaw  J,  's  view301  which  construed 
it  as  being  objective  test. 
297-The  English  jurisprudence  have  their  own  definition,  for 
example,  Humphreys,  J,  in,  John  T.  Euis-  Ltd.  v.  Walter  T.  Lindy 
[1947]  1  K.  B.  p  475  at  p  486,  where  he  stated: 
"The  word  reckless  means  a  great  deal  more  than  negligence".; 
Whereas,  Lord  Herschell,  in,  Deary  v.  Peek  {1889}  14  App.  Cas.  p  337 
at  p  374,  where  he  stated: 
"recklessly,  careless  whether  it  be  true  or  false". 
298-Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  246. 
299-Michael  Mustill,  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971,  vol,  II, 
1972,  p  684  at  p  700,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Mustill". 
300-David  G.  Powles,  "The  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971",  [1978] 
J.  B.  L.  p  141  at  p  145,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Powles",  where  he 
states: 
"In  view  of  the  fact  that  an  objective  assessment  of  knowledge  can 
involve  an  element  of  recklessness,  it  could  be  argued  that  these 
additional  words  attractive  a  subjective  interpretation". 
301-Shawinigan  Ltd.  v.  yoking  &  Co.  Ltd[1961]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
153;  [1961]  1  W.  L.  R.  p  1206  at  p  1214,  where  he  states: 
"Recklessness  is  gross  carelessness-  the  doing  of  something  which 
in  fact  involves  a  risk,  whether  the  doer  realises  it  or  not;  and 
the  risk  being  such  having  regard  to  all  circumstances,  that  the 
taking  of  that  risk  would  be  described  as  "reckless".  The 
likelihood  or  otherwise  that  damage  will  follow  is  one  element  to 
be  considered,  not  whether  the  doer  of  the  act  actually  in  ordinary 
parlance  realised  the  likelihood". 203 
Whereas,  the  jurisprudence  in  Scotland  has  emphazied 
the  subjective  element.  302 
The  United  States  adopted  Mr.  Justice  Barrye's  view303, 
in,  Forman  v.  Pan  American  Airways,  Inc3041  expressed  that 
the  meaning  of  the  wilful  misconduct  is  as  follows: 
"wilful"  ordinarily  means  intentional:  that  the 
fact  that  was  done  was  what  the  person  doing  it 
meant  to  do.  But  the  phrase  "wilful  misconduct" 
means  something  more  than  that.  It  means  that 
in  addition  to  doing  the  act  in  question,  that 
the  actor  must  have  intended  the  result  that 
come  about  or  must  have  launched  on  such  a  line 
of  conduct  with  knowledge  of  what  the 
302-Lord,  MacKenzie,  in,  Callender  v.  Milligan  (1849}  11  D.  p  1174 
at  p  1176,  where  he  stated: 
"Under  malice  I  would  include  gross  recklessness,  culpa,  lata  quae 
equiparatur  dolo".;  Lord  Atkin,  in,  Donoghue  V.  Stevenson,  1932, 
S.  C.  (H.  L)  p  31  at  p  44,  where  he  stated: 
"The  liability  for  negligence,  whether  you  style  it  such  or  treat 
it  as  in  other  system  as  a  species  of  "culpa".;  Walker,  Delict,  p 
46,  where  he  defined  the  term  "culpa"  as  follows: 
"The  term  "culpa"  is  used  in  confusingly  many  senses.  In  origin  it 
undoubtedly  meant  moral  fault,  and  subsequently,  as  in  the  Lex 
Aquilia,  the  mental  element  which  inferred  legal  liability  for 
conduct  by  act  or  omission,  intentional  or  unintentional. 
"culpa",  in  this  wide  sense  covers  conduct  done  dolo  (intentional} 
and  also  done  culpa  (in  a  narrower  sense-  negligently);  Falih,  p 
461. 
303-Horabin  v.  British  Airways  ore,  op.  cit,  p  1020,  where  he 
states: 
"In  order  to  establish  wilful  misconduct  ....  the  person  who  did 
the  act  knew  at  the  time  that  he  was  doing  something  wrong  and  yet 
did  it  notwithstanding,  or,  alternatively,  that  he  did  it  quite 
recklessly,  not  caring  whether  he  was  doing  the  right  thing  or  the 
wrong  thing,  quite  regardless  of  the  effect  of  what  he  was  doing". 
304.:  1954,284  App.  Div,  p  935,  where  it  is  cited  by  N.  R. 
McGilchrist,  "Carriage  by  Air,  Willful  Misconduct  and  the  Warsaw 
Convention",  [1977]  4  LMCLQ,  p  539  at  p  540,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"McGilchris". 204 
consequences  probably  would  be  and  had  gone 
ahead  recklessly  despite  his  knowledge  of  those 
conditions". 
The  United  States  courts  in  Tuller  v.  Kirn305,  have 
declared  that: 
"Wilful  misconduct....  may  be  the  intentional 
performance  of  an  act  in  some  manner  as  to 
imply  reckless  disregard  of  the  consequences  of 
its  performance...  ". 
Wilful  misconduct  and  recklessness  are  therefore 
something  quite  different  from  negligence306  or 
carelessness  or  error  of  judgment,  or  even  incompetence, 
where  the  wrongful  intention  is  absent.  All  these  human 
failings  may  give  rise  to  acts  which  in  the  judgment  of 
ordinary  reasonable  people  may  amount  to  misconduct,  but 
the  element  of  wilfulness  is  missing.  307 
One  can  say  that  the  same  act  may  amount  on  one 
occasion  to  mere  negligence,  and  on  another  to  wilful 
misconduct  depending  upon  the  intention  or  state  of  mind 
of  the  person  who  did  it. 
The  COGSA  1971,  the  Visby  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  have 
however  confirmed  that  there  is  a  realization  of  the 
probability  of  damage  occurred  by  such  an  act  or  omission 
when  these  Rules  state  that  "with  Knowledge  that  damage 
would  probably  result"  following  the  word  "recklessly". 
The  carrier's  malicious  intent  or  recklessness  with 
knowledge  of  probable  consequences  apparently  may  not  be 
305_1961.292  F.  2d,  p  775. 
306-Walker,  Delict,  p  43. 
307-Ho  abin  v.  British  Airways  Corp,  op.  cit,  p  1020. 205 
presumed  from  the  mere  fact  that  loss,  damage  or  delay 
occurred308. 
"2"  THE  ACTUAL  FAULT  OR  PRIVITY  OF  THE  CARRIER 
Turning  now  to  the  meaning  of  the  actual  fault  or 
privity  of  the  carrier  from  which  many  special 
difficulties  arise,  nowadays,  because  most  vessels  are 
owned  by  a  company. 
The  words  "actual  fault"  are  not  restricted  to  positive 
acts  by  way  of  fault.  These  words  include  acts  of 
omission  as  well  as  acts  of  commission309.  Thus,  when  the 
carrier  wants  to  avoid  the  liability  he  has  to  show  that 
he  himself  is  not  blamworthy  for  having  either  done  or 
omitted  to  do  something  or  been  privy  to  something.  Then 
it  is  not  necessary  to  show  knowledge  or  to  show  that  it 
is  the  servant's  fault,  but  it  must  not  be  the  owner's 
fault310.  Some  decisions  held  however  that  the  actual 
fault  means  that  it  infers  something  personal  to  the 
owner  which  is  distinguished  from  constructive  fault  or 
privity  such  as  the  fault  or  privity  of  his  servants  or 
agents311. 
308-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  181. 
309-Royal  Exchange  v.  Kingsley  Navigation  Co.  [1932]  A.  C.  p  235.; 
Paterson  v.  Canadian  Wheat  [1934)  A.  C.  p  538. 
310-Buckley,  L,  J.  &  Hamilton  L.  J.  in,  AQia  is  Petroleum  Co-Ltd.  V. 
Lennard's  Carrying  Co.  Ltd.  (1914)  1  K.  B.  p  419  at  pp  432-438, 
affirmed  by  the  House  of  Lords  (1915)  A.  C.  p  705. 
311-Buckley,  L.  J.  in,  Asiatic  P  rol_um  Co.  Ltd.  v.  kenngiyd's 
Carrying  Co.  Ltd.  op.  cit,  p  432.;  Channell,  J,  in,  Smi  on  V. 
Orient  Steam  Navigation  Co.  [1970)  12  Com.  Cas,  p  270  at  p  276, 
where  he  stated: 
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I  find  that  I  do  not  agree  with  these  decisions  because 
if  "actual"  meant  "personal"  then  that  means  that  the 
owner  must  have  caused  the  fault  himself.  Whereas,  the 
shipowner  would  not  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
statutory  defence,  if  the  shipowner  appointed  an 
incompetent  person  to  act  on  his  behalf,  and  he  knew,  or 
ought  to  have  known,  at  the  time  of  such  an  appointment 
that  that  person  was  incompetent312.  The  shipowners  must 
then  have  taken  reasonable  precautions  to  make  the 
vessel  seaworthy  and  any  failure  to  do  so  was  his  actual 
fault  or  privity  to  render  the  vessel  unseaworthy.  Even 
if  the  failure  in  material  things,  such  as,  the  equipment 
or  the  failure  to  appoint  a  competent  staff  or  to  give 
them  sufficient  instructions  about  the  vessel  regarding 
their  supervision. 
Therefore,  whether  there  is  disabling  want  of  skill  or 
disabling  want  of  knowledge,  both  will  render  the  vessel 
unfit  and  unqualified  for  sailing  and  the  shipowners  are 
guilty  of  actual  fault  or  privity313.  Accordingly,  the 
fault  must  be  the  actual  fault  of  the  shipowner  without 
any  ascription  to  his  personal  fault  or  subjective 
element  in  any  breach  of  contract  in  spite  of  the 
existence  the  term  "privity"  with  the  term  "actual 
fault  "314  . 
"If  they  come  within  the  defendants  are  not  liable  unless  the  loss 
is  occasioned  by  their  personal  fault". 
312-The  Fannýº,  (1912]  28  T.  L.  R.,  p  217  at  p  218. 
313-Viscount  Haldane  &  Lord  Atkinson,  in,  S.  ands  dto.  v.  Clan 
Line  11924]  A.  C.  p  100  at  p  113. 
314-London  Ranannn  Trading  Co.  v.  Ellerman  Lines  M*  (19233  39 207 
It  is  submitted  that  "privity"  does  not  purport  to  add 
anything  to  the  word  "actual  fault"  because  privity  means 
privity  to  the  breach  of  contract  or  to  an  actionable 
wrong,  not  simply  privity  to  the  loss.  Whether  or  not 
there  is  such  a  breach  must  depend  upon  the  standard  of 
duty  laid  down  in  Article  3  [2].  315 
However,  the  courts  do  not  distinguish  between  those 
terms.  They  always  ask  whether  the  loss  of  or  damage  to 
cargo  has  arisen  without  the  shipowner's  actual  or 
privity,  or  not,  in  order  to  avail  the  shipowner  of  the 
statutory  defences.  316 
"3"  VICARIOUS  LIABILITY 
The  trend  of  current  jurisprudence  is  to  make  the 
carrier  liable  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  caused 
by  his  own  fault  or  neglect  or  his  servant's  or  agent's 
fault  or  neglect  during  the  period  of  responsibility  when 
the  goods  are  carried  in  his  custody  or  control.  317  This 
recent  judicial  trend  has  been  based  on  different  views 
of  the  conventions  and  the  precedents.  Then  it  is 
necessary  to  establish  the  criterion  by  which  the 
carriers,  the  servants,  and  the  agents  or  the  independent 
contractors,  can  be  defined. 
The  Hague  Rules318  have  defined  the  carrier  as  follows: 
T.  L.  R.  p  284  at  p  285. 
315-Hyun, 
pp  61-62. 
316-Willmer,  J,  in,  H.  M.  S.  Truculant  v.  The  Diving  [1951)  2  All  E.  R. 
p  968  at  p  981 
317-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/Rev.  1,  p  36;  The  Muncaster  Castle[1961]  A.  C.  p  807. 
318-Article  1  [a]  of  the  Hague  Rules  which  is  identical  with  COGSA 
1936  in  the  United  States  and  COGSA  1924,1971  in  the  UNited 
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["Carrier"  includes  the  owner  or  the  charterer 
who  enters  into  a  contract  of  carriage  with  a 
shipper]. 
The  Hamburg  Rules319  have  made  two  separate  provisions 
for  the  carrier  and  the  actual  carrier  as  follows: 
"1-Carrier  means  any  person  by  whom  or  in  whose 
name  a  contract  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  has 
been  concluded  with  a  shipper. 
2-Actual  carrier  means  any  person  to  whom  the 
performance  of  the  carriage  of  the  goods  ,  or 
of  part  of  the  carriage,  has  been  entrusted  by 
the  carrier,  and  includes  any  other  person  to 
whom  such  performance  has  been  entrusted". 
No  attempt  is  made  to  define  the  concepts  of  "servants"` 
and  "agents".  The  carrier  neither  in  the  bill  of  lading 
nor  in  COGSA  means  or  includes  a  stevedore320. 
In  the  United  Kingdom  the  concept  of  the  servants  is 
well  defined  as: 
"a  person  usually  employed  on  a  regular  basis, 
who  as  distinguished  from  an  independent 
contractor,  is  subject  to  the  command  of  his 
employer  as  to  the  manner  in  which  he  shall  do 
this  work"321. 
Kingdom. 
319-Article  1  (1,2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
320-Viscount  Simonds,  in,  Midland  Silicones  Ltd.  v.  Sc  +-  on 
jß.  (1962]  A.  C.  p  446  at  p  466.;  Krawill  Machinary  corp  v.  Robert 
C.  Herd  &  Cn,  Z=  (1959]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  305  (U.  S.  Supreme  Court}, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"That  stevedore  could  not  be  brought  within  the  definition  of 
"carrier"  in  the  bill  of  lading  by  any  natural  or 
reasonable"interpretation". 
321-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  13. 209 
Then  what  is  the  criterion  for  deciding  whether  the 
stevedore  is  a  servant,  agent  or  independent  contractor? 
There  are  two  categories  to  distinguish  the  act  of 
stevedore  from  the  others  as  follows: 
1-The  degree  of  control  and  supervision  of  his  work  by 
the  principal322. 
2-The  work  to  be  done  within  the  scope  of  his 
employment323. 
Under  the  common  law  when  the  stevedore  is  employed  by 
the  carrier  as  a  single  employee  the  shipowner  is  liable 
to  the  cargo-owner  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo. 
Whereas,  when  the  stevedoring  firm  hires  workers  at  the 
disposal  of  the  carrier,  the  stevedores  would  be 
considered  as  servants  of  this  firm324, 
The  situation  under  the  Rules  and  COGSA  is  different. 
The  stevedores  even  though  a  private  company  are  ship's 
servants  or  agents  when  they  are  controlled  by  the 
carrier  who  is  responsible  for  them325,  because  the  person 
who  appointed  them  is  vicariously  liable  for  damage  done 
322-Lord  Atkin,  in,  Canadian  Transport  Co.  V.  Court  Line  Ltd. 
(1940]  A.  C.  p  934  at  pp  937-38. 
323-Samir  Mankabady,  pp  70-71.;  The  rurymedon  (1971]  2  Lloyd's 
Rep.  p  399  at  p  408.;  United  Africa  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Saks  Owoade  [1955) 
A.  C.  p  130,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  is  no  difference  in  the  liability  of  a  master  wrongs  whether 
for  fraud  or  any  other  wrong  committed  by  a  servant  in  the  course 
of  his  employment". 
324-Stojan  Cigoj,  "  Legal  Relations  of  Stevedores  in  Comparative 
Law",,  [19751  3  LMCLQ,  p  296  at  p  302,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Cigoj".;  Serge  G.  Koushnareff,  Liability  of  Carriers  of  Goods  by 
. 
5g&,  lst,  ed,  1943,  p  132,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Koushnareff". 
325-Tetley  Marine  Claim,  p  387. 210 
by  them326.  According  to  Article  3  [2)  of  the  Visby 
Rules327  the  independent  contractor  should  not  be 
protected  and  should  not  have  the  benefits  of  the  Rules. 
The  attitude  towards  the  independent  contractor  is 
changed  specifically  with  regard  to  the  most  important 
obligation  of  the  carrier  which  is  to  exercise  due 
diligence  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy. 
The  House  of  Lords  held  in  Muncaster  Castle328  that  the 
carrier  was  liable  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  caused 
by  the  negligence  of  an  independent  contractor  employed 
by  him,  even  though  he  has  not  enough  experience  to 
exercise  a  real  control  over  them329. 
Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm330  made  this  quite  clear  when  he 
stated: 
"The  carrier  cannot  claim  to  have  shed  his 
obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence  to  make 
his  ship  seaworthy  by  selecting  a  firm  of 
competent  ship  repairers  to  make  his  ship 
seaworthy.  Their  failure  to  use  due  diligence 
to  do  so  is  his  failure  ...  unless  in  some  very 
exceptional  circumstances  their  employment  can 
be  said  to  be  without  any  authority,  express  or 
implied,  of  the  carrier,  a  case  which  can  be 
considered  if  ever  it  arises". 
326-Chorley  &  Giles,  p  271.;  Cigoj,  p  302. 
327-"If  such  an  action  is  brought  against  a  servant  or  agent  of  the 
carrier  (such  servant  or  agent  not  being  an  independent  contractor) 
such  servant  or  agent  shall  be  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  the 
defences  and  limits  of  liability  which  the  carrier  is  entitled  to 
invoke  under  this  convention". 
328-(1961)  A.  C.  p  807. 
329-Wilson,  p  140. 
330-Muncastnr  castle,  op.  cit,  at  pp  870-72. 211 
Who  is  a  ship's  agent  and  who  is  the  shipbroker  and 
what  is  the  difference  between  them? 
The  ship's  agents'  duties,  obligations  and  liabilities 
are  not  in  the  same  legal  sphere  as  a  shipbroker.  The 
ship's  agent331  is,  in  the  normal  case,  the  agent  of  the 
shipowner  at  the  particular  port,  and  the  ship's  agent, 
therefore,  at  that  port  stands  in  the  shoes  of  the 
shipowner,  and  it  is  reasonable  to  suppose  that  he  has 
the  authority  to  do  whatever  the  shipowner  has  to  do  at 
that  port332. 
Whereas,  the  shipbroker333  just  receives  a  commission 
from  the  shipowner  for  effecting  the  contract  when  the 
contract  is  brought  about  through  the  broker's 
introduction  of  the  parties334. 
The  ship's  agent  legally  speaking,  signifies  more  than 
a  forwarding  agent335.  He  deals  with  all  administrative 
matters,  cares  for  the  ship's  berth,  stores  and  for 
331-Marks  S.  W.  Hoyle,  The  Law  of  International  Trade,  1981,  p  40, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Hoyle",  where  he  states: 
"Agents  who  are  appointed  can,  for  simplicity,  be  divided  into: 
"a"A  special  agents  has  limited  authority  for  a  particular  task. 
"b"A  general  agent  has  general  authority  in  a  particular  area  or 
business. 
"c"A  universal  agent  has  unlimited  authority". 
332-Pearson,  L.  J.  in,  Blan  Bros.  &  Co.  v.  Hello  Simoni(19631  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  393  at  p  404. 
333-Brokers  specialising  in  insurance,  commodities  and  shipping  are 
very  common  in  trade. 
334_1  Carver,  para,  593-595. 
335-Scrutton,  p  41,  where  he  states: 
"A  person  employed  by  the  shipper  to  enter  into  contracts  of 
carriage  with  shipowners,  but  in  the  capacity  of  an  agent  only,  and 
without  personal  liability  as  a  carrier". 212 
unloading  the  cargo,  he  orders  tugs,  pilots  and 
stevedores.  In  fact,  the  ship's  agent  does  for  a 
shipowner  whatever  the  shipowner  has  to  do  at  that 
port.  336 
The  Rules  and  COGSA  do  not  define  these  terms,  namely, 
the  servants,  the  ship's  agents,  shipbrokers  and  the 
independent  contractors.  The  national  law  completes  the 
contractual  relations  where  the  agency  contract  has  some 
ambiguities  and  does  not  expressly  give  the  solution  for 
the  difficulties  arising  from  the  performance  of  such  a 
contract.  337 
The  ship  agent's  acts  in  the  name  of  the  shipowner  or 
the  ship's  operator  when  he  is  authorized  to  undertake  to 
conclude  such  a  contract. 
Then  if  the  ship's  agent  has  no  authority  from  the 
shipowner  to  conclude  the  contract  and  nevertheless  he 
enters  into  contract  as  agent,  the  shipowner  has  no 
liability  unless  he  chooses  to  ratify  such  a  contract.  338 
Therefore,  the  agent  did  not  act  in  his  own  name  but  as 
33  the  representative  of  an  owner  or  of  a  carrier.  9 
Thus,  if  the  warehouse  company  wants  to  contract  with 
the  agent  himself  it  should  make  that  expressly  clear. 
Then,  addressing  the  invoice  to  the  agent  is  not 
336-Johannes  Trappe,  Hamburg,  "The  Duties,  Obligations  and 
Liabilities  of  the  Ship's  Agent  to  his  Principal",  (1978]  4  LMCLQ,  p 
595  at  p  596,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Johannes". 
337-Johannes,  p  597. 
338-Hoyle,  p  40. 
339-The  Santia  Carina  [1977]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  478. 213 
sufficient  to  create  contractual  relations340. 
Mr.  Justice  Salter  made  this  clear  when  he  stated: 
"Where  an  agent  purports  to  make  a  contract  for 
a  principal  disclosing  the  fact  that  he  is 
acting  as  agent,  but  not  naming  his  principal, 
the  rule  is  that,  unless  a  contrary  intention 
appears,  he  makes  himself  personally  liable  on 
the  authorized  contract"341. 
However,  the  agent  must  exercise  the  skill,  care  and 
diligence  which  are  usually  applied  in  his  business  and 
according  to  his  contractual  obligations342.  Then  the 
ship's  agents  will  be  liable  to  their  principals  for 
damages  occurring  by  an  act  or  omission  committed  by 
their  fault  or  negligence343.  The  servant's  or  agent's 
fault  or  neglect  will  be  ascribed  to  the  carrier  where  it 
happened  in  carrying  out  their  work  under  the  control  of 
the  carrier  and  must  have  acted  during  the  period  of  the 
servants  "  tackle  to  tackle"344. 
Moreover,  the  stevedore  owes  the  same  duty  of  care  as 
340_1  Carver,  para,  604-605.;  Johannes,  p  601. 
341_ßn  v.  Campbell,  Parker  &  Co.  Ltd.  119251  2  K.  B,  p  410  at 
p  414. 
342-Mr.  Justice  Megaw,  in,  Anglo-African  Mer  .hns..  Ltd,  V. 
Bavley(1969]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  268  at  pp  279-280,  where  he  states: 
"In  the  absence  of  express  consent  by  his  client  with  full 
knowledge  of  the  implications,  it  would  be  a  breach  of  duty  on  part 
of  broker  to  act  on  instructions  from  underwriters".;  Donaldson,  J, 
in,  North  &  South  Trust  Co.  o.  v.  Berkeley(1970]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
467.;  F.  J.  J.  Cadwallader,  "English  Shipping  Cases  1970",  (1970-71] 
2  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  834,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallader,  English 
Shipping  Cases,  1970". 
343-Hoyle, 
p  39. 
344-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  97,373,387.;  The  Eurymedon[1974]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  534.;  The  Elbemaru  (1978]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  206 214 
the  carrier's  duty  under  COGSA  to  exercise  reasonable 
care  and  due  diligence  to  handle  properly  and  carefully 
the  discharge  of  cargo345. 
Then,  the  shipowner's  duty  is  to  provide  his  servants 
with  safe  system  of  work  which  makes  them  qualified  to 
carry  out  their  obligations  by  exercising  reasonable 
care346.  In  the  event  of  evidence  to  the  contrary,  the 
carrier  will  not  be  responsible  only  for  himself  but  also 
for  those  whom  he  engaged  to  perform  the  carriage 
operations  as  part  of  his  overall  responsibility  to 
exercise  due  care  to  avoid  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo347.  However,  in  the  absence  of  evidence  to  the 
contrary,  namely,  where  the  carrier  provides  his  master 
and  crew  with  a  safe  system  as  any  prudent  carrier,  will 
do,  this  does  not  make  the  carrier  guilty  of  actual  fault 
or  privity348. 
Thus,  The  shipowner  will  be  responsible  for  any  act  or 
fault  or  negligence  committed  by  his  servants  or  his 
agents,  during  the  scope  of  their  employment,  on  behalf 
of  the  shipowner  in  the  fulfilment  of  the  work  for  which 
they  had  been  engaged349. 
United  Kingdom  and  United  States  jurisprudence350  share 
345_Tn  aa  Steel  Corp.  v.  S.  S.  Crystal  GEM.  [1970]  A.  M.  C.  p  617. 
346_Beauchamn.  v.  Turrell  [1952]  2  Q.  B.  pp  207,215 
347-Kimball, 
p  236. 
348-Be+ohamg  v.  1urre1l,  op.  cit,  p  215. 
349-Sellers.  L.  J.  in,  Leash  River  TPA  Co.  Ltd.  v.  British  India 
S-!  -  1-td  (1967]  2  Q.  B.  p  250  at  p  272. 
350_Tnterata  Steel  v.  S.  S.  Crystal  GEM.  (1970]  A.  M.  C.  p  617  at  p 
628,  where  it  is  stated: 215 
the  view  that  the  stevedore  is  also  responsible  for  the 
damage  caused  by  his  fault  or  his  negligence. 
Moreover,  the  United  Kingdom  decisions  do  not  admit  to 
the  carrier's  servants  or  agents  the  right  to  rely  on  the 
Rules  or  to  avail  himself  of  the  exemption  clauses351  or 
the  statutory  defences  352  in  the  Rules  because  he  is  not 
a  party  to  the  contract  of  carriage353  according  to  the 
doctrine  of  "privity  of  contract"354  and  also  the  carrier 
did  not  contract  as  agent  for  the  stevedore.  355  In 
contrast,  the  United  States  decisions  extended  the 
limitation  of  liability  to  independent  contractors  and 
stevedores,  even  though  not  mentioned  expressly  in  the 
"Stevedore  is  also  responsible  for  the  damage  caused  by  its 
employees  at  discharge  at  the  port  of  chicago.  This  liability  is 
based  both  on  negligence  and  breach  of  warranty  to  perform  it 
duties  in  a  proper  and  worthmanlike  manner". 
351-Cosgrove  v.  Horsfall  [1965]  62  T.  L.  R.  p  140,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  defendant,  a  bus  driver  and  a  servant  of  the  board,  was 
liable.  He  could  not  claim  the  benefit  of  the  exemption  clause  as 
he  was  not  a  party  to  the  agreement". 
352-Midland  Silicones  v.  Scrutton  (1962]  A.  C.  p  446;  119621  1  ALL 
E.  R.  p  1. 
353_  v.  Dickson  [1954]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  267.;  The  S  lsyman 
Stalskiv[1976]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  609  at  p  617  (Canada  Supreme  Court 
of  British  Columbia},  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  exemption  clause  did  not  avail  the  stevedores  since,  they  were 
not  a  party  to  the  bill  of  lading  and  were  therefore  not  entitled 
to  benefit  from  them". 
354-MP.  Furmston,  Ch.  sh  Fifoots  Law  of  Contract,  10th,  ed, 
1981,  p  404,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Furmston",  where  he  states: 
"No  one  may  be  entitled  to  or  bound  by  the  terms  of  a  contract  to 
which  he  is  not  an  original  party". 
355-Compare,  Elder  Dempster  &  Co.  v.  Paterson  1  ochonis  &  Co.  (1924] 
A.  C.  p  522  at  p  534.;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  66. 
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bill  of  lading.  356 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  carrier  is  bound  to  show 
that  he  has  taken  reasonable  care  of  the  goods  while  they 
have  been  in  his  custody  which  of  course,  it  includes  the 
custody  of  his  servants  or  agents  on  his  behalf.  357 
Then,  if  insufficiency  of  packing  was  one  of  the  causes 
of  damage  it  is  incorporated  with  the  negligence  of  these 
for  whom  the  shipowner  is  responsible.  The  carrier  is 
still  responsible  for  the  damage  notwithstanding  the 
exceptions  of  insufficient  packing  if  the  cargo-owner 
shows  that  the  damage  was  caused  by  the  negligence  of  the 
carrier's  servant  or  his  agent. 
358 
The  Hamburg  Rules  may  be  rather  stricter  on  a  carrier 
than  the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Rules,  where  Article  7 
[2]  states359  that  the  carrier's  servants  or  agents  can 
avail  themselves  of  the  defence  in  the  Rules  if  they 
prove  that  they  acted  within  the  scope  of  their 
employment.  360 
Moreover,  it  is  to  be  noted  that  where  the  contract  of 
carriage  wholly  or  partially  is  concluded  by  someone  who 
356-Tessler  Bros  v.  Italpacific  (1975)  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  210. 
357-Wright,  J,  in,  Gosse  Millard  v.  Canadian  QnvArnment  Merchant 
Marine.  Ltd.  (19271  2  K.  B.  p  432  at  p  436. 
358-Greer  L.  J.  in,  Silver  v.  ocean.  s.  S.  (19301  1  K.  B.  p  416  at  p 
435. 
359-Article  7  (2)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 
"..  such  servants  or  agents,  if  he  proves  that  he  acted  within  the 
scope  of  his  employment,  is  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  the 
defences  and  limits  of  liability  which  the  carrier  is  entitled  to 
invoke  under  this  convention". 
360-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  14. 217 
is  not  the  contracting  carrier  or  the  carriage  is 
performed  by  such  carrier  he  is  called  "the  actual 
,,  3  carrier  61. 
The  carrier  is  responsible  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of 
the  actual  carrier  and  for  the  acts  or  omissions  of  his 
servants  or  agents  acting  within  the  scope  of  their 
employment  by  virtue  of  Article  10  (2]  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules. 
The  actual  carrier  will  under  the  New  Rules  be  under  a 
wholly  statutory  liability,  neither  contractual  nor 
tortious,  regarding  the  carriage  of  goods362.  On  the  other 
hand,  the  statutory  protection  and  defence  of  the 
servants  and  agents  of  the  carrier  is  extended  to  the 
servants  and  agents  of  the  actual  carrier. 
"4"  THE  EFFECT  OF  SERIOUS  FAULT  ON  THE  DOCTRINE  OF 
DEVIATION 
The  current  trend  considers  that  the  various  types  of 
carrier  misconduct  are  sufficient  to  constitute  a  breach 
in  the  contract  of  carriage  because  the  aspects  of  the 
commercial  venture  will  be  affected  as  a  whole363.  This 
does  not  mean,  premeditation  or  recklessness  with  intent 
to  cause  damage  or  with  knowledge  that  such  damage  would 
probably  result,  may  be  presumed  from  the  mere  fact  the 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  occurred364. 
361-Article  10  (1)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules.;  Diamond,  Hamburg  Rules,  p 
15. 
362-Pollock, 
p  9.;  Thomas,  p  7. 
363-Roger, 
p  172. 
364_Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  181. 218 
The  intentional  or  the  wilful  misconduct  should  be  an 
essential  factor  in  determining  whether  or  not  the 
deviation  is  unreasonable.  The  intention  does  not  always 
seem  to  be  a  category  in  United  States  courts  in  deciding 
whether  or  not  a  particular  departure  from  the  contract 
of  carriage,  is  an  unreasonable  deviation.  For  instance, 
in  the  Silvercy  ress365,  the  court  held  that: 
"In  the  instant  case  the  Respondent  was  under  a 
duty  to  deliver  the  cargo  at  Manila  but 
negligently  carried  it  on  to  Iloilo.  Such  over 
carriage  was  held  deviation,  hence  the  carrier 
was  liable  for  loss  of  the  over-carried  cargo 
by  fire  at  Iloilo". 
This  means,  the  American  jurisprudence  in  this  case  did 
not  consider  whether  the  over-carriage  was  intentional  or 
not  and  it  has  credited  the  negligent  act  as  a  cause  for 
the  deviation.  366  Therefore,  an  emergency  sufficient  to 
excuse  a  departure  cannot  arise  out  of  the  circumstances 
deliberately  planned  nor  from  gross  negligence.  367 
Also,  the  court  held  that  the  Himalaya  clause*  in  no 
case  would  exempt  the  stevedores  and  terminal  operators 
from  gross  negligence,  because  it  was  illegal  to  contract 
out  of  the  liability  resulting  from  gross  negligence. 
368 
365_(1943]  A.  M.  C.  pp  510,513. 
366-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  30.;  Zajicek  v.  United  Fruit  Co(1972] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1746  at  p  1755. 
367_ßh  Ann  (1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  117  at  p  126 
368-Metall  A.  .  v.  nPres  [1977]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  665  at  p  666.;  Tha 
Furymedon  [1974]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  534.;  Midland  Silicones.  ltd.  v. 
s.  ru_tons.  Ltd.  (1961]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  365. 
*.  This  clause  allows  third  parties  to  enjoy  the  per-package 
limitation  and  the  one-year  delay  for  suit  of  the  Hague  Rules,  see 
Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p.  373. 219 
Since  American  courts  often  overlook  the  element  of 
intention  and  focusing  on  the  "act  of  erring  or 
transgression"  aspect  of  deviation,  some  commentators 
believe  that  American  courts  have  relied  on  this  notion 
of  transgression  to  extend  the  doctrine  of  deviation 
beyond  its  geographical  roots369. 
However,  the  element  of  intentional  or  wilful 
misconduct  should  be  the  key  in  determining  an 
unreasonable  deviation370  and  it  applies  to  geographical 
deviation  as  well  as  to  non-geographical  deviation,  such 
as  failure  in  respect  to  stowage  cargoes371,  delay  may  be 
another  form  of  non-geographical  deviation372,  and  dry 
docking  with  cargo  aboard373.  All  these  cases  of  non- 
geographical  deviation  have  been  held  sufficient  to 
constitute  an  unreasonable  deviation. 
Then,  serious  carrier's  misconduct374  or  serious 
violations  of  the  contract  of  carriage  are,  nowadays, 
referring  to  both  geographical  and  non-geographical 
369-Whitehead,  p  47,  Sarpa,  p  156. 
370-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  820. 
371-The  heg  Valley  [1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  555. 
372-Atlantic  Mut.  Inc.  Co.  v.  Po5eidnn  Schiffahart  IThe  Harman 
Shultel,  [1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665.;  Compare,  David  Crystal,  n.  v. 
Cunard  S.  S.  Co.  (1964]  A.  M.  C.  p  1328.;  BBL  v.  Nippon  Yuen  Kaisha 
[1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1258. 
373-Indrapuura,  171  Fed,  p  929  (1909).;  Compare,  Gosse  Millard  v. 
Canadian  Government  (1928]  1  K.  B.  p  717  at  p  741. 
374-Mustill,  p  701,  where  he  states: 
"On  any  view  it  seems  plain  that  the  type  of  misconduct 
contemplated  by  Sub-Rule  (e)  is  substantially  more  reprehensible 
than  the  "actual  fault  or  privity"  referred  to  in  Article  IV  Rule 
2(Q] 220 
deviation.  375  Thus,  if  any  events  occurred  out  of  the 
control  of  the  intentional  or  wilful  misconduct  in 
referring  to  the  conduct  of  the  vessel,  it  is  not  enough 
to  constitute  an  unreasonable  deviation. 
For  instance,  if  the  court  had  decided  that  the  failure 
to  unload  cargo  at  its  destination  was  done 
intentionally,  this  act  should  have  been  classified  as 
unreasonable  deviation,  but  if  the  master  or  the  crew 
makes  such  a  failure  negligently  then  the  act  was  done 
due  to  a  lack  of  proper  care  and  custody  of  the  cargo 
according  to  Article  3  [2)  of  the  Hague  Rules  and 
COGSA.  376 
However,  where  a  full  quantity  of  the  goods  was  loaded 
on  deck  when  they  should  not  have  been,  the  court  has 
often  held  it  to  be  unreasonable  deviation377,  for 
example,  on  deck  stowage,  without  containers,  or  the 
cargoes  are  carried  on  a  ship  which  is  not  prepared  for 
the  containers  bulk. 
Then,  with  this  line  of  reasoning  to  determine 
unreasonable  deviation  according  to  the  element  of  intent 
as  it  relates  to  wilful  misconduct  or  fraud.  378 
One  can  conclude  that  any  potential  exaggeration  in  the 
drastic  effect  of  an  unreasonable  deviation  should 
isolated  from  the  carrier's  duties  provided  for  in 
Article  3  [2)  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  COGSA,  and  should 
375-Sasaoon  &  Cunningham,  p  170. 
376-Roger,  pp  181-182. 
377-Morgan,  p  483. 
378-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  820. 221 
have  precedence  over  any  stipulation  in  the  contract. 
The  Hague  Rules  try  to  compromise  between  the  strict 
liability  which  is  governing  common  carrier  under  general 
maritime  law  and  the  doctrine  of  freedom  of  contract379, 
when  it  is  stated  that  the  contracting  parties  have  a 
right  to  enter  into  agreement,  stipulation,  condition, 
reservation  or  exemption  concerning  the  custody,  care  and 
handling  of  goods  prior  to  the  loading  on  and  subsequent 
to  the  discharge  from  the  ship380.  That  does  not  mean  that 
the  Rules  allow  the  contracting  parties  to  derogate  the 
Rules381  by  stipulating  any  conditions  which  have  defeated 
the  spirit  and  the  common  understanding  of  the  Rules  or 
to  avoid  the  main  object  of  the  contract  of  carriage382, 
and  the  parties  which  will  frustrate  the  commercial 
purpose  of  the  venture. 
379-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  167. 
380-Article  (7]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
381-Article  23  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
382-Article  23  [3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 222 
SECTION  TWO 
THE  IMMUNITIES  OF  THE  CARRIER 
The  carrier  has  many  immunities  throughout  the  agreed 
voyage  whether  in  the  international  conventions,  such  as, 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  or  in  the 
contractual  clauses  which  are  governed  by  the  power  of 
will  of  the  contracting  parties  and  the  principle  of  the 
freedom  of  contract383. 
These  immunities  are  considered  as  a  part  of  the 
contract  and  should  be  read  together  and  reconciled  with 
the  agreed  voyage  in  the  bill  of  lading,  taking  into 
account  the  main  object  of  the  contract  and  should  not 
frustrate  the  commercial  purpose  of  the  venture,  but  must 
be  subordinate  to  fulfil  the  voyage  described384. 
I  will  then  deal  with  the  immunities  of  the  carries  as 
follows: 
i-The  Exoneration  Principles. 
ii-The  Waiver  of  Deviation. 
383-See, 
supra  Section  Two,  Chapter  It  under  the  title  of 
reasonable  deviation,  for  an  explanation  of  the  liberty  clauses  and 
the  exceptional  perils  in  more  detail. 
384-John  Morris,  Chitty  on  Co  tractg,  vol,  1,1961,  para,  709, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Chitty  on  Contracts". 223 
i-THE  EXONERATION  PRINCIPLES 
As  far  as  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  is  concerned  the 
liability  regime  is  based  on  the  "presumed  fault  or 
neglect".  Then  the  exclusion  principles  are  established 
in  favour  of  the  carrier  or  the  shipowner,  especially 
when  such  acts  or  omissions  take  place  without  any 
commitment  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants  or 
agents. 
Thus  I  will  discuss  the  following  points: 
1-Under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
2-Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
1-UNDER  THE  HAGUE/VISBY  RULES 
The  immunities  are  available  to  the  carrier  in  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  set  forth  in  Article  4  [2]  in  a 
catalogue  of  exceptions385.  Several  of  these  exceptions 
are  redundant386  within  the  broader  meaning  of 
"exception",  by  mentioning  synonymous  words  whether  in 
the  same  sub-paragraph,  such  as,  in  respect  of  "perils  of 
the  seai387  or  by  repeating  the  meaning  of  the  exception 
in  other  Articles,  such  as,  in  respect  of  "act  of  war"'388, 
when  the  Rules  set  forth  under  Article  4  [2]  give  more 
385-Kimball,  p  223. 
386_Tp/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  39;  ßerligieri  &  Alpa,  p  129,  where  they 
stated: 
"These  exculpatory  causes,  are  wholly  superfluous  and  merely  the 
cause  of  judicial  complications  and  difformity  of  interpretation  in 
the  various  municipal  legislation". 
387-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  208. 
388-Article  4  [e]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 224 
details  about  the  "exculpatory  causes".  For  instance, 
"act  of  public  enemies"389,  "arrest  or  restraint  of 
princes,  rules,  or  people'"390,  and  "riots  and  civil 
commotions￿391 
Some  of  these  immunities  exempt  the  carrier  for  loss  or 
damage  resulting  from  the  neglect,  or  default  of  the 
master,  or  the  servants  of  the  carrier  in  the  navigation 
or  in  the  management  of  the  ship,  without  drawing  any 
line  between  them  or  making  any  identification  or 
distinction  between  the  "management  of  the  ship"  and  care 
of  cargo  when  the  exception  is  read  in  connection  with 
Article  3  [2]392. 
Under  Article  3  [2]  ,a  shipowner  has  to  transport 
cargo  with  all  reasonable  care,  but  any  damage  or  loss  to 
the  cargo  will  make  the  shipowner  responsible.  Thus  in 
order  to  avoid  liability  he  has  to  bring  himself  within 
an  exemption  and  negative  negligence393. 
Does  Art.  icle---3-.. 
_[. 
L,  2.  l  the  Hague  Rules  consider  as  a 
condition  precedent  to  exempt  the  carrier  for  loss  or 
damage  arising  or  resulting  from  causes  covered  by  a 
catalogue  of  exceptions  which  are  set  forth  in  Article 
(4]from  {a  to  p}? 
Many  authors  have  been  known  to  say  that  the  carrier 
389-Article  4  (f]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
390-Article  4  [g]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
391-Article  4  [k]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
392-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l,  p  39. 
393-Lord  Cameron,  in,  Albaccra  V.  Weatcott  &  Laurance  (19661  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  53. 
.  ý. 225 
must  first  show  that  he  has  been  careful  in  accordance 
with  Article  3  [1,2],  as  a  condition  precedent  to  rely  on 
the  exceptions  in  Article  4  [2j. 
For  instance,  Tetley,  in  supporting  such  a  view  held 
that  the  carrier  is  responsible  in  all  exculpatory 
exceptions  unless  he  proves  that  due  diligence  was 
exercised  to  make  the  ship  seaworthy  in  respect  to  the 
loss394. 
Namely,  Article  3  [2]  which  does  not  require  from  the 
cargo-owner  proof  that  the  carrier  has  been  negligent  in 
dealing  with  the  goods. 
In  contrast,  the  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  carrier  to 
show  that  he  has  performed  the  duties  and  obligations 
provided  in  Article  [3]395. 
Lord  Somerve11396,  also  made  this  clear  when  he  stated: 
"Article  3  [1]  is  an  overriding  obligation.  If 
it  is  not  fulfiled,  and  the  non-fulfilment 
causes  the  damage,  the  immunities  of  Article 
[4]  can  not  be  relayed  on". 
It  seems  quite  clear  that  the  carrier  cannot  avail 
himself  of  the  exculpatory  causes  contained  in  Article 
[4]  only  when  the  damage  or  loss  results  from  want  of  due 
diligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier397. 
394-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  142.;  Compare,  Clark,  p  142.;  Gilmore  & 
Black,  p  156,  where  he  states: 
"The  Article  4  (2)  {a)  immunity  is  not  stated  in  conditional  form". 
395-r.,,,,,  MI  land  v.  Canadian  Government  M  .r  _ha  t  Marina  [1927]  2 
K.  B.  p  432.;  Bes,  p  121. 
396-Maxine  Footwear  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Canadian  Merchant  Marine.  Ltd  [1959] 
2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  105  at  p  113. 
397-Berlingieri  &  Alpa,  p  125. 226 
Under  the  Rules  and  COGSA  the  seaworthiness398  or  the 
proper  and  careful  dealing  with  the  cargo399  is  considered 
as  a  condition  precedent  for  the  carrier  to  exempt 
himself  from  the  responsibility  resulting  from  one  of  the 
causes  contained  in  Article  4  [2]400  which  contributed  to 
the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo.  401  This  does  not  mean 
that  those  terms  are  a  condition  precedent  for  the 
aggrieved  party,  when  the  unseaworthiness  or  want  of  due 
diligence  and  negligent  or  uncareful  dealing  with  the 
cargo  are  ascertained,  to  rescind  the  contract.  402 
Under  the  Harter  Act  the  unseaworthiness  is  a  condition 
precedent  to  the  exemption403,  whereas,  under  the  Rules 
398-Article  4  [1]  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides: 
"In  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  para  {1}  of  Article(3], 
whenever  loss  or  damage  has  resulted  from  unseaworthiness  the 
burden  of  proving  the  exercise  of  due  diligence  shall  be  on  the 
carrier  or  other  person  claiming  exemption  under  this  Article". 
399-Article  3  [2]  of  the  Hague  Rules,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Subject  to  the  provisions  of  Article  (4],  the  carrier  shall 
properly  and  carefully  load,  handle,  stow,  carry,  keep,  care  for, 
and  discharge  the  goods  carried".;  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  149,  where  he 
states: 
"Section  3(1]  and  4  (1)  must  be  read  together  as  they  both  deal 
with  the  subject  of  the  carrier's  duty  with  respect  to 
seaworthiness  of  the  vessel". 
400-Kimball,  p  226. 
401-Greenwood,  p  802. 
402-1  Carver,  p  142. 
403_  v.  Hamburg 
_Amerikaniarh 
Packetfahrt  Aktiengesellschaft, 
290  U.  S.  p  333,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  owner  of  an  unseaworthy  vessel  is  not  entitled  to  the 
statutory  immunity  conferred  by  the  Harter  Act  from  liability  for 
negligence  in  its  navigation,  or  to  a  general  average  contribution 
from  cargo-owners,  the  right  of  which  is  conditioned  on 
seaworthiness,  though  there  is  no  causal  relation  between  the 227 
and  COGSA,  the  causal  connection  between  the 
unseaworthiness  and  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo 
must  be  shown.  404 
However,  I  do  not  want  to  become  involved  in  an 
explanation  of  all  the  exceptions  which  are  set  forth  in 
Article  4  (2]  because  it  is  outside  the  scope  of  this 
study.  Therefore,  I  am  restricting  this  section  to  an 
examination  of  the  exceptions  which  may  enforce  the 
vessel  to  divert  to  another  port  through  one  of  the 
following  exception405  ; 
A-The  Error  in  Navigation  or  Management. 
B-Fire. 
C-Strikes. 
A-THE  ERROR  IN  NAVIGATION  OR  MANAGEMENT 
Article  4  [21  sub-paragraph  (a)  provides: 
"Act,  neglect,  or  default  of  the  master, 
mariner,  pilot,  or  the  servants  of  the  carrier 
in  the  navigation  or  in  the  management  of  the 
ship". 
Both  the  Harter  Act406  and  COGSA  exempt  the  carrier 
from  liability  for  damage  or  loss  to  the  cargo  resulting 
from  errors  in  management  or  negligent  navigation407,  with 
defect  and  the  disaster".;  Mr.  Justice.  Hobhouse,  in,  "ii 
Tertia",  [1983]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  210  at  219. 
404-Greenwood,  p  803. 
405-See  supra,  chapter  1,  Section  one,  for  an  explanation  of  the 
exception  of  saving  or  attempting  to  save  life  or  property  at  sea. 
406_Lou  H.  v.  Hamburg_Amorikaniche,  290  U.  S.  p  333,78  L.  ed.  p 
348. 
407-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  171-72,  where  he  stated: 228 
respect  to  the  considerations  of  Article  3  (1]  which 
concern  the  due  diligence  in  making  the  vessel 
seaworthy.  408  Thus  the  main  factor  to  determine  whether 
the  error  in  management  or  negligent  navigation  exemption 
is  applied  or  not,  is  whether  or  not  such  an  error 
occurred  after  the  start  of  the  voyage. 
Whereas,  unseaworthiness  should  have  occurred  before  or 
at  the  beginning  of  the  voyage  and  must  have  contributed 
to  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  to  deprive  the  carrier 
of  the  exemption.  409 
If  unseaworthiness  coincides  then  with  mismanagement  or 
negligent  navigation  to  cause  the  damage  to  the  cargo, 
the  shipowner  escapes  liability  for  damage  to  the  cargo 
only  if  such  damage  was  caused  by  an  error  in  management 
or  negligent  navigation.  410  Thus,  if  the  carrier  cannot 
separate  resulting  losses  to  the  cargo  then  he  will  be 
liable  for  resulting  cargo  damage.  411 
"An  error  in  the  navigation  and  management  of  the  ship  might  be 
defined  as  "an  erroneous  act  or  omission  the  original  purpose  of 
which  primarily  directed  towards  the  ship,  her  safety  and  well- 
being,  or  towards  the  venture  generally.  An  error  in  the  care  of 
the  cargo  is  an  erroneous  act  or  omission  directed  principally 
towards  the  cargo";  TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l/p  39. 
408-Berlingieri  &  Alpa,  p  131.;  Compare,  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  156. 
409-Morris,  it  in,  Herald  &  Weekly  Tiines  Ltd.  v.  New  Z  _aaland 
shipping  Co.  L.  td  [1947]  80  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  596  at  p  600.;  T,  epAh  River 
Tea  Co.  .  td.  V.  British  Indian  Steam  Navigation  Co.  Ltd  (1967]  2 
Q.  B.  p  250  at  pp  270,275.;  Greenwood,  p  802. 
410-The  New  Port,,  7  F.  ed.  p  452  (1925).;  !  `hewiliQwpool,  (1936) 
A.  M.  C.  p  1852.;  The  Del  Sud,  171  F.  Supp.  p  184  at  p  192  (1959). 
411-The  Walter  Raleigh  (19521  A.  M.  C.  p  618,  where  it  is  stated: 
"When  two  causes  of  damage  concur  and  one  is  due  to  unexcused 
unseaworthiness,  the  vessel  is  liable  for  resulting  cargo  damaged". 229 
However,  if  unseaworthiness  is  not  involved  in  the 
cause  of  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo,  then,  it  is  not 
necessary  to  determine  whether  the  voyage  has  started 
before  the  accident,  whether  it  was  caused  by  error  in 
management  or  navigation  or  not,  in  which  case  such  an 
exemption  would  apply.  412 
There  is  no  criterion  for  the  contracting  parties  to 
establish  a  line  between  what  does  and  what  does  not 
constitute  an  error  of  navigation  and  management  of  the 
ship  within  the  meaning  of  the  exception.  413 
On  the  whole,  one  can  conclude  that  the  exception  of 
the  error  of  navigation  and  management  of  the  ship  and 
what  is  the  distinction  from  the  seaworthiness  as  a  line 
for  applying  such  exception  is  a  material  fact  which  can 
be  proved  by  all  means.  414 
B-FIRE 
The  exception  for  fire  under  the  Hague  Rules  provides 
by  virtue  of  Article  4  (2)  {b}  as  follows: 
"2-Neither  the  carrier  nor  the  ship  shall  be 
responsible  for  loss  or  damage  arising  or 
resulting  from: 
"b"Fire,  unless  caused  by  the  actual  fault  or 
privity  of  the  carrier". 
412-Greenwood,  p  804. 
413_TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  39. 
414-Lord  Wright,  in,  Canadian  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Paterson  S.  S.,  d(1934]  49 
Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  421  at  p  425,;  Compare,  E  ]dor,  DP  s  er  &  Co.  Ltd.  v. 
(1924]  A.  C.  p  522,  (1924]  18  LI.  L.  Rep.  p  319. 230 
The  meaning  of  fire  should  be  a  flame  and  not  merely 
heat.  415  It  is  a  "visible  heat  or  light"  or  "a  flame  or  a 
glow"  as  the  United  States  Fire  Statute  requires  to 
constitute  fire.  416  This  does  not  mean  any  flame  will 
establish  the  conditions  for  applying  the  fire  exception, 
but  the  causal  connection  between  the  flame  and  the  loss 
should  be  shown.  417 
Nevertheless,  even  the  carrier  in  order  to  prove  that 
loss  or  damage  is  caused  by  the  fire,  must  show  that  he 
exercised  due  diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy418 
during  the  relevant  period  {the  beginning  of  loading 
until  the  start  of  the  voyage). 
Therefore,  if  the  carrier  failed  to  prove  a  fire  that 
means  that  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  is  due  to  lack 
of  due  diligence  in  making  the  vessel  seaworthy419  or  want 
of  performance  in  the  duties  which  are  provided  in 
Article  3  [2].  420 
However,  after  proving  the  causal  relation,  then  the 
fault  and  privity  of  the  carrier  must  be  proven.  421  The 
415-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  184. 
416-The  "Santa  Malta"  (1967]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  391. 
417-Tempus  shipping  Co.  ,  tit,  v.  Louis  Dreyfus[1930]  1  K.  B.  p  699, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"The  section  requires  a  causal  connection  between  the  loss  or 
damage  and  the  fire  on  board".;  TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l,  p  40. 
418-Max  ne  Footwear  Co.  v.  Canadian  Gavernment  Merchant 
Marina[1959]  A.  C.  p  589;  [1959]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  105  at  p  113.; 
Sunkist  ,  row  s,  Inc.  v.  Adelaide  Shipping  Lines,  Ltd  (1979]  A.  M.  C. 
p  2787. 
419_Astle, 
p  319. 
420-The  Santa  Malta,  op.  cit,  p  319. 
421-lCarver, 
para,  232,  where  he  states: 231 
Rules  do  not  explain  which  party  has  the  burden  of 
proving  the  fault  or  privity  of  the  carrier.  422 
The  United  States  jurisprudence,  according  to  the  U.  S. 
Fire  statute423,  places  the  burden  of  proof  on  the  cargo 
claimant.  On  the  other  hand,  the  United  Kingdom 
jurisprudence,  according  to  the  Merchant  Shipping  Act424, 
has  obliged  the  carrier  to  prove  that  there  was  no  fault 
or  privity  on  his  part.  425  If  there  is  nevertheless  an 
exception  clause  that  the  carrier  will  not  be  responsible 
for  fire,  then  he  is  not  liable  for  an  accidental  fire 
unless  such  an  accident  is  caused  by  his  own 
"The  statutory  exception  protects  the  shipowner  from  fire  however 
caused  if  it  be  without  his  actual  fault  or  privity".;  Astle,  p 
141;  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  161.;  Ocean  Liberty  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1681, 
where  it  is  said: 
"The  chartered-owner  and  the  operating  agent  were  neither  of  them 
at  fault  or  privity  with  the  cause,  and  the  chartered-owner  was 
entitled  to  the  defense  of  the  Fire  Statute  and  of  the  COGSA  fire 
exception". 
422-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  185. 
423-46  U.  S.  Code  S.  182  R.  S.  4282. 
424-1894,  a,  502  {1},  where  sub-section  {1}  of  section  18  of  the 
Merchant  Shipping  Act,  1979,  does  not  differ  materially  from  the 
old  section  502,  save  that  it  omits  the  requirement  of  happening 
"without  his  actual  fault  or  privity",  which  is  replaced  by 
subsection  {3}  similar  in  meaning  to  Article  (4]  of  the  convention 
as  follows: 
"If  it  is  proved  that  the  loss  resulted  from  his  personal  act  or 
omission,  committed  with  intent  to  cause  such  loss,  or  recklessly 
and  with  knowledge  that  such  loss  would  probably  result".;  1Carver, 
pp  197,427.;  Lennar'Carrying  Co.  v.  Asiatic  Petroleum  Co. 
(1915]  p  705,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  owners  had  failed  to  discharge  the  onus  which  lay  upon  them  of 
proving  that  the  loss  happened  without  their  actual  fault  or 
privity". 
425-Scrutton, 
p  236. 232 
negligence426,  or  by  the  negligence  of  his  servants.  427 
Therefore,  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for  the 
damage  resulting  or  arising  from  negligence  of  his 
servants428  even  though  those  consequences  could  not 
reasonably  have  been  anticipated. 
429 
Finally,  the  carrier  cannot  avail  himself  of  the  Fire 
426-Article  3  [8]  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides: 
"Any  clause,  covenant,  or  agreement  in  a  contract  of  carriage 
relieving  the  carrier  or  the  ship  from  liability  for  loss  or  damage 
to,  or  in  connection  with,  goods  arising  from  negligence,  fault,  or 
failure  in  the  duties  and  obligations  provided  in  this  Article  or 
lessening  such  liability  otherwise  than  as  provided  in  this 
convention,  shall  be  null  and  void  and  of  no  effect".;  Bes,  p  121.; 
Fagan  v.  Green  &  Edwards  [1926]  1  K.  B.  p  102  at  pp  108,109. 
427-Coot,  p  32.;  R  Polemic  (1921)  3  K.  B.  p  560. 
428-Cerro  Sales  Corp.  v.  Atlantic  Marine  En  e  rp  ises(1979]  A.  M.  C.  p 
375,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  crew  was  both  inadequate  in  number  and  inadequately  trained 
to  handle  an  emergency  fire  situation,  vessel  was  unseaworthy.  Both 
shipowner  and  its  managing  agent  held  negligent  and  liable  for 
cargo  damage  and  loss  caused". 
429-Re  Polemis,  op.  cit,  p  500.;  Walker,  Relict,  p  263  at  pp  268-69, 
where  he  states: 
"It  is  submitted  that  it  is  not  possible  to  deny  the  dichotomy 
between  liability  and  compensation  and  to  abolish  the  problem  of 
remoteness  of  damage  by  saying  that  "liability  is  in  respect  of 
that  damage  and  no  other".  However,  this  decision  is  not  binding  on 
any  scottish  or  English  court...  If  this  decision  should  be  adopted 
in  Scotland  for  what  it  purports  to  decide  it  must  be  appreciated 
that  it  makes  very  substantial  changes  in  the  law  without  adequate 
consideration  of  the  Scottish  cases,  and  very  much  narrows  down  the 
extent  of  liability".;  Compare,  The  Wagon  Mound[1961]  A.  C.  p  388  at 
pp  423-26,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  is  not  one  criterion  for  determining  culpability  (or 
liability)  and  another  for  determining  compensation; 
unforeseeability  of  damage  is  relevant  to  liability  until  the 
damage  has  been  done;  it  is  not  the  act  but  the  consequences  on 
which  tortious  liability  is  founded". 233 
Statute  unless  there  is  some  connection  with  unreasonable 
deviation.  In  such  a  case  the  deviation  will  displace  the 
carrier's  right  to  rely  upon  the  Fire  exception  where  the 
ensuing  fire  resulting  in  the  loss  of  cargo  was  causally 
connected  with  that  deviation430. 
C-STRIKES 
Article  4  [2)  {j}  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides: 
"Strikes  or  lockouts  or  stoppage  or  restraint 
of  labour  from  whatever  cause,  whether  partial 
or  general". 
The  strike  exception431  is  frequently  raised  in 
connection  with  Article  4  (4]  when  the  carrier  makes  any 
deviation  or  change  in  the  customary  or  agreed  voyage  to 
avoid  a  strike-bound  port432.  Whether  or  not  the  exception 
of  strike  will  apply  depends  on  the  same  general 
430-The  Orient  Trader(Canadian  Supreme  Court),  [1973]  2  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  174.;  Ocean  Liberty  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1681  at  p  1682,  where  it 
is  stated; 
"Even  though  stowage  on  deck  of  cargo  shipped  under  clean  bills  of 
lading  constitutes  a  deviation.  This  does  not  deprive  the  carrier 
of  its  right  to  exoneration  under  fire  provision  of  the  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  Act,  just  as  it  does  not  deprive  the  owner  of  the 
protection  of  the  fire  statute,  unless  it  was  a  cause  of  the  fire". 
431-Scrutton,  pp  231-232,  where  he  states: 
"The  exception  "strikes  or  lockouts"  covers  refusals  of  men  or 
master  to  carry  on  work  or  business  by  reason  of  and  incidental  to 
labour  disputes.  It  does  not  cover  dismissal  of  men  to  save  expense 
or  (semble)  men  leasing  work  for  fear  of  disease".;  Whereas,  in, 
the  Pinellas  (1929]  A.  M.  C.  p  1301  at  p  1302,  said: 
"A  strike  of  engineers  existing  while  a  vessel  in  safe  in  port  does 
not  excuse  sending  her  to  sea  without  engineers,  in  an  un-manned 
condition". 
432-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l,  p  40. 234 
principle  of  reasonableness  of  deviation433.  If  the 
carrier  can  prove  that  the  deviation  in  the  course  of  the 
voyage  is  reasonable  when  he  deviates  from  his  customary 
or  agreed  course  of  the  voyage  for  the  reason  of 
strike434,  then  he  is  within  the  exception  and  has  not 
committed  any  a  breach  of  his  duty  and  such  deviation 
does  not  constitute  an  unreasonable  deviation435  but  the 
carrier  can  protect  himself  by  applying  the  strike 
exception436. 
When  the  carrier  has  a  right  in  event  of  strike  to 
"discharge  the  cargo  at  port  of  loading  or  any  other  safe 
and  convenient  port",  then  such  discharge  being  deemed 
due  fulfilment  of  the  contract  in  circumstances 
particularly  envisaged  an  agreed  substituted  method  of 
performance  of  the  contract  of  carriage437.  If  the  carrier 
wants  however  to  protect  himself  by  such  an  exception  he 
must  exert  all  reasonable  methods  to  avoid  the  strike  and 
its  consequences  438.  Accordingly,  when  the  carrier  fails 
433-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  358. 
434-Ocean 
,  ib 
.r  y[1951]  A.  M.  C.  p  1464  at  p  1465.  Affirmed  by  the 
United  States  court  of  Appeal,  Fourth  Circuit,  (1952]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1681.;  Manx  Fisher  [1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  177. 
435-British  West  Indian  v.  Atlantic  Clipper[1973]  A.  M.  C.  p  163, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"A  longshore  men's  strike  anticipated  to  occur  "10"  days  in  the 
future  does  not  excuse  carrier  from  compliance  with  its  duty  under 
_  COGSA  of  safe  keeping  the  cargo";  In  the  Matter  of  SingaporeNAY. 
Sö.  S  A"[1975)  A.  M.  C.  p  875.  Affirmed  by  the  United  States  court  of 
Appeals,  Second  Circuit  [1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  1512. 
436-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  41. 
437_C; 
_H.  R 
_n  nn  &  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Palmyra  Trading  Corp,  (1956]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  379;  (1957]  A.  C.  p  149. 
438-Astle,  pp  149-150. 235 
to  take  such  reasonable  exertions,  then  he  will  not  be 
protected  by  the  strike  clause. 
The  strike  must  cause  delay  in  order  to  apply  the 
strike  clause  because  such  exceptions  will  not  protect 
the  carrier  where  the  strike  at  the  port  of  loading  does 
not  prevent  the  cargo  being  loaded.  439  Also  the  delay  must 
not  be  directly  attributable  to  the  fault  or  privity  of 
the  carrier.  440 
"2"-UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  UNCITRAL  discussion  about  the  Hague  Rules  catalogue 
of  exceptions  in  Article  4  [2]  {a-p}  created  a  diversity 
of  views  at  the  conference.  The  debate  turned  into  a 
discussion  of  the  merits  of  retaining  the  two-based 
exceptions  to  fault  liability  in  the  Hague  Rules. 
1-Errors  of  navigation  and  management  of  the  vessel, 
Article  4  (2]  W. 
2-Fire,  Article  4  [2]  {b}. 
The  United  States  and  Japan441  delegates  opposed  any 
changes  to  the  principle  of  liability  scheme  in  the  Hague 
Rules  because  that  would  have  inevitably  increase  the 
freight  rates  and  such  a  proposed  change  would  destroy 
the  ancient  institutions  of  salvage  and  general  average. 
The  Polish,  Belgian  and  U.  S.  S.  R.  delegates  supported 
the  United  Kingdom  position  to  preserve  these 
439-2Carver,  para,  1056. 
440-Ibid,  para,  1057. 
441-Sweeney, 
part,  1,  pp  104,109. 236 
exceptions.  442 
The  United  States  delegates  were  in  favour  of  expanding 
the  fire  defense  to  explosions,  whereas,  Norway  supported 
deletion  of  the  navigation  and  management  error  and  fire 
exceptions.  443 
Further  more,  Egypt  submitted  a  list  of  exceptions 
which  was  criticized  by  developing  countries.  It  stated 
that  the  mentioned  list  of  exceptions  were  illustrative 
and  not  mandatory  and  after  that  Egypt  came  to  approve 
the  French  proposal  which  was  a  single  statement  of  the 
entire  problem  of  liability,  defences,  and  burden  of 
proof- 
However,  a  survey  of  the  opinions  which  had  been 
expressed  and  noted  at  all  the  UNCITRAL  conference 
declared  that  the  majority  seemed  to  favour  deletion  of 
the  Hague  Rules  catalogue  of  defences,  Article  4[2]{a-p}. 
The  countries  supporting  these  decisions  were  Argentina, 
Australia,  Brazil,  Chile,  Egypt,  France,  Ghana,  India, 
Nigeria,  Norway,  Singapore,  Spain,  Tanzania,  and  United 
States.  Whereas,,  the  countries  opposing  suppression  of 
the  negligent  navigation  exception  were  belgium,  Japan, 
Poland,  U.  S.  S.  R.,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  444 
The  Hamburg  Rules  supplied,  however,  the  following 
provisions  as  a  defense  to  the  carrier  from  the 
liability: 
442_Ibid,  p  104. 
443-Ibid,  pp  104,105. 
444-Ibid, 
pp  105,110,111. 237 
1-Article  5  [1]  provides: 
"Unless  the  carrier  proves  that  he,  his 
servants  or  agents  took  all  measures  that 
could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
occurrence  and  its  consequences". 
2-Article  5  [4)  provides: 
"For  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods  or  delay  in 
delivery  caused  by  fire,  if  the  claimant  proves 
that  the  fire  arose  from  fault  or  neglect  on 
the  part  of  the  carrier,  his  servants  or 
agents". 
3-Article  5  [6]  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable,  except  in  general 
average,  where  loss,  damage  or  delay  in 
delivery  resulted  from  measures  to  save  life  or 
from  reasonable  measures  to  save  property  at 
sea". 
The  Hamburg  Rules  are  concerned  about  the  fire 
exception  which  seems  to  improve  upon  the  Hague  Rules445. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  exception  of  negligent  navigation 
or  management  is  eliminated,  but  most  of  the  other 
defenses  are  still  valid446  according  to  the  meaning  of 
the  general  principle  which  is  based  on  a  rule  of 
determining  whether  or  not  the  carrier  has  taken  "all 
measures  that  could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
occurrence  and  its  consequences447. 
445-Rand  R.  Pixa,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  Fault  Concept  and  Common 
Carrier  Liability  Under  U.  S.  Law",  [1979]  19  Virgins  Journal  of 
International  Law,  p  433,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Pixa" 
446-George  F.  Chandler  III,  "A  Comparison  of  COGSA,  The  Hague/Visby 
Rules,  and  the  Hamburg  Rules",  (1984]  15  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  233  at  p 
244,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Chandler". 
447-Wilson,  p  140. 238 
The  effect  of  replacing  the  list  of  exceptions  is 
envisaged  by  the  abolition  of  the  exception  covering 
negligence  in  the  navigation  or  management  of  the  ship 
which  has  substantially  increased  the  contingencies  of 
the  carrier's  responsibility  in  favour  of  the  cargo 
interests  448 
The  scope  of  the  norm  proposed  by  the  Hamburg  Rules 
seems  to  accord  with  the  Article  20  [1)  of  the  Warsaw 
Convention  of  1929  which  provides  that  the  carrier: 
"Shall  not  be  liable  if  he  proves  that  he  and 
his  agents  have  taken  all  necessary  measures  to 
avoid  the  damage  or  that  it  was  impossible  for 
him  or  them  to  take  such  measures". 
The  degree  of  diligence  of  the  air  carrier  is  more 
strict  than  the  degree  of  diligence  required  in  the  norm 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules.  449  However,  the  expression  of 
"reasonable  man"  and  "reasonableness"  are  understood 
and  applied  by  Municipal  legislations.  Authors450,  and 
jurisprudence  which  have  specified  that  the  measures 
448-Ibid, 
p  140.;  Al-Jazairy,  p  111.;  Falih,  p  468,  Hoyle,  p  207. 
449-Berlingieri  &  Alpa,  pp  147-151.;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  54. 
450-Raphael  Powell,  The  Unreasonableness  of  the  Reasonable  men. 
Current  Legal  Problems.  Vol,  10,1957,  p  104  at  p  120,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Raphael  Powell",  where  he  states: 
"The  truth  may  be  that  the  ordinary  conduct  of  ordinary  men  is 
usually  sensible  because  they  do  not  normally  do  things  which  are 
harmful  to  themselves  or  to  others".;  William  L.  Prosser,  Law  of 
Torts,  1978,  p  150,  where  he  states: 
"The  "reasonable  man  of  ordinary  prudence",  he  is  sometimes 
described  as  a  reasonable  man,  or  a  prudent  man,  or  a  man  of 
average  prudence,  or  a  man  of  ordinary  sense  using  ordinary  care 
and  skill". 239 
required  of  the  carrier  are  only  these  that  are 
"reasonable"  and  "normal". 
That  means  that  the  burden  of  proof  would  lie  on  the 
carrier  to  prove  that  he  took  reasonable  care  of  the 
goods.  It  requires  a  higher  standard  of  proof  constituted 
on  presumption  of  liability  which  would  be  difficult  to 
refute.  451  In  respect  of  a  deviation  under  the  Hamburg 
Rules,  as  I  mentioned  previously,  the  Rules  do  not 
contain  a  specific  provision  for  deviation.  However,  it 
constitutes  the  liability  of  the  carrier  on  the  principle 
of  presumed  fault  or  neglect.  452 
Then  in  order  to  exempt  the  carrier  from  liability  for 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery,  occurring  by  the 
departure  from  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  carriage,  the 
carrier'  must  establish  his  lack  of  responsibility  for  the 
"occurrence  and  its  consequences  ,  453  and  he  must  take  all 
measures  to  save  life  or  attempt  to  select  reasonable 
measures  to  save  property  of  third  persons. 
451-Patrick  J,  O'keefe  &  R.  J.  Colinard,  "The  UNCITRAL  Draft 
Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea",  (1976)  10  Journal  of 
World  Trade  Law,  p  346  at  p  347,  hereinafter  cited  as  "0'keefe  & 
Colinard".;  Diamond,  A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  p  11. 
452-Falih, 
p  467. 
453_0'keefe  &  Colinard,  p  346. 240 
ii-  WAIVER  OF  DEVIATION 
After  the  occurrence  of  the  deviation,  the  innocent 
party,  such  as,  the  cargo-owner,  the  shipper,  or  the 
consignee,  may  elect  to  treat  the  contract  as  still 
binding  and  subsisting.  454 
The  general  principle  to  be  deduced  from  the  rule  of 
the  contract  and  from  the  idea  of  freedom  of  contract  or 
from  privity  of  contract  is  that  when  the  contracting 
parties  agree  to  substitute  a  new  contract  or  to  vary  its 
terms  from  the  original  contract,  such  an  agreement  must 
be  in  writing. 
455 
A  waiver  of  deviation  may  be  oral  in  any  event,  but  any 
letter456  or  aid  issued  to  the  shippers  or  consignees  from 
the  carrier  will  not  be  considered  as  assent  to  a 
deviation.  457  For  instance,  where  the  consignee's  consent 
was  neither  sought  nor  given,  their  receipt  of  the 
carrier's  notice  that  vessel  would  discharge  New  York 
cargo  at  Detroit  does  not  constitute  a  waiver  of  the 
deviation.  458  Also,  acts  of  shippers  in  endeavoring  to  aid 
454_2  Carver,  para,  1190. 
455-Chitty  on  Contract,  p  1149.;  Be5seler  Waechter  Glover  &  Co.  v. 
South  Derwent  Coal  Cn.  Lt,  [1938]  1  K.  B.  p  408.;  Walker,  Private 
Law,  p  47.;  Walker,  Contract,  p  322. 
456-The  Archer  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  357,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Neither  the  silence  of  the  shipper  nor  a  letter  from  the  shipper 
assuming  that  deviation  is  legally  permissible  under  the  bill  of 
lading  is  a  ratification  of  a  deviation". 
457_Singapöre  Trader  (Stranding).,  [1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  1512. 
458-Compare,  Knauth,  p  269,  where  he  states: 
"A  charterer  who  knows  that  a  vessel  has  deviated  with  his  cargo 
but  continues  to  give  orders  as  to  the  vessel's  movement  thereby 
waives  the  deviation". 241 
progress  of  voyage  after  deviation  does  not  amount  a 
waiver  of  the  deviation.  459 
The  innocent  party  may  accept  the  deviation  and  treat 
the  contract  as  continuing  and  still  binding,  but  that 
does  not  deprive  him  of  his  right  to  claim  from  the 
carrier  for  any  damage  or  loss  to  the  cargo. 
Lord  Wright460  made  this  quite  clear  when  he  said: 
"But  however  fundamental  is  the  condition,  it 
may  still  be  waived  by  the  goods-owner.  For 
this  purpose  the  case  is  like  any  other  breach 
of  a  fundamental  condition,  which  constitutes 
the  repudiation  of  a  contract  by  one  party;  the 
other  party  may  elect  not  to  treat  the 
repudiation  as  being  final,  but  to  treat  the 
contract  as  subsisting  and  to  that  extent  may 
waive  the  breach,  any  right  to  damages  being 
reserved". 
Thus,  if  the  other  party  such  as  the  shipper  requests 
that  he  changes  the  destination  of  the  shipment  by 
deviating  to  another  port,  while  the  carrier  was  ready 
and  willing  to  perform  his  contract,  then  the  carrier 
would  be  able  to  rely  on  the  assent  of  the  shipper  to 
allow  him  to  vary  the  original  destination  of  the 
459_Thýy  W.  Cramp  [1927]  A.  M.  C.  p  1365. 
460-Hain  S.  S..  C  .  v.  Tate  &  L_yle%  Lt  (19361  2  All  E.  R.  p  597;  per 
Lord  Upjohn  in  the  Suisse  A  Ian-ique  Societe  D'Armement  Mar  time 
S.  A.  V.  N.  V.  Rotterdams.  h.  Knien  CentrAle  (1967]  1  A.  C.  p  361;  = 
Treg-nna  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  1415,  where  it  is  stated: 
"A  shipper,  upon  a  deviation  by  a  ship,  has  the  right  to  rescind 
the  contract  of  shipment  or  charterparty  and  treat  the  goods  as 
converted  by  the  deviator,  or  to  accept  the  goods,  holding  the  ship 
responsible  for  damages  subsequent  to  the  warranty  broken"; 
MacKinnon  LJ.  in,  The  Compagnie  Primera  V.  Coompani  Arrendataria 
[1940]  1  K.  B.  p  362  at  p  375;  Scrutton,  p  259. 242 
shipment,  if  the  consignees  sued  the  carrier  for  non- 
acceptance  or  non-delivery461,  although  the  consignees  are 
entitled  to  rely  on  the  deviation  even  though  the 
charterer  has  previously  waived  a  deviation462. 
CONCLUSION 
The  best  analysis  of  the  basis  of  liability  for  a 
deviating  carrier  is  the  risk  approach,  which  states  that 
the  deviation  is  wrongful  by  increasing  the  risk  of  loss 
beyond  that  permitted  by  contract  and  is  endeavoring  to 
prevent  the  carrier  from  creating  unauthorized  risks463. 
There  are  some  similarities  between  the  risk  approach 
and  the  other  theories,  when  it  considers  the  deviating 
carrier  as  a  wrongdoer  and  stresses  that  the  carrier  is 
in  breach  of  the  terms  of  the  contract  of  carriage  as 
461-Brett,  in  the,  P1  vins  v.  Downing.  1  C.  P.  D.  p  220. 
462_2  Carver,  para,  1193.;  Scrutton,  p  265. 
463-Steven,  pp  1540-47,  where  he  states: 
"There  are  many  theories  for  possible  explanation  for  holding 
deviating  carriers  liable  as  follows: 
"a"Thg  Carrier  as  Wrongdoer: 
As  a  deviation  is  wrongful,  the  wrongdoer  principle  requires  that  a 
deviating  carrier  be  liable  for  losses  that  might  not  have  occurred 
had  the  carrier  not  deviated. 
"b"The  Contra. 
- 
Apprh: 
The  parties  have  contracted  only  for  the  agreed  voyage  therefore 
the  bill  of  lading  does  not  apply  to  a  new  created  by  a  deviation. 
Consequently,  a  deviating  carrier  can  not  rely  on  the  contract  of 
carriage's  exemption  from  liability  and  the  carrier  becomes  an 
"insurer"  of  the  cargoe's  safety. 
"c"The  Tnsuran 
_. 
Theory: 
Deviations  deprived  cargo-owners  of  their  insurance.  This  loss  of 
protection  justified  holding  the  shipowner  liable  for  any  resulting 
loss  that  the  insurance  would  no  longer  cover". 243 
does  the  contract  approach. 
Finally,  this  approach  emphasises  the  creation  of  risks 
not  contemplated  by  the  contracting  parties  similar  to 
the  insurance  theory. 
It  is  important  to  note  that  mere  deviation  or  mere 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  is  not  enough  to  amount  to 
unreasonable  deviation.  The  causal  relation  between  them 
should  be  shown. 
That  means  it  will  be  connected  with  modern  tort-delict 
theory,  especially  the  view  which  constitutes  the  damages 
or  losses  plus  causation.  464 
There  is  no  doubt  that  the  principle  of  freedom  of 
contract  and  the  privity  of  contract  have  no  possibility 
of  applying  when  the  carrier  exempts  himself  and  his 
servants  or  agents  from  liability  for  negligence.  465 
Thus,  one  can  reveal  that  some  jurisprudence  such  as 
the  United  States  courts  refused  to  allow  exceptions  from 
liability  in  cases  of  negligence. 
Whereas  the  United  Kingdom  courts  were  more  favourable 
to  carriers  but  they  strictly  construed  stipulations; 
imposing  liability  in  cases  of  gross  negligence, 
misconduct,  and  misfeasance.  466 
However,  the  aggrieved  party  may  claim  a  remedy  by 
compensation  according  to  the  tort-delict  theory  by  force 
464-Sweeney, 
part  I,  p  112.;  Lord  Migdale  Expresses  the  main 
elements  of  the  delict,  in  the,  Brown  v.  North  British  Steal 
FoundryL±,  d,  1968  S.  C.  p  51  at  p  70. 
465-Villareal,  p  773. 
466-Steven, 
p  1536. 244 
of  general  legal  duty467  or  to  the  liability  in  contract468 
such  as  an  infringement  of  undertaking  of  the  carrier  to 
furnish  the  ship  seaworthy  and  to  load,  stow,  carry, 
discharge,  and  deliver  the  goods  at  the  port  of 
destination. 
Consequently  in  order  to  avail  the  carrier  himself  of 
the  benefit  of  the  exceptions  whether  by.  the  catalogue  of 
the  exceptions  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  or  by  the  general 
principles  of  the  Hamburg  Rules,  all  measures  to  save 
life  or  all  reasonable  measures  to  save  property  must  be 
taken. 
The  carrier  must  have  used  reasonable  care  in  dealing 
with  the  cargo  and  he  or  his  servants  or  agents  must  have 
been  free  of  fault.  469 
The  liability  of  the  carrier  is  still  based  on  the 
principle  of  presumed  fault  or  neglect.  470  Then  one  can 
467-Walker,  Private  Law,  pp  522-23.;  Villareal,  p  770,  where  he 
states: 
"Under  voyage  or  time  charter  contracts,  the  charterer  and 
shipowner  are  liable  to  the  cargo  interests  for  damages  caused  by 
negligence  in  care  of  cargo  or  loss  of  the  goods  by  conversion".; 
Marcardier  v.  Chesapeake  ns.  -o. 
12  U.  S.  p  39;  8  Cranch,  3L.  ed.  p 
481.;  {1814}  Leary  v.  United  states,  81  U.  S.  p  607,14  Wall,  (1872). 
468-Donoghue  v.  Stevenson,  1932  S.  C.  p  31  at  p  64  (H.  L),  (1932) 
A.  C.  p  562  at  p  580,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  is  no  reason  why  the  same  set  of  facts  should  not  give  one 
reason  a  right  of  action  in  contract  and  another  person  a  right  of 
action  in  tort". 
469-Villareal,  pp  773-76. 
470-Erling  Selvig,  "The  Hamburg  Rules,  The  Hague  Rules  and  Marine 
Insurance  Practice",  (1980-811  12  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com.  p  299  at  p  305, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Selvig".;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  54.;  Article  5 
[1)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 245 
deduce  from  common  understanding471  that  the  liability 
under  the  New  Rules  is  still  based  on  the  principle  of 
fault  liability  and  not  of  strict  liability.  472  There  is 
therefore  no  advantage  to  reserve  certain  provisions  for 
duties  of  the  carrier  and  the  long  list  of  exceptions 
from  the  liability  which  now  exist  in  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules. 
The  real  change  under  the  Hamburg  Rules  is  that  the 
vicarious  liability  of  the  carrier  for  his  servants  and 
agents  is  provided  in  express  terms  and  they  will  avail 
themselves  of  any  nautical  fault  and  fire  which  provided 
in  Article  4  (2)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules.  473  In  addition, 
the  carrier  remains  responsible  for  the  loss  of  or  damage 
to  the  cargo  while  actual  carrier  shall  be  responsible 
for  the  carriage  performed  by  him.  474 
However,  it  must  be  born  in  mind  that  the  contingencies 
for  increasing  the  level  of  liability  of  the  carriers 
under  the  liability  regime  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  should 
have  an  economic  effect475. 
The  United  States  and  the  French  delegates  expressed 
their  view  in  the  UNCITRAL  discussions  that  any  attempt 
to  modify  the  liability  regime  of  the  carrier  or 
471-Annex  II  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
472-Selvig,  pp  305,324. 
473-Scrutton, 
p  249,  where  he  expressed  the  situation  under  the 
Hague  Rules  as  follows: 
"Exceptions  in  the  contract  of  affreightment  can  not  be  relied  on 
by  a  person  who  is  not  a  party  to  the  contract,  such  as  the  master, 
a  member  of  the  crew,  or  an  independent  contractor". 
474-Selvig, 
p  306. 
475-Ibid,  p  311. 246 
the  existing  distribution  of  liabilities  because  of 
insurance  coverage  must  be  rejected  and  this  will 
consequently  increase  the  costs  of  shipment,  which  the 
United  Kingdom  has  estimated  will  increase  freight  costs 
by  one  to  two  percent.  476  The  developing  countries  have 
contended  to  remove  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  its 
liability  regime  most  favourable  to  carrier  by 
establishing  a  general  rule  constituting  the  liability  of 
the  carrier  on  the  presumed  fault  or  neglect.  Therefore, 
the  higher  standard  of  care,  which  is  required  from  the 
carrier  in  dealing  with  the  cargo,  might  reduce  net 
losses  and  consequently  reduce  net  insurance  premiums.  477 
476-Sweeney, 
part  I,  pp  104,108,110.;  Pixa,  p  469. 
477-Ibid, 
p  467. 247 
CHAPTER  THREE 
THE  EFFECT  OF  DEVIATION  ON  THE  CONTRACT  OF 
CARRIAGE 
The  effect  of  deviation  particularly  on  the  obligations 
of  the  contracting  parties,  which  emerge  from  the 
contract  of  carriage,.  is  confined  to  unreasonable 
deviation  which  is  considered  outside  the  scope  of  the 
criterion  of  "reasonableness". 
This  effect  has  aroused  real  controversy,  especially 
when  one  considers  that  international  conventions,  such 
as  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules,  and  the 
COGSA  of  United  Kingdom  or  United  States,  do  not  explain 
the  legal  consequences  of  an  unreasonable  deviation.  That 
results  in  the  interpretation  of  particular  cases  being 
divergent  on  this  point.  1 
For  instance,  does  unreasonable  deviation  void  the 
contract  of  carriage  as  it  did  under  the  common  law  pre- 
Hague  Rules  regime  and  consequently  deprive  the  carrier 
of  the  benefit  and  protecting  terms  of  the  contract  and 
the  cargo  insurance  cover,  which  is  based  on  a 
characterization  of  the  breach  of  contract,  as  a 
fundamental  breach  or  on  the  breach  of  fundamental  term. 
One  can  find  the  answers  to  all  these  questions  under 
the  subdivided  heads  as  follows: 
Section  One:  The  Characterization  of  the  Breach  of 
Contract  of  Carriage. 
1-Erik  &  Thomas,  p  693. 248 
Section  Two:  The  Direct  Effect  of  Unreasonable 
Deviation  on  the  Obligations  of  the 
Contracting  Parties. 
SECTION  ONE 
THE  CHARACTERIZATION  OF  THE  BREACH  OF  CONTRACT  OF 
CARRIAGE 
There  are  certain  obligations  in  every  contract 
sometimes  expressed  but  more  usually  implied  concerning 
the  performance  of  the  term  of  the  contract  which  the 
parties  agreed  upon.  The  rationalisation  of  the  rule  is 
that  the  concept  of  the  contractual  obligation  can  be 
divided  into  primary  and  secondary  obligations. 
The  primary  obligations  of  the  contract  are  that 
contracts  are  made  to  be  performed  whereas  in  case  of 
non-performance,  these  obligations  should  be  converted 
into  secondary  obligations  by  paying  compensation  to  the 
aggrieved  party.  2  Contracts  do  not  provide  any 
substituted  obligation  if  the  primary  obligations  are  not 
performed  because  the  non-performance  is  not  within  the 
direct  intention  of  the  contracting  parties  at  the  time 
the  contract  is  made. 
However,  if  the  carrier  has  violated  his  primary 
obligations,  especially  under  the  contract  of  carriage  by 
sea,  then  the  courts  can  enforce  the  carrier  to  pay 
compensation  for  non-performance  as  a  substituted 
2-Kenneth  biplock"  Breach  o  the  Contract  o  car  rfaQehy  a, 
1967,  p  14,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Diplock,  Breach  of  the  Contract". 249 
obligation  in  the  case  of  the  innocent  party  claiming  for 
remedy  to  pay  damages  caused  by  the  non-performance  of 
the  primary  obligation.  Also,  the  aggrieved  party  has  a 
right  to  claim  or  declare  that  the  contract  has  been 
rescinded  by  violating  the  primary  obligation  which  the 
parties  have  undertaken  to  perform. 
This  means  that  there  are  two  aspects  of  the  same 
matter  which  entitle  the  courts  either  to  award  damages 
for  the  breach  of  contract  or  to  declare  that  the 
contract  is  cancelled. 
The  effect  of  breach  of  contract  of  carriage  is  however 
not  to  cancel  a  contract  abinitio.  Viz,  that  contract  is 
valid  and  it  is  not  annulled  automatically  by  the  breach 
nor  even  to  end  the  contract  for  the  future  in  case  of  a 
failure  in  performance  of  a  contract  is  not  so  material, 
but  may  be  sufficiently  material  to  withhold  counter- 
performance3 
3-Gloag,  The  Law  of  contract  {2nd.  ed.  1929}  p  623;  David  M. 
Walker,  The  Law  of  Civil  Remedies  in 
_scotland, 
1974,  p  59, 
hereinafter  cited  as  'Walker,  Civil  Remedies",  where  he  states: 
"Under  suitable  circumstances,  a  party  to  such  a  contract  will  be 
permitted  to  withhold  performance  of  his  obligations  unless  and 
until  the  other  party  performs  his,  or  to  put  it  from  opposite 
angle,  that  failure  to  perform  a  material  part  of  the  contract  on 
the  part  of  one  party  will  disentitle  him  from  demanding 
performance  from  the  other";  W.  W.  McBryde,  "Breach  of  Contract", 
1979  J.  R.  p  60  at  p  67,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Mcßryde,  Breach  of 
Contract",  where  he  states: 
"A  statement  that  "I  am  withholding  payment  until  you  perform"  is 
of  a  different  type  from,  "Because  of  your  breach,  I  am  no  longer 
interested  in  future  performance";  Compare,  AilsaCraig  Fishing  Co. 
LLd.  V.  Malvern  Fishing  Co.  Ltd,  (1983]  1  All  E.  R.  p  101,  where  it 
is  stated: 250 
There  is  also  a  reservation  in  the  influence  of  the 
effect  of  the  breach  on  the  contract  of  carriage  by  sea. 
It  is  not  every  trifling  violation  which  will  be 
considered  as  a  breach  of  contract  in  which  the  aggrieved 
party  is  entitled  to  withhold  performance  of  his  part  of 
the  contract4.  This  means  that  a  classification  and 
characterization  for  every  breach  in  the  contract  could 
be  based  on  the  nature  of  the  term,  for  instance,  whether 
a  breaching  term  is  considered  as  a  condition  or  as  a 
warranty,  or  on  the  nature  of  the  breach  such  as  whether 
that  breach  is  deemed  as  a  fundamental  breach  or  as  a 
breach  of  fundamental  terms  as  far  as  the  doctrine  of 
deviation  is  concerned  and  whether  this  doctrine  is  to 
operate  as  a  rule  of  substantive  law  or  as  a  rule  of 
construction. 
Therefore,  the  following  points  are  to  be  discussed: 
i-Conditions  and  Warranties. 
ii-Breach  of  Fundamental  Term  and  Fundamental  Breach. 
iii-Whether  the  Doctrine  of  Deviation  is  Considered  as 
a  Rule  of  Law  or  as  a  Rule  of  Construction. 
"The  limitation  of  liability  is  applied  not  only  where  there  is  a 
partial  failure  to  perform  the  contracted  services  but  also  where 
there  is  a  total  failure  to  perform  the  services". 
4-McBryde,  "Breach  of  Contract",  p  66. 
5-Lord  Devlin,  "The  Treatment  of  Breach  of  Contract",  1966  J.  R.  p 
192,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Devlin,  The  Treatment  of  Breach  of 
Contract". 251 
i-CONDITIONS  AND  WARRANTIES 
The  distinction  between  the  conditions  and  warranties 
under  the  general  principles  of  law  of  contract  under  the 
English  Law  is  that  the  condition  is  considered  something 
more  essential  to  the  contract  which  entitles  the 
innocent  party  to  rescind  the  contract  and  also  to  claim 
all  the  loss  of  or  damage  which  is  sustained  to  the 
cargo6. 
Whilst,  the  warranty  is  to  operate  as  a  collateral  or 
ancillary  to  the  contract  and  if  it  is  broken,  then  the 
aggrieved  party  has  a  right  to  recover  the  damages 
only7. 
However,  in  the  case  of  an  innocent  party  wanting  to 
reject  the  contract  which  is  violated  by  the  breach,  such 
a  right  depends  upon  the  answers  to  a  series  of 
questions. 
The  first  question  is:  Does  the  provisions  of  the 
contract  expressly  provide  that  in  the  event  of  the 
breach  of  the  term  in  the  contract,  the  other  party  is 
entitled  to  terminate  the  contract? 
6-Walker,  Companion,  p  267,  where  he  states: 
"..  In  Scots  Law  the  distinction  is  between  fundamental  or  material 
stipulations,  usually  called  warranties,  breach  of  which  justifies 
rescission  of  the  contract  and  non-fundamental  stipulations, 
sometimes  called  conditions,  breach  of  which  justifies  damages 
only". 
7-Devlin,  The  Treatment  of  Breach  of  Contract,  p  192.;  Walker, 
Companion,  p  149;  Lord  Scarman,  in,  Runge  Corpn,,  v.  TLadar 
LB.  (H.  L)  (1981]  1  W. L.  R.  p  711  at  p  713;  Anson's  Law  of  Contract, 
pp  130-135. 252 
If  the  answer  is  no,  then  the  next  question  is: 
Does  the  contract  when  correctly  construed  so  provide? 
For  example,  the  relevant  term  may  be  described  as  a 
"condition  ".  8 
The  next  question  then  is.  What  does  constitute  a 
condition  under  the  contract  of  carriage  by  sea? 
In  order  to  answer  the  question  of  what  constitutes  a 
condition  or  a  warranty,  there  is  an  opinion  which 
indicates  that  when  the  breach  of  the  contract  goes  to 
the  root  and  consideration  of  the  contract  or  deprives 
the  contracting  parties  of  the  whole  of  the  benefit  of 
the  contract,  then  such  a  violation  of  the  term  of 
contract  is  to  be  deemed  as  a  breach  of  a  condition.  Viz, 
otherwise,  it  will  be  a  breach  of  warranty  which  entitles 
the  innocent  party  to  compensation  for  the  damages  caused 
to  the  cargo.  9  This  means  that  such  a  viewpoint  depends 
entirely  upon  the  nature  of  the  breach  and  its 
foreseeable  consequences  rather  than  the  nature  of  the 
term.  10 
On  the  other  hand,  there  is  another  notion  which 
endeavours  to  constitute  the  characterization  of  the  term 
of  contract  as  a  condition  depending  upon  the  following 
8-Ormrod  LJ.,  in,  Cehave  N.  V.  v.  Bremer  M.  B.  H.  [1976]  1  Q.  B.  p  44 
at  p  84;  Compare,  Walker,  Companion,  pp  1290-91,  where  he  states: 
"In  Scotland,  on  the  other  hand,  warranty  always  denotes  a  material 
or  fundamental  term,  breach  of  which  does  justify  treating  the 
contract  as  at  an  end". 
9-Upjohn  LJ.  in,  Hong  Kong  Fir.  Shipping  co.  Ltd.  v.  Kawasaki 
Kisen  Kaisha  Ltd.  [19821  2  Q.  B.  p  26  at  pp  63-64;  Roskill  LJ.  in, 
Cehave  N.  V.  v.  Bremer.  M.  B.  H.  [19761  1  Q.  B.  p  44  at  p  73. 
10-Deviln,  The  Treatment  of  Breach  of  Contract,  pp  194-97. 253 
points: 
1-The  form  of  the  clause  itself11 
2-The  relation  of  the  clause  to  the  contract  as  a 
whole. 
3-General  consideration  of  lawl2. 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  following  considerations  are 
however  regarded  as  being  the  basic  principles  in 
deciding  whether  the  breaching  term  is  to  be  a  condition 
or  a  warranty. 
1-The  intention  of  the  contracting  parties13 
2-The  truth  of  what  is  promised  in  the  contract. 
3-The  surrounding  circumstances  of  a  particular 
contract  which  were  prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  breach 
rather  than  at  the  time  the  contract  was  made14. 
4-All  the  factors  which  are  contemplated  by  the  parties 
at  the  time  the  contract  was  made  which  would  be 
effective  on  the  substance  and  foundation  of  the 
adventurel5. 
11-Ibid,  p  203,  where  he  states: 
"...  If  the  fault  be  a  breach  of  an  express  term  in  the  contract, 
it  is  immaterial  whether  that  term  is  a  condition  or  a  warranty". 
12-Lord  Willberforce,  in,  Bremer  v.  Vanden  [1978]  2  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  109 
at  p  113. 
13-Bowen  LJ.  in,  Bentsen  v.  Tayl_or.. 
_., 
So  &  Co.  (1893]  2  Q.  B.  A.  p 
274  at  p  281,  where  he  states: 
"Look  at  the  contract  and  make  up  your  mind  whether  the  intention 
of  the  parties  would  best  be  carried  out  by  treating  the  provisions 
as  a  warranty  or  as  a  condition". 
14-Georag  Mitchetl  Ltd.  v.  Finney  Lock  S  eds(1983]  2  All  E.  R.  p 
737  at  p  738;  Fixby  Engineering  Co.  v.  Aunhlochan  Sand  &  Gravel 
0,.  1974  S.  L.  T.  (Sh.  Ct.  )  p  58. 
15-Bowen  U.  in.  Bentsen  v.  Taylor,  op.  cit,  p  281. 254 
Nevertheless,  Scots  Law  has  never  classified  the  terms 
of  a  contract  into  conditions  and  warranties.  16  The  Scots 
jurisprudence  has  adopted  a  solution,  constituent  on  the 
material  or  fundamental  terms17,  which  entitles  the 
aggrieved  party  from  such  a  breach  to  terminate  the 
contract.  When  the  breach  is  not  considered  as  a  breach 
of  material  or  fundamental  terms,  then  the  innocent  party 
is  entitled  to  claim  for  damages  only-18  This  solution  is 
deemed  contrary  to  the  attitude  of  English  Law  in 
explaining  the  sense  of  the  words  condition  and 
warranty. 
19 
Accordingly,  and  as  far  as  the  deviation  cases  are 
concerned,  some  of  the  lords20  referred  to  the  desire 
that  the  contractual  route  should  be  followed  by  the 
vessel  as  a  "fundamental  condition  of  the  contract" 
whether  provided  expressly  or  impliedly.  Whereas,  others 
16-Thomson,  Fundamental  Breach,  p  47;  Lord  President  Dunedin,  in, 
Wade  v.  WaIdon,  1909  S.  C.  p  571  at  p  576. 
17-Alexander  Stephen  f  forthl  Ltd.  V.  , 7.  t.  Riley  (U.  K}  Ltd,  1976 
S.  L.  T.  p  269  at  pp  272-73;  Smith  v.  TL  N.  B.  Chrygler  (Scotlandl 
Ltd.  1978  S.  C.  (H.  L),  p  1. 
18-Walker,  The  Law  of  Contracts,  p  523;  Decro  Wall  International 
, g$.  v.  Practioners  in  Marketing  [1971)  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  216;  [1971]  1 
W.  L.  R,  p  361;  Compare,  Richard  Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  [2nd,  ed, 
19831,  p  53,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses", 
where  he  states: 
"Scottish  decisions,  which  in  any  case  preferred  the  term  material 
breach  of  contract,  took  that  everything  turned  on  the  construction 
of  the  contract,  so  that  liability  could  always  be  excluded  or 
limited  even  in  the  event  of  such  a  breach";  Pollock  v.  e, 
1922  SC  (M.  1),  p  192. 
19-Walker,  The  Law  of  Contracts,  p  337. 
20-Lord  Wright  &  Lord  Maugham,  in,  Hain  v.  Tate--&  Lyle  (1936)  2 
All  E.  R.  p  597  at  pp  607-608  respectively. 255 
believe  that  a  breach  of  a  condition  is  merely  equivalent 
to  a  breach  of  a  fundamental  term21  which  prevents  the 
deviating  carrier  from  relying  upon  the  exemption 
provision  and  entitles  the  aggrieved  party  to  repudiate 
the  contract  entirely.  22 
Moreover,  the  term  warranty  is  to  be  interpreted  under 
the  Scots  Law  as  an  undertaking  for  non-performance  which 
entitles  the  aggrieved  party  to  rescind  the  contract  if  a 
warranty  is  violated  by  the  other  contracting  parties.  23 
Deviation  still  affects  thus  the  contract  of  carriage 
by  sea,  when  it  constitutes  a  breach  of  condition  or  a 
breach  of  fundamental  term  which  is  significant  for  the 
future  as  well.  24 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  unreasonable  deviation, 
which  is  characterized  as  a  breach  of  condition,  is  going 
to  cancel  the  primary  obligations  automatically  without 
further  notice  from  the  innocent  party  and  subsequently 
21-Lord  Upjohn,  in,  Suisse  Atjan  .  {cnu  .  Societe  D'Armement  Maritime 
. 
A.  V.  N.  V.  Rotterdams.  h  Kolen  C.  ntrale  [1967]  1  A.  C.  p  361  at  p 
422;  Thomson,  Fundamental  Breach,  p  38.;  A,  G.  Guest,  "Fundamental 
Breach  of  Contract",  1961,77  Q.  R.  p  98,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Guest,  Fundamental  Breach" 
22-Guest,  Fundamental  Breach,  p  99.;  Brian  Coote,  "The  Effect  of 
Discharge  by  Breach  on  Exception  Clauses",  1970  C.  L.  Y.  p  221  at  p 
223,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Coote,  Discharge  by  Breach";  See  infra, 
I  will  explain  in  more  detail  under  the  topic  of  breach  of 
fundamental  term  and  fundamental  breach. 
23-Walker,  Law  of  Contracts,  p  337.;  Section  33  (1)  of  Marine 
Insurance  Act  1906,  where  it  is  indicated  that  the  term  "warranty" 
is  used  as  a  condition  precedent. 
24-Coote, 
p  105. 256 
elect  to  treat  the  contract  as  coming  to  an  end25  or 
choose  to  waive  the  breach26  and  consider  the  contract  as 
still  subsisting. 
ii-BREACH  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  TERM  AND  FUNDAMENTAL 
BREACH 
Some  confusion  can  be  detected  in  the  passage  which 
expresses  the  breach  of  fundamental  term  and  fundamental 
breach,  although  a  great  deal  of  effort  has  been  devoted 
to  finding  a  rational  basis  for  these  terms. 
In  order  to  determine  whether  a  party  to  the  contract 
has  committed  a  fundamental  breach  or  breach  of 
fundamental  term,  one  has  to  keep  in  mind  what  is  the 
fundamental  obligation  or  main  object  of  the  contract27 
which  constitutes  the  basis  of  the  contract28. 
I  will  therefore  discuss  the  following  points  which 
form  the  very  core  and  essence  of  the  contract. 
25-fin  v.  Tate  &  LyIA  [1936]  2  All  E.  R.  p  597  (H.  L.  );  Heyman  v. 
Twins  (1942]  A.  C.  p  356(R.  L];  Coote,  p  80.;  Diplock,  Breach  of  the 
Contract,  p  17. 
26-Per  Lord  Wright,  Per  Lord  Maugham,  in,  Hain  V.  Tate&  L,  v1p., 
op.  cit,  at  p  608,614  respectively. 
27-Lord  Denning,  in,  the  Sze  Hai  Tong  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Romb  er  Cycle 
x.  (1959]  3  ALL  E.  R.  p  182  at  p  185,  where  he  states; 
"It  would  defeat  this  object  if  the  shipping  company  was  at 
liberty,  at  its  own  will  and  pleasure,  to  deliver  the  goods  to 
somebody  else,  to  someone  not  entitled  at  all,  without  being  liable 
for  the  consequences.  The  clause  must,  therefore,  be  limited  and 
modified  to  the  extent  necessary  to  enable  effect  to  be  given  to 
the  main  object  and  intent  of  the  contract;  Q-H.  Rentnn  &  Co.  Ltd. 
v.  PalmvrA  Trading 
.o  pn.  of  Panama  (1956]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  222,  (1956] 
1  Q.  B.  p  501  (H.  L.  ),  (1956]  3  ALL  E.  R.  p  957  at  p  961. 
28-Devlin,  The  Treatment  of  Breach  of  Contract,  p  205. 257 
1-Breach  of  Fundamental  Term. 
2-Fundamental  Breach. 
3-Whether  the  Doctrine  of  Fundamental  Breach  is  to 
operate  as  a  rule  of  Substantive  Law  or  as  a  Rule  of 
Construction. 
4-Fundamental  Breach  in  the  United  States. 
1-BREACH  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  TERM 
The  breach  of  fundamental  term  is  concerned  with  the 
performance  of  contractual  undertakings  which.  was 
contemplated  at  the  time  the  contract  was  made  which 
establishes  the  essential  character  of  the  contract29. 
Devlin,  J30.  defined  the  fundamental  term  as  "something 
which  underlies  the  whole  contract,  so  that  if  it  is  not 
complied  with  the  performance  because  totally  different 
from  that  which  the  contract  contemplates". 
Section  12  (11  of  the  Sale  of  Goods  Act,  1893,  implies 
the  meaning  of  the  fundamental  term  by  saying: 
"..  total  failure  of  consideration  and  reckless 
or  grossly  negligent  misconduct". 
Lord  Abinger31  offered  quite  a  famous  example  of  what 
constituted  a  breach  of  fundamental  term  when  he  said: 
29-David  Yates,  Exclusion  .  1a  9e4  in  Con  ra  .  tai  1978,  pp  119,144, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses". 
30-gm 
.a  Qn  Hanscornb  v.  $asaoon  i  Se  .y  (1953)  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  1471  at 
p  1473. 
31-  an  er  v.  Hopkins  (1838)  4  M.  &  W.  p  399  [150  E.  R.  p  1484  at 
pp  1486-1487.;  Devlin,  J.  in,  Smeaton  Hansnnmh  v.  asnnnT  Stty, 
op.  cit,  where  he  referred  to  pinewood  being  delivered  instead  of 
mahogany. 258 
"If  a  man  offers  to  buy  peas  of  another,  and  he 
sends  him  beans,  he  does  not  perform  his 
contract,  ....  the  contract  is  to  sell  peas,  and 
if  he  sends  him  anything  else  in  their  stead, 
it  is  a  non-  performance  of  it". 
Thus,  the  criterion  of  the  performance  of  the 
contractual  obligation  is  considered  to  be  a  category  in 
determining  whether  or  not  there  has  been  a  breach  of  a 
fundamental  term.  This  happened  when  the  contracting 
party  had  not  performed  his  contract  in  a  fundamental  or 
material  respect  and  such  a  breach  of  fundamental  term 
established  in  his  failing  to  provide  the  consideration 
contracted  which  amounted  to  a  total  failure  of 
consideration. 
A  total  failure  of  consideration  is  a  failure  to 
perform  the  contract  in  its  essential  respects.  32  A  total 
failure  of  consideration  is  total  non-performance,  not 
giving  what  has  been  paid  for  at  all,  but  something  else, 
or  nothing.  Such  a  category  depends  upon  the  fault  of  the 
defendant  which  entitles  the  innocent  party  to  relieve 
himself  from  further  obligations  and  to  recover  the  sums 
paid.  33 
2-FUNDAMENTAL  BREACH 
A  breach  of  contractual  obligations  occurs  when  the 
contemplated  contract  is  performed  in  a  deficient  manner 
or  in  a  fundamentally  wrong  manner  which  has  disastrous 
32-Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses,  pp  122-23. 
33-Walker,  The  Law  of  Contracts,  p  524;  Yeoman  C_reda  v.  Apps 
(1962]  2  Q.  B.  p  508  at  p  523.;  Blackburn  -Bobbin  Co.  Ltd.  v.  T.  W. 
Allen  &  Sons  Ltd.  (1918]  2  K.  B.  p  467. 259 
consequences  in  terms  of  loss  but  it  is  not  like  such  a 
breach  of  fundamental  term  which  goes  to  the  very  essence 
and  the  root  of  the  contract34. 
The  consequent  events  are  necessary  to  justify  a 
finding  of  fundamental  breach  but  it  is  irrelevant  to  the 
breach  of  fundamental  term35.  Then  the  fundamental  breach 
is  not  more  than  a  breach  of  contract  having  specially 
serious  consequences  for  the  injured  party,  permitting 
him  to  repudiate  the  contract,  and  recovering  damages 
caused  to  the  cargo.  Whereas,  the  breach  of  fundamental 
term  is  equivalent  to  non-performance  which  terminates 
the  contract  automatically36. 
By  way  of  illustrating  that  the  fundamental  term  was 
merely  equivalent  to  a  breach  of  condition  because  both 
are  essential  to  the  essence  of  the  contract  which 
prevents  a  party,  who  is  violating  the  contract  either  by 
breach  of  the  condition  or  the  fundamental  term  of  the 
contract,  from  relying  upon  the  exemption  clauses.  It  has 
however  been  argued  that  the  party,  who  is  in  breach  of 
fundamental  term,  is  not  entitled  to  avail  himself  by 
means  of  exemption  clauses.  On  the  other  hand,  he  can 
protect  himself  against  liability  for  the  breach  of  a 
condition. 
One  can  then  say  that  the  differences  between  them  are 
34-Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses,  pp  141-42. 
35-Megaw  L.  J.  in,  Wathes  IWesternl  Ltd.  v.  Austins  {Mensweart  Ltd 
[1976]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  14  at  p  19. 
36-Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  146. 260 
so  small  and  the  fundamental  term  is  more  narrow  and 
basic  than  a  condition  of  the  contract37.  As  far  as  the 
fundamental  breach  is  concerned,  some  of  the  lords 
referred  to  the  gravity  of  the  event  because  it  was  not 
the  breach  itself  which  counted  so  much,  but  the  event 
resulting  from  it38.  Others  believe  that  one  must  look  at 
the  quality  of  the  conduct  and  not  at  the  results39. 
However,  in  order  to  constitute  a  real  criterion  for 
determining  whether  a  breach  is  fundamental  or  not,  one 
must  look  at  the  conduct  itself  and  its  consequences. 
That  means  that  they  established  the  interdependence  of 
the  objective  and  subjective  elements  of  a  contract.  That 
does  not  mean  that  these  elements  must'  not  separate  them, 
but  they  must  be  related  to  each  other  in  determining 
whether  a  party  has  committed  a  fundamental  or  total 
breach  of  contract40. 
37-Bowen  LJ.  in,  Bentsen  v.  Taylor  (1893]  2  Q.  B.  p  274  at  p  280, 
where  he  defines  these  terms  by  their  effects  as  follows: 
"A  breach  of  fundamental  term  or  condition  affects  the  substance  of 
the  adventure:  a  breach  of  the  fundamental  term  destroys  it"; 
Guest,  Fundamental  Breach,  pp  98-99;  Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p 
119;  Smeaton  Hanscomb  v.  Sassoon  I  Setty  (1953]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  1471; 
Compare  Roskill.  LJ.  in,  Cehavn  N.  V.  v.  Bremer.  M.  B.  H.  (1976)  1 
Q.  B.  p  44  at  p  73. 
38-Lord  Denning,  in,  abu  is  lasti 
nine  v.  Wayne  Tank  .  n.  Ltd. 
_ 
(1970]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  225  at  p  235. 
39-Diplock  LJ,  in,  Hong  Kong  Fir 
-shipping  cn.  Ltd.  v.  K_ 
___ 
i 
Kaisha  Ltd.,  (1962]  2  Q.  B.  pp  26,68,69;  (1962)  1  ALL  E.  R.  pp 
474,486,487. 
40-Hary  Silberberg,  "The  Doctrine  of  Fundamental  Breach  Revisited", 
1971  J.  B.  L.  p  197,  at  p  283,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Silberberg, 
Fundamental  Breach  Revisited". 261 
3-  WHETHER  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  FUNDAMENTAL  BREACH  IS 
TO  OPERATE  AS  A  RULE  OF  SUBSTANTIVE  LAW  OR  AS  A 
RULE  OF  CONSTRUCTION 
The  breach  of  contract  whether  it  is  considered  as  a 
fundamental  breach  or  as  a  breach  of  fundamental  term41, 
is  only  a  way  of  illustrating  the  destruction  of  the  core 
and  basis  of  the  contract.  42  Therefore,  the  fundamental 
breach  shall  hereinafter  include  the  breach  of  a 
fundamental  term.  43  This  doctrine  has  developed  up  and 
down  through  the  decisions  of  the  House  of  Lords  in 
determining  whether  the  doctrine  is  a  rule  of  substantive 
law  or  a  rule  of  construction. 
The  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  was  firmly 
entrenched  as  a  rule  of 
Karsales  case45  and  Me, 
Pearson  L.  J,  avoided  tha 
construction  based  upon 
parties.  47 
Howdver,  the  entire 
substantive  law44  as  applied  in 
man  Credit  case46,  whereas, 
t  by  considering  it  as  a  rule  of 
the  presumed  intention  of  the 
notion  of  fundamental  breach 
41-Hereinafter  cited  for  both  of  them  as  fundamental  breach. 
42-Devlin,  The  Treatment  of  Breach  of  Contract,  p  204. 
43-Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  Of  ;  Coote,  Discharge  by  Breach, 
p  237,  where  he  states: 
"..  in  the  suisse  Atlantique  case,  the  House  of  Lords  categorized 
fundamental  term  and  fundamental  breach  as  shorthand  expressions 
for  the  circumstances  giving  rise  to  discharge  by  breach". 
44-Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  53. 
45-Karsales  [Harrow)  Ltd.  v.  Wall's  (1956)  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  866. 
46-Yeoman  Credit  v.  Apos  (19621  2  O.  B.  p  508. 
47-_. 
,.  __Finanee  v.  National  Mortgage  Bank  of  ,  reeee(l9641  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  446. 262 
suffered  a  total  failure  in  Suisse  Atlantigue  case48, 
where  the  House  of  Lords  ruled  a  new  judicial  trend  to 
reduce  the  doctrine  from  a  rule  of  law  to  a  rule  of 
construction.  Viz,  it  is  a  matter  of  interpretation  in 
each  case  for  the  court  to  determine  what  benefits 
granted  are  lost  in  case  of  fundamental  breach49  and  to 
consider  the  intention  of  the  contracting  parties  in  a 
particular  contract. 
Nevertheless,  a  substantial  effort  to  re-establish  the 
rule  of  the  legal  approach  was  made  by  the  Court  of 
Appeal  in  Harb  t's  Plasticine  v.  Wayne  Tank  &  Pump 
Co.  Ltd50,  when  it  rejected  the  idea  of  the  fundamental 
breach  and  consequently  the  exception  clauses  as  a  matter 
of  construction,  although  the  court  ostensibly  followed 
the  reasoning  of  the  Suisse  Atlantiq  case,  but  it 
submitted  that  the  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  is  a 
rule  of  law51. 
This  decision  caused  those  who  are  inclined  to  view 
that  the  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  is  considered  as 
a  rule  of  construction  to  hesitate.  They  argued  that 
Section  [9]  of  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Act  was  very 
clearly  drafted,  that  if  the  term  was  reasonable  in  the 
contract,  then  it  must  be  effective  despite  the 
termination  by  breach  or  by  a  party  electing  to  treat  it 
48-(1967]  1  A.  C.  p  361;  [1966]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  61. 
49-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  26. 
50_[1970]  1Q.  B  p  447;  [1970)  TALL  E.  R.  p  225;  Lawson,  Exclusion 
Clauses,  p  56. 
51-Siberberg,  Fundamental  Breach  Revisited,  p  198. 263 
as  repudiated.  52  That  means  that  does  not  of  itself 
exclude  the  requirement  of  reasonableness  in  relation  to 
any  contract  term53  as  far  as  the  contract  covered  by  the 
act  is  concerned. 
Therefore,  certain  judgments  have  been  overruled  by  the 
House  of  Lords  which  were  irreconcilable  with  current 
legal  rational  of  the  court,  which  based  on  a  rule  of 
construction  characterized  the  doctrine  of  fundamental 
breach.  Viz,  that  the  court  always  takes  the  intention  of 
the  contracting  parties  fully  into  account. 
The  following  cases  explain  the  new  judicial  trend  on 
various  grounds. 
The  court,  in  Photo  Production  Ltd.  v.  Securicor 
Transport  L  -d54' 
held  that: 
"..  the  question  whether  an  exception  clause 
applied  when  there  was  a  fundamental  breach, 
breach  of  a  fundamental  term  or  any  other 
breach,  turned  on  the  construction  of  the  whole 
of  the  contract,  including  any  exception 
clauses". 
That  means  that  the  parties  to  a  contract  are  free  to 
modify  their  obligations  to  whatever  degree  they  choose 
within  the  limits  that  the  agreement  must  contain  the 
legal  characteristics  of  a  contract.  55 
This  view  received  strong  support  from  Parker,  J.  in, 
52-Section  22(a]  of  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Act. 
53-Section  9[2]  of  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Act. 
54-(1980]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  556. 
55-Lord  Diplock,  in,  Photo  Production  v.  Securicor  Transport, 
op.  cit,  p  567. 264 
George  Mitchell  v.  Finney  Lock  Seeda56,  when  he  said: 
"It  is  making  commercial  nonsense  of  the 
contract  to  suggest  that  either  party  can  have 
intended  that  it  was  to  operate  in  the 
circumstances  of  this  case;  for  to  do  so  would 
convert  the  contract  into  nothing  but  a 
declaration  of  intention  with  nothing  more". 
Lord  Denning57  unusually  thought  that  the  exemption 
clause  did  cover  the  breach  in  the  contract  which  had 
occurred. 
Finally  the  House  of  Lords  concluded  that  the  exemption 
clause  covered  a  fundamental  breach  only  in  the  absence 
of  negligence  and  when  it  is  treated  as  a  matter  of 
construction.  58 
The  main  finding  from  the  above  mentioned  decisions  is 
that  a  fundamental  breach  is  not  a  rule  of  substantive 
law  which  disentitles  a  party  from  reliance  on  an 
exemption  clause  automatically,  but  it  is  a  rule  of 
construction  only.  59 
Lord  Wilberforce60  has  made  this  point  quite  clear  by 
56-[1981]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  476  at  p  478. 
57-George  Mi  tchell  v.  Finney  Lock  Seeds  (1983]  1  O.  B.  p  248  at  p 
301;  (1983]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  108  at  p  115. 
58-Ailsa  Crai  g  Fishing  Co.  Tit  v.  Malver  n  Fishing  Co.  Ltd.,  (1983] 
1  ALL  E.  R.  p  101;  George  Mitchell  v.  Finn  ey  Lock  Seeds,  op.  cit,  p 
737. 
59-Lawson,  Exclusion  Clause,  p  54. 
60-Suisse  A  tlantic  _  Societe  D'Arme  ment  Maritim  e  E.  A.  V. 
Rotterdamseh_  Kolen  Centrale,  op.  cit,  at  432;  Harb  tt'5  Plastic  n. 
V.  Wayne  Pu  mp  [1970]  1  Q.  B.  p  447,  where  he  states: 
"In  deciding  whether  a  breach  of  contract  is  fundamental  or  not  the 
court  should  have  regard  both  of  the  quality  of  the  act  which 265 
stating: 
"One  must  look  individually  at  the  nature  of 
the  contract,  the  character  of  the  breach  and 
its  effect  upon  future  performance  and 
expectation  and  make  a  judicial  estimation  of 
the  final  result" 
The  clause  should  however  be  fair  and  reasonable  in 
order  to  apply  it  in  a  particular  case  after  determining 
whether  it  was  in  standard  form,  whether  there  was 
equality  of  bargaining  power,  the  nature  of  the 
breach...  etc.  61  Thus  when  a  contract  contains  standard 
clauses  and  the  contracting  party  wants  to  apply  it  even 
in  the  case  of  an  inequality  of  bargaining  power,  for 
instance  uses  his  superior  power  to  impose  an  exclusion 
or  limitation  clause  on  the  weaker  party,  he  will  not 
benefit  from  reliance  upon  the  exemption  or  limitation 
clause  if  he  has  committed  a  breach  of  contract. 
One  can  then  conclude  that  even  though  a  fundamental 
breach  is  based  on  a  rule  of  construction,  an  exclusion 
clause  would  be  normally  construed  as  not  applicable  to 
avoid  liability  for  violation  of  the  carriage  contract  by 
committing  a  fundamental  breach  which  goes  to  the  root  of 
a  contract.  62 
constitutes  the  breach  and  also  its  consequences";  Per  Kerr  LJ,  in, 
j;  eorge  Mitchell  v.  Finney  Lock  Sands  (1983]  3  W.  L.  R.  p  163  (H.  L). 
61-Chandrahasan, 
p  119. 
62-Lord  Hodson,  in,  Suisse  A 
_lan  . 
ique  Sn 
_ie  D'Armement  Maritime 
L.  A.  v.  fi  tterdamsche  Koten  Centrale,  (1967]  1  A.  C.  p  361  at  pp 
408-415. 266 
4-FUNDAMENTAL  BREACH  IN  THE  UNITED  STATES 
The  legal  concept  of  deviation  under  the  United  States 
jurisprudence  has  extended  to  the  non-geographical 
deviation,  i.  e.  stowage  on  deck,  dry  docking  with  cargo 
aboard...  etc.  Some  commentators  believe  that  the  American 
courts  have  relied  on  the  principles  of  fundamental 
breach  in  the  characterization  of  both  types  of 
deviation.  63 
It  is  submitted  that  a  breach  should  be  intentionally 
breached  by  the  wrongdoer's  action,  which  has  broken  the 
contract  in  a  manner  which  goes  to  the  very  essence  and 
the  root  of  the  contract.  64 
Weinfeld,  D.  J.  in  Flying  Clipper65,  said: 
"It  is  sufficient  that  the  carrier's  voluntary 
action  in  unjustifiably  deviation  so  changed 
the  essence  of  the  agreement  as  to  effect  its 
abrogation". 
Therefore,  when  the  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage 
is  considered  a  material  or  fundamental  as  to  be  the 
equivalent  of  a  deviation,  then  all  the  exclusion  clauses 
contained  in  the  Hague  Rules  or  the  bill  of  lading  are 
null  and  void.  66 
63-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  322;  Cene*al  ""i  ice.  v.  argo___Haut 
$S.  Line.  [1934]  A.  M.  C.  p  1147;  $  ac  man  v.  Cunard  White  'qtar.  &. 
yß,.  [19403  A.  M.  C.  p  971,  where  it  has  been  recognized  that  "over 
carriage  is  a  material  deviation.  " 
64-MacDonald  J,  in,  Dorab  H.  Captain  v.  Far  Eastern  SS.  Cg  [19781 
R.  M.  C.  p  2210  at  p  2227. 
65_[19543  A.  M.  C.  p  259  at  p  264. 
66_Snsur, 
ance  Company  of  North  American  V.  The  .  xminster,  127 267 
Accordingly,  an  unreasonable  deviation  should  be 
operated  to  breach  the  contract  of  carriage  which  makes 
the  contract  null  in  the  case  of  the  aggrieved  party 
choosing  to  treat  the  contract  as  being  at  an  end  and 
rendering  COGSA's  limitation  clause  inapplicable 
altogether.  67 
The  United  States  Courts  do  however  not  always  adopt  a 
criterion  of  intention  in  deciding  whether  a  particular 
act  forms  a  deviation  or  not.  68  For  instance,  the  court 
in  the  Atlantic  Mutual  v.  Pogidon69  held  that  when  the 
shipment  was  not  delivered  to  the  consignee  until  18 
months  after  the  due  delivery  date,  then  it  was 
constituted  an  unjustifiable  deviation  without  reference 
to  the  rationale  behind  their  decision  and  whether  the 
delay  happened  intentionally  or  not. 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  criterion  of  intention  is 
not  essential  in  determining  whether  there  has  been  a 
fundamental  breach  large  enough  to  displace  the  contract 
of  carriage.  70  Therefore  the  "intention"  is  still 
considered  as  an  essential  element  in  determining  a 
fundamental  breach  in  the  carriage  contract  especially 
when  it  causes  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo. 
Finally,  one  can  conclude  that  an  unreasonable 
F.  Supp,  p  541  at  p  542  (1954). 
67-Spar_ug  Corp.  v.  S/S  Yafo  1979,590  F.  2d,  p  1310  at  p  1311. 
68-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  29;  The  Silver  Cy  e  [19433  A.  M.  C.  P 
510. 
69-[1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665. 
70-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  30. 268 
deviation  which  emerges  from  a  fundamental  breach  is 
deemed  as  a  rule  of  substantive  law  and  then  the  carrier 
can  not  avail  himself  by  the  exclusion  clause  under  the 
Rules  or  the  contract7l.  That  means  that  the  principle  of 
an  unreasonable  deviation  under  the  common  law  is  still 
valid  and  not  changed  in  the  United  States  since  the 
passage  of  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act,  193672. 
We  can  however  find  many  decisions  which  try  to  adopt  a 
new  trend  which  is  opposed  to  the  common  law  principles, 
in  saying  that  all  the  exclusion  clauses  are  valid  and 
applicable  even  in  the  case  where  the  carrier  has 
committed  an  unreasonable  deviation73. 
iii-WHETHER  THE  DOCTRINE  OF  DEVIATION  IS 
CONSIDERED  AS  A  RULE  OF  LAW  OR  AS  A  RULE  OF 
CONSTRUCTION 
As  we  have  seen  before,  the  obligation  of  the  carrier 
to  transport  the  goods  according  to  the  advertised  or 
agreed  course  of  the  voyage  is  considered  as  a  material 
or  a  fundamental  obligation.  Therefore,  any  unnecessary 
or  unreasonable  departure  from  the  stated  or  recognized 
course  of  the  voyage  will  constitute  a  fundamental  breach 
of  the  contract  of  carriage. 
71-Captain  v.  Far  Eastern  SS.  Co.  11978)  A.  M.  C.  p  2210  at  pp  2227- 
29. 
72-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  354;  Knauth,  p  241;  Scrutton,  p  440. 
73-  t  anti  .  Mutual  Insurance  Co.  V.  Poseidon  (1963)  R.  M.  C.  p  665; 
De  Lave1  Turbine.  Inc.  v.  West  India  Indugtri  an,  1974,502 
F.  2d.  p  259;  Spartas  Corp.  v.  s/S  yafo,  590  F.  2d,  p  1310  at  p  1317 
(1979]  ;  Varian  Assoc  v.  C.  C.  T.  (19801  A.  M.  C.  p  450  at  p  456;  See 
supra,  chapter  two. 269 
The  court  of  Appeal  in  the  Albion74  decided  that  the 
concept  of  fundamental  breach  was  restricted  to  what  are 
called  deviation  cases. 
Denning  LJ.  has  extended  the  doctrine  of  fundamental 
breach  beyond  deviation  cases  into  the  general  field  of 
commercial  law.  75 
The  House  of  Lords  has  now  ruled  a  new  judicial  trend 
in  a  non-deviation  admiralty  case  on  the  question  of 
fundamental  breach  of  the  contract  which  is  considered  as 
a  rule  of  construction.  76  That  does  not  change  the  legal 
concept  of  the  doctrine  of  deviation  in  carriage  by  sea 
as  a  rule  of  substantive  law  for  many  reasons. 
The  first  reason  is  that  the  contract  of  carriage  by 
sea  and  its  obligations  are  so  complicated.  The 
fundamental  (deviation)  type  must  therefore  be  different 
from  the  others,  such  as,  the  ordinary  discharge  by 
breach  i.  e,  the  contract  of  sale  of  goods,  contract  of 
carriage  by  land...  etc. 
Then,  one  must  make  his  mind  up  not  merely  what  terms 
of  the  contract  are  lost,  but  what  benefits  granted  under 
the,  law  are  lost.  77 
The  second  reason  which  is  arguable,  for  the  survival 
of  the  doctrine  is  that  the  Unfair  Contract  Terms  Act 
1977  is  not  applicable  to  contracts  of  sea  carriage, 
74-[1953]  2  W.  L.  R.  p  1036. 
75-Karsales  (Harrows  Ltd.  v.  Wal  is  (1956]  1  W.  L.  R.  p  936. 
76-George  Mitchell  v.  Pinney  Seeds  (1983]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  108;  Ai13a 
Craig  Fishing  v.  Malvern  Fishing  (1983]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  101. 
77-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  27. 270 
because  there  is  no  provision  dealing  with  deviation  in 
carriage  by  sea,  while  Section  (9)  of  the  Act  would  be 
applicable  to  deviatory  breaches  in  carriage  by  land78. 
Furthermore,  it  must  be  kept  in  mind  that  there  is  a 
specific  provision  which  is  dealing  with  the  doctrine 
either  in  the  Hague  Rules79,  or  in  the  COGSA80. 
The  common  understanding  from  such  provisions  is  that 
an  unreasonable  deviation  is  an  infringement  or  breach  of 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  of  the  contract  of  carriage81. 
The  fundamental  deviation  type  under  the  Visby  Rules 
deprives  the  carrier  of  all  the  benefits  granted  by  the 
convention  and  the  contract  when  the  carrier  deviates 
from  the  contracted  course  of  a  voyage  with  intent  to 
cause  damage  or  recklessly  and  with  knowledge  that  damage 
would  probably  result82.  Whereas,  the  Hamburg  Rules83 
have  adopted  a  new  criterion  which  constitutes  the 
measures  to  save  life  or  reasonable  measures  to  save 
property  in  characterization  whether  the  carrier's  act  is 
considered  as  a  breach  of  the  convention  or  not  and 
consequently  whether  or  not  it  is  considered  as  an 
unreasonable  deviation. 
Also  the  United  Kingdom  jurisprudence  has  stuck  to  the 
78-Mills,  The  Future  of  Deviation,  p  594. 
79-Article  4  (4]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
80-Article  4  [4]  of  the  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States,  1924,1971,1936,  respectively. 
81-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  26. 
82-Article  3  [4]  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
83-Article  5  (6]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 271 
doctrine  as  a  rule  of  substantive  law  and  it  is  too 
firmly  rooted  in  precedent.  Therefore,  they  can  not  alter 
these  principles  except  by  enactment  of  an  act  by 
parliaman.  84 
SECTION  TWO 
THE  DIRECT  EFFECT  OF  UNREASONABLE  DEVIATION  ON  THE 
OBLIGATIONS  OF  THE  CONTRACTING  PARTIES 
It  should  be  borne  in  mind  that  the  meaning  of  and  what 
constitutes  unreasonable  deviation  is  not  confined  to 
geographical  deviation  as  the  United  Kingdom  does,  but  it 
is  extended,  particularly  in  the  United  states,  to 
include  any  serious  change  or  modification  in  the  conduct 
of  the  vessel  or  in  the  course  of  carriage  contracted 
for,  such  as,  stowage  cargo  on  deck,  dry  docking  with 
cargo  aboard..  .  etc. 
The  doctrine  of  unreasonable  deviation  has  effect  on 
the  duties  and  obligations  of  many  parties  and  is  not 
just  effective  in  relation  to  obligations  of  the 
contracting  parties  which  emerge  from  the  contract  of 
carriage  incorporated  in  the  bill  of  lading,  the 
insurance  policy  and  charter  party.  Therefore,  in  order 
to  complete  the  theory  of  the  doctrine  of  unreasonable 
deviation,  I  will  consider  all  its  legal  consequences  on 
the  contract  of  carriage  and  other  documents  which  are 
concerned  in  the  field  of  maritime  transport  as  follows: 
i-Depriving  the  Shipowner's  Right  to  Freight  of  the 
Contract  of  Carriage. 
84-Diplock,  Breach  of  the  Contract,  p  17. 272 
ii-Cancelling  the  protection  Terms  of  the  Contract. 
iii-Will  Unreasonable  Deviation  Avoid  the  Cargo 
Insurance  Cover  and  Will  the  Carrier  be  an  Insurer  of 
the  Goods? 
i-DEPRIVING  THE  SHIPOWNER'S  RIGHT  TO  FREIGHT  OF 
THE  CONTRACT  OF  CARRIAGE. 
The  contract  of  carriage  imports  particular  obligations 
which  have  obliged  the  contracting  parties  to  fulfil  the 
contract  for  the  purposeswhich  were  agreed. 
For  instance,  the  obligation  of  the  shipowner  to 
perform  the  contractual  course  of  the  voyage  with 
reasonable  speed  which  is  usual  for  this  vessel  or  the 
speed  explicitly  or  implicitly  promised  by  the 
s  hipowner85  and  deliver  the  cargoes  at  the  contract 
destination  to  the  consignee  safely  without  loss  or 
damage. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  shipper  or  cargo-owner  is 
obliged  to  pay  the  contract  freight.  Thus,  the  freight  is 
a  reward  to  the  shipowner  when  he  is  performing  his  duty 
by  carrying  and  delivering  the  cargo  safely  to  their 
destination.  86  Deviation  has  many  influences  upon  the 
85-T.  Falkanger,  "The  Risk  of  Delay-Affecting  the  Cargo",  Published 
in  the  Ocean  .  ha  +ng,  Organized  by  the  "UNCTAD"  Secretariat, 
1977,  p  124  at  p  129,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Falkanger". 
86-Scrutton, 
p  329;  Hoyle,  p  209;  F.  D.  Rose,  "Deductions  from 
freight  and  hire  under  English  Law"  11983)  1  LMCLQ,  p  33,  at  p  38, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Rose";  2  Carver,  para,  1661,  where  he  states: 
"The  remuneration  payable  for  the  carriage  of  goods  in  a  ship  is 
called  freight.  Also,  the  same  word  is  often  used  to  denote  a 273 
contract  freight  depending  on  the  characterization  of  the 
effect  of  deviation.  In  the  event  of  a  deviation  being 
considered  as  reasonable87  or  as  a  waiver"  by  the 
cargo-owner  or  the  consignee,  it  seems  to  be  clear  that 
the  contractual  right  to  freight  remains  unaffected  and 
the  shipowners  would  be  entitled  to  full  freight  on 
delivery  of  the  cargoes  at  their  destination.  89 
The  question  still  arises  however  in  case  of 
unreasonable  deviation  of  what  is  the  effect  of  such 
deviation  on  the  contract  freight,  and  what  is  the  right 
of  the  shipowner  to  freight? 
The  effect  of  deviation  upon  a  contract  freight  has 
been  stated  in  a  variety  of  cases  but  not  in  uniform 
language.  It  is  quite  clear  that  prima  facie  freight  is 
deemed  as  the  other  face  of  the  contract  of  carriage 
which  is  not  payable  except  upon  delivery  of  the  cargo90, 
or  offered  for  delivery  at  the  port  of  destination.  91 
Therefore,  many  decisions  held  that  unreasonable 
payment  made  for  the  use  of  a  ship". 
87-Republic  of  Franc  v.  French  Overseas  Corp.  277  U.  S.  p  323,72 
L.  ed,  p  901,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Deviation  by  the  master  of  a  vessel  to  a  port  of  refuge  to  avoid  a 
peril  of  the  sea  does  not  forfeit  the  contract  of  affreightment". 
88-Scrutton,  p  260. 
89-Mr.  Justice,  Greer,  in,  The  ongaldal  Sea  Co.  T  td.  v.  j  1erman 
Lines,  Ltd.  (19201  2  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  639  at  p  642;  Bartle,  p  102. 
90-Collins.  M.  R.  in,  The  London  Transport  Co,  v.  Trechmann 
Brothers  [1940]  1  K.  B.  p  635  at  p  643. 
91_H.  Tiberg,  "The  Risk  of  Having  to  Pay  Additional  Freight  and 
Cost",  Published  in  the  , 
Organized  by  the  UNCTAD  Secretariat,  1980,  p  65  at  p  71, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Tiberg". 274 
deviation  will  deprive  the  shipowner  from  his  own  right 
to  the  contract  freight  even  though  the  voyage  is 
completed  and  the  goods  delivered  at  the  contract 
destination-92  This  means  that  the  performance  of  the 
described  voyage  is  considered  as  a  condition  precedent 
to  the  right  of  the  shipowner  to  the  freight.  93 
Consequently,  the  logic  involved  is  that  an  unreasonable 
deviation  goes  to  the  root  of  the  contract  under  which 
the  goods  are  being  carried  unlawfully  after  deviation 
which  neither  the  shipowner  nor  the  cargo-owner  ever 
asked  the  shipowner  to  perform. 
94 
Another  opinion  has  distinguished  between  if  the 
cargoes  have  been  lost  after  deviation95  or  if  they  have 
been  delivered  at  a  port  other  than  the  agreed 
destination.  96  The  shipowner  is  entitled,  in  the  latter 
case,  to  claim  for  a  reasonable  freight  equal  to  the 
amount  of  the  carriage  and  delivery  of  the  cargo  at  the 
port  of  discharge  even  though  such  a  port  is  other  than 
the  described  destination. 
92-Branson,  J,  in,  Hain  S.  S.  v.  Tate  &  Lyle  (1936]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p 
597  at  p  611;  2  Carver,  para,  1194. 
93-Collins.  M.  R.  in,  the  Xsse  h  Thorley,  Ltd  v.  Or  -hshii  Spa. 
Ltd.  (1907]  1  K.  B.  p  656  at  p  666. 
94-Hain  S.  S.  v.  Tate  &  Lyle.  op.  cit,  p  611. 
95-Jame,  Morrison  v.  Shaw  Savil  (1916]  2  K.  B.  p  783;  Donaldson,  J, 
in,  The  Montedison  S.  P.  A.  v.  ?  croma  S.  P.  A.  (1980]  1  W.  L.  R.  p  48  at  p 
53,  where  he  states: 
"The  mere  fact  that  the  oil  as  delivered  was  not  identical 
commercially  with  the  cargo  as  loaded  did  not  deprive  the 
shipowners  of  their  right  to  freight". 
96-Branson,  J,  in,  The  Hain  S.  S.  Co.  V.  a&  Lyle[19361  2  ALL 
E.  R.  p  597  at  p  612. 275 
United  Kingdom  Law  has  made  a  distinction  between  where 
the  freight  is  payable  as  a  "lump  sumi97  for  the  use  of 
the  ship  and  some  of  the  cargo  is  lost  and  others  is 
delivered.  Then  the  freight  is  not  repayable  but  could  be 
generally  taken  to  reduce  the  freight  claim 
proportionally.  98  If  all  the  cargo  is,  however,  lost  then 
the  shipowner  is  not  entitled  to  freight.  99 
Where  the  freight  is  payable  as  an  "advance  freight" 
and  all  the  cargoes  are  totally  lost,  or  even  the 
completion  of  the  voyage  is  frustratedl0o,  the  freight  can 
not  be  recovered,  because  the  freight  paid  in  advance  is 
to  be  deemed  as  "earned"  by  the  ship  and  such  a  risk  of 
paying  freight  for  nothing  can  be  insured.  Such  a  case, 
nevertheless,  has  no  application  unless  the  freight 
97-Payne  &  Ivamy's,  p  27,  where  he  states: 
"To  earn  lump  sum  freight,  either  the  ship  must  complete  the 
voyage,  or  else  the  cargo  must  be  transhipped,  or  forwarded  by  some 
means  other  than  the  ship  in  which  it  was  originally  loaded,  and 
delivered  by  the  shipowner  or  his  agents  at  its  destination". 
98-Compare,  Rose,  p  41,  where  he  states: 
"First  and  foremost  that  freight  was  not  subject  to  abatement  by  a 
claim  in  respect  of  cargo.  Secondly,  the  charterers  could  not  rely 
on  equitable  set-off:  short  delivery  (unless  a  mounting  to 
repudiation  of  the  contract  of  carriage)  does  not  impeach  the  title 
to  the  legal  demand  for  freight";  See  also,  F.  J.  J.  Cadwallder, 
"English  Shipping  Cases-1972",  (1973-74)  5  J.  Mar.  L  &  Com,  p  407  at 
p  432,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallder,  English  Shipping  Cases- 
1972". 
99-Lars  Gorton,  Rolf  Ihre  &  Arne  Sandevarn,  Shipbroking  and 
Chartering  Practice,  2nd.  ed.  1984,  p  175,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Gorton,  Ihre  &  Sandevarn,  Chartering  Practice";  Cadwallder, 
English  Shipping  Cases-1972,  p  433. 
100-A.  G.  Guest,  An9on's  Law  of  Co  ac.,  1979,  p  520,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Anson's  Law  of  Contract". 276 
clause  is  stated  in  the  contract  of  carriage  or  in  the 
charterparty101  which  has  incorporated  into  the  bill  of 
lading.  102 
In  contrast  United  States  jurisprudence  has  made 
notable  remarks  about  prepaid  freight,  that  it  is  not 
"earned"  until  delivery  has  been  made  at  the  destination 
of  the  goods  where  the  parties  have  contracted. 
Sometimes,  however,  the  voyage  charterparty  provides  a 
clause: 
"Freight  earned  and  payable  upon  shipment,  ship 
and/  or  cargo  lost  or  not  lost". 
The  shipowner,  in  this  case,  is  then  entitled  to 
freight  and  it  is  not  returnable  even  if  the  vessel  and/ 
or  the  cargo  are  lost.  103  Though  the  cargo-owner  or 
claimant  may  be  able  to  maintain  a  cross-action  for 
damages.  104  The  shipowner  is  therefore  entitled  to  recover 
either  the  prepaid  freight  charges  or  to  require  the 
101-Tiberg,  pp  71-71;  F.  J.  J.  Cadwallder,  "Charterparties 
Distribution  of  Functions  Shipowner  and  Charterer",  Published  in 
the  Ocean  Chartering,  Organized  by  the  UNCTAD  Secretariat,  1977,  p 
94  at  p  95,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallder,  Charterparties", 
where  he  states: 
"More  recent  charterparties  provide  that  the  charter  is  only  to  be 
entitled  to  a  reduction  in  hire  in  the  event  of  the  vessel  being 
only  partially  able  to  carry  out  the  immediate  task". 
102-For 
more  detail  and  an  explanation  see,  F.  J.  J.  Cadwallder, 
"Incorporating  Charterparty  Causes  into  Bills  of  Lading",  Published 
in  the  Speaker's  Paprsf  r  the  Bill  of  Lading  Conventions 
Conference,  Organized  by  the  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  1978,  p 
Cadwallder  1,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallder,  Bills  of  Lading". 
103-Gorton,  Ihre  &  Sandevarn,  Chartering  Practice,  p  175. 
104-Cadwallder,  English  Cases-1972,  p  433. 277 
vessel  to  pay  port  expenses  at  ports  other  than  the 
destination  at  which  the  cargo  was  discharged  and 
reasonable  costs  of  on  ward  carriage,  but  not  both.  105 
The  criterion  of  a  quantum  meruit106  is,  however, 
considered  as  a  rightful  freight  to  the  shipowner  after 
deviation,  taking  into  account  all  the  relevant 
circumstances  whether  the  cargoes  have  been  delivered  at 
the  agreed  port  and  without  damagei07  or  substantial 
delay.  108  The  implied  significance  of  this  criterion  is 
not  making  a  balance  between  the  freight  and  the 
performance,  because  the  freight  may  be  low  or  high 
depending  on  the  amount  of  performance  of  the  contract  by 
means  of  a  sanction  of  contracting  parties.  109  In 
addition,  the  relationship  of  carrier  and  cargo-owner 
still  continues  despite  the  deviation  and  the  carrier  is 
carrying  the  goods  as  a  common  carrier.  110 
105-Hellenic  Lines,  Ltd.  v.  United  States,  512  F.  2d,  p  1196  at  p 
1197{1975};  Compare,  Treganna  1415,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  cargo-owner  was  liable  for  the  freight,  but  in  as  much  as  the 
damages  to  the  cargo  exceeded  the  freight  owned,  this  sum  should  be 
surrendered  as  part  of  the  limitation  fund". 
106-Captain  L.  F.  H.  Stanton,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  Sea  Transport, 
1964,  p  148,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Stanton,  Sea  Transport";  Bartle, 
p  101;  Payne  &  Ivamy's,  p  247;  Hain  SS.  Co.  v.  Tate  &  Lyle  Ltd 
[1936]  2ALL  E.  R.  p  597  {H.  L}. 
107-Compare,  Puerto  Madrin  S.  A.  v.  Esso  Standard  nil  C  . 
[1962] 
R.  M.  C.  p  147,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Since  damage  to  cargo  does  not  obviate  the  shipowner's  claim  for 
extra  freight,  charterer  is  liable  for  the  reasonable  value  of 
transportation  to  the  second  port,  not  the  charterer  rate". 
108-Per  Lord  Atkin,  and  per  Lord  Maugham,  in,  Hain  S.  S.  Ca.  v.  Tate 
&  Lvle,  op.  cit,  at  pp  603,616. 
109-Knauth, 
p  242. 
110_2  Carver,  para,  1197;  Bankes  L.  J.  in,  U.  S.  Shipping  Board  v. 278 
ii-CANCELLING  THE  PROTECTION  TERMS  OF  THE  CONTRACT 
In  pre  Hague  Rules,  the  legal  situation  of  unreasonable 
deviation  remains  unchanged  after  the  adoption  of  COGSA 
whether  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  in  the  United  States, 
especially  when  one  recalls  that  neither  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  nor  COGSA  contain  any  provision  concerning  the 
legal  consequences  of  an  unreasonable  deviation.  111 
However,  putting  the  matter  inversely,  it  seems  difficult 
to  believe  that  a  deviation  which  was  unreasonable  by 
breaching  the  fundamental  term  of  contract  of  carriage112, 
ousting  the  contract,  depriving  the  carrier's  right  to 
benefit  of  protecting  terms  of  both  law  and  bill  of 
lading113,  and  consequently,  creating  liability  in  the 
carrier  as  an  "insurer"  for  any  loss  of  or  damage 
suffered  by  the  cargo114,  could  be  to  change  and  abolish 
the  harsh  effect  of  the  doctrine  of  deviation  since  the 
passage  of  the  COGSA  whether  in  the  United  Kingdom  or  in 
the  United  States,  and  the  effect  of  unreasonable 
deviation  will  be  confined  to  claiming  the  loss  or  damage 
caused  by  the  cargo  in  accordance  with  the  liability  for 
damage  with  which  the  deviation  has  some  causal 
J.  J.  Mant_r4  &  Co.  [19221  10  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  573  at  p  575. 
111-Tetley  &  Cleven,  pp  817-818;  Astle,  Shipping  Law,  pp  191,202; 
Knauth,  p  241. 
112-Bartle,  p  98. 
113-st.  Johns  N.  F.  Shipping  Corti.  V.  S.  A.  Companhia  Geral 
Commercial,  263  U.  S.  p  119  at  p  124. 
114_yß;  11  dome  no  v.  Citro  Chemical  Co.  272  U.  S.  p  718  at  p  725; 
Roger,  p  157  at  p  164;  Longley,  p  118. 279 
relationship.  115 
I  will  however  discuss  whether  or  not  the  carrier  has  a 
right  to  depend  upon  the  protecting  terms  in  the 
International  Conventions  and  COGSA  and  what  are  the 
legal  consequences  in  dealing  with  an  unreasonable 
deviation  in  the  following  points: 
1.  Preventing  a  Shipowner  from  Relying  upon  Exemption 
Clauses  Contained  in  the  Sill  of  Lading. 
2.  Loss  of  the  Right  to  Limit  Liability. 
1-PREVENTING  A  SHIPOWNER  FROM  RELYING  UPON 
EXEMPTION  CLAUSES  CONTAINED  IN  THE  BILL  OF  LADING. 
An  inexcusable  deviation  from  the  contemplated  course, 
whether  such  a  deviation  is  geographical,  or 
ungeographical,  exposes  the  goods  to  greater  risk  than 
has  been  agreed  and  consequently  may  cause  the  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo.  Where  the  carrier  has  unreasonably 
deviated  from  the  agreed  or  advertised  course  of  the 
voyage,  he  is  violating  the  contract  of  carriage  by 
breaching  the  fundamental  terms  of  contract  which  go 
deeper  to  the  root  of  venture.  116 
Then,  the  carrier  by  having  failed  to  perform  his  part 
of  the  contract  must  not  be  given  the  benefit  of  any  of 
the  exemption  clauses  contained  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
In  respect  of  an  exemption  clause,  what  is  the  position 
of  the  carrier  when  the  contract  is  repudiated? 
The  explanation  for  this  phenomenon  may  have  varied 
115-Gilmore  &  Black,  pp  180,246. 
116_Knauth, 
p  240;  Coote,  81. 280 
from  time  to  time  and  case  to  case  depending  upon  the 
relevant  circumstances  of  a  particular  case,  especially 
when  one  finds  out  that  the  effect  of  an  unreasonable 
deviation  on  a  carrier's  right  to  the  statutory 
exemptions  provided  by  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  or  COGSA  has 
not  been  made  clear117. 
In  addition,  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  particular 
cases  have  varied  according  to  the  different  theories 
used  by  them  to  show  the  result  of  such  a  deviation. 
The  common  understanding  of  the  position  of  the  carrier 
is  generally  recognized  to  be  the  same  one  which  would 
exist  in  common  law118.  He  is  thus  not  entitled  to  invoke 
the  benefit  of  the  common  law  exceptions  unless  he  can 
prove  that  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  has  occurred 
even  if  the  vessel  had  not  deviated  from  her  course119. 
Carver120  has  made  this  quite  clear  when  he  states: 
117-Longley,  p  126;  Tongig  V.  Flying  Clipper  (1954)  A.  M.  C.  p  259, 
where  it  is  stated: 
"Neither  the  Brussels  Convention  nor  the  COGSA  contains  any 
provision  concerning  the  legal  result  of  an  unjustifiable 
deviation". 
118_Scrutton, 
p  440. 
119_2  Carver,  para,  1196;  Temperley,  pp  78-79;  Tetley,  Selected 
Problems  of  Maritime  Law,  p  560;  Bartle,  p  100;  James  Morrison  & 
Co.  Ltd.  v.  Shaw  Savill  &  Albion  Co.  Ltd.  (1916]  2  K.  B.  p  783; 
Compare,  Astle,  Shipping  Law,  p  202,  where  he  states: 
"The  Shipowner  will  lose  the  benefits  of  the  immunities  from 
liability  conferred  upon  the  carrier  by  the  Rules,  and  the  only 
exceptions  that  the  carrier  would  enjoy  would  be  those  that 
remained  under  common  Law-except,  perhaps,  the  right  to  limit 
liability". 
120_1  Carver,  pars,  550. 281 
"It  is  clear  that  the  Rules  have  not  altered 
the  principle  that  an  unjustifiable  deviation 
deprives  a  ship  of  the  protection  of  exceptions 
from  liability,  or,  indeed,  affected  in  any  way 
the  pre-  existing  position  as  to  the  effect  of 
a  deviation.  In  this  respect  the  exceptions  in 
Article  4  [2]  and  indeed  the  whole  of  the 
Rules,  must  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  contract 
which  is  abrogated  by  the  deviation.  For,  by 
Article  (2]  the  provisions  of  the  Rules  apply 
only  under  a  contract  of  carriage  covered  by  a 
bill  of  lading  or  similar  document  of  title:  if 
that  contract  goes,  so  go  the  Rules  with  it". 
This  view  has  been  debated  by  the  judgements  of  the 
United  Kingdom  courts  which  have  generally  refused  to 
apply  exemption  clauses  to  exonerate  a  deviating  carrier 
from  the  contractual  obligations  in  event  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation.  121  The  general  principle  of  the 
English  Law  concerning  the  doctrine  of  unreasonable 
deviation  Stated  by  Lord  Atkin122,  is  that: 
"I  am  satisfied  that  the  general  principles  of 
English  Law  are  still  applicable  to  the 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea  except  as  modified  by 
the  Act,  and  I  can  find  nothing  in  the  Act 
which  makes  its  statutory  exceptions  apply  to  a 
voyage  which  is  not  the  voyage  the  subject  of 
the  contract  for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea 
to  which  the  Act  applies". 
The  line  of  reasoning  as  I  understood  from  the  said 
view  that  the  unjustifiable  deviation  will  change  the 
character  of  the  voyage  essentially  by  going  to  the  very 
121-Morgan, 
p  484;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  354. 
122-Fo5colo.  Mango  v.  stag  Line  (1931]  41  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  165  at  p  170; 
(1932]  A.  C.  p  328  at  p  340. 282 
root  of  the  contract  of  carriage.  123  As  a  result  of  such 
an  abrogation  the  entire  contract  which  was  incorporated 
into  the  bill  of  lading,  including  all  the  exception 
clauses,  is  annulled.  124 
Thus,  if  the  carrier  failed  to  perform  the  contracted 
course  of  voyage  as  a  condition  precedent  in  a  particular 
case  upon  which  his  right  to  rely  on  the  exception 
clause,  then  he  cannot  avail  himself  of  the  exoneration 
clauses  which  only  exist  in  the  bill  of  lading  for  his 
benefit125  by  permitting  himself  deliberately  to  ignore 
the  main  object  of  the  contract  and  disregard  the 
intention  of  the  contracting  parties.  126 
By  way  of  illustration  one  must  not  confuse  between  the 
consequences  of  a  fundamental  breach  which  is 
characterized  on  the  construction  basis  and  maritime 
deviation  which  is  based  on  the  substantive  rule  of  law. 
Then  the  question  of  whether  there  was  a  fundamental  or 
material  breach  or  not  and  whether  such  a  breach 
nullifies  an  exemption  clause  would  have  reference  to  the 
question  of  the  construction  of  an  exemption  clause127 
123-Astle,  Shipping  Law,  p  192. 
124-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  168;  Denning,  L.  J.  in,  Spu  ling  v. 
Bradshaw  (1956]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  121  at  p  124. 
125-Collins,  M.  R.  in,  Joseph  Thorley  v.  Orchis.  S.  S.  (1907]  1  K.  B. 
p  660  at  p  668;  Compare,  Benton  v.  Palmyra  (1957]  A.  C.  p  149  at  p 
150;  Pickford,  J,  in,  Tnternational  CuanoEngtpnr  Phosnhaat  Werken 
v.  Robert  MacAndrew  (1909]  2  K.  B.  p  360  at  p  365;  Temperly,  pp  78- 
79. 
126-Sze  Hai  Tong  Ban  v.  Rambler  Cycle  (1959]  A.  C.  p  576  at  p  588; 
John  Carter  v.  $ansan  Haulage  (1965]  2  Q.  B.  p  495  at  p  496. 
127-N.  Chandrahsan,  "Fundamental  Obligation  Theory",  (19791  5 
Colombo  Law  Review,  p  115  at  p  117,  hereinafter  cited 283 
under  contract  law  in  general. 
The  decisions  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  given  cases  move 
directly  towards  adopting  a  universal  rule  by 
characterizing  the  effects  of  exception  clauses  depending 
on  their  proper  interpretation.  128  The  general  principle 
of  English  Law  has  not  prohibited  or  nullified  a  clause 
of  exemption  of  liability  for  a  fundamental  breach  or 
breach  of  fundamental  term,  which  is  based  upon  the 
principle  of  freedom  of  contract. 
Lord  Wilberforce129  has  made  that  quite  clear  by 
saying: 
"Whether  a  condition  limiting  liability  is 
effective  or  not  is  a  question  of  construction 
of  that  condition  in  the  context  of  the 
contract  as  a  whole". 
An  exclusion  clause  must  be  clearly  and  unambiguously 
expressed  in  order  to  be  effective  in  excluding  liability 
for  negligence.  130 
On  the  other  hand  the  real  construction  of  the 
exemption  clause  is  that  exemption  or  exclusion  clauses 
are  not  intended  to  give  exoneration  from  the 
consequences  of  the  fundamental  breach  in  the  case  of 
fraud,  illegality  and  the  like.  If  there  was  however  a 
as"Chandrahsan". 
128-Brian  Coote,  "The  Effect  of  Discharge  by  Breach  on  Exception 
Clauses",  (1970]  C.  L.  J.  p  221  at  p  238,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Coote, 
Discharge  by  Breach";  George  Mitchell  (Chi  rha  l1  TLtd.  v.  iirinay 
Lock  Seeds  Ltd  (1983]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  737. 
129-Ailsa  Craig  Fishing  Co.  Ltd  v.  Finney  Loo  Se  da  Lt-d  & 
-Another 
(19831  1  ALL  E.  R.  pp  101-102. 
130-Lord  Wiberforce,  Ibid,  at  p  102. 284 
clear  and  deliberate  intention  when  the  contract  was  made 
that  an  exemption  clause  should  cover  such  a  material  or 
a  fundamental  breach,  then  the  law  should  enforce  such 
clauses131. 
Lord  Fraser  of  Tullybelton132  has  adopted  a  wide 
criterion  which  applies  even  in  the  case  of  negligence, 
where  he  states: 
"In  my  opinion  it  is.  It  applies  to  any 
liability  whether  under  the  express  or  implied 
terms  of  this  contract,  or  at  common  law,  or  in 
any  other  way  liability  at  common  law  is 
undoubtedly  wide  enough  to  cover  liability 
including  the  negligence  of  the  proferens 
itself,  so  that  even  without  relying  on  the 
final  words  "any  other  way".  I.  am  clearly  of 
opinion  that  the  negligence  of  securicor  is 
covered". 
I  am  however  inclined  strongly  in  favour  of  the  view 
which  classifies  the  exclusion  clause  into  fair  or 
reasonable  and  unreasonable  in  order  to  apply  it  to  a 
particular  case  after  determining  whether  it  was  in 
standard  form,  whether  there  was  equality  of  bargaining 
power,  the  nature  of  the  breach133,  and  the  circumstances 
131-Stevenson.  v.  Henders  on  (1873]  1  R.  p  215  at  pp  220-221; 
Compare,  Lord  Wilberforce,  in,  Suisse  Atlantiove  [1967]  1  A.  C.  p 
361  at  pp  431-32,  where  he  states: 
"The  parties  should  not  be  free  to  use  contract  to  a  mere 
declaration  of  intent";  L  ord  Ordinary  (Kincraig),  in,  A  lexander_ 
Stephen  Iforthl  Ltd.  v.  . "[.  T  Riley  fU.  K{  Ltd.  1976  S.  L.  T.  p  269  at 
p  272. 
132-Ailsa  Craig  Fishing  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Malvern  Fi  shing  C  o.  .,  td  & 
Another,  (1983)  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  101  at  p  107. 
133-Chandrahasan  119  ,p  . 285 
prevailing  at  the  time  of  the  breach  rather  than  at  the 
time  the  contract  was  made. 
134 
This  attitude  tends  to  restrict  or  limit  the  effect  of 
exemption  clauses  which  is  based  on  the  rational  that 
there  is  inequality  of  bargaining  power  and  that  the 
terms  have  been  imposed  on  the  weaker  party.  135 
For  instance,  if  the  strong  party  uses  his  superior 
power  to  impose  an  exemption  clause  on  the  weaker  party, 
he  will  not  be  allowed  to  rely  on  it  if  he  has  himself 
been  guilty  of  a  breach  going  to  the  root  of  the 
contract.  However,  such  contract  is  called  an  adhesion 
contract  because  there  is  an  unequal  bargaining 
relationship  existing  between  them  when  it  is  drafted  by 
the  carrier  leaving  no  real  freedom  of  choice  to  the 
shipper.  136 
On  the  other  hand,  the  doctrine  of  deviation  which  is 
based  on  the  substantive  rule  of  law  has  considerable 
effects  on  the  contract  of  carriage  in  particular.  By  way 
of  example,  if  the  result  of  failure  to  perform  the 
course  of  voyage  is  considered  to  be  completely  contrary 
to  the  main  object  of  the  contract  this  brings  the  entire 
contract  to  an  end  including  the  exemption  clauses 
134_G 
-orge  Mitchell  fCh  n  er.  hal)  l  Ltd.  v.  Finney  Lock  Seeds  Ltd 
(1983]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  737  at  p  738. 
135-Chandrahasan,  p  121. 
136-Steven,  p  1549;  Compare,  Griffiths,  J,  in,  A  W.  Green  v.  Cada 
Bros  [1978]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  602  at  p  607,  where  he  states: 
"They  are  therefore  not  conditions  imposed  by  the  strong  upon  the 
weak;  but  are  rather  a  set  of  trading  terms  upon  which  both  sides 
are  apparently  content  to  do  business". 286 
whether  the  parties  had  equal  bargaining  power  or  not.  137 
This  view  is  however  not  universally  accepted  and  has 
been  questioned  by  several  critics. 
138 
Some  courts  as  well  as  authors139  have  therefore  taken 
the  view  which  held  to  retain  the  legal  consequences  of 
the  exception  clauses  which  excludes  or  modifies  an 
obligation  whether  contractual  or  statutory  and  whether 
primary,  secondary  or  anticipatory,  according  to  the 
general  rules  of  the  freedom  of  contract  that  any  person 
capable  of  making  a  contract  is  free  to  enter  into  any 
contract  he  may  chooses140  unless  such  a  contract  is 
against  the  equitable  rule  and  penalties. 
141 
The  American  jurisprudence  appear  to  have  been 
supporting  this  notion,  even  though,  their  decisions  have 
been  contradicted  among  circuits  about  the  effect  of 
deviation  on  the  exception  clauses. 
The  first  line  of  cases  reveal  that  a  deviation  from 
137-McNair,  J,  in,  W  olmer  v.  elm_  Price  (1955]  1  Q.  B.  p  291  at 
pp  294-95;  Lord  Reid,  in,  Suisse  Atlantigue  (19671  1  A.  C.  p  361  at 
p  399;  Chandrahasan,  p  122;  Thomson,  "Fundamental  Breach  and 
English  Law",  1977  J.  R.  p  38  at  p  47,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Thomson,  Fundamental  Breach";  Richard  Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p 
52,;  Compare,  Ails,  i  Craig  Fishing  Co.  v.  Malvern  Fishing  Cc,  (1983] 
1  ALL  E.  R.  p  101;  George  Mitchell  v.  Finney  Lock  Seeds  Ltd.  (1983] 
2  ALL  E.  R.  p  737. 
138-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  pp  172-73. 
139-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  181,  where  he  states: 
"Certainly,  a  construction  is  appealing  which  would  abolish  the 
drastic  effect  of  deviation,  leading  the  carrier  liable  for  damages 
caused  by  the  undoubted  breach  of  duty  involved";  Whitehead,  p  48. 
140-Lord  Salmon,  in,  Photo  Production  v.  Secur_i  or,  (1980]  A.  C.  p 
827  at  p  828  (H.  L.  }. 
141-Lord  Diplock,  Ibid,  at  p  850. 287 
the  contract  of  carriage  as  amount  to  an  unreasonable 
deviation  will  displace  the  bill  of  lading  and  all  its 
terms142. 
MacDonald,  J143,  has  made  this  quite  clear  when  he 
approved  the  judgment  of  Lord  Denning,  M.  R.  in,  Levison 
v.  Steam  Carpet  Cleaning  Co.  Ltdl44,  about  the  effect  of 
fundamental  breach  on  the  exempting  clause  as  follows: 
"The  Court  will,  whenever  it  can,  construe  the 
contract  so  that  an  exemption  or  limitation 
clause  only  avails  the  party  when  he  is 
carrying  out  the  contract  in  substance,  and  not 
when  he  is  breaking  it  in  a  manner  which  goes 
to  the  very  root  of  the  contract". 
It  is  therefore  true  that  COGSA  allows  a  freedom  of 
contracting  out  of  its  terms,  but  only  in  the  direction 
of  increasing  the  shipowner's  liabilities,  and  never  in 
the  direction  of  diminishing  them145. 
Obviously,  this  line  of  cases  purports  to  give  the 
innocent  party  the  right  to  deprive  the  shipowners  from 
the  exempting  clauses  contained  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
resulting  from  intentional  breaches  of  the  contract  of 
carriage  which  have  committed  by  the  shipowner's  command 
with  a  deliberate  intention.  Viz,  if  the  deviation  was 
142_Jones 
V.  Flying  Clipper  (1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  259  at  pp  263-64;  Sn 
The  Matter  of  S  ngapore  Nav=C  .  S.  A.  (1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  875;  B.  th  Ann 
(1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  117. 
143..  0  v.  Far  pastern  SS.  _o.  [1978]  A.  M.  C.  p  2210  at  p  2229. 
144_(1973]  3  ALL  E.  R.  p  498  at  p  504;  119781  1  Q.  B.  p  69  at  p  81. 
145_Gilmore  &  Black,  p  145;  EncyclopBedja  nr  an  ina  V.  ongKonv 
Producer  (1969]  A.  M.  C.  p  1741  at  p  1747;  Sider  urgica  v.  North 
Ern  press  (1977]  A.  M.  C.  p  1140  at  p  1144. 288 
done  intentionally,  then  the  act  should  have  been 
classified  as  an  unreasonable  deviation  and  the  other 
party  to  the  contract  is  entitled  to  treat  the  contract 
as  at  an  end  and  he  is  no  longer  bound  by  these 
protecting  terms  from  the  moment  the  deviation 
commences.  146 
This  means  that  the  negligence  by  itself,  without  more, 
is  not  a  breach  which  goes  to  the  root  of  the  contract.  147 
It  does  however  not  mean  that  gross  negligence  can  never 
go  to  the  root  of  the  contract  especially  when  the 
carrier  handled  the  goods  so  roughly  he  was  reckless  and 
indifferent  to  their  safety,  he  would  be  guilty  of  a 
breach  of  fundamental  terms  of  the  contract  and  could  not 
rely  on  the  exempting  clause. 
148 
Also,  where  the  neglect  caused  a  fire  with  causal 
connection  to  the  deviation,  the  carrier  could  be 
deprived  of  the  benefit  of  the  exemption  clauses.  149 
146-Roger, 
pp  181-82;  Morgan,  p  493;  Lord  Atkin,  in,  Hain  SS.  Co. 
Ltýj.  v.  Tate  &  Lyle  Ltd  [1936]  41  Com.  Cas,  p  350  (19361  2  ALL  E.  R. 
p  597  {H.  L.  },  where  he  states: 
"..  the  breach  of  deviation  does  not  automatically  cancel  the 
express  contract,  otherwise,  the  shipowner  by  his  own  wrong  act  get 
rid  of  his  own  contract". 
147-waalHaven  [1930]  A.  M.  C.  p  27,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  distinction  between  a  deliberately  planned  deviation  and  gross 
negligence  compelling  the  inference  that  deviation  was  intended  is 
tenuous". 
148-Captain  v.  Far  Eastern  SS.  Co.  [1978]  A.  M.  C.  p  2210  at  p  2225, 
Approved  the  judgment  of  Mcnair,  J,  in,  Woolmer  v.  Delmer  Price. 
Ltd.  [1955]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  377;  Scrutton,  p  264. 
149-Ida,  [19351  A.  M.  C.  p  302;  The  Tai  Shan  (Fire),  [1955]  A.  M.  C.  p 
420;  Compare,  lndrapuura,  171,  Fed.  Rep.  1909,  p  929  at  p  930,  where 289 
Accordingly,  where  fire  is  due  to  the  actual  fault  or 
privity  of  the  carrier,  the  shipowner  is  not  entitled  to 
the  defence  of  the  fire  statutes  and  COGSA  fire 
exception.  150  He  will  therefore  be  responsible  for  loss  of 
cargo  by  fire  during  such  a  deviation.  151 
Consequently,  if  the  deviation  is  not  such  a  departure 
as  could  have  gone  to  the  root  of  the  contract,  then  the 
carrier  could  rely  on  the  exception  of  "Fire"  either  by 
an  exemption  in  the  bill  of  lading  or  by  COGSA.  152 
However,  according  to  the  new  line  of  cases  in  American 
jurisprudence  which  have  purported  to  protect  the  carrier 
from  the  responsibility  caused  by  deviation  in  enforcing 
the  exception  clauses. 
The  court  has  made  this  clear  in  Herman  Schulte153,  as 
follows: 
"The  language  of  the  statute,  if  it  constitutes 
a  change  of  existing  law,  according  to  the  rule 
applied  to  other  statutes,  is  sufficiently 
clear  and  unmistakable". 
This  trend  of  view  has  been  criticized  by  many 
it  is  stated: 
"The  owner  of  a  vessel  which  has  deviated  from  her  voyage  by  his 
order  is  not  relieved  from  liability  for  loss  of  cargo  by  fire 
during  such  deviation  either  by  an  exemption  of  loss  by  fire  in  the 
bill  of  lading  or  by  Rev.  St.  para  4282,4283". 
150-pin 
M  b.  rty  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1681. 
151-Indrapura,  op.  cit,  at  p  930. 
152-Orient  Trader  (Canada,  Exchequer  Court,  Ontario  Admiralty 
District),  [1972]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  35  at  p  36. 
153-Atlantic-  Mutual  v.  Poseidon[1930]  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  pp  668-69; 
Merman  Sch  utl  _,  rational  was  followed  by  a  Florida  District,  in, 
Nassau  Class  Co.  v.  Noel  Roberts,  Ltd,  249  F.  Supp,  p  116  (S.  D.  Fla 
1955,  (Quoted  from  Roger,  p  178,  n,  116). 290 
authors154  who  have  based  their  conclusion  on  the  fact 
that  any  act  which  is  characterized  by  the  court  as 
unreasonable,  the  court  should  declare  the  contract 
either  void  or  voidable  and  such  an  act  would  be 
sufficient  to  establish  a  violation  of  COGSA155. 
The  Rules  then  merely  apply  if  the  contract  is  valid, 
either  by  carrying  out  the  terms  of  the  contract  or  by 
waiving  the  deviation  and  affirming  all  the  contract, 
including  the  exemption  clauses156, 
Otherwise  it  would  be  beyond  the  scope  of  the  Rules  and 
there  is  no  possibility  to  apply  the  Rules  in  event  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation157. 
2-LOSS  OF  THE  RIGHT  TO  LIMIT  LIABILITY 
In  order  to  reveal  the  background  of  the  nature  and  the 
central  purpose  behind  the  carrier's  loss  of  his  right  to 
limit  liability158,  it  is  necessary  to  consider  the 
154-Roger,  p  179;  Morgan,  p  493. 
155-Roger,  p  179;  Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  819. 
156-Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  146. 
157-Falih,  p  439. 
158-H.  B.  Williams,  "The  Limitation  Versus  Direct  Action  Statutes", 
[1975]  8  Vanderbilt  Journal  of  Transportational  Law,  pp  815-18, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Williams,  Limitation",  where  he  states: 
"The  earliest  legislation  in  the  United  Kingdom  upon  the  limitation 
of  liability  was  passed  in  1734  which  discharged  the  shipowner  from 
any  responsibility  for  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargoes  on  board  the 
vessel  sustained  by  embezzlement  of  the  master  or  marines  or  by 
them  without  the  privity  or  knowledge  of  such  owner.  In  1786,  the 
limitation  of  liability  was  covered  to  losses  of  robbery  even 
though  the  master  and  marines,  had  no  part,  to  losses  by  their 
negligence  and  to  damage  done  by  collision.  In  1813,  the  limitation 
had  been  extended  to  case  of  loss  by  negligence  of  the  master  or 291 
following  points: 
1.  The  General  Principle  of  the  Limitation  of  the 
Carrier's  Liability. 
2.  How  and  When  Does  the  Carrier  Lose  the  Right  to 
Limit  Liability. 
"1"THE  GENERAL  PRINCIPLE  OF  THE  LIMITATION  OF  THE 
CARRIER'S  LIABILITY 
The  carrier  is  entitled  to  limit  his  liability  for  loss 
of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  in  accordance  with 
international  principles  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  the 
Hamburg  Rules  and  COGSA  as  follows: 
"i"  Article  (5]  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides: 
marines  and  to  damage  done  to  other  vessels  and  their  cargoes. 
The  earliest  legislation  in  the  United  States  upon  this  subject  is 
a  Massachusetts  Statute,  taken  substantially  from  the  statute  of 
George  II,  passed  in  1818  and  revised  in  1836.  It  was  followed  by 
an  act  of  the  Marine  legislature  in  1821,  copied  from  the  statute 
of  Massachusetts. 
In  1815,  enacted  the  limited  liability  Act.  By  the  Act  of  June  26, 
1884,  it  was  extended  possibility  of  limitation  against  all  claims 
except  seamen's  wages;  was  extended  to  non-maritime  torts  and  to 
claims  arising  either  excontractu  or  ex  delicto. 
The  Act  of  1886  excluding  the  application  of  the  act  to  inland 
vessels  and  the  limitation  statutes  were  applied  "to  all  sea  going 
vessels,  and  also  to  all  vessels  used  on  lakes  and  rivers  or  in 
inland  navigation". 
However,  the  Supreme  Court  went  further  and  rejected  an  argument 
that  claims  under  para  33  of  the  Merchant  Marine  Act  of  1920  were 
not  subject  to  limitation  and  had  been  decided  that  an  action  under 
this  law,  to  recover  damages  for  the  death  of  a  sea-man,  may  be 
enjoined  in  a  Federal  Court  in  a  proceeding  under  the  admiralty 
rules  for  limitation  of  liability  of  the  shipowner";  Fas.  Rivet 
Towing  Co,  266  U.  S.  p  355;  69  L.  ed.  p  324. 292 
"Neither  the  carrier  nor  the  ship  shall  in  any 
event  be  or  become  liable  for  any  loss  or 
damage  to  or  in  connection  with  goods  in  an 
amount  exceeding  £100  pounds  sterling  per 
package  or  unit,  or  the  equivalent  of  that  sum 
in  other  currency  unless  the  nature  and  value 
of  such  goods  have  been  declared  by  the  shipper 
before  shipment  and  inserted  in  the  bill  of 
lading". 
"ii"  This  Article  has  been  deleted  by  Article  [2)  of 
the  Visby  Rules  and  replaced  by  the  following: 
(a)  Unless  the  nature  and  value  of  such  goods 
have  been  declared  by  the  shipper  before 
shipment  and  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
neither  the  carrier  nor  the  ship  shall  in  any 
event  be  or  become  liable  for  any  loss  or 
damage  to  or  in  connection  with  the  goods  in  an 
amount  exceeding  the  equivalent  of  10,000 
Francs  per  package  or  unit  or  30  Francs  per 
Kilo  of  gross  weight  of  the  goods  lost  or 
damaged,  whichever  is  the  higher". 
"iii"  Article  (21  of  the  Brussels  Protocol  of  1979  to 
the  Hague  /Visby  Rules  provides  that: 
1.  Article  4,  paragraph  5(a)  of  the  Convention 
is  replaced  by  the  following: 
(a)  Unless  the  nature  and  value  of  such  goods 
have  been  declared  by  the  shipper  before 
shipment  and  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading, 
neither  the  carrier  nor  the  ship  shall  in  any 
event  be  or  become  liable  for  any  loss  or  damage 
to  or  in  connection  with  the  goods  in  an  amount 
exceeding  666.67  units  of  account  per  package  or 
unit  or  2  units  of  account  per  kilogramme  of 293 
gross  weight  of  the  goods  lost  or  damaged, 
whichever  is  the  higher". 
2.  Article  4,  paragraph  5(d)  of  the  Convention 
is  replaced  by  the  following: 
"(d)  The  unit  of  account  mentioned  in  this 
Article  is  the  Special  Drawing  Right  as  defined 
by  the  International  Monetary  Fund". 
"iv"  COGSA  1971  of  the  United  Kingdom  was  amended  by 
the  Merchant  Shipping  Act  1981  which  implemented  the 
Brussels  Protocol  of  1979  and  substituted  special 
drawing  rights  for  the  unit  of  limitation.  * 
"v"  The  Articles  of  COGSA  in  the  United  Kingdom  and 
United  States  are  identical  to  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
"vi"  Article  6[lj{a}  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  states: 
"The  liability  of  the  carrier  for  loss 
resulting  from  loss  of  or  damage  to  goods 
according  to  the  provisions  of  Article  [5]  is 
limited  to  an  amount  equivalent  to  835  units  of 
account  per  package  or  other  shipping  unit  or 
2.5  units  of  account  per  kilogramme  of  gross 
weight  of  the  goods  lost  or  damaged,  whichever 
is  the  higher". 
The  purposes  of  these  provisions  purport  to  protect  the 
carrier  or  the  shipper  from  the  particular  packages  of 
unexpectedly  high  value  and  to  prevent  the  shipowner  from 
lessening  his  liability  otherwise  than  as  stated  in  the 
Rules.  159 
On  the  other  hand,  where  the  Rules  and  COGSA  do  not 
*.  Chorley  &  Giles',  (8th  ed,  1987),  p.  170. 
159-Article  3  181  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Al-Jazairy,  p  190). 294  ý--Z' 
apply,  the  shipowners  are  entitled  to  limit  their 
liability  to  any  amount  they  agreed  upon.  160  The  yardstick 
of  the  calculation  of  limits  based  on  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules,  the  Hamburg  Rules  and  COGSA,  is  totally  different 
depending  upon  the  methods  of  computing  the  total  sum  of 
damages  and  the  figure  of  packages  or  units  and  weights. 
I  will  therefore  discuss  the  following  points: 
"A"  The  Single  System  of  Limitation. 
"B"  The  Effect  of  Containerization  and  palletization  on 
the  "Per  Package  or  Unit"  Concept. 
"C"  The  Dual  System  of  Limitation. 
"A"  THE  SINGLE  SYSTEM  OF  LIMITATION 
All  the  International  Rules  and  COGSA  have  adopted  the 
single  system  of  the  limitation  of  the  carrier's 
liability  based  on  "per  package  or  unit"  even  though  some 
ambiguities  and  equivocations  have  appeared  in  the 
application  of  several  courts  which  have  not  interpreted 
these  terms  uniformly. 
It  is  therefore  necessary  to  point  out  the  difference 
between  and  the  definitions  of  "package"  and  "unit"  in 
order  to  draw  the  carrier's  liability161  as  follows: 
"1"  Per  Package. 
"2"  Per  Unit. 
160-Payne  &  Ivamy,  p  176. 
161-Tallman  Bissell,  "The  Operational  Realities  of  Containerization 
and  Their  Effect  on  the  "package"  Limitation  and  the  On-Deck 
Prohibition:  Review  and  Suggestion",  (1970-71]  45  Tul.  L.  Rev,  p  902 
at  p  903,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Bissell". 295 
"1"  PER  PACKAGE 
The  interpretation  of  this  term  has  arisen  several 
difficulties  in  applying  it  by  the  courts  of  various 
contracting  states.  162  This  renders  it  difficult  to  make  a 
unified  law  to  explain  the  elements  and  purposes  of  this 
expression. 
The  term  package  was  not  defined  in  the  Article  4[5]  of 
the  Hague  Rules  and  COGSA.  The  Visby  Rules  and  the 
Hamburg  Rules  used  the  same  expression,  but  the  latter 
Rules  set  forth  further  explanation  by  providing  Article 
6(1)  (a)  : 
11  per  package  or  unit". 
Theoretically,  the  term  package  includes  goods  packed 
up  or  made  up  for  portability163,  or  as  Tetley  puts  it 
"a  wrapper,  carton  or  other  container  in  which  cargo  has 
been  placed  for  carriage".  164 
In  particular  cases,  the  jurisprudence  of  various 
countries  has  differed  on  that  which  constitutes  the 
elements  and  the  purposes  of  per  package  limitation. 
Goddard,  J165,  defined  this  term  as: 
162-Erling  Selvig,  "Unit  Limitation  and  Alternative  Types  of 
Limitation  of  Carrier's  Liability",  Published  in  Six  Lectures  on 
the  Hague  Rules,  1967,  p  109  at  p  110,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Selvig,  Unit  Limitation". 
163-Temperley,  p79;  Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  111;  Lexicographical 
definition  of  "package"  is  "a  bundle  of  things  packed,  parcel, 
box...  etc.  in  which  things  are  packed";  See,  The  Pocket  oxford 
Dictionary,  (6th.  ed,  1978),  p  632,  hereinafter  cited  as  "The  Pocket 
Oxford  Dictionary". 
164-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  435. 
165-Feinberg, 
ct,  j,  in,  standard  El  c  _rina  v.  Hamburg 
Sudamerikanische.  11967]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  193,  (U.  S.  Court  of 
Appeals,  Second  Circuit);  Studebaken  Distributors,  Ltd.  v.  Charlton 
5. S. -Co.  [1938]  1  K.  B.  p  459  at  p  467;  whajt  v.  The  Lan  ash  & 296 
"package  must  indicate  something  packed". 
This  means  that  the  lost  or  damaged  goods  shipped 
unpacked,  or  unboxed,  can  never  be  deemed  goods  in  any 
imagination  as  packages. 
The  purposes  of  Article  4[5]  of  the  Rules  or  COGSA  was 
to  protect  cargo.  Then  the  "package"  would  completely 
include  goods  which  made  up  for  facilitating  the  handling 
of  the  goods  during  transport,  set  a  reasonable  figure 
below  which  the  carrier  should  not  be  permitted  to  limit 
his  liability166  and  to  protect  the  shipowner  from  any 
excessive  or  unforeseen  claims  of  high  value  goods  which 
were  not  inserted  in  the  bill  of  lading.  This  definition 
of  the  package  does,  nevertheless,  not  reveal  how  much 
packaging  or  covering  of  the  goods  is  required  so  as  to 
determine  what  constitutes  a  "package".  167 
The  United  States  Courts  held  that  the  shape,  size,  or 
weight  of  the  cargo  has  however  no  effect  on  the 
determination  of  whether  the  packed  goods  constitutes 
package  or  not. 
Judge  Moore168,  has  made  this  clear  when  he  concluded: 
"The  meaning  of  "package"  which  has  evolved 
from  the  cases  can  be  said  to  define  a  class  of 
cargo,  irrespective  of  size,  shape,  or  weight, 
to  which  some  packing  preparation  for 
Kirkbank,  9  L.  R.  Exch,  p  67,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Contained  in  any  parcel  or  package,  unless  a  greater  value  was 
declared  for  the  goods". 
166-Chief  Judge,  Friendly,  in,  the  Mormac1ynx  [1971]  A.  M.  C.  p  476  at 
p  486. 
167_Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  111;  Falih,  p  95;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  58. 
168_Al"minioa  Pozu  io,  L  d.  v.  S.  S.  Maviga  o  (1968]  A.  M.  C.  p  2532. 297 
transportation  has  been  made  which  facilitates 
handling,  but  which  does  not  necessarily 
conceal  or  completely  enclose  the  goods". 
v 
Thus,  the  mere  size  will  never  prevent  the  goods  from 
being  a  package.  169  For  instance,  a  railway  wagon170,  a 
roll  of  steel  weighing  32.1/2  tons  in  a  wooden  case1711a 
container172,  a  crated  machine173  and  a  pallet  loaded  with 
goods174,  have  all  been  to  be  packages.  175 
"2"PER  UNIT 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  provide  in 
Article  4[5]  and  Article  6[l]{a}  respectively  the  phrase 
"per  unit"  which  it  has  wider  meaning  than  the  term  "per 
package". 
One  can  therefore  say  that  if  the  damaged  cargo  does 
not  constitute  a  "package",  then  the  limitation  of 
liability  is  based  on  per  unit.  176  Viz,  the  limitation  of 
liability  is  extended  to  goods  which  are  not  shipped  in 
"packages".  177 
The  "unit"  concept  may  be  construed  as  "shipping  unit" 
169_Scrutton,  p  442. 
170_ße  v.  Lancashire  &  Yorkshire  R.  Y.  Co.  (1874)  L.  R.  9  EX.  p  67. 
171-Mitsubishi  International  Corp.  v.  S.  S.  "Palme-  o  Stut_"(1963] 
A.  M.  C.  p  958. 
172-Encye1  aed  a  Britannica  Inc.  v.  Hongkong  Produc.  r(1969)  A.  M.  C. 
p  1741;  [1969]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  536. 
173-Carl.  &  Montanara  inc.  v.  American  Export  Tab  and  sc  Lines, 
275  F.  Supp,  p  76  (1967). 
174-Standard  Electr_ica  S.  A.  v.  Hamburg  Sud-Am  _ri  kan  s  .h. 
(19671  2 
L1oyd's.  Rep.  p  193. 
175-Scrutton,  p  442;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  435-436. 
176-Bissell,  p  906. 
177-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  45. 298 
such  as  the  physical  unit  as  received  by  the  carrier  from 
the  shipper,  e.  g.;  an  unboxed  tractor  or  yacht,  a  barrel, 
a  sack  ...  etc;  or,  it  may  refer  to  the  "freight  unit", 
i.  e;  the  unit  of  measurement  applied  to  calculate  the 
freight178,  or  it  may  refer  to  the  "commercial  unit"  in 
which  the  particular  commodity  is  customarily  traded, 
e.  g.;  timber.  179  The  latter  unit  may  be  deemed  as  a 
freight  unit  by  which  the  freight  of  carriage  is 
calculated  or  it  may  refer  to  the  unit  by  which  the 
purchase  price  is  computed. 
180 
The  distinction  between  package  and  unit  is  of  little 
interest  when  the  "unit"  is  considered  as  a  "shipping 
unit"  which  embraces  the  term  "package".  181 
The  position  will  be  different  when  the  "Unit"  is 
considered  as  a  "Freight  Unit"  which  is  usually  based  on 
the  weight  or  value  of  the  cargo.  The  calculation  based 
upon  "Freight  Unit"  will  be  however  higher  than  those 
based  upon  "Shipping  Unit".  182 
The  concept  of  the  "Unit"  has  been  made  quite  clear 
under  the  United  States  COGSA  by  using  a  new  phraseology 
to  the  "Unit"  which  is  expressed  as  a  "Per  Customary 
Freight  Unit".  )B3  The  term  "Freight"  may  refer  both  to 
the  money  paid  for  the  transportation  and  the  goods 
carried.  184 
178-Scrutton,  p  442;  Wilson,  p  146;  Falih,  p  128. 
179-Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  111;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  58. 
180-Falih,  p  129. 
181-Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  111;  Samir  Mankabady,  58. 
182-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  l/  p  45;  Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  111; 
Falih,  p  128. 
183-Article  4  (51  of  United  States  COGSA. 
184-Selvig,  Unit  Limitation,  p  115. 299 
Judge  Chestnut,  in,  the  Brazil  Oiticia,  Lt 
.  V. 
X185,  has  made  this  term  clear  when  he  said: 
"Generally,  in  marine  contracts  the  word 
"Freight"  is  used  to  denote  remuneration  or 
reward  for  carriage  of  goods  by  ship,  rather 
than  the  goods  themselves". 
Then  the  trend  of  American  jurisprudence  seems  to 
accept  the  unit  on  which  the  freight  is  based  as  the 
"Customary  Freight  Unit"  unless  the  freight  unit  employed 
was  a  mere  false.  186 
The  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  in  Article  4[5]  defines 
however  the  term  unit  as  being  equivalent  to  a  "Shipping 
Uniti187,  which  is  measured  by  "package".  This  means  that 
the  term  "Unit"  is  extended  to  cover  goods  which  are  not 
shipped  in  packages188  when  Article  4[5]  added  the  term 
"or  unit"  after  the  term  "per  package". 
Under  United  Kingdom  COGSA  the  term  "Unit"  should  thus 
be  construed  as  the  "Shipping  Unit"  which  has  the  same 
effect  of  per  packages  limitation-189  Whereas,  the  COGSA 
of  United  States  provides  a  "Customary  Freight  Unit" 
which  differs  from  the  prevailing  view  point  in  the  Hague 
Rules,  which  refers  to  "Shipping  Units".  190 
185_(1944]  A.  M.  C.  p  883  at  p  887,  affirmed,  (1945  A.  M.  C.  p  108  (4th. 
Cir.  1944). 
186-George  F.  Wood,  "Damages  in  Cargo  Cases",  (1970-71]  45  Tu1.  L. 
Rev.  p  932  at  p  948,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo". 
187-Bissell,  p  904. 
188-Falih,  pp  130-143;  Bissell,  p  904. 
189-Compare,  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  438-39. 
190-Chandler,  p  268. 300 
B-THE  EFFECT  OF  CONTAINERIZATION  AND  PALLETIZATION 
ON  THE  "PER  PACKAGE  OR  UNIT"  CONCEPT 
The  recent  advent  of  the  container191  and  pallet192  as  a 
modern  technological  advances  in  the  transportation 
industry  have  created  various  difficulties  in  explaining 
the  term  "  Package"  and  whether  it  is  or  not  applicable 
to  these  types  of  shipment.  Viz,  we  have  to  consider  how 
the  limitation  of  liability  is  to  be  construed  in  light 
of  this  technological  change. 
The  lacuna  of  the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Rules  in 
dealing  with  the  concept  of  "package"  is  reflected  to  the 
container,  pallet-package  problem  which  was  unknown  when 
the  Hague  Rules  were  enacted.  This  prevents  the  courts  of 
various  countries  to  find  a  criterion  for  this  dilemma. 
The  following  are  however  the  criteria  which  have 
emerged  the  decisions  of  the  courts  of  different 
countries. 
191-An  article  of  transport  equipment  other  than  a  vehicle  or 
conventional  packaging  [which  is]  ...  strong  enough  to  be  suitable 
for  repeated  use;...  specially  designed  to  facilitate  the  carriage 
of  goods  by  one  or  more  modes  of  transport,  without  intermediate 
reloading  ..  (Fitted]  with  devices  permitting  its  ready  handling, 
particularly  its  transfer  from  one  mode  of  transport,  and  ...  so 
designed  as  to  be  easy  to  fill  and  empty,  See,  Proposed  Regulation, 
49  C.  F.  R.  para,  420.3  (3),  Published  at  34  Fed.  Reg.  14054 
(Sept.  4,1969).  Quoted  in,  Edward  Schmeltzer  &  Robert  A.  Peavy, 
"Prospects  and  Problems  of  the  Container  Revolution",  (1969-70]  1 
J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  203,  Footnote,  1,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Schmeltzer 
&  Peavy". 
192-"A  method  of  stowing  general  cargo  of  a  fairly  homogeneous 
nature  on  rectangular  wooden  cargo  trays  designed  to  be  transported 
by  means  of  a  fork  lift  truck";  Bissell,  p  907. 301 
1-  The  Intention  of  the  Parties. 
2-  Facilitation  for  Transport. 
3-  Functional  Economic  Test. 
1-  THE  INTENTION  OF  THE  PARTIES. 
According  to  this  criterion  the  main  factor  which 
determines  whether  the  container  or  the  pallet 
constitutes  a  "package  or  unit"  is  governed  by  intention 
of  the  contracting  parties. 
The  shipper  and  the  carrier  may  or  may  not  intend  to 
treat  these  types  of  transportation  as  a  "package" 
depending  on  the  considerations  of  all  the  relevant 
circumstances  of  a  particular  case;  e.  g.  previous  course 
of  dealings,  the  descriptions  and  the  types  of  the  goods 
stated  in  the  bill  of  lading;  the  type  of  container193  or 
pallet,  who  shipped  it,  who  sealed  it,  if  it  was  sealed 
on  delivery  to  the  carrier.  194 
As  a  result  of  technological  advances  in  the 
transportation  industry,  the  container  and  the  pallet 
193-The  types  of  container  may  be  divided  into  these  classes: 
a-Door-to-Door  shipment:  is  a  container  which  loaded  and  sealed  at 
the  supplier's  factory  and  delivered  intact  to  the  consignee's 
warehouse  or  other  place  of  business. 
b-Point-to-Point  shipment:  is  a  container  loaded  by  a  freight 
consolidator  at  an  inland  point  and  transported  to  an  inland  point 
overseas. 
c-Port-to-Port  or  Air  Terminal-to-  Terminal:  is  the  movement  of  a 
container  consolidated  at  a  port  or  air  terminal  and  shipped  to  an 
overseas  port  or  air  terminal  where  the  contents  then  are  sorted 
for  distribution,  See,  Schmeltzer  &  Peavy,  pp  205-206. 
194-Coller,  J,  in,  The"Tindefjet  "  (1973]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  253  at  p 
258,  (Canada  Federal  Court-Trial  Division). 302 
were  used  as  modern  methods  for  carrying  goods.  The 
shipper  and  carrier  recognized  the  cargo  may  be  packed  in 
a  palletized  form  or  containerized  form.  195  This  means 
that  the  contracting  parties  have  taken  into  account  the 
considerations  of  the  container  and  the  pallet  in  what 
constitutes  a  "package". 
Then  the  court  can  deduce  the  characterization  of  the 
parties  from  the  material  facts  and  shipping  documents, 
such  as,  the  description  of  the  goods  in  connection  with 
their  actual  numeration  by  the  carrier196  if  the 
individual  bales  were  the  packages  and  not  the  container. 
Also,  when  the  deck  receipt  and  the  bill  of  lading 
indicated  that  the  parties  regarded  each  pallet  or 
container  as  a  "package".  197 
By  contrast,  when  the  bill  of  lading  states  the  number 
of  packages  as  "container",  and  gives  no  indication  that 
it  contains  "190  cartons",  these  cartons  are  considered 
as  one  package  and  not  each  carton  individually.  198 
One  can  thus  conclude  that  the  surrounding 
circumstances  in  each  case,  and  the  intention  of  the 
contracting  parties  indicated  by  the  shipping  documents 
and  the  course  of  dealing  between  them199,  are  considered 
195-Standard  El  i.  a  v.  Hamburg  Sudamerikan{ache  (19671  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  193  at  p  195.  (U.  S.  Court  of  Appeals,  Second  Circuit). 
196-The  Mormaclynx  [1971]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  476  at  p  486,  (U.  S. 
Court  of  Appeals,  Second  Circuit};  Falih,  p  165. 
197-Standard  Electrina  v.  Hamhurg  Sudam  _rikanisch  .,  op.  cit,  p  195. 
198-Th 
_"Bianho  a  _{n^  [1974]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  122  at  p  126,  (U.  S. 
District  Court  Southern  District  of  New  York". 
199-Smith,  Dep,  J,  in,  Aleksander  '1;  erafimovich"(1975]  2  Lloyd's, 303 
the  main  factors  in  determining  this  criterion.  This 
criterion  has  been  criticized  for  the  inequality  in 
bargaining  power  of  the  contracting  parties  to  conclude 
the  bill  of  lading  which  has  made  the  contract  more 
favourable  to  carriers  and  has  given  them  enormous 
advantages200.  Viz,  the  characterization  consider  it  as  a 
contract  of  adhesion20x  which  has  made  the  balance  of  the 
bargaining  power  fruitless  and  consequently  the  intention 
2 
of  the  contracting  parties  becomes  futile02. 
2-FACILITATION  FOR  TRANSPORT: 
This  criterion  states  that  any  preparation  which  makes 
cargo  handling  easier  will  cause  that  cargo  to  be 
designated  as  a  COGSA  package203. 
The  palletized  and  the  containerized  forms  in  which  the 
Rep.  p  346  at  p  354,  (Canada  Federal  Court,  Trial  Division). 
200-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  409. 
201-Standard  Electrica  v.  Hamburg  Sudamerikanische,  [1967]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  193  at  p  194,  where  he  states: 
"When  COGSA  was  enacted  in  1936,  it  had  as  its  central  purpose  the 
avoidance  of  adhesion  contracts,  providing  protection  for  the 
shipper  against  the  inequality  in  bargaining  power". 
202-Kabob  Foods,  Ltd.  v.  cape  Corse  lwoners1,  [1954]  2  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  40 
at  p  43;  D.  J.  Beeks,  in,  The  Aegis  Spirit  (1977]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  93 
at  p  100  (Exchequer  Court  of  Canada,  British  Columbia  Admiralty 
District),  where  he  states: 
"A  further  undesirable  side  effect  of  a  rule  based  upon  the  parties 
intention  is  its  obvious  potential  for  impairing  the  value  and 
negotiability  of  ocean  bills  of  lading,  due  to  uncertainty  in  the 
allocation  of  risks  with  respect  to  the  cargo". 
203-George  Denegre,  "Admiralty-Carrier-Owned  Shipping  Container 
Found  not  to  be  COGSA  "Package",  (1981-82]  56  Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  1409  at 
p  1411,  hereinafter  cited  as  Denegre,  'Package". 
L" 
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goods  were  received  for  shipment  are  deemed  under  this 
criterion  as  a  mechanical  aid  for  loading,  unloading  and 
delivery  with  less  damage  or  loss  to  cargo  and  less  labor 
expense  over  the  long  course  of  the  voyage204. 
Then  these  types  of  carrying  the  goods  have  the 
physical  characteristics  of  a  package  and  are  clearly  a 
bundle  put  up  for  transportation205.  They  are  quite 
convenient  and  safe  in  handling.  Viz,  the  containers,  or 
pallets  are  actually  no  more  than  a  handling,  loading, 
stowing  and  unloading  devices  of  the  carrier206. 
In  determining  whether  or  not  the  container  or  pallet 
is  a  COGSA  package,  the  courts  in  the  United  States  have 
drawn  a  distinction  between  a  situation  in  which  the 
carrier  or  the  shipper  who  supplies  the  cargo  container 
or  pallet  regardless  the  owns  the  ship  or  controls  these 
types  of  carrying  the  goods207. 
The  Second  Circuit,  in,  Standard  El  ectri  c.  a  v.  Hamburg 
Sudamerikanische208,  held  that  per  pallet  to  be  considered 
the  COGSA  package  because  it  was  the  shipper  and  not  the 
carrier  who  chose  to  pack  up  the  goods  into  a  pallet.  In 
contrast,  Judge  Friendly,  in,  the  leather's  nest  Inc  v. 
S.  S.  Mormaclynx209,  held  that: 
204-Chief  Judge  Lumbard,  in,  Standard  Electrica  v.  Hamburg 
Sudamerikanische,  op.  cit,  at  pp  194-95. 
205-Black,  Law  Dictionary,  Rev.  4th.  ed,  1968,  p  1262. 
206-Seymour  Simon(  "Latest  Developments  in  the  Law  of  Shipping 
Containers",  [1972-73)  4  J.  Mar.  L  &  Com,  p  441  at  p  442,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Simon,  Latest  Developments";  Denegre,  Package,  p  1419. 
207-Denegre,  Package,  p  1418. 
208_op.  cit,  p  195. 
209_[1971]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  476  at  pp  485-87. 305 
"when  the  carrier  has  made  up  the  cargoes  into 
a  container  for  transport,  then  a  cargo 
container  is  not  a  package  for  COGSA  purposes, 
because  the  court  does  not  prefer  to  find  the 
shipper  in  a  less  favourable  position  as  to 
liability  comparing  with  carrier  who  chose  this 
type  of  shipment". 
In  the  same  line  of  reasoning  judge  Cashing  stated 
however  that  the  wooden  sheathing  which  partially  covered 
the  tractor  from  the  skid  was  placed  there  for  protective 
purposes210  and  not  for  facilitating  the  handling  and 
transporting  of  the  machinery.  211 
3-FUNCTIONAL  ECONOMIC  TEST: 
Under  this  test,  if  the  inner  cartons  of  the  container 
could  feasibly  be  transported  separately  or  be  suitable 
for  break-bulk  shipment212,  a  presumption  would  be  created 
that  the  cartons,  or  packages  rather  than  the  container 
would  be  deemed  as  a  COGSA  package. 
If  the  container  was  not  presumed  to  be  the  COGSA 
package213,  then  this  presumption  could  be  rebutted  by  the 
210_,  u  Italia  Co,  V.  S.  S.  Exivia  (1958]  A.  M.  C.  p  439  at  p  443, 
affirmed  by  the  Second  Circuit  [1959)  A.  M.  C.  p  930 
211-Midd 
_l 
Past  Agency,  Inc.  V.  S.  S.  John  B.  Waterman,  [1949]  A.  M.  C. 
p  1403. 
212-"Break-Bulk",  is  the  term  used  to  refer  to  traditional  non- 
containerized  carriage",  See,  Matsushita  Eles.  Corp.  of  A.  M.  V. 
S.  S.  Aegis  Spirit,  414  F.  Supp,  pp  894,900,  Footnote,  4(1976), 
[19771  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  93. 
213-John  D.  Kimball,  "Package  Limitation-A  Container  is  a  "Package" 
in  Re  Tug  Dorothy  H"(1980]  11  J.  Mar.  L&Com  p.  370,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Kimball,  Package  Limitation";  M.  E.  De  Orchis,  "The  Container  and 306 
evidence  of  the  contracting  parties  intent.  214 
Oakes.  Ct.  J215,  who  has  created  this  criterion  after  a 
long  struggle  rationalized  the  necessity  for  such  test  by 
saying: 
["The  functional  package  unit"  test  we  propound 
to-day  is  designed  to  provide  in  a  case  where 
the  shipper  has  chosen  the  container  a  "common 
sense  test'  under  which  all  parties  can 
allocate  responsibility  for  loss  at  the  time  of 
contract,  purchase  additional  insurance  if 
necessary,  and  thus,  avoid  the  pains  of 
litigation]. 
Under  this  criterion  the  carrier  has  however  to  prove 
that  the  parties  have  intended  to  treat  the  container  as 
a  package.  But  when  the  shipowners  own  the  packaging 
units,  the  carrier  should  prove  that  his  units  are 
packages  rather  than  the  container.  216 
The  functional  economics  test  does  not  solve  the 
problems  of  the  limitation  of  liability  created  by 
containers  or  pallets  as  a  modern  technological 
the  Package  Limitation-the  Search  for  Predictability"  (1973-75]  5 
J.  Mar.  L  &  Com,  p  251  at  p  256,  hereinafter  cited  as  "De  Orchis,  The 
Container  and  the  Package  Limitation";  Denegre,  Package,  p  1414; 
Judge  Oakes,  in,  Royal  Typewriter  v.  M.  V.  Kul  er  and,  (1973]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  428  at  pp  431-32,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Kulmerland". 
214-Timothy  J.  Armstrong,  "Packaging  Trends  and  Implications  in  the 
Container  Revolution"  (1981]  12  J.  Mar.  L  &  Com,  p  427  at  p  438, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Armstrong,  Packaging  Trends". 
215-Kulmerland, 
op.  cit,  at  p  432. 
216-Ibid, 
p  432;  Falih,  p  170;  The  American  Legion,  (1975]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  295  at  p  296  (U.  S.  Court  of  Appeals,  Second 
Circuit). 307 
methods  for  carrying  goods.  consequently,  this  test  has 
been  severely  criticized  for  many  reasons: 
First  of  all  there  is  no  specific  standard  of  what 
constitutes  a  functional  economics  test  which  has  made 
the  circuits  courts  of  the  United  States  differ  widely  in 
the  interpretation  of  this  criterion  even  by  the  second 
circuit  which  is  deemed  to  be  the  creator  of  such  a 
touchstone.  217 
For  instance,  the  court  mentioned  that  the  standard  of 
usability  and  suitability  for  overseas  shipment  could  be 
considered  as  functional  economics.  218 
Also,  the  contracting  parties'  intent,  as  evidenced  by 
the  bill  of  lading,  should  have  no  effect  on  a  COGSA 
determination.  219 
Judge  Anderson220  argued  that: 
217-Armstrong,  Packaging  Trends,  p  452. 
218-Seymour  Simon,  "The  Law  of  Shipping  Countries",  (1973-741  5 
J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  507  at  p  508,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Simon,  The  Law 
of  Shipping  Countries",  where  he  states: 
"If  a  carrier  accepts  any  shipment-whether  with  packaging,  without 
packaging,  or  even  with  obviously  frail  or  inadequate  packaging-it 
is  deemed  suitable,  and  the  carrier  is  duty  bound  to  give  the 
shipment  such  appropriate  care...  Thus,  even  a  frail  or  inadequate 
package  or  the  absence  of  packaging  is  functional";  Tyler,  Jr.  D. 
J.  in,  The  Brooklyn  Maru,  (1975)  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  512  at  p  515, 
where  he  states: 
"Since  the  individual  cases  were  not  suitable  for  overseas  shipment 
without  further  packaging  or  special  shipping  arrangements  the 
[636)  boxes  placed  in  the  container  failed  the  "functional 
economics  test"  and  could  not  qualify  as  S.  4  (5)  packages";  Falih, 
p  171. 
219-Denegre,  Package,  p  1416. 
220-A  testate  ins.  v.  Inversions  Navieray  Im  ,  646  F.  2d,  p  169 
at  pp  171-72  15th.  Cir.  1981),  Quoted  by  Denegre,  Packaging  Trends, 308 
"Section  4  (5]  of  COGSA  was  enacted  in  response 
to  the  superior  bargaining  power  of  the 
carrier,  and  its  purpose  was  to  set  a 
reasonable  figure  below  which  the  carrier 
should  not  be  permitted  to  limit  his 
liability". 
One  can  thus  conclude  that  two  factors  have  expressed 
the  container-packages  issue: 
"a"  Ownership  or  control  of  the  container. 
"b"  Disclosure  in  the  bill  of  lading  of  the  number  of 
inner  cartons. 
Lastly,  this  test  does  not  afford  the  predictability 
needed  for  the  parties  to  allocate  responsibility  for 
loss  at  the  time  of  contract  and  to  purchase  the 
necessary  insurance,  because  neither  the  carrier  knows 
how  the  cargoes  inside  a  sealed  container  are  packed,  nor 
the  shipper  gains  the  benefit  of  a  limitation  based  on 
each  carton  in  the  container221. 
The  courts  placed,  however,  more  emphasis  on  the 
relevant  circumstances  in  which  the  cargo  was  loaded222  as 
follows: 
1-Whether  the  carrier  actually  possesses  superior 
bargaining  strength  sufficient  to  coerce  the  shipper's 
p  1417. 
221-De  Orchis,  The  Container  and  the  Packaging  Limitation",  p  279. 
222-There  is  another  criterion  for  the  container-package  issue 
which  is  called  "single  shipper  package  test"  that  where  a 
container  contains  goods  of  a  single  shipper  and  has  been  coaled 
and  packed  by  the  shipper;  See,  Ronenhrueh  V.  Amnr!  ean-  Export 
Ichrand  sen  LineLTTn.  (1974)  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  119  at  p  121.  (United 
States  District  Court  Southern  District  of  New  York). 309 
agreement  to  adhesion  contract; 
2-Whether  the  parties  treated  the  container  as  a  single 
unit  in  their  negotiations,  on  the  documents  of 
contract,  and  in  determining  the  shipping  rate; 
3-Whether  the  shipper,  or  at  least  one  other  than  the 
carrier,  chose  to  ship  the  goods  in  container; 
4-Whether  the  shipper  or  carrier  procured  the 
container; 
5-Whether  the  goods  were  delivered  to  the  carrier 
previously  loaded  into  the  container; 
6-Whether  the  goods  were  loaded  by  the  shipper  or  by 
the  carrier; 
7-Whether  the  carrier  actually  observed  the  contents  of 
the  container  before  it  was  sealed  for  shipment; 
8-Whether  the  container  was  loaded  with  the  shipper's 
goods  only,  and  not  those  of  any  other  shipper; 
9-Whether  the  markings  on  the  container  provided  a 
complete  accurate  indication  of  the  contents  or  their 
value; 
10-Whether  the  bill  of  lading  contained  any, 
declaration  of  the  nature  of  the  container's  contents 
and  their  value; 
11-Whether  the  bill  of  lading  provided  the  shipper  was 
an  adequate  opportunity  to  declare  the  value  of  the 
container  and  its  contents  to  obtain  financial 
protection  for  any  excess  value; 
12-Whether  the  shipper  took  advantage  of  this 310 
opportunity223. 
These  criteria  may  help  the  courts  to  find  out  the 
solution  to  the  dilemma  of  containerization  and 
palletization  when  they  apply  the  concept  of  the  "per 
package  or  unit"  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
The  Draftsman  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  have  dealt  with  this 
issue  in  Article  6  (21(a)  which  states  that  if  the  bill 
of  lading  recited  "one  container,  said  to  contain  a 
specific  amount  of  packages",  this  would  constitute  the 
same  amount  of  packages  or  shipping  units  which  were 
contained  in  the  container,  pallet  or  similar  article  of 
transport  used  to  consolidate  goods.  Conversely,  if  the 
bill  of  lading  recited  "one  container,  said  to  contain 
one  article"  such  as  machine  or  yacht,  this  would 
22  constitute  one  shipping  unit4. 
C-THE  DUAL  SYSTEM 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  adopted  an 
alternative  limitation  system  which  might  be  called  a 
"mixed"  system  of  limitation  which  fixed  a  certain  amount 
per  package  or  unit  or  a  certain  amount  per  kilo  of  gross 
weight  of  the  goods  lost  or  damaged  whichever  is  the 
higher225. 
223-Kimball,  Package  Limitation,  p  374;  Armstrong,  Packaging 
Trends,  p  441. 
224-D.  E.  Murray,  "The  Hamburg  Rules.  A  Comparative  Analysis",  (1980] 
12  Lawyer  of  the  Americas  (U.  S.  A.  ),  p  59  at  p  86,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
225-Article  2  [a]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  Article  6  (1]  (a)  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules,  but  the  latter  Rules  are  stated  that: 311 
The  controversy  has  arisen  in  the  UNCITRAL  conference 
about  the  merits  of  retaining  the  dual  system  of  the 
limitation  of  liability  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  or 
adopting  the  new  system  which  is  based  on  the  weight  of 
the  cargo  alone  as  found  in  the  C.  I.  M.  226,  C.  M.  R.  227,  and 
Warsaw  Conventions. 
The  discussions  about  this  issue  had  separated  the 
conference  into  two  divisions: 
Nigerian  and  Norwegian  delegates  endorsed  the  view  of 
the  unit  limitation  which  is  based  on  the  principle  of 
the  weight  alone,  but  the  Australian  delegate  indicated 
that  he  could  accept  the  dual  system. 
Whereas,  the  delegates  of  the  United  States,  the  United 
Kingdom,  the  USSR  and  France  were  in  favour  of  retaining 
the  dual  system  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules.  This  view  was 
endorsed  by  Belgium,  Poland,  Singapore,  India,  Argentina, 
and  Brazil.  Japan  accepted  this  system  on  condition  that 
the  container  should  be  governed  by  weight  alone.  228 
The  arguments  of  these  delegates  are  summarized  as 
follows: 
"The  liability  of  the  carrier  for  loss  resulting  from  loss  of  or 
damage  to  goods  according  to  the  provisions  of  article  (5)  is 
limited  to  an  amount  equivalent  to  835  units  of  account  per  package 
or  other  shipping  unit  or  2.5  units  of  account  per  Kilogramme  of 
gross  weight  of  the  goods  lost  or  damaged,  whichever  is  the 
higher". 
226-International  Convention  Concerning  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by 
Rail. 
227-Convention  on  the  Contract  for  the  International  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Road. 
228-Sweeney,  part  II,  p  329. 312 
"a"  The  difficulty  of  establishing  weight  in  cases  of 
partial  loss,  or  broken  package. 
"b"  The  dual  system  is  a  flexible  approach  to  the 
problem  of  the  carrier's  limitation  of  liability229. 
For  instance,  the  per  package  or  unit  will  be  applied 
in  case  of  the  weight  of  cargo  is  unknown.  In  contrast, 
the  weight  test  is  only  applicable  and  it  is  more 
beneficial  to  the  shipper  in  case  of  bulk  cargo. 
On  the  other  hand  the  amount  of  freight  will  be  deemed 
as  a  baseline  in  calculating  the  limitation  amount  of  the 
carrier's  liability  for  delay  in  delivery230. 
The  calculation  of  the  amount  of  limitation  of  the  lost 
or  damaged  cargo  depending  upon  the  weight  or  per  package 
or  unit,  will  provide  the  same  amount  of  limitation231. 
This  means  when  each  package  or  unit  weighs  [333.3]  Kilos 
or  less  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  or  [334]  Kilos  under 
the  Hamburg  Rules232,  the  limit  under  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  is  10.000  Francs,  per  package  or  unit  or  30  Francs 
per  Kilo  and  it  produces  the  same  limit  under  the  Hamburg 
Rules  where  the  835  SDR  represents  the  limits  of  a 
package  or  other  shipping  unit  weighing  (334]  Kilos233. 
When  the  gross  weight  of  the  goods  lost  or  damaged  is 
229-Ibid,  pp  328-29;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  62. 
230-Article  6(1]  {b}  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  62. 
231-Falih, 
p  373,  where  he  stated  the  method  of  calculation  as 
follows: 
"10.000  Francs  /  30  Francs-  333.3  Kilos". 
232-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  19;  Falih,  p  374. 
233-Falih,  p  374,  where  he  stated  the  following  calculation: 
835/2.5  SDR  per  Kilo-  334  Kilos. 313 
however  more  than  [333.3]  Kilos  under  the  calculation  of 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  or  more  than  [334]  Kilos  under  the 
Hamburg  Rules,  the  alternative  limit  based  on  weight  will 
provide  a  higher  limit. 
These  limits  are  applied  whenever  the  amounts  of  the 
limitation  are  higher  than  the  per  package  or  unit, 
according  to  the  provisions  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules234 
and  the  Hamburg  Rules235. 
The  Draftsman  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  clarified  the 
ambiguities  with  respect  to  the  term  "unit"  by  stating 
"per  package  or  other  shipping  unit"236.  it  should  be  then 
noted  that  the  term  "unit"  under  the  Hamburg  Rules  means 
"Shipping  Unit".  Viz,  the  calculation  method  of  the 
weight  under  "package  or  unit"  concept  produces  the  same 
standard  which  is  calculated  as  334  Kilos. 
However,  the  baseline  of  the  limitation  which  adjusted 
by  weight  will  be  higher  for  several  cargoes  and  it  will 
impose  limitation  upon  new  items  where  non-existed 
before. 
Also,  the  lost  or  damaged  article  of  a  transport  {such 
as  a  container,  pallet.  etc.  }  is  recoverable  under  the 
Hamburg  Rules  as  one  separate  shipping  unit  from  the  view 
point  of  the  carrier's  limitation  of  liability237. 
234-Article  2  [a]  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
235-Article  6  (11  (a)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
236-Erik  &  Thomas,  p  686. 
237-Article  6  [2]  (b)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Chandler,  p  271. 314 
2-HOW  AND  WHEN  DOES  THE  CARRIER  LOSE  THE  RIGHT  TO 
LIMIT  LIABILITY 
Authors  have  differed  between  themselves  in  relation  to 
the  considerations  of  the  characterization  of  the 
limitation  of  the  carrier's  liability  and  how  the  carrier 
loses  his  right  to  limit  liability  in  case  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  under  the  Rules  and  COGSA.  Some 
authors  favour  however  applying  the  Rules  as  a  matter  of 
contract  and  the  others  prefer  applying  the  Rules  as  ex 
proprio  vigore.  The  subject  is  thus  divided  under  two 
headings: 
A-The  Rules  Apply  as  a  Matter  of  Contract. 
B-The  Rules  Apply  ex  proprio  vigore. 
A-THE  RULES  APPLY  AS  A  MATTER  OF  CONTRACT 
According  to  this  theory,  that  the  pre-existing 
position  of  the  common  law  as  to  the  effect  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  is  still  applicable  under  the 
Rules,  an  unjustifiable  deviation  deprives  the  shipowners 
of  the  protection  provisions  from  liability  including  the 
limitation  clauses  which  incorporates  the  Rules,  as  a 
matter  of  contract.  238 
Lord  Atkin239  made  this  quite  clear  when  he  said: 
"I  am  satisfied  that  the  general  principles  of 
English  Law  are  still  applicable  to  the 
238-Scrutton, 
p  440;  Knauth,  p  241;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  354. 
239-St 
ne.  v.  Foscolo  Mango  &  Co,  op.  cit,  at  p  340;  1Carver, 
para  550. 315 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea  except  as  modified  by 
the  Act:  and  I  can  find  nothing  in  the  Act 
which  makes  its  statutory  exceptions  apply  to  a 
voyage  which  is  not  the  voyage  the  subject  of 
the  contract  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  to 
which  the  act  applies". 
That  means,  in  respect  of  the  effect  of  unjustifiable 
deviation  that  the  whole  of  the  Rules,  should  be 
considered  as  part  of  the  contract  of  carriage  covered  by 
a  bill  of  lading  or  similar  document  of  title240  which  is 
cancelled  by  the  unreasonable  deviation. 
Namely,  if  the  carrier  has  committed  unreasonable 
deviation  then  the  contract  and  all  the  exceptional 
provision  including  the  limitation  clauses  will  be 
nullified. 
The  Rules  no  longer  apply  therefore  to  a  voyage  which 
was  actually  a  different  one  from  that  to  which  the  bill 
of  lading  applied241.  Thus,  if  the  contract  goes,  so  the 
Rules  go  with  it242,  where  the  Rules  were  applied 
contractually  or  on  a  consensual  basis,  and  were  not 
applicable  ex  proprio  vigore243. 
There  is  however  a  long  series  of  cases  which  have 
explained  such  a  serious  effect  of  an  unreasonable 
deviation,  but  not  in  uniform  language. 
The  jurisprudence  in  the  United  Kingdom  has  enunciated 
240-Article  1  [b]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
241-Sassoon  &  Cuningham,  p  172. 
242-1  Carver,  para  550;  Balia  &  Sons  v.  7oly,  Victoria  &  Co.  Ltd, 
(1889-90)  6  T.  L.  R.  p  345. 
243_Sassoon  &  Cuningham,  p  174. 316 
in  most  decisions  that  unreasonable  deviation  would  be 
sufficient  to  constitute  the  liability  which  is  expressed 
in  the  bill  of  lading. 
In  general,  the  effect  of  unauthorized  deviation,  as 
stated  by  Lord  Atkin  in  The  Ixia244  would  displace  the 
statutory  exceptions  contained  in  the  COGSA  which  are 
incorporated  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
This  trend  is  confirmed  by  a  long  series  of  decisions 
adopting  in  fact  a  conclusion  that  the  unreasonable 
deviation  displaces  the  contract  and  it  abrogates  the 
contractual  stipulations  including  the  limitation  clauses 
when  the  innocent  party  chose  to  treat  the  contract  as  at 
an  end. 
245 
The  United  States  jurisprudence  has  been  in  conflict 
about  this  issue. 
Some  of  the  United  States  courts  have  followed  the  Ixia 
and  hold  that  the  carrier  has  no  right  to  the  COGSA 
limitation  of  liability  on  the  ground  that  the 
unreasonable  deviation  is  deemed  as  a  fundamental  breach 
of  the  contract.  246 
The  interesting  case  in  the  American  Courts  which 
emphasises  that  the  main  effect  of  unjustifiable 
deviation  is  to  deprive  the  carrier  of  the  limitation 
clauses  and  displace  the  $500  per  package  of  COGSA,  is 
244-(1932]  A.  C.  p  328  at  p  340. 
245-Hain  S.  S.  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Tate  &  Lys,  Ltd.  (1936]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  597 
at  pp  600-601. 
246-Lafcomo,  (1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  903  at  p  907;  Morgan,  p  487;  Falih,  p 
431. 317 
Flying  C  ipperr247.  The  authority  of  the  passage  of  such  a 
view  point  is  the  English  1xia248  case. 
Much  of  the  carrier's  argument  for  preserving  the 
principle  of  the  common  law  is  however  that  there  is  no 
indication  that  the  COGSA  of  1936  represent  any  basic 
departure  from  the  pre-existing  law  as  the  Flying 
Climeer249  stated: 
"Neither  the  convention  nor  the  Act  contains 
any  provision  concerning  the  legal  result  of  an 
unjustifiable  deviation.  There  is  nothing  in 
the  history  of  the  Act  to  indicate  that 
congress  by  fixing  the  limitation  of  $500 
intended  to  displace  the  doctrine  of 
unjustifiable  deviation  which  was  so  firmly 
entrenched  in  maritime  law,  such  as  a  drastic 
change  in  the  existing  law,  with  its  far- 
reaching  consequences  in  the  commercial  and 
financial  world  would  have  been  expressed-  in 
clear  and  unmistakable  terms". 
This  trend  of  the  effect  of  an  unreasonable  deviation 
has  received  judicial  approval  in  Encyclopedia  Britannica 
Ina.  v.  S.  S.  Hongkong  Producer250,  where  it  is  stated; 
"The  stowing  of  the  six  containers  on  the 
weather  deck  was,  therefore,  an  unreasonable 
deviation.  it  is  not  disputed  that  the  damage 
to  the  cargo  was  caused  by  sea  water  to  which 
it  was  exposed  by  being  stowed  on  deck.  The 
carrier  is  liable  for  the  full  amount  of 
247-(1954)  A.  M.  C.  p  259  at  pp  262-63,266. 
248_op.  cit,  p  328. 
249-op.  cit,  pp  262-63. 
250_(1969)  A.  M.  C.  p  1741  at  p  1757;  xato  La  V  rgarena  r  .  A.  v. 
Siisaa  (1973)  A.  M.  C.  p  195,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Ocean  carrier's  unreasonable  deviation  in  stowing  cargo  on  deck 
deprives  it  of  COGSA  Sec.  3  (61". 318 
damages  sustained  without  the  benefit  of  the 
$500  limitation  per  package  of  COGSA". 
The  other  United  States  Circuits  have  however  in 
general  accepted  the  Flying  Clipper's  viewpoint,  this 
acceptance  may  be  on  various  rationales.  For  instance, 
when  the  carrier  fails  to  call  at  a  particular  port  which 
is  stated  in  the  bill.  of  lading,  then  it  constitutes  an 
unreasonable  deviation  which  deprives  the  carrier  not 
only  of  its  bill  of  lading  defences  but  also  of  the  right 
251  to  limit  its  liability  as  shipowner. 
Also,  the  ocean  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  limit  its 
liability  for  loss  and  damage  to  cargo  where  it  has 
knowledge  and  privity  as  to  the  cause  of  shipboard  fire. 
By  the  way,  the  negligence  of  the  shipowner's  managing 
agent  to  provide  a  proper  crew  and  to  train  the  crew  in 
fire  protection,  will  hold  him  liable  to  cargo  interests 
without  the  benefit  of  the  COGSA  limitations  available  to 
the  ocean  carrier252. 
One  can  therefore  say  that  the  trend  of  this  view  is 
that  the  unreasonable  deviation,  whether  geographical  or 
non-geographical  deviation, 
breach  of  the  contract 
constitutes  a  fundamental 
of  carriage  which  have 
incorporated  the  Rules  and  thus  renders  COGSA's  per 
package  limitation  and  any  limiting  clauses  inapplicable 
altogether253. 
251-In  the  Matter  of  Singapore  Nav.  Cn_S_A.  [19751  A.  M.  C.  p  875. 
252-Cerro  Sales  Corp.  V.  Atlantic  Marine  nter  i5e  Y2L.,,,.,,,  (19761  A.  M.  C. 
p  375. 
253-Cam  v.  Par  Eastern  S.  S.  fin.  (1978]  A.  M.  C.  p  2210;  Spa  u4 319 
B-THE  RULES  APPLY  EX  PROPRIO  VIGORE 
This  opinion  has  adopted  the  trend  which  is  stated  that 
the  doctrine  of  unreasonable  deviation,  under  the  common 
law,  is  displaced  by  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA. 
The  common  understanding  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  the 
provision  of  the  limitation  of  liability  follows  the 
deviation  provision  immediately  in  the  same  article.  All 
these  significant  provisions  imply  that  the  deviating 
carrier  can  no  longer  be  held  liable  beyond  the  amount  of 
limit  constituted  by  Article  4  [51  of  the  Hague  Rules.  254 
This  means  that  when  the  Rules  apply  by  their  own 
force,  the  deviating  carrier  is  entitled  to  invoke  the 
statutory  limitation  to  limit  his  liability  within  the 
specified  amounts,  unless  the  nature  of  the  goods  has 
been  declared  by  the  shipper  before  shipment  and  inserted 
in  the  bill  of  lading255,  depending  upon  the  term  "in  any 
event"  in  the  case  of  unjustifiable  deviation.  256 
The  influence  of  prefix  "in  any  event"  upon  the  effect 
of  deviation  has  been  discussed  extensively  by  the  United 
States  courts,  which  aim  to  support  their  opinion  to 
Corp.  v.  ;  /S  Ya  o,  F.  2d,  p  1310  at  p  1311,  (1979);  Tetley&  Cleven,  p 
819. 
254-Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  173. 
255-Article  4  (5](a)  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  Visby  Rules 
respectively;  ne  Laval  Turbine.  Inc.  v,  West  India  rnduR  ries.  Inc, 
502  F.  2d,  p  259  (1974). 
256-Scrutton,  p  440;  Wilson,  p  149;  Compare,  Morgan,  p  484,  where 
he  states  another  view  as  follows: 
"..  the  carrier  may  be  deprived  of  all  other  protections,  but  not 
of  those  subject  to  the  "in  any  event"  preamble";  Astle,  p  170. 320 
mitigate  the  drastic  effect  of  deviation.  257 
It  is  arguable  that  these  words  were  presumably 
designed  to  prevent  the  limitation  provision  from  being 
abrogated  through  unjustifiable  deviation  and  it  would  be 
redundant  if  the  statutory  limitation  was  not  held  to  be 
effective;  namely  that  the  Rules  were  basically  enacted 
to  reflect  a  compromise  between  cargo-owners  and 
shipowners  or  carriers  interested  and  consequently,  the 
statutory  limitation  set  forth  in  the  Rules  should  be 
deemed  an  integral  aspect  of  such  a  compromise258  which  is 
considered  the  intent  of  the  contracting  states. 
The  United  States  circuits,  in  respect  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  upon  the  limitation  provisions  of 
the  Rules  have  in  general  rejected  the  reasoning  of  the 
Flying  Clipper259,  but  on  different  grounds. 
The  seventh  circuit  in  the  Herman  Schulte260  has 
rejected  the  notion  of  depriving  the  carriers  of  relying 
upon  limitation  statutory,  -where  it  is  held  that  the 
congress  clearly  intended  to  modify  the  pre-COGSA  law  by 
enacting  the  phrase  "in  any  event".  Thus  the  $500  per 
257-Halsbury's  Shipping  and  Navigation,  p  546,  Footnote,  3. 
258-Roger,  p  177;  Varian  Assoc.  v.  C.  G.  T[1980]A.  M.  C.  p  450  at  p  456. 
259-[1945]  A.  M.  C.  p  259. 
260-Atlantic  Mutual  v.  Poseidon[1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  p  669,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"It  appears  to  this  court  that  the  language  of  the  statute,  if  it 
constitutes  a  change  of  existing  law,  according  to  the  rule  applied 
to  other  statutes,  is  sufficiently  clear  and  unmistakable.  No 
amount  of  interpolation  is  required  to  evaluate  the  weight  of  the 
phrases  "in  any  event";  Nassau  Mass..  o.  v.  Noel  Roberts.  Ltd 
(1965]  A.  M.  C.  p  1600  at  p  1601. 321 
package  limitation  should  apply  to  any  loss,  regardless 
of  the  case.  261 
A  similar  theory  to  defeat  limitation  of  liability 
under  COGSA  was  rejected  by  the  United  States  Second 
Circuit  court  of  Appeals  by  holding  in  the  Iligan 
Int.  Steel  v.  John  Weyrehaeuser262  that: 
"..  even  the  holding  that  a  deviation  in  the 
geographical  sense  voids  limitations  on  the 
carrier's  liability  seems  inconsistent  with  the 
263  language  of  COGSA". 
This  means  that  expansion  of  the  notion  of  deviation  is 
not  to  be  considered  without  changes  in  the  Rules.  264 
There  is  however  a  tendency  within  this  trend,  to 
restrict  the  "doubtful"  effect  of  unreasonable  deviation 
on  the  geographical  concept  and  it  is  not  to  be  extended 
to  the  non-geographical  deviation265  (as  they  called  it 
Quasi-Deviation].  266 
Gilmore  &  Black267,  have  made  this  quite  clear,  when 
they  say: 
261_1  spartus  Corp.  v.  S/S  Yafo,  590  F.  2d,  p  1310  at  p  1317  (1979). 
262-[1975]  A.  M.  C.  p  33  at  p  38. 
263-Compare,  Robert  C.  Hard  &  Co.  inc.  v.  Krawill  Machinery,  359 
U.  S.  p  297,3  Led.  2d,  p  820,  where  it  is  stated: 
"a  statute  is  not  to  be  construed  as  altering  the  common  law  more 
than  the  statute's  words  import,  and  is  not  to  be  construed  as 
making  any  innovation  upon  the  common  law  which  it  does  not  fairly 
express". 
264-Chandler,  p  40. 
265-Il 
gan  Tnt.  Steel.  v.  John  Weyerh  ,  op.  cit,  p  38. 
266-Falih, 
p  431;  2  Carver,  para,  1214-1215;  Compare,  supra, 
Chapter  I. 
267-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  183. 322 
"It  would  seem  unwise  to  extend  analogically 
and  by  way  of  metaphor  a  doctrine  of  doubtful 
justice  under  modern  conditions,  of 
questionable  status  under  COGSA  and  of  highly 
penal  effect". 
It  has  however  been  suggested  that  the  drastic  effect 
of  unreasonable  deviation  should  be  displaced,  leaving  a 
carrier  entitled  to  rely  upon  the  statutory  limitation 
under  COGSA268.  This  means  that  the  unreasonable  deviation 
or  any  other  breach  of  a  shipowner's  duty  under  this 
viewpoint,  is  not  going  to  abolish  the  limitation  of 
liability  under  COGSA  or  the  Rule  and  the  carrier  is 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  statutory  limitation.  269 
iii-WILL  UNREASONABLE  DEVIATION  AVOID  THE  CARGO 
INSURANCE  COVER  AND  WILL  THE  CARRIER  BE  AN  INSURER 
OF  THE  GOODS? 
The  voyage  insured270  whatever  it  is  called  should  be 
defined  in  the  policy,  both  the  commencement  of  the 
risk271  which  usually  takes  place  at  the  port  of  departure 
or  loading,  and  the  termination  of  the  risk272,  which 
usually  happens  at  the  port  of  destination  or  discharge. 
268-Whitehead,  pp  47-48. 
269..  A/S  J.  Ludwig  Mowinckel4  v.  Anninanto,  199  F.  2d,  p  134  (1952); 
Poor,  1974,  Supplement,  p  45. 
270-There  are  two  types  of  policies: 
"a"Time  Policy  which  is  limited  by  time. 
"b"Voyage  Policy  which  is  limited  by  local  termini,  See,  9  Arnould, 
para,  428. 
271-Terminus  aquo. 
272-Terminus 
ad  quem. 323 
The  underwriter  guarantees  to  compensate  the  insured 
cargoes  when  the  expected  risk  remains  precisely  the  same 
as  the  contracting  parties  have  agreed  upon  and  fixed  on 
the  face  of  the  policy.  273 
Then  what  is  the  effect  of  unreasonable  deviation  on 
the  insurance  policy? 
The  legal  consequences  in  pre-Hague  Rules  were  that 
when  the  carrier  deviated  from  the  contemplated  voyage 
without  lawful  excuse,  then  the  cargo-owner  would  lose 
his  cargo  insurance  cover  and  the  carrier  would  be 
treated  as  an  insurer  of  the  carried  goods.  274  Obviously 
the  unreasonable  deviation  exposes  the  vessel  and  cargoes 
to  a  very  much  riskier  adventure  than  has  been  agreed  and 
expected  by  the  underwriter.  Thus  the  motive  of  making 
the  carrier  liable  as  an  insurer  is  to  keep  the  risk  and 
the  premium  in  balance.  275 
This  situation  is  still  effective  as  the  obligations  of 
273-Kimball,  p  231,  where  he  made  a  distinctions  between  P.  &I. 
insurance  and  the  normal  insurance  by  saying: 
First:  P&I  insurance  is  liability  insurance,  and  not  insurance 
designed  to  cover  a  property  interest. 
Second:  rather  than  providing  insurance  at  a  fixed  rate  or  premium, 
a  system  of  "calls"  is  applied. 
At  present,  the  calls  are  allotted  between  members  on  the  basis  of 
individual  experience,  rather  than  on  the  basis  of  equal  shares  per 
registered  ton,  as  was  the  practice  at  an  earlier  stage  of  P&I 
history". 
274-Mark  P.  Klein,  "$500  Per-Package  Limitation  in  COGSA 
Inapplicable  due  to  Deviation;  On-Deck  Stowage  Construed; 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Inc.  v.  S.  S.  Hong  Rang  Producer,  F.  2d. 
(2d.  Cir.  1969),  hereinafter  cited  as  "Klein,  $500  Per-Package 
Limitation. 
275-Knauth,  p  242. 324 
the  contracting  parties  under  the  Marine  Insurance  Act, 
1906276,  which  provides  in  Section  46  [1]  that: 
"Where  a  ship,  without  lawful  excuse,  deviates 
from  the  voyage  contemplated  by  the  policy,  the 
insurer  is  discharged  from  liability  as  from 
the  time  of  deviation  and  it  is  immaterial  that 
the  ship  may  have  regained  her  route  before  any 
loss  occurs".  277 
When  the  risk  of  adventure  is  however  just  temporary 
and  the  insured  risk  is  still  precisely  the  same  as 
before  the  deviation,  then  the  insurer  is  discharged  from 
any  liability  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  only 
when  such  losses  or  damages  are  causally  related  to  the 
existence  of  the  unreasonable  deviation.  278 
With  respect  to  the  effect  of  unreasonable  deviation, 
under  the  Anglo-American  jurisprudence  concerned,  it 
still  considers  the  carrier  as  an  insurer  against  any 
loss  resulting  directly  or  indirectly  from  the 
deviation.  279  Taking  into  account,  a  cargo-owner  does  not 
276-Ibid,  p  263. 
277-ThCitt  a  Di  Messina,  169  Fed.  Rep,  p  472  at  p  475,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  recent  British  Marine  Insurance  Act  (1906)  has  excluded  delay 
from  the  definition  of  deviation  (Section  46),  while  giving  the 
insurer  by  (Section  48)  the  same  release  from  liability  from  the 
time  when  the  delay  becomes  unreasonable". 
278-Theophilus  Parsons,  a  Trea-ise  on  Maritime  Law,  Vol  II,  1859,  p 
278,  hereinafter  cited  as"Parsons,  Maritime  Law";  Judge,  Hays,  in, 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica.  Inc.  v.  Hong  Kong  Producer,  (1969)  A.  M.  C. 
p  1741  at  p  1759. 
279-Indrapura,  171  Fed.  Rep.  p  929  at  930  (1909);  Wil  domino  V. 
Citro  Chemical  Co.  272  U.  S.  p  718  at  p  725;  Hain  S.  S.  V.  Tate  & 
Lyle  [1936]  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  597  at  p  601. 325 
require  to  lose  his  insurance  cover  in  order  to  recover 
for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  deviation280. 
When  the  deviating  carrier  becomes  liable  as  an 
insurer,  it  is  immaterial  to  inquire  whether  loss  was  due 
to  unseaworthiness,  errors  of  navigation,  perils  of  the 
sea,  or  other  causes  expected  by  the  bill  of  lading281. 
One  can  find  out  that  where  the  carrier  has  deviated 
with  knowledge  and  privity  that  he  is  at  fault,  then  he 
becomes  an  insurer  of  the  cargo282  and  cannot  avail 
himself  of  any  exceptions  in  the  bill  of  lading283. 
Lord  Atkin  concluded  in  Hain  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Tate  &  Lvle284I 
by  saying: 
"no  doubt  the  extreme  gravity  attached  to  a 
deviation  in  contracts  of  carriage  is  justified 
by  the  fact  that  the  insured  cargo-owner  when 
the  ship  has  deviated  has  become  uninsured". 
There  is  another  opinion  which  endeavours  as  an  insurer 
of  a  limited  amount  which  is  stipulated  in  the  carriage 
contract  by  the  parties285. 
This  means  that  agreement  between  the  contracting 
280-The  Citta  Messina,  169  Fed.  Rep.  p  472  at  p  475  (1909). 
281-pelotas  (1933)  A.  M.  C.  p  1188  at  p  1193;  LnduCB  v.  Ward,  (1888) 
20  Q.  B.  p  475;  Longlely,  p  120. 
282-Davis  v.  Garret,  6  Bing,  p  716;  Knox  v.  The  Nn_  -a, 
14 
Fed.  Cas,  p  912. 
283-  ndrapura,  op.  cit,  p  939;  St.  John.  N.  F.  Shig  eng 
Corp.  V. 
S.  A.  Companh  a,  _ral 
Co  m.  a1,263  U.  S.  pp  119,124;  68  L.  ed,  pp 
201,203;  Iligan,.  Int.  Steel  v.  John  Wey  rhaeu5er,  (19753  A.  M.  C.  P 
33  at  p  36. 
284-(1936)  2  ALL  E.  R.  p  597  at  p  601. 
285-Judge  Hough,  in,  De  VasconFý,  11o  V.  The  Sar  na,  NO.  60-374 
(S.  D.  N.  Y,  May  23,1919). 326 
parties  or  the  provisions  of  the  limitation  of  liability 
in  the  Rule  are  still  survivals  even  in  the  case  of 
deviation  and  the  liability  of  the  carrier  is  limited  to 
a  specific  amount  of  money  per  package  or  unit  and  per 
Kilogramme  of  gross  weight  of  the  goods286,  unless  the 
nature  and  value  of  such  goods  have  been  declared  by  the 
shipper  before  shipment  and  inserted  in  the  bill  of 
lading. 
There  has  been  an  increasing  tendency  to  limit  such  a 
harsh  effect  of  unreasonable  deviation  to  geographical 
deviation  and  not  to  require  it  to  be  extended  to  non- 
geographical  deviation287. 
Some  authors  have  however  endeavoured  to  mitigate  such 
a  harsh  effect  of  unreasonable  deviation  in  COGSA  by 
saying  that  the  deviating  carrier  ought  not  to  be  given 
or  avail  himself  of  the  benefit  of  the  exemption  clauses, 
because  it  is  not  allowed  for  the  carrier  to  take 
advantage  of  his  own  mistake.  An  interpretation  beyond 
these  legal  consequences  of  an  unreasonable  deviation 
holds  the  carrier  liable  as  an  insurer  for  any  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  deviation  during  the  course 
286-see  supra,  chapter  III;  Article  4  (5]  of  the  Hague  Rules  which 
is  identical  with  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  (1924)  and  the  United 
States  (1936),  Article  2  of  the  Visby  Rules  which  is  identical  with 
COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom  (1971)  and  Article  6  (1]  (a)  of  the 
Hamburg  Rules  which  they  are  provided  the  limitation  per  package  or 
unit. 
287-They  called  it  "Quasi-Deviation",  Compare,  Supra,  Chapter  I; 
Tl  igan  Int.  Steel  v.  John  Weyerhaeuser,  op.  cit,  at  p  38;  Tetley, 
Marine  Cargo,  p  530. 327 
of  the  voyage  or  even  after  a  deviation,  makes  the 
provisions  of  the  Rules  contradictory  with  concept  of 
Article  4  [2)  of  the  Rules  and  COGSA288. 
When  the  parties  (insurer  and  assured}  have  agreed  to 
use  the  "held  covered"  clauses289  as  liberal  clauses  for 
avoiding  the  harsh  effect  of  an  unreasonable  deviation  in 
marine  insurance290,  it  is  not  unusual  to  hold  that  the 
assured's  cover  still  survives  even  in  the  case  of 
deviation,  but  an  additional  premium  to  be  arranged291. 
Section  31  [2]  of  the  Marine  Insurance  Act,  1906, 
provides: 
"Where  an  insurance  is  effected  on  the  terms 
that  on  additional  premium  is  to  be  arranged 
in  a  given  event,  and  that  event  happens  but 
no  arrangement  is  made,  then  a  reasonable 
additional  premium  is  payable". 
The  House  of  Lords  held  that  there  is  an  implied  term 
of  the  contract  indicating  that  notice  of  advice  of  a 
deviation  should  be  given  to  the  insurer  within  a 
reasonable  time  after  the  assured  had  been  notified  of 
the  deviation292. 
288-Gilmore  &  Black,  p  180. 
289-BnZd  v.  West  End  Motor  Car  Packing.  Co  (1911]  2  K.  B.  p  38,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"Held  covered  at  a  premium  to  be  arranged  in  case  of  deviation  or 
change  of  voyage  or  of  any  omission  or  error  in  the  description  of 
the  interest  vessel  or  voyage";  Cabaud,  Cargo  Insurance",  (19713  45 
Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  988  at  p  990,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cabaud". 
290-Mills,  The  Future  of  Deviation,  p  587. 
291-Lord  Atkin,  in,  Hain  S.  S.  Co.  V.  Tate  &  . yle,  (1936]  2  ALL  E.  R. 
p  597  at  p  601. 
292-Hood  v.  West  End  Motor  Car  Marine  Insurance'  Co,  Op.  cit,  p  38; 328 
Then,  any  deviation  occurring  in  the  course  of  a 
maritime  voyage  is  nowadays  invariably  covered  by 
insurance  with  an  additional  premium  to  be  agreed  upon 
for  changing  the  insured  subject  and  the  risk  to  be 
encountered  which  is  contemplated  by  the  parties.  293 
Thus  the  purpose  of  cargo  insurance  is  to  recover 
against  any  economic  consequences  of  cargo  loss  or 
damage294,  having  considered  all  surrounding  circumstances 
and  commercial  risk  in  arranging  an  additional  premium 
for  covering  the  new  adventure  occurring  in  the  course  of 
sea  carriage  and  the  assured  has  been  advised  of  the 
deviation.  295  These  considerations  do  however  not  appear 
to  diminish  the  serious  nature  of  the  breach  of  the 
carriage  contract  and  the  subsequent  effects  of 
unreasonable  deviation  on  the  obligations  of  the 
contracting  parties.  296 
Thames  v.  H.  T.  Van  &  Co.  (1917]  2  K.  B.  Note  (H.  L.  ),  p  48  at  p  53;  9 
Arnould,  p  406. 
293-Mills,  The  Future  of  Deviation,  p  595;  Cabaud,  p  989. 
294-Cabaud,  p  988. 
295-Bigham,  J,  in,  Greenock  S.  S.  Co.  v.  Maritime  Insurance  Co.  [1903) 
1,  K.  B.  p  367  at  p  375,  where  he  states: 
"The  parties  must  assume  that  the  breach  was  known  to  them  at  the 
time  it  happened  and  must  ascertain  what  premium  it  would  then  have 
reasonable  charge";  Ment  2  Decker  &  Co.  V.  Maritime  Tn4iurxnce_LQ 
(1910}  1  K.  B.  p  132  at  p  135;  watt  v.  ,  London  General  Insurance 
Co.  Ltd  (1925]  23  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  243  at  pp  246-47. 
296-Bartle,  p  99;  Selvig,  p  313;  See  infra,  Section  II. 329 
COMMENT 
There  is  no  consensus  as  to  the  effect  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  upon  the  contract  of  carriage  and 
particularly  upon  the  protection  terms  contained  in  the 
bill  of  lading  or  the  Rules,  such  as  exemption  clauses 
and  statutory  limitations  ßspecially  as  we  have  seen  that 
previously  neither  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  nor  the  COGSA 
contains  any  provision  concerning  the  legal  result  of  an 
unjustifiable  deviation.  297 
This  leaves  the  dilemma  still  unsolved  even  though  some 
authors  have  tried  to  make  a  distinction  between  the 
situations  where  the  Rules  apply  as  a  matter  of  contract 
or  apply  as  ex  proprio  vigore.  298 
We  can,  however,  suggest  a  possible  solution,  in  the 
case  of  a  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage  including 
"unreasonable  deviation",  based  on  the  degree  of 
seriousness  of  the  faults  which  is  called  the  criterion 
of  "privity  or  knowledge".  299  This  criterion  has 
297-Roger,  p  178. 
298-Morgan,  p  484,  where  he  mentions  a  third  view  in  this  point  as 
follows: 
"There  is  no  distinction  between  the  two,  and  that  the  same  rule 
ought  to  apply  in  both  cases". 
299-Judge  Ainsworth,  in,  The  Greater  New  Orl.  an9  Express 
-Way. 
v.  The. 
Clairbel,  222  F.  Supp.  p  521,524  (1963),  where  he  defines  these 
words  as  follows: 
"Privity  means  personal  Cognizance  or  participation  in  the  fault  or 
negligence  which  causes  the  accident...  the  term  knowledge  as  used 
in  the  statute  has  been  held  to  mean  not  only  personal  Cognizance 
but  also  the  means  of  knowledge  of  which  a  party  must  avail  himself 
in  order  to  prevent  a  condition  likely  to  produce  or  contribute  to 
a  loss";  Longlely,  p  222;  Williams,  Limitation,  p  829;  Powles, 330 
replaced300  the  phrase  "in  any  event"  which  was  created  by 
the  Hague  Rules  as  a  compromise  between  the  carrier  and 
the  shipper. 
Deviation  is  of  no  consequences  unless  the  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  was  intentionally  or  recklessly  with 
knowledge  that  such  loss,  or  damage  would  probably 
result301.  The  carrier  is,  thus,  responsible  for  showing 
that  the  losses  of  or  damages  to  the  cargo  have  occurred 
without  his  actual  fault,  privity  or  knowledge. 
Therefore,  when  the  carrier  fails  to  prove  that,  then  is 
not  entitled  to  benefit  by  the  protection  terms302. 
Also,  the  carrier's  servant  or  agent  might  have  the 
same  defences  and  limitations  of  liability  as  the  carrier 
and  they  are  entitled  to  avail  themselves  of  the 
statutory  limitation  in  the  Rules  if  they  show  evidence 
that  they  acted  within  the  "Scope  of  their  employment""303 
p145;  See,  supra,  Chapter  II,  Section  I. 
300-Article  (31  of  the  Visby  Rules,  Article  4  [5j  (e}  of  the  COGSA, 
1971,  and  Article  (81  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  See,  Sweeney,  part  II, 
p  338,  where  he  states: 
"That  the  "UNICTRAL"  discussion  about  the  proposal  to  make  special 
provision  for  serious  fault  created  a  diversity  of  views  at  the 
conference". 
301-Chandler,  p  266. 
302-Northern  Fishing  Co.  (Hull)  v.  Eddom  "The  Norman"[1960]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p1  at  p  2;  Cerro  Sales  Corp.  v.  Ati  am  ia  Marine 
En  P  prises[19761  A.  M.  C.  p  375;  (rand  Champion  Tankers  Ltd  V. 
Norpipe  A/S(H.  L.  }[1984]  A.  C.  p  563;  (1984]  2  W.  L.  R.  p  942;  Morgan, 
p  493. 
303-Sweeney,  Part  II,  pp  340-344;  Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  where 
he  states: 
"Warsaw  Convention  artificial  distinction  between  carrier  liability 
and  agent  liability,  but  at  the  same  time  it  clearly  markes  the 331 
without  an  act  or  omission  of  such  servant  or  agent,  done 
with  the  intent  to  cause  damage  or  recklessly  and  with 
knowledge  that  damage  would  probably  result304. 
However,  when  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo 
occurred  through  negligence  by  the  stevedores  then  they 
may  not  avail  themselves  of  the  benefit  of  the  statutory 
limitation  contained  in  the  Rules  or  in  the  bill  of 
lading3o5. 
The  same  rules  apply  in  the  case  of  the  shipowner's 
managing  agent  negligently  failing  to  provide  a  proper 
crew.  Then  the  agent  will  be  fully  liable  to  cargo 
damages  without  the  benefit  of  the  COGSA  limitations 
available  to  the  ocean  carrier306. 
Thus,  the  shipowner  can  not  benefit  by  the  limitation 
in  the  case  of  him  ignoring  his  duty  to  choose  competent 
crew  on  the  theory  that  he  is  without  "privity  or 
0knowledge07 
. 
carrier  liable  for  the  acts  of  the  servants,  whereas,  the  Hamburg 
Rules  have  ignored  this  reality". 
304-Article  (3]  of  the  Visby  Rules,  Article  4  (5]  {e}  of  the  United 
Kingdom  COGSA,  1971,  and  Article  (8]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
305-Herd  v.  Krawill  Machinery  Corte,  359  U.  S.  p  297;  (1959]  A.  M.  C.  P 
879;  Erik  &  Thomas,  p  688. 
306-Cerro  Sales  Corp.  v.  Atlantic  Marine  Enterprises,  op.  cit,  p 
375;  Compare,  Longley,  p  222,  where  he  stated: 
"Usually,  the  private  or  knowledge  "of  the  vessel's  master  will  not 
defeat  the  vessel  owner's  right  to  limitation". 
307-Longlely,  p  224;  Williams,  Limitation,  p  829;  ca  ls 
-orye 
l 
v.  John  S.  Phipps  &  George,  317  U.  S.  p  406;  87  L.  ed.  p  363. 332 
CONCLUSION 
The  suggestion  that  the  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach 
was  confined  to  deviation  cases308,  does  not  affect  the 
doctrine  of  deviation.  Though  some  authors  have  tried  to 
establish  a  strong  relation  between  them  dependent  upon 
the  idea  that  deviation  equals  fundamental  breach  and 
discharge  by  breach  equals  deviation.  309 
The  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  has  aroused  a  real 
controversy  about  whether  it  is  to  operate  as  a  rule  of 
law  or  as  a  rule  of  construction. 
The  House  of  Lords  has  adopted  a  new  judicial  trend 
which  constitutes  the  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  as  a 
rule  of  construction  and  consequently  all  the  exemption 
clauses  contained  in  the  Rules  or  bill  of  lading  are 
effective.  The  attitude  of  the  House  of  Lords  in  dealing 
with  the  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  does  not  affect 
the  doctrine  of  deviation  because  it  still  survives  as  an 
independent  legal  concept  which  is  provided  by  the  Hague 
Rules  in  an  express  and  a  specific  provision. 
These  Rules  should  be  applied  to  deviation  admiralty 
cases  otherwise  it  will  be  an  infringement  of  the  Rules. 
Therefore  any  reference  to  deviation  cases  when  the  court 
is  dealing  with  doctrine  of  fundamental  breach  in  non- 
admiralty  deviation  cases  will  be  contradictory  to 
general  principles  of  the  law  in  general  and 
contrary  to  common  understanding  of  the  Rules  in 
308-The  Albion  (1953]  1  W.  L.  R.  p  1026. 
309-Coote,  Discharge  by  Breach,  p  237. 333 
particular. 
The  doctrine  of  deviation  still  then  survives  as  a 
substantive  rule  and  it  has  all  effects  on  the 
contractual  obligations  of  the  contracting  parties310. 
One  can  however  say  that  it  would  be  more  rational  and 
appropriate  with  for  new  judicial  trend  of  the  House  of 
Lords  to  base  the  characterization  of  the  doctrine  of 
deviation  upon  the  test  of  reasonableness  which 
determines  whether  or  not  a  breach  of  contract  is 
fundamental  or  material  and  consequently  it  is  effective 
11,  3  in  relation  to  the  exclusion  clauses 
The  criterion  of  reasonableness  has  already  been 
adopted  by  the  non-admiralty  law  which  is  called  Unfair 
Contract  Terms  Act  1977,  Section  (11]  rules  [1]  and  (3], 
in  Scotland,  Section  [24]  rule  [1]  where  it  states  the 
meaning  of  the  reasonableness  as  follows: 
"...  the  term  shall  have  been  a  fair  and 
reasonable  one  to  be  included  having  regard  to 
the  circumstances  which  were,  or  ought 
reasonably  to  have  been  known  to  or  in  the 
contemplation  of  the  parties  when  the  contract 
"312  was  made, 
The  breach  is  material  or  not;  one  should  take  into 
account  the  intention  of  the  contracting  parties  and  all 
the  surrounding  circumstances  which  exist  or  ought 
310-Stag.  Line.  Ltd.  v.  Foscolo  Mango,  Ltd  [1932]  A.  C.  p  328. 
311_RW  Green  Ltd.  v.  Cade  Bros  Farm  [1978]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  602; 
Photo  Production  Ltd.  v.  Securicor  Trannnort  Lock  Seeds  (1983]  1 
ALL  E.  R.  p  108  at  p  117;  Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  61. 
312-Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses,  p  110. 334 
reasonably  to  have  been  known  to  the  parties  at  the  time 
the  contract  was  made313. 
One  must  bear  in  mind  that  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo  is  not  enough  to  constitute  the  test  of 
reasonableness314,  but  it  must  be  caused  by  the  deviation 
itself  and  not  by  any  act  independent  of  the  deviation. 
When  we  characterize  however  the  deviation  as  a 
reasonable  deviation  in  depending  upon  the  criterion  of 
reasonableness  or  in  waiving  the  unreasonable  deviation, 
then  the  contract  is  effective  and  all  the  contractual 
exemptions  are  valid.  On  the  other  hand,  the  effects  of 
unreasonable  deviation,  are  extremely  serious  which 
nullifies  all  the  exclusion  clauses  and  insurance  policy. 
If  the  carrier  or  the  shipowner  has  committed  an 
infringement  to  the  basic  duties  to  make  the  vessel  fit 
for  a  particular  voyage,  such  as,  a  gross  lack  of  due 
diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  or  to  load,  stow 
and  discharge  the  cargo  in  wrong  manner  and  caused  loss 
of  or  damage  to  the  cargo,  then  the  innocent  party  has 
merely  a  right  to  compensate  all  the  loss  or  damage  while 
the  carrier  is  entitled  to  rely  upon  the  exclusion 
clause,  i.  e;  limitation  of  liability  clause315,  because 
this  case  is  not  considered  as  a  deviation  at  all. 
Finally  we  must  keep  in  mind  that  the  prefix  "in  any 
event"  which  is  provided  in  the  Hague  Rules  has  aroused 
313_Chandrahasan,  Fundamental  Obligation,  p  119;  Lord  Denning,  in, 
Levison  v.  patent  Steam  Carpet  Co.  L.  td,  op.  cit,  p  69. 
314-Compare,  Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  193. 
315_Iligan  ?  nt.  Steel  v.  John  Weyerhaeuser  [19751  A.  M.  C.  p  33  at  p 
38;  Whitehead,  p  48. 335 
many  problems  in  relation  to  applying  the  limitation 
clauses  when  the  carrier  has  committed  an  unreasonable 
deviation. 
That  makes  some  authors  endeavour  to  adopt  the  idea 
that  the  Rules  apply  as  ex  proprio  vigore  and  the  others 
attempt  to  apply  the  Rules  as  a  matter  of  contract  which 
makes  the  situation  more  complicated  and  the 
jurisprudence  of  the  contracting  state  divergent  on  this 
point. 
Therefore,  the  situation  which  is  adopted  by  the  Visby 
Rules  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  is  quite  a  reasonable 
criterion  to  distinguish  between  the  situation  where  the 
exclusion  clauses  are  valid  or  null. 
This  criterion  depends  upon  the  category  of  'privity  or 
knowledge"  of  the  wrongdoer.  When  the  carrier  commits 
thus  a  deviation  intentionally  to  cause  damages  or 
recklessly  with  knowledge  that  damage  would  probably 
result,  then  he  is  not  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  the 
exclusion  clauses.  Otherwise,  he  has  to  rely  upon  the 
protection  terms  contained  in  the  Rules  and  the  bill  of 
lading  such  as  the  exemption  clause  and  the  limitation 
clause. 336 
CHAPTER  FOUR 
RECOVERY  OF  LOSSES  AND  DAMAGE 
The  carrier  is  liable  for  a  breach  of  the  contract 
expressly  or  impliedly  as  far  as  losses  and  damages 
caused  to  the  cargo  while  the  goods  were  in  his  charge. 
I 
The  innocent  party  is  entitled  to  compensation  for  all 
the  damage  or  losses  resulting  from  such  a  breach  of 
contract  whether  the  action  be  founded  in  contract  or  in 
2 
tort. 
Damages  are  compensatory  in  nature  either  for  physical 
or  economic  loss.  Difficulty  which  arises  from  the 
assessment  of  the  damages  does  not  disentitle  the 
consignee  or  the  innocent  party  to  recover  such  loss  of 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  and  consequently  the  court  is 
entitled  to  have  a  special  method  to  estimate  them. 
The  causal  relationship  between  the  breach  of  the 
contract  and  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  must  be  shown 
in  order  to  establish  a  right  to  compensate  all  the 
damages  which  were  caused  by  the  breach. 
The  measure  of  damages  depends  however  upon  the  basis 
of  the  actual  loss  or  damage  in  recovering  the  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  regardless  of  the  motive  or  the 
nature  of  the  breach  of  the  contract.  3  Then  if  the 
carrier  has  done  part  of  what  he  was  bound  to  do  under 
Tetley  Marine  Claim,  p  99. 
2 
-Article  3  (1)  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
3-Anson's  Llaw  of  Contract,  p  550. 337 
the  carriage  contract,  he  may  be  able  to  sue  upon  a 
quantum  meruit4,  when  the  innocent  party  has  claimed  for 
all  the  damages  caused  to  the  goods.  Therefore  the 
rational  basis  for  such  recovery  is  that  the  compensation 
is  considered  as  a  replacement  for  an  infringement  of  the 
contract  and  places  the  contracting  parties  in  the  same 
position  as  if  the  contract  had  been  performed5.  Thus 
the  recovery  of  damages  cannot  to  be  used  as  a 
punishment  to  the  defendant,  but  be  used  as  a  substitute 
method  for  performing  the  contemplated  contract  by  paying 
a  compensation  to  the  aggrieved  party  and  restoring  the 
contracting  parties  into  the  same  position  when  the 
contract  was  made  and  before  the  damage  was  done.  6 
I  will  discuss  therefore  the  following  points: 
Section  one:  Compensatory  Nature  of  Damages  and  Losses 
Section  two:  Causation 
Section  three:  Measure  of  Damages. 
4-Ibid,  p  549. 
5-Chitty  on  Contracts,  pp  565-566;  J.  Bond  Smith,  "Recent 
Development  in  the  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of  the  Charter", 
[1982)  13  J.  Mar.  L&  Com,  p  313  at  p  314,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Smith,  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of  Charter". 
6-Tetley  Marine  Claim,  P  129;  lucienne  Carasso  Bulow,  " 
Consequential  Damages  and  the  Duty  of  Mitigate  in  New  York  Maritime 
Arbitrations".  (1984]  LMCLQ,  p  622  hereinafter  cited  as  "Bulow, 
Consequential  Damages;  Daniel  A.  Farber,  "Reassessing  the  Economic 
Efficiency  of  Compensatory  Damages  for  Breach  of  the 
Contract",  (19801  66  Virginia  L.  Rev,  p  1443  at  p  1444,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Farber,  Compensatory  Damages  for  Breach  of  the  Contract.  " 338 
Section  one 
COMPENSATORY  NATURE  OF  DAMAGES  AND  LOSSES 
Damages  are  the  compensatory  claim  which  are  confined 
to  the  loss  of  or  damage  sustained  to  the  cargo  from 
breaching  the  contract  of  carriage  during  the  course  of 
maritime  voyage.  Consequently,  damages  are  the  monetary 
compensation  given  to  the  aggrieved  party  in  order  to 
restore  the  contracting  parties  into  the  same  position  in 
which  the  contract  had  been  performed  which  is  called  the 
principle  of  restituto  integrum7. 
The  general  rule  of  the  contract  is  that  the  motive  or 
conduct  is  not  to  be  deemed  as  an  essential  element  in 
assessing  damages8.  Then  the  aggravated  damages  and 
exemplary  damages  are  not  to  be  awarded  in  case  of  breach 
of  contract9.  Many  sophisticated  and  controversial 
issues  fall,  however,  within  the  scope  of  the  "damages 
recoverable"  in  the  maritime  transportation  matters  as 
far  as  cargo  damages  cases  are  concerned. 
I  will  thus  confine  my  discussion  in  the  following 
points  : 
(i)  Physical  Damage. 
(ii)  Delay  in  Delivery  as  Non-Physical  Damage. 
7-David  M.  Walker,  Law  of  Damages  n  Scotland,  1955,  p  24, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Walker,  Law  of  Damages";  Chitty  on  Contracts, 
p  565;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  129. 
8-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  36 
9-Halsbury's  Laws  of  England,  (4th,  ed,  vol,  12,1975),  Para, 
1187,  p  471,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Halsbury's  Damages";  Aritish 
Guiana  Credit  opv.  Da  Silva  [1965]  2"WLR,  p  248  p  259. 339 
(i)  PHYSICAL  DAMAGE 
Damage  is  of  the  essence  of  the  wrong".  The  carrier 
is,  then,  liable  for  the  loss  of  or  damage  caused  to  the 
cargo  in  his  charge. 
The  carrier  liability  regime  is  based  on  the  principle 
of  the  presumed  fault  or  neglect  under  The  Hague/Visby 
Rulesl1,  and  the  Hamburg  Rules12.  That  makes  out  a  prima 
facie  that  the  carrier's  failure  to  rediliver  the  cargo, 
which  was  in  his  custody,  without  any  explanation  as  to 
how  the  cargo  disappeared  which  renders  him  liable  to 
the  shipper13. 
Physical  damages  may  be,  however,  caused  by  the 
carrier's  failure,  negligence  or  by  his  servants  and 
agents14.  On  the  other  hand,  the  goods  carried  may  suffer 
a  minor  loss  or  damage  from  natural  causes  during  the 
course  of  the  voyage  that  are  called  "Trade  Losses  in 
Transit". 
As  we  have  seen  before,  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo 
mainly  sustained  from  the  carrier's  failure  or  his 
servants  and  agents  during  the  course  of  maritime  voyage 
in  loading,  stowing  and  discharging15. 
Therefore,  I  will  not  go  into  the  details  once  more  and 
I  will  confine  the  discussion  to  the  principles  of 
10-per  Lord  Keith  in  B.  M.  T.  A.  v.  Gray  1951  S.  C.,  p  586  at  p  604. 
11-Article  [3,4]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
12-Article  5  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  see,  chapter  II,  section  (2). 
13-Baker  Oil  Tools.  v.  Delta  S.  S.,  in.  R  [19751  A.  M.  C.,  p  238. 
14-H.  A.  L.  Hart  and  Tony  Honore,  Causation  in  the  Law,  [1984,2nd 
ed],  p  314  hereinafter  cited  as  "Hart  and  Honore". 
15-Supra,  chapter  II,  section  I. 340 
"Normal  deterioration"  or  "Trade  loss  in  Transit".  16 
These  principles  indicate  that  some  loss,  damage  or 
shortage  cannot  be  claimed  where  it  causes  an  ordinary 
minor  damage  during  the  course  of  the  voyage.  17E  specially 
where  the  carrier  shows  the  evidence  that  such  a  cargo 
inevitably  will  suffer  some  deterioration  from  natural 
causes,  i.  e.,  condensation,  staining  and  wasting...,  etc. 
Certain  cargoes  may  sustain,  therefore,  such  a  minor 
loss.  For  instance,  bulk  oil,  cement,  wheat,  flour,  rice, 
coffee,  etc.  These  commodities  have  a  certain  packing  or 
have  a  particular  method  of  transporting  which  depends 
upon  the  custom  in  the  trade. 
The  U.  S.  court  held  in  Palmco  v.  American  president18 
and  Hokkai  Maru19  that  [0.5]  per  cent  of  bulk  oil  would 
unfavourably  adhere  to  the  insides  of  lines  and  tanks  or 
be  lost  through  evaporation  or  handling  and  such  amount 
was  held  not  recoverable20,  although,  where  cargoes 
packed  in  cartons  and  bags  will  sustain  a  minor  amount  of 
damage,  i.  e.,  cement,  Rice  and  coffee. 
These  bags  of  a  shipment  are  expected  to  be  torn.  That 
does  not  mean  that  all  damaged  bags  can  be  re-bagged  and 
consequently  the  carrier  will  be  responsible  for  the 
16-Freinte  de  route,  see  Jule  Jeraute,  French-English  and  English- 
French  Vocabulary  of  Legal  Terms  and  Phrases  ,p  71. 
17-M.  D.  C.  Ltd.  v.  N.  V.  2eevaart  Maatschappij  Beurss  aa-  [1962] 
1Lloyd's  Rep.  p  180. 
18_[1978]  A.  M.  C.  p  1715. 
19-[1937]  A.  M.  C.  p  280. 
20-Robert  B.  Aeomb,  Jr.  Damages  Recoverably  in  Mar  time  Matters, 
1984,  p  31,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Acomb,  Damages  Recoverable. 341 
amount  of  those  commodities  which  cannot  be  re-bagged. 
Then  such  amount  is  considered  as  a  damage  of  trade  loss 
in  transit  which  being  computed  upon  the  custom  in  the 
particular  trade.  21 
If  the  carrier  or  the  ship  owner  can  not,  however,  show 
evidence  of  the  goods  being  damaged  by  unavoidable 
deterioration  or  wastage  in  bulk  and  weight  during  the 
course  of  the  voyage,  then  he  will  be  responsible  and  all 
the  damages  are  recoverable.  22 
The  test  of  being  considered  as  a  criterion  to  the 
"trade  losses  in  transit"  is  not  absolute.  Therefore,  it 
has  to  be  looked  at  realistically  and  the  common  or 
surrounding  circumstances  of  a  particular  cargo.  What  is, 
thus,  the  criterion  of  "trade  losses  in  transit"  or 
"normal  deterioration"? 
We  can  say  that  the  prudent  shipowners  criterion23  is 
a  fair  and  realistic  category,  that  where  the  shipowner 
makes  his  vessel  seaworthy  before  and  at  the  beginning  of 
21-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  119-122  where  he  states  that  "A  minor 
inevitable  loss  or  damage  in  certain  commodities  in  particular 
countries,  i.  e.,  in  the  Canadian  trade,  approximately  half  of  one 
per  cent  of  the  bags  of  a  shipment  of  cement  will  be  expected  to  be 
torn;  In  France,  Tribunal  du  Commerce  de  Paris,  1975,  (1976] 
D.  M.  F.,  p  748  where  it  is  stated  that: 
"loss  in  weight  of  0.1%,  0.25%  and  0.3%  in  bags  of  coffee  is  an 
acceptable  Freinte  de  route",  and  the  Court  d'Appel  de  Paris  stated: 
"The  carrier  is  not  responsible  for  the  loss  of  rice  packed  in 
single  thickness  Jute  bags"t19751  D.  M.  F,  p  467;  Mc  Nair,  J,  in,  Lfl-.. 
C  Ltd.  v.  N.  V.  Zeeaart  Maatschapp  j  R_ursstraat,  op.  cit,  at  p  180. 
22-Acomb,  Damages  Recoverable,  p  31. 
23-Per  Mc  Nair,  J.  in  M.  D.  .  Ta-d.  V.  N.  V.  zeevart  Maatsnhanii 
Deursstraat  [1962]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  op.  cit.,  at  p.  186. 342 
the  voyage  in  exercising  due  diligence  to  supply  the  ship 
properly  manned,  equipped  and  make  the  holds, 
refrigerating  and  cooling  chambers  fit  and  safe  for  the 
goods  reception,  carriage  and  preservation24. 
Accordingly,  if  the  shipowner  had  known  of  the  nature 
of  the  cargo  and  the  weather  conditions  during  the  course 
of  the  voyage  which  made  the  vessel's  hatches  closing  for 
longer  periods  than  usual,  then  he  would  not  be 
responsible  for  that  wastage  in  bulk  or  weight  or  any 
other  loss  or  damage  arising  from  inherent  defect, 
quality  or  vice  of  the  goods25. 
That  reveals  that  such  deterioration  has  taken  place 
beyond  the  shipowner's  liability,  because  cargoes 
inevitably  suffer  some  loss  or  damage  from  natural 
reasons,  i.  e.,  condensation,  staining  and  wasting,  etc. 
even  though  the  vessel  is  seaworthy  and  suitable  for  the 
cargo  carried. 
The  carrier  is,  however,  still  bound  to  show  the  cause 
of  the  damage  without  negligence  or  fault  on  his  part. 
Especially  where  loss  of  or  damage  to  cargo  sustained 
from  unknown  causes26  or  from  two  contribution  causes.  27 
The  carrier  is  liable  for  such  loss  or  damage28  because 
24-Article  (3]  para  (1)  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
25-Article  [4)  para  (11)  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
26-Branimir  luksic,  "Damages  of  Goods  from  Unknown  Causes  in 
Maritime  Transport",  1982,  IL  Diritto  Marittimo.  p  567,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "lusic,  Damages  from  Unknown  Causes". 
27-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  126. 
28-Article  [43(2)  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Acomb,  Damages  Recoverable, 
p  31. 343 
these  losses  should  be  borne  by  the  carrier,  unless  he 
can  identify  the  cause  of  the  damage29  or  to  distinguish 
the  damages  which  were  caused  by  his  fault  or  negligence 
and  that  damage  which  is  caused  by  the  sea  perils30. 
If  the  carrier  can  not  separate  resulting  losses  to  the 
goods  carried,  then  he  will  not  exonerate  himself  from 
liability  in  the  damages  cases,  where  one  cause  is  the 
unseaworthiness  of  the  vessel  and  the  other  an  excepted 
cause3l. 
One  can  say  that  carrier  is  not  liable  for  any  loss  of 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  in  the  following  cases: 
(a)  When  the  damage  to  the  cargo  results  from  following 
the  shipper's  directions32. 
For  instance,  where  a  shipper  had  known  the  condition 
of  the  weather  and  loaded  his  cargo  in  rainy  weather 
which  caused  the  damage  to  the  cargo  by  fresh  water33I 
or  where  a  shipper  had  inspected  and  accepted  the 
vessel's  tanks  prior  to  loading  and  then  the  chemical 
cargo  suffered  from  discoloration  damage  by  exposure  to 
air34. 
(b)  When  the  damage  has  been  sustained  by  inherent 
29-Luksic,  Damage  from  Unknown  Causes,  p  568. 
30-carry  Schnell  v.  The  S.  S.  valescu  ra,  293  U.  S.  p  296  (1934];  where 
it  states  that: 
to.  .  it  is  for  him  (carrier)  to  bring  himself  within  the  exception 
or  to  show  that  he  has  not  been  negligent  ";  Tri-Vl  ev  Packing  V. 
States  Marine  "The  Celestial".,  (1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  1965  at  p  1967. 
31-The  Walter  Raleigh  (19521  A.  M.  C.  p  618  at  p  636. 
32-Hutchinson,  vol.  I,  p  682. 
33-The  Wildwood,  133  F  2d,  p  765. 
34-Dow  chemical  co.  v.  S.  G.  Giovann.  ll_a  D'Amier.,  11970)  A.  M.  C.  p  379 344 
vice35,  latent  defect36,  fraud  or  any  officious  action 
of  the  cargo  owner37  which  made  such  damage  undiscovered 
without  a  close  examination  of  the  shipment. 
(c)  Any  consequent  damages  caused  to  the  perishable 
cargo,  in  spite  of  the  care  and  attention  which  has  been 
given  by  the  carrier.  38 
In  passing,  one  should  mention  a  phrase  of  the 
statement  as  to  "apparent  good  order  and  condition".  39 
If  the  ship  had  issued  a  clean  bill  of  lading  and 
stated  that  goods  were  in  apparent  good  condition,  then 
consignees  could  rely  on  such  statements  as  conclusive 
proof  that  no  apparent  defect  existed,  40  especially  where 
those  portions  of  the  shipment  are  visible  and  open  to 
inspection.  41 
35-Article  [4]  para  (2)  (m)  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Tetley,  Marine 
Claim,  p.  219  at  p  220,  where  he  states  that  : 
"Nevertheless  if  one  must  use  a  single  term  in  English  "  inherent 
defect"  seems  to  cover  both  "hidden  defect"  and  "  inherent  vice". 
36-Article  [4]  para  (2}  (P)  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
37-Article  (4]  para  (2)  (q)  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Hutchinson, 
vol.  II,  p  821,  sec.  738. 
38-Hutchinson,  vol.  11,  p  713,  sec.  649. 
39  Tokio  Marine  &  Eire  Insurance.  Co.  Ltd.  v.  R.  ta.  S.  S.  -o. 
(1970]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p.  91;  U.  S.  ct.  of  Apps.  " 
40-The  Carso,  53  Fed.  Rep.  p  374  (1931)  ;  E.  T.  RArwick  Mills  V. 
Hellenic  Lines  [1972]  A.  M.  C.  p  1802;  Cehave  N.  v.  U_Br  .  mer  Handel 
sgesel  schaft  M.  B.  H  [1976]  1  Q.  B.  p  44  at  p  45,  where  it  is  stated 
that  : 
"the  term  'shipment  to  be  made  in  good  condition'  was  not  a 
"condition"  any  breach  of  which  entitled  the  buyers  to  reject  the 
goods  but  an  intermediate  stipulation  which  gave  no  right  to  reject 
unless  the  breach  went  to  the  root  of  the  contract...  ". 
41-Spartus  Corp.  v.  S/S  Yafo,  590  F.  2d,  p  1310  at  p  1311  (1979); 
Aunt  Mid.  Inc.  v.  F  el  -oranje  lines.  ET  At,  119721  A.  M.  C.,  p  677 345 
Where  the  physical  damage  occurred  during  the  course  of 
the  voyage,  then  the  best  way  of  proving  the  shortage  or 
damage  is  for  the  consignee  to  call  a  joint  survey  where 
both  of  them  are  represented,  i.  e.,  shipowner,  or  carrier 
and  consignee  or  any  claimant.  42 
The  carrier  has  the  burden  of  proof  to  show  that  he 
exercised  due  diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  and 
the  damage  was  due  to  one  of  the  excepted  causes.  43 
Otherwise  the  carrier  will  be  liable  for  any  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  without  proof  of  negligence.  44 
Thus  the  carrier  does  not  need  to  show  the  exact  cause 
of  the  damage,  but  he  can  prove  the  absence  of  his 
negligence  by  one  of  the  protection  of  the  Article  (4  ) 
of  the  Hague  Rules45,  i.  e.,  an  excepted  peril  of  the  sea 
which  protects  the  carrier  from  any  responsibility  has 
arisen  through  the  damage  cases.  46 
Lastly,  when  the  competent  court  considered  the  facts 
and  the  legal  conclusion  of  the  case  of  the  damage,  then 
it  will  become  an  adjudication  for  that  case  and  there  is 
no  reason  to  re-open  and  consider  these  facts  once  more 
on  appeal.  47 
at  p  678. 
42-Tetley,  Marine  claim,  p  127. 
43-The  Walter  Ruleigh,  (19521  A.  M.  C.  p  618  at  p  636. 
44_i.  Gerber  &  Co.  v.  S.  S.  Sabine  Howatdt  (19701  A.  M.  C.  p  450. 
45-  Luksic,  Damages  from  Unknown  Causes,  p  571. 
46-yallescura,  (19341  A.  M.  C.  p  1573,  where  it  is  stated  that 
"Where  the  efficient  cause  of  cargo  damage,  for  which  the  carrier 
is  prima  facie  liable  is  not  an  excepted  peril,  no  burden  is  cast 
on  the  shipper  to  prove  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier". 
47-Lafcomo,  (1967]  A.  M.  C.,  p  284. 346 
(ii)  DELAY  IN  DELIVERY  AS  NON-PHYSICAL  DAMAGE 
An  unreasonable  delay  or  deviation  may  cause  physical 
or  non-physical  damage  to  the  cargo.  The  actual  loss  to 
the  shipper  is  an  important  element  for  the  claimant 
recovering  such  damage.  Therefore,  an  unreasonable 
deviation  which  caused  delay  in  delivery  of  cargo  without 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  is  not  enough. 
There  is  no  specific  provision  in  the  Hague  Rules 
concerning  loss  or  damage  caused  by  delay  in  delivery. 
The  pursuance  of  the  Article  [3)  rule  (2)  of  the  Hague 
Rules  reveals  that  one  can  find  out  a  general  duty  of 
care  in  loading,  handling,  stowage,  carriage,  custody, 
care  and  discharge  of  the  goods  carried  which  is  imposed 
on  the  carrier  while  the  goods  were  in  his  charge.  48 
There  is  however  no  difficulty  in  dealing  with  physical 
damage  caused  by  delay,  but  it  would  be  more  difficult  to 
apply  the  same  rules  to  non-physical  damage.  49 
I  will  discuss  therefore  the  attitude  of  jurisprudence 
of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United  States  and  the 
International  Conventions  in  respect  of  economic  loss  and 
its  consequences. 
48-Wilson,  p  145. 
49-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  The  "UNCITRAL"  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage 
of  Goods  by  Sea,  (part  II),  [1975-761  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  com,  p  487  at  pp 
489-490,  hereinafter  cited  as  "  Sweeney,  part  11. 347 
ECONOMIC  LOSS 
The  general  principle  of  the  common  law  concerning 
economic  loss  was  that  liability  did  not  extend  to  cover 
purely  economic  loss.  50  These  rules  were  applied  in  cases 
of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  which  were  based  upon  the 
principles  that  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  was  uncertain 
and  consequently  the  economic  loss,  i.  e.,  loss  of  market 
was  irrecoverable  as  being  too  speculative.  51 
This  situation  was  changed  in  respect  of  economic  loss 
where  the  court  in  Dunn  v.  Busknall  Bros*  held  that  : 
"There  is  no  rule  of  law  that  damages  cannot  be 
recovered  for  loss  of  market  on  a  contract  of 
carriage  by  sea.  " 
This  is  well  illustrated  by  the  court  of  Appeal  on  the 
grounds  that  when  the  claimant  had  sufficient  proprietory 
or  possessory  interest  in  the  cargo,  which  emerged  by  the 
contract  of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  then  he  has  a  right 
to  maintain  an  action  for  recovering  the  economic  loss.  52 
The  economic  loss  is  however  still  considered  an 
important  issue  which  has  created  a  real  diversity 
especially  where  the  claimant  had  suffered  purely 
50-Atiyah,  Economic  Loss,  p  248;  J.  W.  Davies,  "  Actions  in  Tort  for 
Damaged  Cargo",  [1985]  1  LMCLQ,  p1  hereinafter  cited  as  ,  Davies, 
Damaged  Cargo,  where  he  states  that  : 
"Oliver  and  Robert  Goff,  L.  JJ,  agreed  that  there  is  no  single 
general  principle  which  can  explain  the  circumstances  in  which 
economic  loss  is  recoverable.  " 
51-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  164. 
*.  [1902]  2  K.  B.  p.  614  at  p.  616;  (1900-19031  All  E.  R.  p.  131. 
52-The  Kehampton,  (1913]  p  54,  at  p  173;  Elliott  steam  Tug  Co  Ltd. 
v.  Shipping  controller  [1922]  1KB.  p  127. 348 
economic  loss  without  suffering  any  physical  damage.  The 
general  principal  of  the  common  law  confined  the 
recovering  of  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  physical  damage. 
Nevertheless,  there  has  been  a  restriction  on  the 
principle  that  a  claimant  who  suffers  physical  damage  can 
maintain  an  action  for  recovering  some  economic  loss  in 
addition  to  the  physical  damage.  53 
The  Hedlev  Byrne54  case  is  the  first  case  which 
totally  abolishes  the  prevailing  view  which  was 
considered  that  the  pecuniary  loss  was  not  recoverable 
unless  the  plaintiff  had  suffered  some  physical  damages 
and  also  cancels  the  distinction  between  physical  damage 
or  injury  and  financial  loss55. 
As  the  general  principle  states  that  all  loss  of  or 
damage  arising  from  one  cause  such  as  breach  of  the 
contract  or  delict,  then  the  compensation  of  these 
damages  must  be  awarded  in  one  action56.  The  law  should, 
therefore,  try  to  channel  all  the  claims,  i.  e.,  financial 
53-Atiyah,  Economic  Loss,  pp  251-252;  Halsbury's  Damage,  p  416, 
para,  1113. 
54-[1964]  A.  C.  p  465. 
55-Atiyah,  Economic  Loss  p  264,  where  he  states  that  the  Hedley 
Byrne  case  is  that  : 
".  .  it  no  way  affects  the  general  principle  that  pecuniary  loss  is 
not  recoverable  in  the  law  of  negligence,  but  merely  illustrates  an 
exception  to  that  general  rule.  " 
56-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  165;  Junior  Books  Ltd  v.  yeitch  Ltd. 
[1983]  1  A.  C  p  520,  where  it  is  stated  that  : 
"A  duty  to  avoid  causing  pure  economic  loss  consequential  on 
defects  in  the  work  and  of  to  avoid  defects  in  the  work  itself  ... 
so  that  the  pursuers  were  entitled  to  recover  their  financial  loss 
for  repairing  the  floor.  .  ." 349 
loss,  through  that  action,  viz,  through  the  person  who 
has  suffered  the  physical  damage  if  any. 
According  to  the  doctrine  of  subrogation  the 
insurance  companies  have  then  a  right  to  claim  in  the 
name  of  the  insured  for  loss  arising  where  they  have 
compensated  him57. 
The  argument  which  supports  the  compensation  of 
economic  loss  is,  however,  based  on  the  principle  of 
restitutio  in  integrum  which  is  aimed  at  restoring 
both  contracting  parties  to  the  same  position  as  if  the 
contract  had  been  performed58. 
The  loss  of  the  profit  is,  however,  recoverable  as 
damages  occurred  from  the  breach  of  the  contract  of 
carriage,  which  was  caused  by  deviation  involving  delay, 
when  such  loss  of  profit  is  not  too  remote  in  law, 
especially  in  the  case  when  the  contracting  parties  have 
contemplated  such  circumstances  which  caused  delay  in 
delivery59,  or  when  the  special  circumstances  were 
57-Atiyah,  Economic  Loss,  p  274. 
58-Tetley  Marine  Claim,  p  129;  Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  121;  Lord 
Wright,  in  ,  the  lie  bosch  Dredger  v.  The  Edison.  S.  S.  [1933]  A.  C. 
p.  449  at  p  463,  where  he  states  that: 
"The  dominant  rule  of  law  is  the  principle  of  restitutio  in 
integrum,  and  subsidiary  rules  can  only  be  justified  if  they  give 
effect  to  that  rule.  " 
59-Lord  Pearce  in  the  Saufes  v.  C.  ar  ikow.  T.  td  [1967]  3  ALL 
E.  R.  p  686  at  p  712,  where  he  states  that  : 
"The  loss  of  market  arose  naturally.  ..  according  to  the  usual 
course  of  things,  from  the  shipowner's  deviation.  The  sugar  was 
being  exported  to  Basrah  where,  as  the  respondents  knew  there  was  a 
sugar  market.  It  was  sold  on  arrival  and  fetched  a  lower  price 
than  it  would  have  done  had  it  arrived  on  time.  The  fall  in  market 
price  was  not  due  to  any  unusual  or  unpredictable  factor.  "Aruna 350 
communicated  by  the  parties,  then  the  damage  resulting 
from  the  breach  of  the  contract  under  such  circumstances 
would  be  recoverable60. 
Thus,  whether  there  is  a  loss  of  profit  or  not  depends 
on  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  a  given  case.  Then 
the  question  of  recovering  loss  of  profit  on  the  basis  of 
losing  the  market  is  in  truth  a  question  of  fact. 
Nevertheless,  the  interpretation  of  international 
conventions  of  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  concerning 
the  economic  loss  is  not  easy  to  deduce  a  legal  solution 
of  a  particular  case,  especially  where  the  convention  did 
not  contain  a  specific  provision  for  economic  loss. 
Therefore,  the  conventions  have  different  attitudes 
depending  upon  a  particular  convention  and  the 
surrounding  circumstances  of  a  particular  case.  The  Hague 
Rules  contain  no  specific  provision  for  the  economic  loss 
caused  by  delay  in  delivery  of  the  cargo6l. 
It  is  silent  on  that  matter  as  to  what  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  is  the  responsibility  of  the 
carrier62.  Some  believe  that  the  liability  for  economic 
loss  suffered  by  delay  exists  under  the  Hague  Rules  and 
it  is  considered  as  coming  within  the  term  "loss  or 
damagei63. 
Mills.  Ltd.  v.  Dhanrajmal  Gobindram.  (1968]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  113. 
60-Alderson  B.  in,  Hadley  v.  Baxendale  (1843-18601  ALL  E.  R.  p  461 
at  p  465. 
61-Tetley  Marine  Claim,  p  129  ;  TD/B/C.  4/ISL/  6/Rev,  l,  p.  48. 
62-Some 
national  COGSA  contains  a  specific  provision  for  delay, 
i.  e.,  Japan,  Art,  3;  see  TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/  Rev.  1,  p  48. 
63-J,  p.  Bonour,  "The  P&I  Clubs  and  the  New  United  Nations 351 
There  is  no  authority  in  Article  4  (1)  or  Article  4  [2] 
of  the  Hague  Rules  which  expressly  limits  loss  or  damage 
to  physical  loss  or  damage64. 
Thus  the  phrase  "loss  or  damage"  has  a  wider  meaning 
than  physical  loss  or  damage65  which  mentions  in  Article 
3  [8]  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  shows  that  the  loss  or 
damage  contemplated  in  "loss  or  damage  to  or  in 
connection  with  the  goods". 
Therefore,  such  loss  or  damage  is  not  limited  to 
physical  loss  or  damage,  but  must  arise  in  relation  to 
the  loading,  handling,  stowage,  carriage,  custody,  care 
and  discharge  of  such  goods66. 
Lord  Morton  of  Henryton67  said  that 
Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  1978,  "  Publish  in  Ths, 
Hamburg  Rules  on  the  carriage  of  Goods  by  Spar  Edited  by  Samir 
Mankabady  1978,  p.  239  at  p  244,  hereinafter  edited  as  "Honour, 
Carriage  of  Goods  be  Sea". 
64-yicount  Simond  in  the  Adamstors  Shipping  Co.  Ltd  v.  Anglo-Saxon 
Petroleum  Co.  . td.  (1959]  A.  C.  p  133  at  p  157. 
65-Devlin.  J,  in,  The  Adamastors  Shipping 
_o.  td  v.  Anglo-Saxon 
Petroleum  Ltd.  op.  cit.,  at  p  144;  G.  H.  Renton  &cn.  ttd  v.  Palmyra 
Trading  Corporation  of  Panama,  (1957]  A.  C.  p  149  at  p  150;  Sa  - 
Hut  n_  Alb 
_r  -us 
S.  .  A.  v.  Paloma  Tercera  Shipping  on.  S.  A.  (The 
se),  [1981]1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  175,  where  the  court  was  held  that; 
".  ..  the  shipowner  was  liable  to  a  receiver  of  cargo  ,  for  the 
receiver's  lost  profits  resulting  from  a  65  day  delay  in  delivery 
of  the  goods  caused  by  deviation";  J.  Bond  Smith,  Jr,  "Recent 
Developments  in  the  law  of  damages  for  breach  of  charter",  [1982]  13 
J.  Mar.  L&comm.  p  313,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Smith..  Law  of  Damages  for 
Breach  of  Charter". 
66-Lord  Keith  of  Avonholm,  in  The  Adamamtors  Shipping  Cojtd  V. 
, nULJQý-Saxon  Petroleum  Co.  Ltd,  op  cit.  p  181. 
67- 
.  }l  neon  &o.  Ltd  v.  Palmyra  Trading  Corporation  of  Panama, 
op.  cit,  p  169. 352 
"In  my  view,  the  phrase  "loss  of  or  damage  to 
goods"  covers  four  events  : 
"a"  loss  to  goods  (  whatever  that  may  be 
"b"  damage  to  goods  ; 
"c"  loss  in  connection  with  goods  ; 
"d"  damage  in  connection  with  goods.  " 
Thus  the  words  "loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods"  and 
words  "or  in  connection  with"  should  be  interpreted 
altogether  in  order  to  give  wider  meaning  and  scope  to 
the  term  "loss  or  damage  to  the  goods  and  cover  economic 
loss. 
That  means  that  the  rules  do  not  exclude  or  restrict 
recovery  of  damages  from  a  carrier  assessed  with 
reference  to  an  economic  loss  if  on  the  ordinary 
principles  of  law  such  damages  should  be  recovered". 
The  United  States  courts  have  however  made  quite  clear 
in  respect  of  recovering  the  economic  loss  that  when  the 
carrier  knew  or  was  aware  that  the  goods  should  be 
delivered  to  whom  they  were  addressed  at  the  time  which 
is  contemplated  by  the  contracting  parties,  then  he  will 
be  liable  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  caused 
from  delay  in  delivery69. 
The  court  in  B.  F.  Mckernin  &co.  Inc,  v.  jj.  5.1tines, 
x.  70,  held  that: 
68-The  Pegase,  [1981]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  175. 
69-companian  Maviera  Asiatic,  S.  A.  v.  Burmah  nil  Co.  [1977]  A.  M.  C. 
p  1538,  where  the  court  allowed  the  time  charterer's  claim  for  lost 
profit. 
70-416  F.  Supp,  p  1068  at  p.  1072  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1976);  Hpctor  Martine  Z& 
. 
Ca.  v.  Southern  Pacific  Trans,  606  F.  2d,  p  106  (5th.  cir.  1979}, 
where  it  is  stated  that: 
"the  "rental  value"  of  capital  goods  during  a  delay  in  shipment 353 
"To  establish  a  right  to  recover  for 
consequential  damages,  Mckernin  must  prove  that 
U.  S.  lines  was  aware  at  the  time  the  parties 
entered  into  their  contract  of  the  need  to 
deliver  the  goods  in  time  for  Christmas  sales". 
Whereas,  the  court  in  the  M/V  Antonis  P.  Lemos71,  held 
that  the  lost  profit  was  "a  matter  of  considerable 
speculation"  and  therefore  dismissed  the  claim  for 
recovering  such  loss. 
We  can  then  say  that  the  Anglo-American  attitude  for 
liability  of  economic  loss  caused  by  delay  in  delivery  is 
regarded  as  coming  within  the  scope  of  the  provisions  of 
the  Hague  Rules  and  in  general  all  such  loss  of  or  damage 
to  the  cargo  is  recoverable. 
Nevertheless,  the  jurisdictions  of  most  countries  had 
not  resolved  this  problem  exclusively  yet  either  by  court 
decisions  or  legislation72. 
Therefore,  the  "UNCITRAL"  conference  at  the  preliminary 
discussion  of  carrier  liability  for  non-physical  damage 
caused  by  delay  in  delivery  has  created  a  real 
diversity73. 
The  subject  was  handed  over  to  the  Drafting  party  to 
arrive  at  a  single  text  in  order  to  produce  unanimous 
might  be  recoverable"  ;  Acomb,  Damages  Recoverable,  p  44. 
71-S.  M.  A.  Award  No.  768  t  p.  12  (1973),  where  it  is  quoted  from 
"Smith,  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of  Charter"  at  p  318. 
72-David  K.  Schollenberger,  "  Risk  of  Loss  in  Shipping  Under  the 
Hamburg  Rules"[1981]  10  Denver  Journal  of  International  Law  and 
Policy  (USA),  p  568,  at  pp  272-273,  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Schollenberger,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
73-Sweeney  part  II,  p  145. 354 
approval  of  the  delegations  and  remove  all  the 
difficulties  and  the  doubts  in  applying  the  rules  on  the 
subject. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  contain  thus  specific  provisions 
concerning  the  liability  of  the  carrier  for  delay  which 
set  forth  in  Article  5  [1)  as  following  : 
"The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  resulting  from 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods,  as  well  as  from 
delay  in  delivery,  if  the  occurrence  which 
caused  the  loss,  damage  or  delay  took  place 
while  the  goods  were  in  his  charge  as  defined 
in  article  4,  unless  the  carrier  proves  that 
he,  his  servants  or  agents  took  all  the 
measures  that  could  reasonably  be  required  to 
avoid  the  occurrence  and  its  consequences.  " 
Then  delay  in  delivery  is  defined  by  article  5  [2]  as: 
"Delay  in  delivery  occurs  when  the  goods  have 
not  been  delivered  at  the  port  of  discharge 
provided  for  in  the  contract  of  carriage  by  sea 
in  time  expressly  agreed  upon  or  on  the  absence 
of  such  agreement,  within  the  time  which  it 
would  be  reasonable  to  require  of  a  diligent 
carrier,  having  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.  " 
Finally,  the  consignee  has  been  authorized  by  para  131 
to  recover  for  the  loss  of  the  goods  if  they  have  not 
been  delivered  within  [60]  consecutive  days  following  the 
expiry  of  the  time  for  delivery. 
These  provisions  do  not  mention  the  clauses  providing 
for  damages  only  if  the  delay  in  delivery  of  the  goods 
is  in  excess  of  a  certain  time  limit. 355 
We  can  however  find  out  in  the  application  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Hague  Rules  that  Article  3  (8],  does 
not  permit  the  carrier  to  lessen  his  liability  which  are 
set  forth  under  the  Rules.  Otherwise,  these  clauses  would 
be  considered  null  and  void. 
74 
SECTION  TWO 
CAUSATION75 
The  cargo  claimant  must  prove  the  causal  connection 
between  the  loss  or  damage  and  the  carrier's  fault  or 
negligence  in  order  to  enable  himself  to  recover  such 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo76.  Certain  losses  may  be 
too  remote  which  makes  the  causal  connection  unsustained 
and,  consequently  these  losses  are  not  compensable.  77 
The  courts  always  use  causal  terminology  in  making 
their  decisions  for  recovering  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo. 
Therefore  the  defendant  is  liable  for  loss  or  damage 
caused  by  breaching  the  contract  of  carriage  irrespective 
of  the  manner  of  its  occurrence,  if  it  would  not  have 
occurred  for  the  breach.  78 
74-Dor,  p  146. 
75-This  topic  has  been  developed  in  the  law  of  tort,  but  may  arise 
in  the  law  of  contract.  See,  chitty  on  contracts,  p  570,  para, 
1342;  Hart  &  Honore,  causation  in  the  Law  (1984),  chapter  II. 
76-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  147. 
77-Anson's,  Law  of  Contract,  p  554. 
78-De  La  Sere  v.  Pearson  (1908]  1  K.  B.  280  ;  Ball-  v.  M  noav 
[1943]  K.  B.  p  281;  Stanssbie  V.  Troman  [1948]  2  K.  Be  p  48;  Hart  & 
Honore,  pp  321-322. 356 
Then  the  cargo  owner  or  any  claimant  can  recover  loss 
of  the  cargo  when  he  shows:  - 
(1)  The  physical  cause  of  his  losses  or  damages  to  the 
cargo. 
(2)  Fault  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  or  shipowner  sought 
to  be  held  responsible. 
(3)  A  causal  connection  between  such  fault  and  the 
physical  cause.  79 
However,  the  interpretation  of  the  phrases  of  the 
causation,  such  as  "proximate  causes80,  "but  for"81,  or 
"sine  qua  non"  test82  have  been  expressed  in  different 
meaning  and  the  jurisprudence  have  reached  different 
solutions  which  showed  that  the  causal  terminology  had  no 
definite  meaning  so  that  it  is  still  as  enigma  either  in 
law  of  tort  or  in  law  of  contract. 
We  can  therefore  say  that  the  issue  of  causation  is 
characterized  on  the  strength  of  the  criterion  of 
remoteness  whether  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  within 
"the  contemplation"  of  the  defendant  or  within  the  risk 
of  which  he  was  aware  or  should  have  been  known  to  him.  83 
79-The  Martello,  153  U.  S.  p  64  (1894)  at  p  75. 
80-  Hart  &  Honorer  p  324. 
81-Margaret  A.  Somerville,  "A  Diagramatic  Approach  to  Causation", 
[1978]  24  McGill.  L.  J.  p  442  at  P  451,  hereinafter  cited  as, 
"Somerville,  causation",  where  he  states  that: 
"Thus  at  this  stage  ,  the  "but  for"  test  is  used  to  create  a  causal 
chain". 
82-Joseph  H.  King,  Jr.  Causation,  "valuation  and  Chance  in 
Personal  Consequences"(1981)  90  Yale.  L.  J.  p  1353  at  pp  1355-1356, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "  King  ,  Causation". 
83-Hart  &  Honorer  p  107  ;  Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  558. 357 
In  addition,  we  can,  however,  argue  that  although  a 
doctrine  of  mitigation  may,  in  addition  to  the  causation 
be  relevant  where  the  aggrieved  party  has  suffered  loss 
through  his  own  negligence  by  allowing  damages  caused 
from  the  defendant's  breach  of  contract  to  be 
accumulated. 
84 
Thus,  there  are  two  doctrines  which  have  endeavoured  to 
confine  and  limit  the  damages  which  can  be  awarded. 
(i)  Remoteness. 
(ii)  Mitigation  of  Damages. 
i-REMOTENESS 
The  test  of  remoteness  is  whether  the  loss  of  or  damage 
to  the  cargo  may  fairly  and  reasonably  be  considered  as 
arising  naturally  or  may  be  supposed  to  have  been  in 
contemplation  by  the  contracting  parties  at  the  time  they 
made  the  contract.  85 
The  breach  of  contract  is  not  sufficient  to  recover  all 
the  loss  of,  or  damages  to,  the  cargo  without  showing  the 
causal  relation  between  the  loss  or  damage  and  the  breach 
of  contract  in  which  such  loss  was  caused  by,  or 
resulted  from  ,  the  breach  of  contract.  86 
This  causal  relationship  is  not  in  contradiction  with 
the  test  of  remoteness  which  depends  on  the  contemplation 
84-Chitty  on  Contracts,  para,  1344. 
85-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  pp  22,48  ;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  132; 
yctoria  Laundary  v.  NewmaII,  (1949]  2  K.  B.,  p  528;  rlobe  refining  Co. 
v.  Landa  Cotton  Oil  Co,  190  U.  S,  p  540,47  L.  ed.  p  117  (1903 
86-Walker,  The  Law  of  Contracts,  pp  507-508. 358 
of  the  contracting  parties.  Then  the  question  may  arise: 
What  is  the  category  to  show  that  the  consequences  were 
in  contemplation  of  the  parties  ? 
The  criterion  of  a  prudent  and  reasonable  shipowner  is 
an  important  factor  to  judge  the  reasonable  contemplation 
of  the  contracting  parties  at  the  time  of  making  the 
contract.  87  A  shipowner  must  reasonably  contemplate  the 
consequences  of  the  breach  of  contract  which  causes  loss 
of,  damage  to,  or  delay  in  delivery. 
It  has  been  held  that  such  contemplation  may  prove  by 
any  evidence  either  oral  or  written  to  show  that  the  loss 
or  damage  claimed  is  not  considered  so  remote.  Remoteness 
is  however  a  matter  of  law  for  the  court  to  deduce  which 
parts  of  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  are 
considered  legally  too  remote  or  not,  because  the 
remoteness  of  damage  is  considered  as  a  substantive 
issue.  Having  regard  to  the  surrounding  circumstances  of 
each  case  when  it  applies  to  such  a  test.  88 
There  are  many  cases  that  explain  that  remote  damages 
not  within  the  contemplation  of  the  contracting  parties 
at  the  time  the  contract  was  made  cannot  be  recovered. 
The  court  in  Hadley  v.  Bax 
_ndal  P89  held  that  if  the 
special  circumstances  were  wholly  unknown  to  the 
breaching  party,  then  he  could  only  be  supposed  to  have 
had  in  his  contemplation  the  amount  of  damage  which 
87-per  Lord  Wright,  in,  Koufoy  v.  C.  CZarnikow.  T  td  (1967]  3  ALL 
E.  R.  p  705;  Vo  i_a  Laundry  (Windpo  1,  mod.  v.  Newman  Industri_ 
J,  td,  [1949]  1A  LL  E.  R.,  p  997. 
88-Walker,  Law  of  Contract,  p  509. 
89-(1843-1$60]  ALL  E.  R.  Rep,  p  461. 359 
arises  generally  and  naturally  from  such  a  breach  of 
contract. 
Although,  where  a  sub-contract  was  unknown  to  the  party 
breaking  the  contract,  then  only  nominal  damages  were 
recoverable  because  such  consequences  are  not  within  the 
contemplation  of  the  breaching  party.  90 
Whereas,  there  are  more  remote  damages  recoverable  when 
such  damages  are  within  the  contemplation  of  the  parties 
and  the  breaching  party  is  liable  for  these  consequences 
which  resulted  from  his  breach  of  contract. 
The  court  in  Dunn  v.  Bucknall  Bros91,  held  that:  - 
"A  shipowner  who  carries  goods  destined  for  an 
alien  enemy  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of 
shippers,  or  other  goods  in  the  same  ship,  is 
prima  facie  liable  to  them  in  damages  for  late 
delivery  occasioned  by  the  seizure  and 
detention  of  the  ship  as  a  result  of  enemy 
goods  being  on  board..  "92 
Also,  Asquith,  L.  J.  in,  Newnan  Industries,  Ltd.  93, 
has  made  that  quite  clear  by  saying:  - 
"it  is  important  to  inquire  what  information 
the  defendants  possessed  at  the  time  when  the 
contract  was  made  as  to  such  matters  as  the 
time  at  which,  and  the  purpose  for  which,  the 
90-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  pp  48-49;  Wal  on  v,  Fo 
.h  _rgill 
(1835)  7 
C&P,  p  392. 
91-[1900-1903]  ALL  E.  R.  p  131. 
92-Aruna  Mills.  Ltd.  v.  Dhanrajmal  cohind  ram,  (1968]  1  ALL  E.  R.  , 
p  1131,  where  it  is  stated  that  :  - 
"As  the  contract  showed  that  the  parties  had  contemplated  the 
possibility  that  late  delivery  was  liable  to  result  in  loss  to  the 
buyers  through  revaluation  of  the  rupee.  " 
93_(1949]  1  All  E.  R.  p  997  at  p  999. 360 
plaintiffs  required  the  boiler.  The  defendants 
knew  before  and  at  the  time  of  the  contract 
that  the  plaintiffs  were  laundrymen  and  dryers 
and  required  the  boiler  for  purposes  of  their 
business  as  such.  They  also  knew  that  the 
plaintiffs  wanted  the  boiler  for  immediate 
use.  " 
We  can  conclude  that  the  defaulting  party  is  liable  for 
the  consequences  as  he  ought  reasonably  to  have 
contemplated  such  consequences  at  the  time  of  the 
contract  as  a  serious  possibility  or  real  danger.  94 
Then,  the  natural  consequences  of  the  breach  of 
contract  by  deviation  or  delay  should  be  taken  into 
account  by  the  prudent  businessman  and  it  does  not  need 
generally  be  the  subject  of  special  discussion  or 
communication. 
95 
For  instance,  when  the  vessel  on  sailing  was 
unseaworthy  and  the  owner  knew  of  the  vessel's  state  at 
the  commencement  of  the  voyage,  then  the  shipowner  ought 
to  have  foreseen  all  the  consequences  which  took  place 
within  the  course  of  the  contemplated  voyage.  96 
Also,  where  a  contract  of  carriage  of  goods  gives  the 
carrier  an  option  between  methods  and  procedures  of 
transportation,  then  the  carrier  should  only  exercise  the 
option  which  harmonies  and  suits  with  interests  of  the 
shipper.  Otherwise,  it  will  be  against  the  advantage  of 
94-Lord  Denning  M.  R,  in,  parsons  Ltd.  v.  Uttley  Ingharn  &Co. 
(19781  1  0.  B.  p  791  at  p  802. 
95-Lord  Wright,  in,  A/B  Karlsham_ns  O1  jefabri  kAr  v,  Monarch  SS.  Ca. 
1949  S.  C  (H.  L)  p1  at  p  21 
96-Lord  Porter,  in,  AIR  Karlshamns  Ol,  j_fahrlker  v.  Monarch  SS1  Co. 
op.  cit,  at  p  9. 361 
the  shipper  unless  it  is  done  in  good-faith  or  notified 
the  shipper  for  any  modification  or  change  in  the  course 
of  the  voyage.  97  That  means  that  all  the  circumstances, 
which  arise  during  the  commencement  of  the  course  of  the 
voyage  were  known  or  should  have  been  known  to  the 
contracting  parties  at  the  date  the  contract  was  made. 
Although  such  circumstances  may,  reasonably  be  presumed 
to  contemplate  the  estimation  of  the  amount  of  damages  by 
both  parties.  98  Finally,  a  particular  measure  of  damages 
in  an  individual  case  is  not  bound  to  apply  by  the  court 
in  each  case  but  it  has  to  consider  all  the  individual 
circumstances  of  the  hearing  case.  99 
(ii)  MITIGATION  OF  DAMAGES 
This  doctrine  is  known  the  "doctrine  of  avoidable 
consequences"100  of  the  breach  of  the  contract  by  the 
aggrieved  party.  101  The  general  principle  of  the  contract 
97-Hutchinson,  vol.,  I,  p  684. 
98-Hadley  v.  Raxendale,  9  ex.  p  341  [156  E.  R.,  p  145  at  p  1511 
Richard  A.  Posner,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law,  (2d,  ed.,  1977),  p  94, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Posner,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law"). 
99-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  42. 
100-gulow,  Consequential  Damage,  p  622. 
101-There  is  a  dichotomy  in  doctrine  of  mitigation  of  damage  which 
rests  upon  the  breaching  or  wrongdoing  party  and  the  consignee  or 
the  innocent  party. 
The  basic  duty  of  the  carrier  during  the  course  of  the  voyage  is  to 
exercise  due  diligence  to  load,  handle,  stow,  carry,  keep,  care 
for,  and  discharge  the  goods  carried  as  we  have  seen  previously  in 
chapter  II. 
Accordingly  the  carrier  must  adopt  all  the  reasonable  steps  to  save 
the  goods  carried  from  damage  and  prevent  such  damages  from 
spreading.  Taking  into  account  the  interest  of  the  cargo  as  well  as 362 
indicates  that  the  damages  are  due  from  the  breaching 
party  in  order  to  release  himself  from  liability  by 
damages  in  compensation  for  his  failure.  102  That  does  not 
mean  that  the  innocent  party  has  a  right  to  remain  idle 
and  allow  damages  to  accumulate.  103  Accordingly  the 
aggrieved  party  must  take  any  reasonable  steps  which  are 
available  to  him  to  avoid  and  mitigate  the  extent  of  the 
loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  or  consequent  upon 
the  breach,  viz,  mitigation  is  not  required  until 
repudiation  is  definite.  104 
Then  the  innocent  party  is  not  entitled  to  be 
compensated  by  the  party  in  default  for  loss  of  or  damage 
to  the  cargo  which  has  not  been  caused  by  the  breach  but 
by  his  (innocent  party)  own  failure  to  behave  and  take 
reasonable  steps  to  reduce  the  consequences  after  the 
breach.  105 
Therefore  the  court  will  confine  and  limit  the 
recoverable  damages  resulting  from  the  consignee's 
negligence  to  halt  the  progressive  damage  to  the  date 
when  the  carrier  should  be  discharged  of  any  consequences 
of  the  ship,  namely  he  must  consider  the  whole  adventure  and  act 
accordingly;  Halsbury's,  Shipping  and  Navigation,  pare,  616,  p  423. 
102-Walker  Law  of  Damages,  p  86. 
103-Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  570  ;  Smith  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach 
of  Charter,  p  319. 
104-Smith  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of  Charter,  p  320  ;  Walker  Law 
of  Damages,  p  174. 
105-2  Carver,  para  2143  ;  Scrutton,  389;  Poor,  p  50  ;  Walker  Law  of 
Damages,  p  168;  Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  p.  570;  Hato  La  Versarena 
C.  A.  v.  S/S  Susaa,  [19733  A.  M.  C.  p  195;  Compare,  Fabre  S.  A.  V. 
Mondial  United  Corp.  [1963]  A.  M.  C.,  p.  946  at  p  947. 363 
and  responsibility  upon  the  breach.  106 
Although  the  consignee  is  not  entitled  to  recover  any 
loss  or  damage  where  he  knew  that  damage  had  taken  place 
before  shipping  the  goods  to  its  customers.  107 
The  U.  S.  court  held  in  Ellerman  Lines  .  _d.  V.  M  ha 
President  Hardina108  that  the  standard  of  reasonableness, 
which  is  required  in  mitigation  cases,  is  set  forth  as 
following:  - 
"All  that  is  required  of  the  non-defaulting 
party  in  measuring  his  damages  is  that  he  act 
reasonably  so  as  not  unduly  to  enhance  the 
damages  caused  by  the  breach.  He  (the  injured 
party)  is  required  only  to  use  good  faith  and 
reasonable  diligence  in  so  doing.  He  is  not 
required  to  use  the  best  judgement  possible  or 
adopt  the  wisest  course  which  hindsight  might 
have  indicated.  " 
The  requirement  of  the  "good  faith"  is  implied  in  every 
mitigation  case.  The  good  faith  principles  are  considered 
very  important  elements  in  governing  whether  the  steps 
which  are  set  forth  by  the  innocent  party  are  reasonably 
or  not.  For  instance,  the  court  held  that  it  "was 
unreasonable  to  expect  from  the  aggrieved  party  to  avoid 
harm  if  he  must  enter  into  a  risky  contract,  or  put 
himself  in  a  humiliating  position,  or  one  involving  loss 
of  honour  or  respect".  109 
106-  gin  T,  a  Vergarena,  C.  A.  v.  S.  S.  Susan,  op.  cit,  p  195. 
107-Consolidated  cork.  v.  J  gonlavPnaka(1971]  A.  M.  C.  p  1195. 
108-187.  F.  Supp,  p.  948  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1960)  affd.  288  F.  2d  288  (2d 
cir.  1961)  where  it  is  stated  by  Bulow,  consequential  damages,  pp 
638-639. 
109-Christman  v.  t.  tarist_e11a  Campania  Nave  a,  349  F.  Supp,  845,  pp 364 
Consequently,  the  innocent  party  is  not  bound  to  do 
anything  in  mitigating  damages  where  to  do  so  would  have 
damaged  his  commercial  situation.  110 
Then  the  question  has  arisen  whether  the  steps  which 
should  be  taken  by  the  innocent  party  towards  mitigation 
the  damage,  is  it  one  of  fact  or  of  law  ? 
I  am  disposed  to  take  a  view  which  depends  upon  the 
surrounding  circumstances  in  each  case.  That  indicates 
that  the  question  is  indeed  a  question  of  fact  and  not  of 
law.  111 
The  duty  of  the  consignee  in  mitigating  or  minimising 
the  loss  or  damage  consequent  upon  the  carrier's  breach 
is  that  the  consignee  should  be  required  to  act  only  in 
good-faith  and  with  reasonable  diligence  in  so  doing. 
Then  the  burden  of  proof  rests  on  the  carrier  or 
shipowner  to  show  that  the  consignee  failed  to  exercise 
reasonable  care  to  mitigate  or  avoid  its  damages.  112  If 
the  consignee  has  however  failed  to  take  reasonable  steps 
858  C.  S.  D.  Y  1971),  affd.  468  F  2d  p  620  (2  d  cir.  1972),  where  it  is 
stated  by,  Smith,  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of  Charter,  pp  319-320. 
110-dames  Finlay  &  Co.  ltd.  V.  Kwik  Hoo  Tong,  (1929]  1  K.  B.,  p 
400,  where  it  is  stated  that:  - 
"The  buyer  was  not  bound  to  enforce,  for  the  purpose  of  minimizing 
the  damages,  the  contracts  with-subpurchasers,  as  to  do  so,  after 
he  knew  that  the  shipment  date  was  incorrect,  might  seriously  injure 
his  commercial  reputation.  "2  Carver,  para,  2143;  Scrutton,  p.  390. 
111-  2  Carver,  para,  2143  ;  Pay  zu  v.  Sounder,  (1919)  2  K.  S.  p  581. 
112-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  176;  Emmeo,  Tng.  Co.  v.  Watte  ￿i  s 
Caribbean  Line  [1974]  A.  M.  C.  p  2052;  Dixie  plywood  Co.  v.  `'... 
Federal  Lakes[1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  439;  404  F.  Supp,  p  461;  fulow, 
Consequential  Damages,  p  638;  The  World  Beau  º.  [1969]  3  ALL  E.  R.  P 
158;  Halsbury's  Damages,  parat  1199. 365 
in  mitigating  damages,  then  he  is  not  entitled  to  be 
awarded  more  than  the  actual  damages  consequent  upon  the 
carrier's  breach.  113 
Thus  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  sustained  from 
the  consignee's  failure  to  mitigate  damages  is  not  to  be 
included  in  the  damages  recoverable.  Moreover,  the 
consignee  should  adopt  reasonable  methods  and  steps  to 
mitigate  and  avoid  such  damages. 
Therefore,  any  extensive  method  or  extraordinary  cost 
which  is  resulting  from  efforts  to  lessen  the  loss  cannot 
be  recovered  from  the  breaching  party.  114  On  the  other 
hand,  legitimate  expenses  of  the  consignee  resulting  from 
mitigation  procedure  to  avoid  or  minimise  damages  are  the 
responsibility  of  the  wrongdoing  party.  115 
113-Houndsditch  Warehouse  Co.  v.  Wad  x,  (1944]  K.  B.,  p  579,  where 
it  is  stated  that: 
"The  amount  of  the  damages  to  which  the  plaintiffs  would  otherwise 
have  been  entitled  must  be  reduced  accordingly"  ;  Walker,  Law  of 
Damages,  p  177. 
114-Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p.  176  ;2  carver,  para  2144. 
115-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p"  136;  2  Carver,  para  2143;  Bulow, 
Consequential  Damages,  p.  638. 366 
COMMENT 
According  to  these  criteria  which  are  concerned  with 
the  chain  of  causation  in  order  to  recover  all  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo. 
We  can  conclude  that  the  test  of  "reasonableness"  is 
the  important  factor  in  determining  the  contemplation  of 
the  contracting  parties.  That  means  that  when  the  conduct 
of  the  contracting  parties  was  reasonable,  then  the  chain 
of  causation  will  not  break,  if  it  was  unreasonable,  it 
will116. 
Although,  the  question  of  remoteness  of  damage  or  in 
other  words,  the  question  of  recovering  damage  is  in 
truth  a  question  of  law.  117 
That  indicates  that  there  is  a  different  rule  of  law 
in  respect  of  causation  between  the  rule  of  tort  or 
delict  and  contract  which  is  applied  in  the  contract  of 
carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  viz,  in  the  case  of  contract 
the  contracting  parties  have  contemplated  their  mutual 
duties,  the  consequences  of  breaching  the  contemplated 
contract  and  for  what  they  shall  and  shall  not  be  liable. 
116-Aruna  Mills,  Ltd.  v.  phanrajmal  Gobindtam  (1968)  1  All  E.  R.  p 
113,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  would  have  been  causal  connection  between  the  breach  of 
contract  and  the  loss  due  to  revaluation,  and  on  that  basic  the 
buyers  were  entitled  to  recover  the  amount  of  the  measures  in  the 
purchase  price  as  damages  for  the  seller's  breach  of  contract  by 
failure  to  ship  the  goods  by  May  31  as  the  contract  showed";  MCkew 
v.  Holland[1969]  3  All  E.  R.  p  1621  (H.  L);  Wieland  v.  Cyril  Lord 
Qarpets.  Ltd  [1969)  3  All  E.  R.  p  1006  {Q.  B.  );  Somervill,  Causation,  p 
450. 
117-Walker,  Law  of  Contract,  p  509. 367 
On  the  other  hand  , 
in  the  case  of  tort  or  delict,  the 
acts  of  one  person  have  collided  with  the  rights  of  the 
other.  Thus,  the  law  has  drawn  the  boundaries  between  the 
obligations  of  the  contracting  parties  and  what  has  been 
expressed  and  implied  in  the  contract  in  case  of 
recovering  loss  or  damage  resulting  from  breaching  the 
contract.  While  the  court  has  to  define  the  liability  for 
the  ensuing  damage  and  how  far  it  extends. 
118 
The  causal  terminology  in  the  Hague  Rules  is,  however, 
quite  clear  as  far  as  the  exceptional  clauses  are 
concerned.  Such  clauses  are  not  applied  if  the  carrier 
cannot  show  or  give  evidence  that  loss  of  damage  to  the 
cargo  was  not  caused  by  his  fault  or  negligence.  119 
Lord  Pearson,  in,  Albacora  S.  R.  L.  v.  Westcot_  & 
Lawrance  Line,  Ltd  120  has  concluded  that:  - 
"There  is  no  express  provision,  and  in  my 
opinion  there  is  no  implied  provision  in  the 
Hague  Rules  that  the  shipowner  is  debarred  as 
matter  of  law  from  relying  on  an  exception 
unless  he  proves  absence  of  negligence  on  his 
part.  But  he  does  have  to  prove  that  the  damage 
was  caused  by  an  excepted  peril  or  excepted 
cause,  and,  in  order  that  he  may  in  a 
particular  case  have  to  give  evidence  excluding 
causation  by  his  negligence.  " 
118-Lord  Pearce,  in,  oufos  v.  C.  Czarnikow,  (1967)  3  ALL.  E.  R.,  p 
686  at  pp  709-710;  Compare,  Scarman  L.  J.,  in,  sons,  Ltd.  v. 
Uttley  Ingham  &  Co.  (1978]  1  Q.  B.  p  791  at  p  807.  where  he  states:  - 
"The  difference  between  reasonably  foreseeable  (the  test  in  tort) 
and  reasonably  contemplated  (the  test  in  contract)  is  semantic  not 
substantial.  " 
119-Article  [4]  para  (2)  (a)  to  (q)  of  the  Hague  Rules  ;  Tetley, 
Marine  Claim,  p  148;  Luksic,  Damage  from  Unknown  Causes,  p  568. 
120-(1966]  2  Lloyd's  Rep.,  p  53  at  64. 368 
The  need  for  a  causal  connection  between  the  deviation 
and  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  has  been  settled 
by  the  rules.  Then  deviation  is  of  no  consequences  where 
there  was  no  causal  relationship  between  the  two,  viz, 
deviation  and  loss  or  damage.  121 
This  was  made  quite  clear  in  the  A/S  J.  >>dwina 
Mowinckds  Redeei  v.  Accinanto,  Ltd122.  where  it  is  stated 
that  :- 
"Even  though  stowage  on  deck  of  cargo  shipped 
under  clean  bills  of  loading  constitutes  a 
deviation,  this  does  not  deprive  the  carrier  of 
his  right  to  exoneration  under  the  fire  of 
provision  of  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  Act, 
just  as  it  does  not  deprive  the  owner  of  the 
protection  of  the  fire  statute,  unless  it  was  a 
cause  of  the  fire.  " 
However,  where  the  carrier  or  his  servant  makes  any 
failure  negligently  and  it  appears  that  negligence  caused 
or  contributed  to  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo, 
then  the  carrier  remains  liable123  on  the  grounds  of  a 
121-The  Citta  Di  Mess  na,  169  Fed.  Rep  (1909),  p  472  at  pp  475-476; 
Paterson  S.  S.  Ltd.  v.  Rabin  Hood  Mills  Ltd.  (1937)  58  LL.  L.  R.,  p  33; 
Haroco  Co.  v.  The  Tai  shan,  111  F.  Supp.  p  638;  Searoad  Shipping  o. 
v.  F. T.  dupont  De  Nemours  &Co.  361  F.  2d  p  833  (1966);  Frannnsteel. 
Corp.  v.  N  . 
V.  Nederlandsch,  [1967]  A.  M.  C.  p  2440  at  p  2459; 
Compare,  The  T  egenna,  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  pp  1415-1416,  where  it  is 
stated  that  : 
"When  a  deviation  takes  place,  and,  the  shipper  affirms  the 
contract...  the  shipowner  becomes  an  insurer  of  the  cargo,  liable 
for  all  damages  subsequent  to  the  warranty  broken,  without  any 
reference  to  the  question  whether  the  deviation  had  any  bearing  on 
the  particular  loss  complained  of.  " 
122-[1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1681,199  F(  2d)  p.  134. 
123-Celestial[1962]  A.  M.  C.  p  1962;  Chester  Valley  [1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  555 369 
lack  of  proper  care  and  custody  of  the  cargo  according  to 
Article  [31,  rule  [2]  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  COGSA.  That 
means  that  the  effect  of  deviation  is  applied  only  in 
case  of  unreasonable  deviation  which  occurred 
intentionally. 
We  can  then  conclude  that  the  consignee  or  claimant  can 
recover  all  loss  of  or  damage  to-the  cargo  resulting  from 
any  failure  in  loading,  handling,  stowing,  caring  for, 
and  discharging  the  goods  carried. 
Consequently,  any  loss  of  or  damage  caused  to  the  cargo 
during  the  course  of  maritime  voyage  from  an  unknown 
cause  should  be  borne  by  the  carrier,  because  he  is 
liable  for  all  the  goods  which  were  in  his  charge  and  he 
did  not  succeed  in  rebutting  the  presumption  of  his 
fault.  124 
at  p  558. 
124-Luksic,  Damages  from  Unknown  Causes,  p  568;  The  nddrapura,  171 
Feb.  Rep  (1909)  p  929  at  p  930.  where  it  is  stated  that  : 
...  deviation  makes  the  carrier  an  insurer  against  any  loss 
resulting  directly  or  indirectly. 370 
SECTION  THREE 
MEASURES  OF  DAMAGES 
The  basic  principle  of  the  measure  of  the  damages  is 
that  the  monetary  position  of  the  aggrieved  party  should 
be  put  in  the  same  position  as  if  the  contract  had  been 
performed-125  Namely,  enable  the  innocent  party  to  obtain 
comparable  supplies  from  the  market.  126  That  means  that 
any  gains  have  to  be  considered  when  assessing  the 
aggrieved  party's  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo. 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  have  referred  to  these  principles 
in  Article  4  j5]  subparagraph  {b}  when  it  is  stated  that: 
"The  total  amount  recoverable  shall  be 
calculated  by  reference  to  the  value  of  such 
goods  at  the  place  and  time  at  which  the  goods 
are  discharged  from  the  ship  in  accordance  with 
the  contract  or  should  have  been  discharged. 
The  value  of  the  goods  shall  be  fixed  according 
to  the  commodity  exchange  price,  according  to 
the  current  market  price,  by  reference  to  the 
normal  value  of  the  goods  of  the  same  kind  and 
quality.  " 
The  Anglo-American  jurisprudence  confirms  the  measure 
of  the  damages  already  settled  under  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules.  127 
125-Davis,  Assessment  of  Damages,  p  595;  Dodd  Pronerties  v. 
Canterbury  City  Council,  (19801  1  W.  L.  R.  p  433  at  p  434. 
126-Stoltar,  Damages  in  Contract.  p  68. 
127-Compare,  Mr  Gordon  Pollock,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules",  Published  in,  The  Hamburg  R  tt-m  A  one-1)  ay  seminar, 
Organised  by  the  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd.  1978,  Pollock,  1  at 
pollock,  p  11,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Pollock,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 371 
Lord  Sumner,  in  The  Chekiang128,  has  made  that  quite 
clear  when  he  stated  that: 
"The  measure  of  damages  ought  never  to  be 
governed  by  mere  rules  of  practice,  nor  can 
such  rules  override  the  principles  of  the  law 
on  this  subject". 
Accordingly,  the  following  points  will  be  discussed:  - 
i)  Assessment  of  Damages 
ii)  The  Unit  of  Account 
i)  ASSESSMENT  OF  DAMAGES 
The  measure  of  damages  is  based  on  different  grounds  in 
estimation  of  the  damages.  The  dominant  rule  of  law  is 
that  the  true  measure  of  damages  is  the  difference 
between  the  contract  price  and  the  market  price  at  the 
date  of  arrival.  129 
We  should  mention  that  the  measures  of  damages  in 
respect  of  the  goods  lost  in  transit  is  different  from 
the  measure  of  the  damages  caused  to  the  cargo  from  delay 
in  delivery,  but  the  basis  of  the  estimate  is  still  the 
market  value1130  8specially  when  the  prices  in  the 
commodity  market  are  liable  to  the  fluctuate  which  should 
be  known  or  are  presumed  to  have  been  known  by  the 
shipowners.  131 
128-25  LI.  L.  Rep.  p  173  at  p  175  ;  (1926]  A.  C.  p  637  at  p  643. 
129-Williams  Brothers  v.  E.  D.  J.  Agius.  1d.  [1914]  A.  C.  p  510;  Eat= 
v.  Mitsui  &  Co.  ltd  (1917]  A.  C.  p  .  227  at  p  228;  Atlantic  Mutual  V. 
Poseidon,  [1963]  A.  M.  C.  p  665;  Stoltar,  Damages  in  Contract,  p  7; 
The  n1andon,  [1923]  A.  M.  C.  p  242;  Th_  Archer,  [1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  357. 
130-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  130. 
131-Koh  v.  C.  Czarnikow.  Ltd,  119691  1  A.  C.  p  350  ;  Pollock,  The 372 
In  case  of  the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  resulting 
from  deviation  or  unseaworthiness  or  in  cases  of 
shortage132,  the  normal  measure  of  these  damages  in  the 
absence  of  special  circumstances  in  the  contract133,  are 
the  market  value  of  the  goods  on  the  date  when  they 
should  have  been  delivered134,  less  the  sums  which  the 
cargo-owner  must  have  paid  to  the  carrier  in  order  to  get 
them.  135 
Whereas,  in  the  case  of  delay  in  delivering  the  goods, 
the  measure  is  the  difference  between  the  market  value  of 
the  goods  on  the  date  they  should  have  been  delivered  and 
the  market  value  at  the  actual  date  of  delivery.  136 
However,  these  view  points  aimed  to  sustain  that  the 
consignee  or  any  person  who  is  interested  in  the  arrival 
of  the  goods  at  the  time  and  the  place  at  which  they  have 
stipulated  in  the  contract,  then  they  should  not  recover 
more  than  the  price  they  could  get  if  the  cargo 
arrived.  137 
Thus,  this  trend  attempts  to  enable  them  to  go  into  the 
Hamburg  Rules,  p  4. 
132-Ministry  of  Food  v.  Australian  Wheat  Board[1952]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep, 
p  297. 
133-Scrutton,  {19th,  ed.  1984},  p  403. 
134-poor,  1974,  Supplement,  p  50  ;  Sanson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  560. 
135-Scrutton,  (19th,  ed.  1984).  p  403. 
136-Hutchinson,  III,  1620  ;  Chitty  on  Contracts,  p  588;  Anson's  Law 
of  Contract,  p  560;  Poor,  1974,  Supplement,  p  51  ;  Scrutton,  (19th, 
ed.  1984),  p  404;  Haskell  v.  Continental  xs  (1950]  83  LI.  L.  R., 
438;  Koufos  v.  C.  C%arnikow,  Ltd.  (1969]  1  A.  C.  p  350. 
137-Foscoto  Mango  &  -o.  fi  d,  v.  Stag  Line.  Ttd(1931]  39  LI.  L.  R.  p  101 
at  p  108. 373 
market  and  obtain  comparable  supplies.  138  Then  what  is  the 
meaning  of  the  market  value  or  what  is  the  criterion  of 
the  market  value  of  the  goods  in  question  ? 
The  market  value  is  an  important  criterion  for 
estimating  damages  which  is  considered  the  commonest 
basis  in  this  issue  and  the  only  one  which  ascertains  the 
loss  to  the  shipper139  or  consignee,  especially  in  case  of 
short  delivery.  140 
There  is  no  difficulty  in  estimating  damages,  if  there 
is  a  market  value  or  price  with  published  listings  at  the 
place  of  discharge.  141  However,  when  there  is  no  such 
market  price,  the  value  must  be  ascertained  by 
substituted  methods  which  is  called  criteria  of  the 
market  value. 
These  criteria  try  to  calculate  the  market  price  on  a 
different  basis  in  order  to  recover  the  actual  damages 
from  deviation,  delay  in  delivery  or  any  shortage  in  the 
shipment  during  the  course  of  the  maritime  voyage.  The 
138-Stoltar,  Damages  in  Contract,  p  68. 
139-Dixie  Plywood  Co.  V.  Federal  Lakes  at  al[1976)  A.  M.  C.  p  439  at 
pp  444-445;  Samin  Corp.  V.  S.  S  Rivadeluna  [1968]  A  M.  C.  p  1062; 
Shackman  v.  Cunard  White  Star,  Ltd,  (1940)  A.  M.  C.  p  971,  where  it 
is  stated  that  : 
"in  event  of  short  delivery,  the  price  should  be  market  price  at 
port  of  destination...  so  that  the  plaintiffs  were  entitled  to 
recover  £  30.396,03  from  the  defendants  in  respect  of  their  claim 
for  short  delivery  and  the  market  value  of  the  delivered  cartons.  " 
140-The  Queen  Dynam  [1982]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  88  at  p  89,  where  it 
stated  that  : 
"On  the  issue  of  damages,  the  sound  arrived  value  should  be 
assessed  on  the  basis  that  a  higher  rate  of  duties  would  be  payable 
on  them.  ";  Freedman  &  Slater  v.  M.  V.  Tofero,  [1963  ]  A.  M.  G.  p  1525. 
141-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  130-131. 374 
market  price  may  be  calculated,  in  the  absence  of  special 
circumstances,  on  sub-contracts142  which  is  considered  as 
evidence  to  show  that  was  the  value  of  the  goods  at  the 
date  which  should  have  been  delivered. 
If  there  has  been  a  contract  to  resell  the  goods 
carried,  that  contract  price  may  be  taken  as  evidence  of 
value143,  but  we  cannot  regard  it  as  a  substitute  method 
for  the  market  price  ruling  on  the  presumed  date  of 
arrival. 
144 
Lord  Wright,  in,  Monarch.  S.  S.  Co,  ltd  v.  Karlshamns 
Oljefabriker145,  referred  to  the  authority  of  the  Scotch 
case  of  Connal  Cotton  and  Co.  v.  Fisher  Renwick  &  Co, 
where  he  states  that: 
"  Where  the  cost  of  the  transhipment  was  allowed 
as  the  proper  measure  of  damages  for  failure  to 
deliver  under  a  contract  of  sea  carriage  at  the 
agreed  destination.  " 
Whereas,  professor  Walker146,  has  added  many  elements 
in  calculating  the  value  of  the  goods  on  the  basis  of 
"purchase  price  together  with": 
a)  Cost  of  transport. 
142-The  Arpa  ,  [1934]  p.  189;  49  LI.  L.  Rep.  p  313  at  p  320;  Compare, 
Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  143,  where  he  states  that 
"...  sub-contracts  cannot  be  regarded  either  to  enhance  or  diminish 
damages  unless  they  were  within  the  contemplation  of  both  parties.  " 
143-Patrick  v.  Pusso  British  Co.  (  1927  j2K.  B.  p  535. 
144-Williams  v.  Agius(1914]  A.  C.  p  510;  Sia  nr  v.  Houle(1920)  2KB. 
p  11;  Walker,  Law  of  Damages,  p  140;  Scrutton,  {19th,  ed  1984}.  p  404. 
145-[1949]  A.  C.  p  196  at  p  225. 
146-Walker,  Law  of  Damages  ,  pp  139-140. 375 
b)  An  element  of  normal  profits  or  ;  the  price  at  the 
nearest  available  market  or  at  the  ultimate  destination 
with  allowances  for  the  cost  of  carriage"147. 
The  courts  will,  however,  not  be  bound  by  any 
phraseology  used  by  both  parties,  but  will  look  to  the 
intent  rather  than  to  the  form  of  the  contract  in 
construing  the  terms  of  the.  contract  concerning  the 
meaning  of  the  market  value  or  any  disputed  issue.  148 
Accordingly,  the  courts  have  to  take  into  account  the 
special  character  of  the  contract,  the  expression  of  the 
general  principles  which  apply  to  them,  and  extraordinary 
surrounding  circumstances  which  have  been  contemplated  by 
the  contracting  parties.  Viz.,  the  courts  may  apply 
equitable  principles  in  assessing  damages  in  order  to 
readh  just  result.  149 
These  considerations  may  justify  higher  damages  than 
the  market  value  as  compensation  for  the  damaged  cargo.  150 
We  can,  thus,  say  that  the  measure  of  damages  or  the 
criterion  which  is  used  to  ascertain  the  market  value  or 
price  is  a  question  of  fact. 
147-j_eyatino  Co.  v.  Arnerican  President  Linea,  (1965]  A.  M.  C.  p  2386 
at  p  2393.  where  it  is  stated  that  : 
"under  the  long  established  law  the  applicable  values  are  those 
which  prevail  on  the  date  of  the  ship's  arrival  .  As  there  were 
no  sales  published  in  the  New  York  Daily  Report  for  that  date  the 
nearest  sales  dates  govern" 
148-Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  573;  cellulose  Acetate  silk  Co..  Lt_d. 
v.  Widness  Foundry  (1925),  Ltd,  11933]  A.  C.  p  20. 
149-Hato  La  vargarena.  C.  A.  V.  B.  S.  Susaa(1973]  A  M.  C.  p  195  at  p  201. 
150-the  Pec  ase[1981]  1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  175;  The  Ard 
_nn  R  [1951]  1 
K.  B.  p  55. 376 
ii)  THE  UNIT  OF  ACCOUNT  IN  THE  INTERNATIONAL 
CONVENTIONS 
The  monetary  limits  of  the  international  convention 
have  various  effects  depending  on  a  particular  basis  in  a 
particular  convention.  For  instance,  the  Hague  Rules 
adopted  a  Gold  Clause,  The  Visby  Rules  chose  the  Franc 
Gold  basis  and  the  Hamburg  Rules  approved  the  S.  D.  R. 
basis. 
I  will,  therefore,  discuss  the  following  heads  :  - 
1)  The  Gold  Clause 
2)  The  Gold  Franc  Basis. 
3)  The  S.  D.  R.  Basis. 
1)  THE  GOLD  CLAUSE  BASIS 
Article  4  [5]  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides  that  the 
monetary  limits  do  not  exceed  the  amount  of  £100  for  the 
lost  or  damaged  cargo.  The  standard  of  the  unit  account 
which  is  equivalent  to  that  sum,  viz,  £  100  shall  be 
taken  to  be  gold  value,  as  Article,  [9]  of  the  Hague  Rules 
states: 
"The  monetary  units  mentioned  in  this 
convention  are  to  be  taken  to  be  gold  value.  " 
The  gold  clause  aimed  to  ensure  the  international 
uniformity  of  the  recovery  value  for  loss  or  damage  to  or 
in  connection  with  goods  which  imposed  on  the  carriers  in 
different  countries.  Many  difficulties  have  nevertheless 
arisen  in  application  of  this  article.  4 377 
Firstly,  the  inconvertibility  of  the  pound  sterling 
into  gold  and  the  devaluation  of  the  pound  in  relation  to 
the  sovereign.  The  pound  did  not  have  the  same  value  as 
the  pound  sterling  in  1924  and  became  an  inconvertible 
into  gold  because  it  did  not  represent  one  pound  sterling 
in  gold. 
The  limitation  level  had  been  decreased  and  the 
carriers  gained  an  extra-profit  from  the  £100  limit  or 
its  equivalent  in  other  currencies.  151  Consequently,  the 
balance  of  interests  between  the  carriers  and  cargo- 
owners,  which  was  ascertained  by  the  Hague  Rules  is 
interrupted  in  favour  of  the  carrier's  interest,  who 
harvested  the  merit  and  the  ultimate  object  of  the  Hague 
Rules.  152 
However,  the  British  Maritime  association  has  concluded 
the  "Gold  Clause  Agreement"  on  Ist  August,  1950  which 
raised  the  limitation  of  liability  to  £200  Lawful  money 
of  the  United  kingdom.  This  agreement  was  amended  on  July 
1st  1977  by  increasing  the  amount  of  limitation  to  £  400 
Sterling  lawful  money  of  the  United  Kingdom.  153 
Secondly,  the  date  of  conversion  for  those  contracting 
states  in  which  the  pound  is  not  a  monetary  unit. 
151-Samir  Mankabady,  "The  Brussels  Bills  of  Lading  Convention: 
Deficiencies  and  Suggested  Reforms".  A  thesis  Approved  for  Ph.  D 
degree.  London  University,  1970.  pp  230-231.  hereinafter  cited  as 
"Mankabady,  The  Brussels  Bills  of  lading  convention.  " 
152-N.  W.  Palmier  Egger,  "The  Unworkable  Per-Package  Limitation  of 
the  Carrier's  Liability  Under  the  Hague  (or  Hamburg)  Rules",  (1978] 
24  M.  C.  Gill.  L.  J.  p  459,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Egger,  The  Unworkable 
Per-Package  Limitation.  ";  Falih.  pp  289-290. 
153-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  601. 378 
The  courts  of  different  contracting  states  have  not 
arrived  at  a  uniform  conclusion  in  determining  the  rate 
of  conversion  as  follows 
(1)  The  date  of  the  commencement  of  the  proceeding 
(2)  The  date  of  the  breach  of  the  contract. 
(3)  The  date  of  the  arrival  of  the  ship  at  the  port  of 
discharge. 
(4)  The  date  of  the  judgement. 
(5)  The  date  of  the  payment.  154 
The  jurisprudence  of  the  United  States  and  the  United 
Kingdom  have,  however,  their  own  particular  opinions  in 
this  issue. 
The  jurisprudence  of  England  had  been  adopted  the  date 
of  the  breach  of  the  contract  or  when  the  loss  was 
incurred  in  the  case  of  tort  as  a  suitable  rate  of 
conversion.  155 
The  main  change  has  been  made  by  the  House  of  Lords  in 
Liangos  v.  Frank(Textiles)_Ltd156,  where  it  held  that 
154-Falih,  p  298,  Al-Jazairy,  p  240,  Mankabady,  The  Brussels  Bills 
of  Lading  Convention,  p  231-235. 
155-Bankes,  L.  J,  in,  Di  Ferdinando  v.  Simon  Smiths  &  Co.  Ltd.  [1920] 
3  K.  B.  p  409.  Viscount  Simonds,  in,  United  Railways  of  Havana  and 
Regla  Warehouses.  Ltd.  T11-  re  _ 
(1961]  A.  C.  (H.  L),  p  1007  at  1034, 
where  he  states  that 
"...  A  claim  for  damages  for  breach  of  contract  or  for  tort  in  terms 
of  a  foreign  currency  prevailing  at  the  date  of  breach  or  tortious 
act";  Halsbury's  Damages,  para,  1201,  p  485;  Walker,  Civil 
Remedies,  p  393. 
156-(19761  A.  C.  p  443  at  p  444  (H.  L.  );  [1976]1  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  201 
at  p  206;  Lord  Denning,  in,  George  Veflinga  Reder{  A/s  v.  prPs  d-nt 
of  India  (The  Bellami)_,  [1978]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  467,  Affirmed  by 
the  Court  of  Appeal  (1979]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep,  p.  123,  where  Lord 379 
the  date  of  conversion  should  be  at  the  date  payment  in 
terms  of  sterling.  157 
The  Scottish  jurisprudence  has  differed  from  the 
English  jurisprudence  in  this  issue. 
The  prevailing  Scottish  view  has  been  in  conflict  as  to 
what  constitutes  the  relevant  moment  of  conversion  of  -a 
foreign  currency  into  sterling.  The  court  of  session  held 
for  a  sum  in  U.  S.  dollars.  The  House  of  Lords  held  that 
the  payment  can  only  be  in  British  money.  158 
Therefore  the  U.  S.  dollars  should  be  converted  into 
sterling  on  the  date  of 
Macf  i  e'  s  judicial  fact  c 
amount  to  be  calculated 
with  the  rate  of  exchange 
debt  became  payable  and 
date  of  decree.  161 
raising  the  action.  159  Whereas 
!Zv.  Macfje, 
160  held  that  the 
in  sterling  was  in  accordance 
prevailing  at  the  date  when  the 
not  at  that  prevailing  at  the 
However  the  Scottish  court  in  Commerzbank 
Aktiengesellschaft 
v.  Large162,  held  that: 
Denning  says  that:  - 
"It  seems  to  me  clear  that  the  rate  of  exchange  should  be  the  rate 
prevailing  at  the  date  of  payment.  " 
157-A1-Jazairy,  p.  241. 
158-David  M.  Walker,  The  Law  of  Civil  Remedies  in  Scotland,  1974,  p 
393,  hereinafter  cited  as,  "Walker,  Civil  Remedies";  Barry  v.  ., 8. a 
Den  Heek,  (1920)  2  K.  B.  p  709. 
159-  sloes  v.  Gordon  (1824)  2  Sh.  App.  p  451. 
160-1932.  S.  L.  T.  p  460  at  p  461. 
161-A.  E.  Anton,  Private  International  Law.  A  Treatis  from  the 
Standpoint  of  Scots  Law,  1967,  p  231,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Anton, 
Private  International  Law.  " 
162-1977.  S.  L.  T.  (Reports)p  219  at  p  224. 380 
"For  the  purpose  of  this  case  the  pursuers  have 
deliberately  chosen  to  fix  the  conversion  date 
as  the  date  of  payment  or  at  the  date  when  the 
decree  is  extracted  whichever  is  the  earlier.  " 
Nevertheless,  the  Reciprocal  Enforcement  Act  1933,  S.  2 
(3)  provides  that  where  foreign  judgments  for  payment  are 
expressed  in  foreign  currency,  then  the  sum  is  to  be 
converted  into  sterling  at  the  exchange  rate  prevailing 
at  the  date  of  the  original  judgement.  163 
These  provisions  have,  however,  abrogated  by  S.  4  of 
the  Administration  of  Justice  Act  1977,  for  the  whole  of 
the  United  Kingdom  as  from  29  August,  1977.164 
The  House  of  Lords  in  1976  expressly  departed  from  that 
rule,  which  is  stated  that  the  foreign  currency  should  be 
converted  into  sterling,  then  the  plaintiffs  are  entitled 
to  recover  their  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  in 
foreign  currency  and  the  English  courts  can  give 
judgement  in  foreign  currency,  165  and  finally  to  enforce 
it  by  converting  that  amount  of  money  into  sterling  at 
the  rate  current  at  the  date  of  payment.  166 
163-  Walker,  Civil  Remedies,  p  34.;  Comm  _r  . bank  Ak  -i  eng  nha  ftt 
v.  Large,  op.  cit,  p  222. 
164-Beare,  The  Effect  of  Conflict  of  Law.  Beare  10. 
165-Milian  gsv.  Frank  (Textilea).  Ltd.  op.  cit.,  p  201;  Lord 
Denning,  in,  The  Ballami,  [1979]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  123  at  pp  124-125, 
where  he  states  that: 
"Since  so  far  as  demurrage  was  concerned  the  money  of  account  as 
well  as  the  money  of  payment  was  U.  S.  dollars  ;  and  since  there  was 
no  provision  for  it  to  be  paid  in  sterling,  a  reasonable  inference 
was  that  the  money  was  payable  in  U.  S  dollars";  Flie,  119771  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  535;  ppspina  R.  [1977]  2  Lloyd's  Rep.  p  319. 
166-Scrutton,  (19th-ed.  1984),  p  395. 381 
Although,  there  are  different  rules  in  the  United 
States  as  to  the  proper  date  of  conversion.  The  Supreme 
Court  has  adopted  the  date  of  commencement  of  the 
proceeding  as  the  date  of  conversion.  167  The  District 
courts  of  the  United  States  uphold  the  date  of  the  breach 
as  the  proper  date  of  conversion.  168 
Whereas  Beare  states  that  :- 
"I  understand  that  in  the  United  States  it  is 
customary  for  the  value  of  the  loss  to  be 
converted  into  U.  S.  dollars  at  the  rate  ruling 
at  the  date  the  goods  were  discharged  or  should 
have  been  discharged  from  the  vessel  and  for 
the  judgment  to  be  given  in  U.  S.  dollars.  1"169 
There  is  however  no  general  principle  or  common 
understanding  among  the  contracting  parties  for  the 
proper  date  of  conversion. 
Therefore  one  can  conclude  that  the  proper  date  for 
conversion  is  the  date  agreed  by  the  parties170  or  is  the 
date  which  is  governed  by  national  laws  of  the 
contracting  parties  and  by  its  jurisprudence  in 
explaining  this  issue,  in  spite  of  their  contradicting 
decisions  which  have  been  in  conflict  as  to  what 
constitutes  the  relevant  moment  of  conversion. 
These  principles  have  been  confirmed  by  Article  9  (3) 
of  the.  Hague  Rules  where  it  provides  that:  - 
167-Die  Deutsche  wank  v.  Humphrey,  272  U.  S.  p  517  (1926). 
168-Philip  Holtman  A.  G.  v.  S.  S.  Het  nic  Sunbean  ý  ,  [1977]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1731;  Falih,  p  298,  A-Jazairy,  p  243. 
169-Falih,  p  313  ;  Marshall,  Foreign  Currency,  p  77. 
170-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  18. 382 
"The  national  laws  may  reserve  to  the  debtor 
the  right  of  discharging  his  debt  in  national 
currency  according  to  the  rate  of  exchange 
prevailing  on  the  day  of  the  arrival  of  the 
ship  at  the  port  of  discharge  of  the  goods 
concerned.  " 
Many  difficulties  may  arise  in  interpreting  the  words 
"at  port  of  discharge"  ? 
It  could  be  intended  to  mean  the  place  at  which  the 
goods  are  discharged  from  the  ship  regardless  of  whether 
this  place  is  the  port  of  destination  or  not.  171  This 
interpretation  is  aimed  at  avoiding  the  uncertainty  which 
may  happen  where  the  goods  are  discharged  in  a  port  short 
of  destination. 
2)  THE  GOLD  FRANC  BASIS 
Article  2  para  [d]  of  the  Visby  Rules  provides  that  :- 
"A 
, 
Franc  means  a  unit  consisting  of  65.5 
milligrammes  of  gold  of  millesimal  fineness 
900.  " 
The  gold  poincare  Franc  has  replaced  the  gold  clause  as 
a  unit  of  account  in  order  to  achieve  uniformity  and 
avoid  fluctuations  and  devaluation  in  currencies172  which 
might  result  from  having  the  limits  expressed  in  any 
national  currencies. 
At  any  rate  it  provides  the  uniformity  and  stability 
which  might  be  provided  by  the  gold  franc  as  long  as  the 
171-Falih,  p  297. 
172-Mankabady,  The  Brussels  Bills  of  Lading  Convention,  p  240. 383 
dollar  was  linked  with  gold,  especially  before  the  1939 
war. 
173 
However,  when  the  floating  policy  was  adopted  by  most 
currencies  including  the  dollar  after  1971,  then  the 
value  in  terms  of  gold  reflected  changes  in  market  rates 
of  national  currencies  and  it  was  difficult  to  convert  an 
amount  of  gold  into  local  currencies.  174 
Then  one  can  conclude  that  the  gold  poincare  Franc  has 
proven  its  inadequacy  as  a  unit  of  account  in  the 
international  monetary  affairs. 
The  fluctuations  and  the  devaluations  of  the  poincare 
franc's  price  have  made  the  official  price  less  than  the 
free  market  price.  This  situation  has  caused  many 
difficulties  in  applying  the  gold  franc  as  a  unit  of 
account  of  limitation  of  carrier's  liability.  For 
instance  the  shipowners  endeavoured  to  limit  their 
liability  to  an  amount  based  on  the  official  price  and 
the  cargo-owners  attempted  to  apply  the  free  market 
price. 
The  Supreme  Court  of  the  Netherlands  in  Hornlinie  A.  G 
v.  Societe  National  Petrole  Aguitaine175  has  solved  this 
problem,  where  it  states  that: 
173-L.  Bristow,  "Gold  Franc-  Replacement  of  Unit  of  Account",  (19781 
1  LMCLQ,  p.  31  at  p  33,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Bristow,  Gold  Franc"; 
Allan  I.  Mendelsohn,  "The  Value  of  the  Poincare  Gold  Franc  in 
Limitation  of  Liability  Convention",  (1973]  5  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com.,  p  125, 
hereinafter  cited  as,  "Mendelsohn,  The  Value  of  the  Poincar6  Gold 
Franc". 
174-Samir  Mankabady,  p  113. 
175-1972.  E.  T.  L.  p  933. 384 
"The  conversion  rate  of  the  gold  franc,  under 
the  Brussels  convention  on  shipowners' 
limitation  of  liability  ,  shall  be  calculated 
on  the  basis  of  the  official  value  of  the 
currency  in  relation  to  the  poincare  gold  unit 
and  not  on  that  of  the  free  market.  " 
The  COGSA  of  the  United  kingdom  1971  adopted  the 
poincare  gold  franc  as  a  unit  account  of  limitation  by 
converting  the  gold  franc  into  SDR  and  then  into  sterling 
at  a  rate  of  exchange  prevailing  on  the  date  in 
question-176  However,  Article  2[d]  of  the  Visby  Rules 
states  that:  - 
"The  date  of  conversion  of  the  sum  awarded 
into  national  currencies  shall  be  governed  by 
the  law  of  the,  court  seized  of  the  case.  " 
1 
Therefore,  one  can  say  that  the  Visby  Rules  are  more 
flexible  than  the  Hague  Rules  because  they  leave  the  date 
of  conversion  to  be  decided  by  the  national  law  of  a 
particular  contracting  state's  court.  177 
3)  THE  SDR  BASIS 
There  was  no  problem  with  the  exchange  rate  of  gold 
until  1971,  but  after  that  the  gold  market  price  became 
as  high  as  five  times  the  official  price.  The 
convertibility  of  U.  S.  dollar  balances  into  gold  was 
suspended. 
This  situation  has  created  a  duality  in  prices  and  a 
problem  as  to  which  one  should  be  taken  as  a  basis  for 
176-Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  11.,  Article  4(5)  of  Schedule 
to  the  1971  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom. 
177-Compare,  Falih,  p  322,  Al-Jazairy,  p.  245. 385 
the  conversion  of  the  gold  franc  into  national 
currencies. 
178 
The  (IMF]179  was  also  faced  with  the  same  problems 
relating  to  the  value  of  the  SDR  which  was  used  as  a  form 
of  reserve  currency  as  well  as  a  unit  of  account  which  it 
fixed  by  terms  of  gold.  Then  in  1974  the  [IMF]  decided  to 
define  the  value  of  the  SDR  in  terms  of  "basket"  of 
(16)180  IMF  members'  currencies  which  reflected  the 
largest  exports  of  goods  and  services  for  the  period 
1975-1979.181 
However,  the  international  liability  conventions  aimed 
to  use  the  SDR  as  a  unit  of  account  in  order  to  avoid  the 
fluctuations  and  the  devaluations  of  the  poincare  franc 
gold  by  converting  a  gold  franc  into  SDRs  and  then  into 
national  currencies  at  a  rate  which  reflected  current 
market  conditions.  182  Consequently  the  "UNCITRAL"  has 
adopted  the  SDRs  as  a  unit  of  account  which  it  defines 
178-Samir  Mankabady,  pp  113-114  ;  Chandler,  p.  270. 
179-International  Monetary  Fund. 
180-The  SDR  was  valued  in  terms  of  basket  of  (5)  IMF  members' 
currencies  as  follows:  The  U.  S.  Dollar  42%,  the  Deutschmark  19%  and 
13%  each  for  the  French  Franc,  the  Japanese  Yen  and  the  Pound 
Sterling. 
181-Diamond,  The  Hague  Visby  Rules;  p  10;  Diamond,  The  Hamburg 
Rules,  p  19;  Les  Ward,  "The  SDR  in  Transport  liability  Conventions: 
Some  Clarification",  [1968]  13  J.  Mar.  L&  com;  p1  at  p  3, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Ward,  The  SDR  in  Transport  Liability 
Conventions;  Compare,  Bristow,  The  Gold  Franc,  p  32  where  he  states 
that:  - 
"In  1974  the  (IMF]  decided  to  define  the  value  of  the  SDR  in  terms 
of  a  basket  of  (16)  members'  currencies.  " 
182-Bristow,  Gold  Franc,  p.  32.,  Article  II(1)  and  (2)  of  the 
Brussels  Protocol  of  1979  to  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 386 
by  the  international  monetary  fund  [IMF]  in  order  to 
provide  a  more  stable  and  justifiable  instrument  of 
international  trade  and  exchange. 
183 
Thus  the  Hamburg  Rules  have  adopted  two  methods  of 
units  of  account:  "The  SDR  and  the  poincare  Franc". 
The  SDRs  are  created  by  Article  [26]  para  [1]  and  this 
Article  is  mentioned  that  the  SDRs  are  defined  by  the 
[IMF],  whereas  the  [IMF]  do  not  define  the  SDRs,  but  the 
fund  allocates  the  SDRs  and  determines  their  value.  184 
We  can  produce  a  technical  analysis  to  the  Article  (26] 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules  as  follows: 
"The  unit  of  account  in  the  contracting  states, 
which  are  a  member  of  IMF,  is  the  SDR  and  the 
method  of  valuation  of  this  unit  should  be 
applied  to  the  same  method  of  the  IMF  at  the 
date  of  question  for  the  operations  and 
transactions". 
1-The  unit  of  the  account  in  the  contracting  states, 
which  are  a  member  of  IMF,  is  the  SDR  and  the  method  of 
valuation  of  this  unit  should  be  applied  to  the  same 
method  of  the  IMF  at  the  date  of  question  for  the 
operations  and  transactions. 
2-The  unit  of  account  in  the  contracting  states  which 
are  not  members  of  the  IMF,  but  whose  laws  permit  them  to 
183-Aleksander  Tobolewski,  "The  Special  Drawing  Right  in  Liability 
Conventions:  An  Acceptable  Solution?  "  119793  2  LMCLQ.  p  169  at  p 
172,  hereinafter  cited  as  ￿Tobolewski,  SDR";  Stephen  A.  Silard, 
"Carriage  of  the  Goods  by  Sea:  The  Unit  Account  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules",  [1978]  10  J.  Mar.  L.  &  com.,  p  13  at  p  27,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Silard,  The  Unit  of  Account.  " 
184-Silard,  The  Unit  of  Account,  p  29. 387 
use  the  SDRs,  is  still  the  SDRs  and  it  is  to  be 
calculated  according  to  their  manner  which  is  determined 
by  those  states. 
3-An  exceptional  option  is  granted  by  this  Article  for 
those  states  which  are  not  members  of  the  IMF  and  whose 
law  does  not  permit  the  application  of  the  SDRs  as 
follows: 
"a"  Accept  the  SDRs  as  a  unit  of  account  according  to 
the  method  of  valuation  which  is  described  by  this 
art. 
"b"  Allow  to  convert  the  value  of  their  currencies 
into  terms  of  gold  which  in  this  case  should  be  the 
poincare  franc  as  an  alternative  unit  of  account.  185 
The  relevant  date  of  conversion  as  mentioned  in  Article 
[26]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  is  the  date  of  judgement  or  the 
date  agreed  upon  by  the  parties.  186 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  date  of  judgement  is  not  an 
alternative  solution,  because  it  raises  the  question  of 
the  exchange  risks  between  that  date  and  the  date  of 
payment.  Consequently,  this  situation  would  give  the 
strong  party  a  right  to  choose  the  date  of  conversion 
which  would  be  most  favourable  to  him. 
Therefore,  it  will  be  more  sensible  to  consider  the 
date  of  payment  as  a  date  of  conversion  in  order  to 
inquire  the  aims  of  conversion  by  avoiding  the 
185-Silard,  The  Unit  of  Account,  p  34;  Falih,  p  331;  Diamond,  The 
Hamburg  Rules,  p.  19. 
186-Falih,  p  337;  Silard,  The  Unit  of  Account,  p  29. 388 
fluctuations  in  the  exchange  rates  and  providing  the 
uniformity  in  international  liability  conventions  which 
are  governing  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea. 
CONCLUSION 
Any  doctrine  which  endeavours  to  confine  or  limit  the 
compensatory  damages  cannot  be  inconsistent  with  the 
general  principle  which  is  set  forth  in  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules,  COGSA,  and  the  Hamburg  Rules.  These  principles 
have  explained  the  duty  of  the  carrier  in  dealing  with 
the  cargo  in  loading,  handling,  stowage,  carriage, 
custody,  care  and  discharge. 
Thus,  the  contractual  obligation  requires  the  carrier 
to  take  extensive  care  of  the  goods  while  these  goods 
were  in  his  charge.  otherwise,  he  will  be  liable  for  all 
loss  of  or  damage  to  and  in  connection  with  the  goods, 
though  he  exercised  due  diligence  in  making  the  ship 
seaworthy  and  properly  manned,  equipped,  and  supplied  the 
vessel  to  make  it  fit  and  safe  for  the  goods  reception, 
carriage  and  preservation. 
According  to  the  compensatory  nature  of  the  damages, 
the  court  is  bound  to  recover  the  actual  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  caused  by  the  act  or  default  of  the 
carrier. 
Therefore,  any  aggravated  or  exemplary  damages  are  not 
recoverable,  but  the  court  may  be  awarded  such  damages 
when  it  takes  into  account  the  intent  of  the  contracting 
parties,  depending  on  the  contractual  obligation  and  the 389 
claimant's  motives.  187 
That  means  that  the  compensation  of  the  claimant,  in 
case  of  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo,  is  based  upon  the 
compensatory  nature  of  of  the  damage  by  recovering  to 
the  plaintiff  the  actual  damage  and  not  punishing  the 
carrier  for  his  wrongdoing.  188 
However,  in  respect  of  damage  caused  by  an 
unjustifiable  deviation  that  will  deprive  the  carrier  of 
the  benefit  of  the  statutory  limitation  of  liability 
which  is  stated  in  the  Rule  and  COGSA.  189  Nevertheless, 
mere  non-delivery  does  not  constitute  a  deviation,  190  but 
may  create  a  presumption  of  compensation  of  all  the  loss 
of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  caused  thereof. 
Finally,  one  can  conclude  that  the  failure  of  the 
carrier  to  discharge  the  goods  carried  to  their 
destination  and  hand  them  to  the  consignee  at  the 
contemplated  time  and  place  could  cause  very  grave 
consequences  which  could  affect  the  financial  situation 
of  the  consignee  or  any  claimant. 
187-Halsbury's  Damages,  p  416,  Para,  1112;  C.  F.  Bri  ish  Transportcommission 
v.  Gourlay  (1956]  A.  C.  p  185  at  p  206. 
188-Harvey  Mc  Gregor,  "Compensation  Versus  Punishment  in  Damages 
Awards,  (1965)  28  M.  L.  R.  p  629,  hereinafter  cited  as  "McGregor, 
Damages  Awards";  Compare,  P.  S.  Atiyah,  Accidents,  Compensation  and 
the  Law.  (2d,  ed,  1975)  p  478,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Atiyah, 
Compensation  and  the  Law",  where  he  states  that  :  - 
"We  are  not  taking  the  money  from  the  defendant  in  order  to  give  to 
the  plaintiff,  we  are  giving  some  money  to  the  plaintiff  because  we 
want  to  punish  the  defendant.  " 
189-Tom  v.  The  flying  Clipper,  (  1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  259. 
190-  Shackman  v.  Cunard  White  Stare.  Ltd,  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  971. 390 
This  may  encourage  claims  for  delay  in  delivery  which 
caused  economic  loss  and  there  is  authority  either  in  the 
rules,  or  COGSA  and  the  decisions  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  United  States,  which  authorized  to  recover  all  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  or  in  connection  with  the  goods. 
That  does  not  mean  any  non-physical  damage  is 
recoverable,  but  may  indicate  that  the  meaning  of 
"damage"  in  a  statute  is  a  matter  of  construction,  191 
which  is  based  upon  the  intent  of  the  contracting 
parties,  and  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  a 
particular  case,  in  characterization  the  non-physical 
damage  whether  it  is  recoverable  or  not. 
However,  mere  intention  or  wilful  misconduct  is  not 
enough  to  constitute  an  unreasonable  deviation,  but  the 
causal  relationship  should  be  shown  between  the  loss  of 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  in  order  to  deprive  the  shipowner 
or  the  carrier  from  all  the  protection  of  the  Rule  or 
COGSA  and  deprive  him  from  the  benefit  of  the  statutory 
limitation  of  liability. 
Thus  in  case  of  an  unreasonable  deviation  or  when  such 
an  act,  default  or  a  omission  is  enough  to  amount  an 
unreasonable  deviation,  then  the  consignee  or  any  person 
who  is  interested  in  the  cargo  can  recover  such  loss  or 
damage  on  the  basis  of  the  market  value  or  price  without 
applying  the  limitation  clauses  or  any  provisions  which 
limit  the  responsibility  of  the  carrier  or  shipowner 
according  to  the  unit  of  account  in  the  Rules  or  COGSA. 
191-Hulsbury's  Damages,  p  141,  para,  1102. 391 
In  respect  of  unreasonable  deviation  any  limitation 
clauses  are  invalid  under  COGSA  because  the  Bill  of 
lading  and  the  Rules  are  displaced  by  deviation.  192 
Then  the  consignee  or  claimant  has  a  right  under  the 
general  maritime  law  or  common  law,  to  recover  full 
losses  or  damages  caused  to  the  cargo  during  the  course 
of  the  maritime  voyage.  193 
Although,  when  the  nature  and  value  of  the  goods  have 
been  declared  by  the  sY 
in  the  Bill  of  lading, 
the  value  of  the  goods 
the  market  value  or 
discharged  from  the 
discharged.  194 
Lipper  before  shipment  and  inserted 
then  such  damages  in  addition  to 
may  be  calculated  on  the  basis  of 
price  at  which  the  goods  were 
ship  or  should  have  been  so 
Namely,  when  the  shipper  makes  a  statement  concerning 
the  value  and  the  nature  of  the  goods,  then  he,  or  any 
person  authorized  by  him,  is  entitled  to  compensation  for 
full  damages  caused  to  the  cargo195  which  may  exceed  the 
192-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  412-413. 
193-Joseph  C.  Sweeney,  "Review  of  the  Hamburg  Conference",  Published 
in  the  Speakers'  Papers  for  the  Bill  of  Lading  Conventions 
Conference,  New  York,  Organised  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  1978. 
Sweeney  1  at  Sweeney  15,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Sweeney,  Review  of 
the  Hamburg  Conference",  Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules,  p  16  ; 
Scrutton,  p.  464. 
194-Dor,  pp  128-129. 
195-Shackman  v.  Cunard  white  star,  , td-(1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  971;  where 
it  is  stated  that: 
"A  price  at  port  of  destination  "clause  must  be  read  with  the 
statutory  recovery  is  $  500,  if  such  price  exceeds  $  500  for  a 
package,  the  maximum  recovery  is  $  500  unless  a  large  value  was 
declared.  " 392 
statutory  limitation.  Otherwise,  for  instance,  in  absence 
of  such  a  statement  or  a  false  statement  may  render  the 
carrier  liable  for  only  a  sum  which  is  set  out  in  the 
Rules  or  COGSA.  196 
196-Scrutton,  119th,  ed,  1984),  p  454;  Article  [IV]  para  (5)  (a) 
of  the  Carriage  of  the  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971,  Mark  S.  W.  Hoyle,  The 
Law  of  International  Trade,  (1st,  ed,  1984),  pp  203-204, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Hoyle";  Varian  Agsoc  v.  -.  .  T.  [1980]  A.  M.  C.  p 
450,  where  it  is  stated  that:  - 
".  ..  shipper's  failure  to  insert  in  bill  of  lading  the  value  of 
(4)  ton  crate  containing  electromagnet  worth  $  35,000  precludes 
recovery  of  more  than  $  500  from  ocean  carrier.  " 393 
CHAPTER  FIVE 
PROCEDURES  OF  ACTION  FOR  LOST  OR  DAMAGED  CARGO 
Once  the  cargo  claimant  has  made  his  claim  to  the 
court,  in  order  to  enquire  the  precedent  conditions  of 
the  action,  he  must: 
First: 
Prove  that  the  notice  of  loss  or  damage  has  been  given 
to  the  carrier  or  his  agent,  before  or  at  the  time  of 
the  removal  of  the  goods,  or  not  latter  than  the  day  when 
the  goods  were  handed  over  to  the  consignee,  or  within 
specified  days  in  case  the  loss  or  damage  is  not 
apparentl. 
Second: 
Prove  that  the  suit  has  been  brought  and  instituted 
within  a  specific  period  after  delivery  of  the  goods,  or 
the  date  when  the  goods  should  have  been  delivered2. 
Third: 
Satisfy  himself  that  the  court  which  heard  a  particular 
case  is  the  right  court  and  the  action  must  be  brought 
within  its  jurisdiction3;  and 
Finally: 
Prove  the  cause  of  the  loss  or  how  the  loss  took  place 
1-Article  3  [61  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  Article  19  (1,2,4,5)  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules. 
2-Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  Article  20  [1,2]  of  the 
Hamburg  Rules. 
3-Article  [211  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 394 
and  who  bears  the  burden  of  proof  in  the  litigation  of  a 
claim  for  loss  or  damage4" 
These  four  points  are  divided  into  formal  and 
substantive  conditions  which  are  very  important  for  the 
court  in  bringing  justice  to  the  parties.  The  first  three 
conditions  are  formal  condition.  Viz,  the  court  must 
enquire  and  must  be  satisfied,  as  a  matter  of  form,  that 
these  conditions  have  been  instituted  before  hearing  the 
case. 
The  last  condition  which  is  called  the  burden  of  proof 
is  a  substantive  condition.  Namely,  the  court  must 
constitute  who  bears  the  burden  of  proof  at  a  particular 
point  in  the  litigation  of  a  claim  for  loss  of  or  damage 
to  the  cargo. 
I  will  therefore  explain  the  following  points  in  more 
detail: 
Section  One:  Notice  of  Loss,  Damage  and  Delay  in 
Delivery. 
Section  Two:  Time  Limitation  for  Suit. 
Section  Three:  Jurisdiction  Clauses. 
Section  Four:  Burden  of  Proof. 
4-Article  (41  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  Article  (5)  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules. 395 
SECTION  ONE 
NOTICE  OF  LOSS,  DAMAGE  AND  DELAY  IN  DELIVERY 
When  the  carrying  vessel  has  arrived  at  the  port  of 
destination.  The  cargo-owner  expects  the  carrier  to 
deliver  his  goods  in  good  condition.  The  cargo-owner,  or 
his  representative,  may  find  that  his  goods  were  short- 
landed  or  were  damaged  while  they  were  in  the  carrier's 
charge. 
The  procedures  in  these  cases  are  that  the 
warehouse5,  usually  issues  a  short-landing  certificate, 
in  case  of  shore-landing,  which  certifies  the  loss  of  the 
goods  at  the  port  of  destination,  and  consequently  the 
consignee,  or  any  person  authorized  by  him,  is  entitled 
to  claim  for  the  loss  of  his  goods  against  the  carrier. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  respect  of  damaged  cargo,  the 
warehouse  usually  issues  an  out-turn  report  certifying 
the  condition  of  the  goods  as  received  from  the  vessel. 
Also,  the  cargo-owner,  consignee  or  his  agent  will 
exercise  his  right  to  call  for  the  surveyor  to  examine 
and  inspect  the  goods  in  order  to  itemize  and  value  the 
damaged  goods.  A  surveyor  usually  issues  a  report 
concerning  the  condition  of  the  goods  and  identifies  the 
cause  of  the  damage  if  possible.  6 
However,  if  upon  delivery  from  a  carrier,  the 
5-We  use  this  term  to  indicate  the  port  authority  or  any  public 
or  private  depository. 
6-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/4/Rev.  l/p  7. 396 
consignee,  or  his  agent,  finds  the  goods  have  suffered 
loss  of,  damage  to,  or  delay  in  delivery,  then  he  will  be 
obliged  to  issue  a  notice  of  such  loss  of,  damage  to,  or 
delay  in  delivery.  This  notice  has  particular  rules 
governing  the  procedures  of  the  action  depending  upon  the 
rules  of  a  particular  International  Convention  or  COGSA 
which  control  the  legal  procedures  of  a  given  case. 
I  will  therefore  discuss  the  legal  consequences  of  such 
a  notice  of  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  under  the 
following  heads: 
i-Under  the  Hague  Rules  and  COGSA  of  the  United  Kingdom 
and  the  United  States. 
ii-Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
i-UNDER  THE  HAGUE  RULES  AND  COGSA  OF  THE  UNITED 
KINGDOM  AND  THE  UNITED  STATES 
Where  the  carrier  has  unloaded  the  goods  at  the  port  of 
destination  in  apparently  sound  condition  without  any 
objection  from  the  consignee  or  any  person  who  is 
authorised  to  receive  the  goods.  That  means  that  is  prima 
facie  evidence  of  discharging  the  cargo  in  the  same 
apparent  condition  as  stated  in  the  bill  of  lading7. 
Whereas,  discharge  the  goods  under  reserve  or  a  written 
notice  of  loss  or  damage  issued  at  the  time  of  the 
delivery  or  within  three  days  of  delivery,  in  case  of 
such  loss  or  damage  is  not  apparent,  is  considered  prima 
facie  as  evidence  to  the  contrary8- 
7-Astle,  pp  110-111;  Hoyle,  p  199. 
8-D.  E.  Murray,  "The  Hamburg  Rules,  A  Comparative  Analysis",  (19801 397 
Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules  has  however  explained 
these  rules  in  detail  in  order  to  emphasise  the  basic 
duty  of  the  carrier  to  deliver  the  goods  which  were  in 
his  charge  in  apparently  as  sound  a  condition  as  he 
received  them  at  the  port  of  loading.  9 
Consequently,  the  purpose  or  the  nature  of  the  notice 
requirements  under  the  Hague  Rules  and  COGSA  is  that: 
1-  Once  the  notice  is  given  to  the  carrier  by  the 
consignee,  or  any  person  authorised  by  him,  that  means 
that  the  goods  have  suffered  loss  or  damage. 
2-  To  give  the  carrier  plenty  of  time  to  investigate 
the  claim  while  he  has  access  to  the  facts  concerning  the 
goods  and  all  the  evidence  is  still  available  to  him  in 
order  to  defend  himself  against  groundless  claims  or 
retort  exaggerated  claims.  10 
The  notice  of  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  must  be  given 
to  the  carrier  in  writing  and  must  disclose  the  general 
nature  of  such  loss  or  damage"  before  or  at  the  time  of 
the  removal  of  the  goods  into  the  custody  of  the  person 
entitled  to  delivery.  12 
The  United  States  COGSA  added  an  additional  paragraph 
12  Lawyer  of  the  Americas  (U.  S.  A.  ),  p  59  at  p  79,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
9-Astle,  pp  109-110. 
10-George  F.  Wood;  "Damages  in  Cargo  Cases",  (1971]  45  Tul.  L.  Rep.  p 
932  at  p  952,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo  Cases"; 
Delaware  Steel  Co.  v.  Calmar  S.  S.  Corp.  378  F.  2d,  p  386;  (1968] 
A.  M.  C.  p  1527  (3d.  cir,  1967);  Deer  Island  ,  range  prods,.  or.  v. 
Luck  nba.  h,  S.  S.  Co[1959]  A.  M.  C.  p  1839. 
11-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  426;  Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo  Cases,  p  952. 
12-Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  427. 398 
to  the  Rules  in  order  to  clarify  these  Rules  as  follows: 
"Said  notice  of  loss  or  damage  may  be  endorsed 
upon  the  receipt  for  the  goods  given  by  the 
person  taking  delivery  thereof". 
We  can  therefore  conclude  that  there  are  some  forms  or 
manners  other  than  written  notice  which  are  considered  as 
an  equivalent  to  such  notice  as  follows: 
1-  To  issue  a  qualified  receipt  at  the  time  of 
discharge13,  i.  e;  bad  order  receipt,  or  out-turn  report 
and  short-landing  certificate  for  the  goods. 
2-  Joint  survey  or  inspection  by  the  contracting 
parties  or  their  agents14. 
We  turn  however  now  to  the  effect  or  sanction  of  the 
failure  to  give  notice  and  ask  does  the  failure  to  give 
notice  operate  as  a  forfeiture  of  the  claim  or  is  it 
merely  a  prima  facie  obstacle? 
We  can  reveal  from  Article  3  [61  of  the  Hague  Rules 
that  the  failure  to  give  notice  does  not  affect  the  right 
of  the  parties  to  bring  suit  within  one  year15. 
The  authors  have  their  own  viewpoints  in  referring  to 
such  sanction  or  effect. 
Scrutton16  believes  that  the  notice  of  loss  or  damage 
seems  to  have  no  legal  effect  as  following: 
13-Astle,  p  111. 
14-Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
15-Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo  Cases,  p  953. 
16-Scrutton,  19th,  ed,  1984,  p  440. 399 
"Whether  notice  is  given  or  not,  the  onus  of 
proving  loss  or  damage  will  lie  upon  the  person 
asserting  it". 
Carver17  supports  Scrutton's  viewpoint  by  saying: 
"The  first  paragraph  of  this  rule  appears  to 
have  little,  if  any  meaning,  as  the  burden  of 
proving  loss  or  damage  is  on  the  consignee  in 
any  event". 
Whereas,  Tetley18,  says  that  the  notice  of  loss  or 
damage  is  set  out  in  the  Hague  Rules  as  prima  facie 
evidence  of  the  condition  of  the  goods  at  discharge  which 
can  be  valuable  to  the  consignee. 
However,  Article  3  [6]  of  the  United  States  COGSA  has 
made  that  quite  clear  by  adding  the  following  paragraph: 
"Provided,  that  if  a  notice  of  loss  or  damage 
either  apparent  or  concealed,  is  not  given  as 
provided  for  in  this  section,  that  fact  shall 
not  affect  or  prejudice  the  right  of  the 
shipper  to  bring  suit  within  one  year  after  the 
delivery  of  the  goods  or  the  date  when  the 
goods  should  have  been  delivered". 
Then,  what  is  the  legal  effect  of  a  notice  of  claim 
clause  which  purports  to  bar  the  suit  in  case  a  notice 
was  not  given  in  a  specific  time? 
These  clauses  are  not  valid  under  the  Hague  Rules 
because  the  failure  to  give  notice  does  not  affect  the 
17-1  Carver,  para,  524. 
18-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  428,  where  he  states: 
"Clauses  in  a  bill  of  lading  calling  for  a  written  notice  of  claim 
(otherwise  suit  is  barred)  are  valid  under  the  Harter  Act,  if 
reasonable,  but  not  under  the  Hague  Rules". 400 
right  of  the  consignee,  or  his  agent,  to  bring  suit 
within  one  year19.  Although,  Article  3  [8]  of  the  Hague 
Rules  provided  that  any  clause  intends  to  relieve  the 
carrier  or  the  ship  from  liability  arising  from 
negligence,  fault  or  failure  in  the  duties  and 
obligations  provided  in  the  Rules  or  lessen  such 
liability  other  than  as  provided  in  this  convention, 
shall  be  null  and  void  and  of  no  effect20. 
ii-UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  "  UNCITRAL  "  plenary  discussion  in  respect  of  a 
"notice  of  loss"  created  contradictory  versions  of  what 
is  the  sanction  for  a  failure  to  give  the  required 
written  notice. 
The  United  States'  viewpoint  is  that  the  failure  to 
give  such  notice  is  not  considered  as  a  time  bar. 
Germany  favoured  retention  of  the  "notice  of  loss" 
provision  of  the  Hague  Rules  as  a  precondition  to  stating 
a  claim.  Whereas,  the  United  Kingdom  supported  the 
viewpoint  of  Germany  concerning  the  retention  of  the 
"notice  of  loss"  provision  of  the  Hague  Rules,  but  as 
19-Dor,  p  72;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  429;  The  Hawaiian 
Craftsman[1954]  A.  M.  C.  p  72;  Coventry  Sheppard.  v.  Larrinage 
S.  S.  Co.  [1942]  73  Ll.  L.  R.  p  256;  Ftser.  In  ..  v.  International 
harvester[1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1929. 
20-Nashiwa  v.  Matson  Navigation  Co.  [1954)  A.  M.  C.  p  610,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"The  failure  to  give  notice  of  loss  within  three  days  after 
delivery,  as  set  out  in  the  bill  of  lading,  does  not  bar  the  suit, 
despite  the  provisions  of  the  bill  of  lading.  Such  provisions  are 
null  and  void  of  S.  1303  [8]  of  COGSA". 401 
"disciplinary  measure".  21 
The  notice  of  loss  must  be  given  to  the  carrier  in 
writing,  but  the  periods  for  giving  notice  have  been 
slightly  enlarged  by  the  Hamburg  Rules.  22 
In  the  case  of  apparent  loss  or  damage,  the  required 
time  for  the  written  notice,  concerning  the  general 
nature  of  such  loss  or  damage,  is  to  be  given  not  later 
than  the  day  after  the  day  when  the  goods  were  handed 
over  to  the  consignee.  23 
Where  the  loss  or  damage  is  not  apparent,  the 
requirement  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  concerning  the  time  of 
giving  notice  according  to  Article  19  (2]  is  a  period  of 
fifteen  consecutive  days,  regardless  of  holidays,  after 
the  day  when  the  goods  were  handed  over  to  the 
consignee.  24 
However,  in  respect  of  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo 
caused  by  delay,  the  notice  must  be  given  in  writing  to 
the  carrier  within  sixty  days  after  the  day  when  the 
goods  were  handed  to  the  consignee. 
These  notices  of  loss,  damage  or  delay  in  delivery  must 
be  given  by  the  consignee  to  the  carrier,  actual  carrier, 
shipper  or  any  person  who  acting  on  the  carrier's  or  the 
actual  carrier's  behalf,  including  the  master  or  the 
officer  in  charge  of  the  ship,  or  to  a  person  acting  on 
21-Sweeney,  Part  V,  p  173. 
22-Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  79. 
23-Article  19  [11  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
24-Sweeney,  Part  V,  p  174;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  94. 402 
the  shipper's  behalf  is  deemed  to  have  been  given  to  the 
carrier,  to  the  actual  carrier  or  to  the  shipper, 
respectively25. 
On  the  other  hand,  in  the  event  that  the  goods  caused 
damage  to  the  ship,  then  such  notice  must  be  given  by  the 
carrier  or  actual  carrier  not  later  than  ninety 
consecutive  days  after  the  occurrence  of  such  loss  or 
damage  or  after  the  delivery  of  the  goods,  whichever  is 
later. 
However,  failure  to  give  notice,  concerning  the  loss  or 
damage  to  the  cargo,  does  not  affect  the  right  of  the 
consignee  to  bring  suit  against  the  carrier  and  it  goes 
only  to  the  question  of  the  quality  of  the  evidence26. 
Namely,  such  failure  to  give  notice  is  deemed  prima  facie 
evidence  that  the  carrier  has  delivered  the  goods  as 
described  in  the  bill  of  lading  or,  has  delivered  them  in 
sound  condition,  if  no  such  bill  of  lading  has  been 
issued27. 
Respecting  the  failure  of  the  carrier  to  give  notice 
concerning  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  ship  caused  by  the 
goods  is  considered  prima  facie  evidence  that  the 
carrier,  or  the  actual  carrier,  has  sustained  no  loss  or 
damage  due  to  the  fault  or  neglect  of  the  shipper,  his 
servants  or  agents28. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  failure  to  give  notice  of  loss 
25-Article  19  (5,8]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
26-Sweeney,  Part  V,  p  173. 
27-Article  19  (1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Samir  Mankabady,  p  93. 
28-Article  19  (7)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules, 
p  79. 403 
or  damage  caused  by  delay  is  considered  as  a  precondition 
to  recovery,  because  no  compensation  shall  be  payable  for 
delay  in  delivery  and  it  will  bar  the  claim29. 
Where  the  state  of  the  goods  has  been  the  subject  of  a 
joint  survey  or  inspection  by  the  parties,  then  written 
notice  need  not  to  be  given  because  such  a  survey  or 
inspection  is  deemed  an  equivalent  to  such  notice. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  bound  however  the  carrier  and  the 
consignee  by  Article  19  [4]  to  give  all  reasonable 
facilities  to  each  other  for  inspecting  and  tallying  the 
goods. 
29-  Article  19  (51  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Sweeney,  Part  V,  p  74; 
Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  80. 404 
SECTION  TWO 
TIME  LIMITATION  FOR  SUIT 
The  general  principles  of  the  time  limitation  within 
which  an  action  may  be  brought  is  characterized,  such  a 
period  of  time,  as  procedural  and  not  substantive  rules. 
Then  when  the  claimant  institutes  his  action  after  the 
expiry  of  a  time  limitation,  it  will  bar  the  contractual 
remedy,  but  not  extinguish  the  right30. 
That  means  that  a  claim  may  be  revived  by  an 
acknowledgement  or  payment  made  after  the  expiry  of  the 
time  limitation  of  a  particular  action31.  Then  the 
contracting  parties  may  agree  to  extend  the  time 
limitation  provided  by  the  Rules  because  it  is  not 
considered  as  a  part  of  the  public  policy. 
I  will  therefore  discuss  the  problem  of  the  time 
limitation  for  suit  for  loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  as 
follows: 
i-  Under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
ii-  Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
iii-  The  Effect  of  the  Deviation  on  the  Time  Limitation 
for  Suit. 
30-  nson's  Law  of  Contract,  p  588;  P.  A.  Stone,  "Time  Limitation 
in  the  English  Conflict  of  Laws",  (1985]  4  LMCLQ,  p  497,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Stone,  Time  Limitation";  Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  8. 
31-Stone,  Time  Limitation,  p  500. 405 
i-UNDER  THE  HAGUE/VISBY  RULES 
According  to  the  Hague/Visby  Rules32,  the  time 
limitation  for  suit  for  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo, 
is  one  year33.  The  claimant  must  institute  his  action 
within  the  one  year  provided  by  the  Rules34.  Article  3 
[6)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  provides  that  the  period  of 
limitation  is  commenced  within  one  year  from  delivery  of 
the  goods,  or  the  date  when  the  goods  should  have  been 
delivered. 
What  do  the  Rules  mean  by  providing  term  {delivery}  as 
an  important  point  for  operating  the  time  limitation  for 
suit;  and  what  is  the  difference  between  delivery  and 
discharge? 
Since  the  Rules  used  the  term  "delivery",  there  is  no 
doubt  that  delivery  was  what  the  Rules  required  to 
commence  the  running  of  the  time  period35.  Disputes  may 
arise  in  determining  the  scope  and  the  meaning  of  the 
term  "delivery"36 
Tetley37  has  defined  "Delivery"  as  follows: 
32-The  period  of  the  time  limitation  under  the  Hague  Rules  is 
unchanged  by  the  Visby  Rules. 
33-Article  3  [61  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
34-Franco  steel. 
Corp.  v.  N.  V.  Nederlandsch  Amerikaansch 
StoomvartMaatachappij,  [19671  A.  M.  C.  p  2440. 
35-Hemphill,  D.  J.  in,  The  American  Hoesch  Inc.  V.  ""Aijh;  arIg&',  [1971)  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  423  [U.  S.  Dis.  Ct,  Dis  of  South  Carolina  (Charleston 
Division)). 
36-Walker,  The  Companion  to  Law,  pp  349,362,  where  he  defines  the 
word  "delivery"  and  "discharge". 
37-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  331. 406 
"..  the  moment  when  the  consignee  named  in  the 
bill  of  lading  receives  the  goods.  This  would 
normally  mean  upon  delivery  by  the  stevedore  or 
terminal  agent  to  the  consignee  or  to  the 
consignee's  agenti38. 
Hemphill,  D.  J.  in,  American  Hoesch.  Inn.  V.  ßd39, 
has  explained  the  differences  between  the  term  "delivery" 
and  "discharge"  as  follows: 
"The  word  "delivery"  was  not  synonymous  with 
"discharge",  for  "delivery"  denoted  a  two-party 
transaction  in  which  the  consignee  would  have 
an  opportunity  to  observe  defects,  whereas 
"discharge"  need  only  involve  the  carrier,  and 
there  might  or  might  not  be  an  opportunity.  for 
the  consignee  to  discover  the  damage  at  that 
point,  only  at  delivery  must  there  be  such  an 
opportunity". 
However,  Devlin,  Jr  in,  Pyr 
-n  .  .  Ltd.  v.  Scindia  Steam 
Navigation  Co.  Ltd40,  has  explained  the  scope  of 
38-Cent.  rchem  Products  V.  A/S  Rederiet  Adjel  et  Al(1972]  A.  M.  C.  p 
373  at  pp  374-75,  where  it  is  defined  the  proper  delivery  by  saying: 
"It  has  been  established  that  proper  delivery  occurs  when  a  carrier 
(1)separates  goods  from  the  general  bulk  of  the  cargo;  (2) 
designates  them;  and  (3)  gives  due  notice  to  the  consignee  of  the 
time  and  place  of  their  deposit,  and  a  reasonable  time  for  their 
removal". 
39-[1971]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  423  (U.  S.  Dis.  Ct.  Dis  of  Carolina, 
Charleston  Division);  Compare,  Lord  Wright,  in,  Cnsan  Millard  v, 
Canadian  Government  Merchant  Marine  [1927]  28  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  88  at  p 
103,  where  he  said: 
"The  word  "discharge"  is  used  ,I  think  in  place  of  the  word 
"deliver"  because  the  period  of  responsibility  to  which  the  Act  and 
Rules  apply  (Art  1  (e),  ends  when  they  are  discharged  from  the 
ship.  The  words  "properly  discharge"  I  think,  mean,  deliver  from 
the  ship's  tackle  in  the  same  apparent  order  and  condition". 
40-(1954]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  321  at  p  329. 407 
application  of  the  Rules  quite  clearly  by  saying  that  the 
carrier's  liability  commences  when  the  cargo  crosses  the 
ship's  rail  and  ceases  the  moment  the  goods  are  released 
from  the  discharging  ship's  tackle. 
The  Hague  Rules  have  adopted  the  terms  "discharge"  and 
"delivery"  in  order  to  apply  the  Rules  to  goods  which 
cannot  be  handled  by  tackle,  e.  g;  grain,  oil...  etc.  Also, 
to  avoid  any  difficulties  arising  from  applying  the  term 
"tackle  to  tackle":  precisely,  but  it  was  not  intended  to 
alter  the  "tackle  to  tackle"  criterion.  41 
That  indicates  that  the  term  delivery  must  have  a 
different  meaning  from  discharge,  which  is  used  in 
Article  1  (e)  of  the  Hague  Rules  in  explaining  the  period 
of  the  carrier's  liability.  On  the  other  hand,  the  Rules 
refer  to  the  term  "delivery"  in  Article  3  [6]  concerning 
"time  for  suit"  without  referring  to  the  word 
"discharge". 
We  can  conclude  that  the  failure  to  mention  "discharge" 
in  Article  3  [6)  of  the  Rules  was  purposefu142  and  must 
be  considered  as  an  essential  factor  in  interpreting  the 
term  "delivery". 
The  period  of  limitation  does  not  begin  from  the  date 
of  discharge  of  the  goods,  but  it  commences  from  the 
moment  of  the  delivery,  or  the  date  when  the  goods  should 
have  been  delivered.  43 
41-Mankabady,  The  Brussels  Convention,  p  98;  Al-Jazairy,  p  117, 
Footnote,  1. 
42-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  284. 
43-Compared,  Wood,  Damages  in  Cargoes  Cases,  p  55,  where  he  states: 408 
The  substituted  delivery  has  raised  many  difficulties 
concerning  the  commencement  of  the  moment  of  delivery 
such  as  when  the  goods  are  discharged  into,  barges, 
lighters,  etc.  Then  what  constitutes  delivery  in  such  a 
case? 
As  far  as  the  substituted  delivery  is  concerned  we  can 
say  that  there  is  delivery  for  limitation  purpose  when 
the  goods  are  released  from  the  'vessel's  tackle  and  are 
loaded  into  a  craft,  lighter  or  onto  the  quay.  44 
Respecting,  the  discharge  of  goods  into  a  lighter  or 
craft,  the  limitation  period  does  not  commence  until  the 
last  item  of  the  shipment  is  delivered,  or  should  have 
been  delivered.  45  Then  the  completion  of  the  discharge 
into  a  particular  lighter  is  an  essential  element  in 
deciding  whether  the  delivery  of  the  goods  is 
accomplished  or  not. 
46 
However,  the  actual  passing  of  possession  of  the  goods 
to  the  consignee,  or  any  person  authorized  by  him,  is  a 
determined  element  in  differentiating  between  discharge 
and  delivery.  Otherwise,  if  the  possession  or  control  of 
the  goods  is  still  under  the  carrier,  then  it  is  mere 
discharge  of  the  cargo  and  is  not  delivery.  47 
"Since  the  duties,  rights  and  responsibilities  of  the  carrier  under 
COGSA  terminated  upon  discharge  of  the  goods,  logic  would  dictate 
that  the  limitation  period  of  section  3(6)  commences  at  that  time". 
44-See  chapter  II  for  more  details. 
45-Loeb  V.  S.  S.  Washington  Mail,  150  F.  Supp.  p  207;  [1957]  A.  M.  C.  p 
267;  Ungar  v.  S.  S.  Urold  [1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  1663. 
46-The  Hoegh  Lines  v.  Green  Truck  Sal  s,  Win,  298  F.  2d.  P 
240;  [1962)  A.  M.  C.  p  431  {9th.  Cir.  Court,  denied,  p  371,  U.  S.  p  817 
(1962);  Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo  Cases,  p  955. 
47-American  Hosech  Inc.  v.  S.  S.  Aubade(19711  A.  M.  G.  p  1217  at  p 409 
Thus,  when  the  goods  are  discharged  into  the 
consignee's  lighter,  or  he  owns  or  controls  such  a 
lighter,  then  the  carrier's  liability  will  cease  at 
tackle  because  the  goods  are  still  under  the  consignee's 
control.  Whereas,  when  such  lighters  or  barges  are  under 
the  carrier's  control,  or  he  owns  such  a  lighter  or 
barge,  then  he  will  still  be  responsible  until  the  goods 
have  been  discharged  on  land  and  are  ready  for 
delivery48. 
In  respect  of  non-delivery,  the  Hague  Rules  are  quite 
clear,  saying  that  the  time  limitation  begins  to  run  from 
the  date  when  the  goods  should  have  been  delivered49. 
The  American  court  in  Western  Gear  Corp.  v.  states 
Marine  Lines  Tnn50,  held  that: 
"Suit  instituted  within  a  year  from  actual 
delivery,  but  (16)  months  after  it  should  have 
been  delivered,  was  barred  by  the  one-year 
limitation  under  COGSA". 
Misdelivery  is  to  be  treated  the  same  as  non-delivery, 
then  the  proceedings  of  the  action  must  commence  within 
one  year  from  the  date  when  the  goods  should  have  been 
delivered.  Otherwise,  when  the  proceedings  were  not 
commenced  until  the  expiry  of  the  time  limitation,  the 
1221;  [1971]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  423  at  p  425. 
48-Tetley  &  Cleven,  p  826;  Compare,  C.  Tennant.  Sonn&  Co.  v. 
Norddeutscher  Lloyds  [1964]  A.  M.  C.  p  754,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  claim  was  time  barred,  because  the  time  limitation  was 
commenced  from  the  date  of  discharge  of  the  goods  into  the  barges". 
49-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  334. 
50-[1966)  A.  M.  C.  p  1969. 410 
claim  was  time-barred5l. 
However,  the  phrase  "unless  suit  is  brought"  meant 
"unless  the  suit  before  the  court  was  brought  within  one 
year  and  not  whether  other  proceedings  had  been 
instituted  within  that  period  of  limitation"52.  That 
means  that  the  action  must  be  brought  in  the  jurisdiction 
which  the  dispute  is  ultimately  decided53.  Then  such 
action  will  be  time-barred,  when  the  proceedings  are  not 
instituted  before  the  proper  jurisdiction  and  were 
brought  before  other  jurisdiction  within  the  period  of 
limitation. 
Roskill  J.  in,  The  Comanion  Colombiana  De  S  guru  v. 
Pacific  Steam  Navigation  C54,  has  made  that  quite  clear 
when  he  said: 
"I  think  the  true  proposition  in  English  Law  is 
that  where  in  an  action  in  the  English  courts 
the  plaintiff  seeks  relief  and  the  defendant 
pleads  limitation,  the  issue  which  an  English 
51-Astle,  pp  113-114;  Commodity  Service  Corp.  v.  Furness  Withy  & 
Q  Q..  [1964]  A.  M.  C.  p760;  Anglo-Saxon  Petroleum  &  cn.  Ltd.  v.  Adamag  o9 
S.  S.  Co.  Ltd  [1957]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  79,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Article  3  (6]{4)  of  the  Hague  Rules  covers  the  liability  for  wrong 
delivery  even  though  the  goods  had  suffered  no  physical  loss  or 
damage  and  consequently  the  one  year  time  was  applied";  Heljyer  v. 
N.  Y.  K.  [1955)  A.  M.  C.  p  1258,  where  it  is  stated; 
"Non-delivery  of  cargo  after  the  vessel  arrives  at  the  port  of 
destination  is  not  such  a  "deviation"  (if  deviation  it  be)  as  will 
avoid  the  COGSA  one-year  limit  upon  the  time  to  sue". 
52-Ivamy,  p  142;  Al-Jazairy,  p  282;  Companion  Col  obi  ana  nn$Seg_  1uro 
v.  Pa  ifs  Steam  Navigation  Cc,  (1965]  1  Q.  B.  p  101  at  p  103. 
53-scrutton,  p  44;  Halsbury's  Shipping  and  Navigation,  p  535, 
para,  773,  Footnote,  1;  The  Merak  (1965]  1  ALL  E.  R.  p  230. 
54_[19633  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  479  at  p  496. 411 
court  had  to  determine  is  whether  the  action 
before  the  court,  and  not  some  other  action, 
has  been  instituted  within  the  relevant 
limitation  period". 
Respecting  an  arbitration  clause  contained  in  a  bill  of 
lading  does  not  affect  the  time  limit  and,  in  such  a 
case,  the  principles  of  that  period  of  limitation  should 
be  applied,  because  it  does  not  amount  to  a  waiver  of  the 
time  limit55. 
Therefore,  if  an  arbitration  clause  intends  to  limit 
the  period  of  limitation  in  less  than  one  year,  such  a 
clause  would  be  null  and  void,  because  of  its  conflict 
with  purpose  of  Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules  by 
lessening  the  time  limitation  for  suit. 
This  was  made  quite  clear  in  The  Ion56,  where  it  is 
held: 
"The  part  of  the  arbitration  clause  concerning 
the  time  limit  was  void,  because  it  was  in 
conflict  with  Article  3  (6]  of  the  Hague 
Rules". 
Then,  when  part  of  an  arbitration  clause  calling  for 
lessening  the  period  of  limitation  which  provided  in 
Article  3  (6]  of  the  Hague  Rules,  such  a  clause  would  be 
55_Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  95;  Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules, 
p  80,  where  he  states: 
"Case  law  in  America  and  England  has  differed  as  to  whether 
arbitration  proceedings  are  within  the  COGSA  one-year  limit,  with 
the  American  courts  taking  the  view  that  it  does  not  apply  to 
arbitration  proceedings,  while  the  English  courts  follow  the 
opposite  view";  NEA  Agrex  S.  A.  v.  Baltic  Shippingo  Ltd  (19761 
2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  47;  Chandler,  p  257. 
56-(19711  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  541. 412 
void  to  that  extent  but  no  further57. 
The  term  "suit"  includes  then  the  proceedings  of 
arbitration58  and  the  commencement  of  arbitration  should 
be  brought  within  the  period  of  limitation  which 
providing  by  Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules.  Therefore, 
when  the  claimant  failed  to  claim  within  one  year  of 
delivery,  or  the  time  when  the  goods  ought  to  have  been 
delivered,  then  the  Arbitration  Act  of  1959  will  not 
apply  upon  an  admiralty  cases  concerning  the  time  limit 
as  a  matter  of  construction,  i.  e;  allowing  the  court  to 
extend  an  agreed  limitation  period. 
Kerr,  J,  in,  The  Angeli-k!  59,  has  pointed  out  these 
principles  by  saying: 
"The  court  should  not  exercise  its  discretion 
so  as  to  interfere  with  the  time  limit  of  the 
Hague  Rules". 
Thus,  the  extension  of  the  time  limit  shall  not  be  left 
to  the  discretion  of  the  court,  but  should  be  governed  by 
the  provisions  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  not  by  non- 
admiralty  law.  The  one  year  delay  for  suit  may  however  be 
waived  or  extended  by  written  consent  between  the 
contracting  parties60, 
57-Ibid,  at  p  542;  Dennv  Motte  &  Dickinston  Ltd.  v.  Lynn  Shipping 
Ca,  [1963]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  339. 
58-Cadwallader,  Bills  of  Lading,  p  8:  Compare,  Son  Shipping  Co.  v. 
De  Foss  &  Tanghe  [1952]  A.  M.  C.  p  1903,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  an  arbitration  clause  was  incorporated  in  a  bill  of  lading, 
there  was  no  time  bar  because  arbitration  is  not  within  the  term 
"suit"  as  used  in  Article  3  [6]  of  the  American  Act". 
59_[1963]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  226  at  p  230. 
60-Fir-man'sIns.  v.  Gulf  Puerto  inn[1973]  A.  M.  C.  p  995  at  p  1004. 413 
The  jurisprudence  in  most  countries  enforce  the  terms 
of  any  express  extension  of  the  time  limitation61.  If  the 
extension  is  given  for  a  certain  time  then  the  suit  must 
be  brought  before  the  court  by  the  end  of  the  extension 
or  another  extension  must  be  agreed  by  the  contracting 
parties62.  Therefore  a  mere  request  for  extension  without 
agreement  by  another  party  does  not  establish  a  waiver63. 
Article  1  (2]  of  the  Visby  Rules  has  authorized 
expressly  any  agreement  between  the  parties  to  extend  the 
time  limitation  as  follows: 
"Subject  to  paragraph  (6)  bis  the  carrier  and 
the  ship  shall  in  any  event  be  discharged  from 
all  liability  whatsoever  in  respect  of  the 
61-The  British  Maritime  Law  Association  Agreement  [The  Gold  Clause 
Agreement],  extends  the  time  limitation  to  two  years  as  follows: 
"The  shipowners  will,  upon  the  request  of  any  party  representing 
the  cargo  whether  made  before  or  after  the  delivery  of  the  goods  or 
the  date  when  the  goods  should  have  been  delivered  as  laid  down  by 
the  (Hague  Rules)  extend  the  time  for  bringing  suit  for  a  further 
twelve  months  unless  (a)  notice  of  the  claim  with  the  best 
particular  available  has  not  been  given  within  the  period  of  twelve 
months  or  (b)  there  has  been  undue  delay  on  the  part  of  consignees, 
receivers  or  underwriters  in  obtaining  the  relevant  information  and 
formulating  the  claim";  Buxton  v.  Reden  [1939)  A.  M.  C.  p  815; 
United  Fruit  v.  Fo1Qer  (1959]  A.  M.  C.  p  224;  Clifford  March  (1982] 
2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  251,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  there  was  any  extension  "up  to  and  including  April,  21st, 
1981  which  was  a  Sunday  then  suit  on  the  following  Monday  was 
timely". 
62-Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo  Cases,  p  957. 
63-Schwadach  Coffee  Co.  v.  S.  S.  Suriname  [1967]  A.  M.  C.  p  604  at  p 
605,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Knowledge  of  the  pending  claim  and  failure  to  answer  a  written 
request  for  an  extension  of  time  to  file  suit...  did  not  constitute 
a  waiver  by  the  carrier  of  the  one-year  limitation  provision  of 
COGSA";  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  341. 414 
goods,  unless  suit  is  brought  within  one  year 
of  their  delivery  or  of  the  date  when  they 
should  have  been  delivered.  This  period  may, 
however,  be  extended  if  the  parties  so  agree 
after  the  cause  of  action  has  arisen". 
We  can  conclude  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  the 
contracting  parties  might  effectively  extend  the  period 
of  limitation,  whether  prior  to,  or  after  the  cause  of 
action  has  arisen,  by  inserting  a  clause  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  or  depending  upon  the  provision  of  the  Visby 
Rules  in  the  case  of  the  extension  being  made  after  the 
cause  of  action  has  arisen64. 
The  one  year  time  limit  for  suit  is  however  not  subject 
for  an  indemnity  claim  against  a  third  party.  Then  what 
is  the  time-bar  for  an  indemnity  claim  against  a  third 
party? 
Article  3  (6]  bis  of  the  Visby  Rules  provides: 
"An  action  for  indemnity  against  a  third  person 
may  be  brought  even  after  expiration  of  the 
year  provided  for  in  the  preceding  paragraph, 
if  brought  within  the  time  allowed  by  the  law 
of  the  court  seized  of  the  case.  However,  the 
time  allowed  shall  be  not  less  than  three 
months,  commencing  from  the  day  when  the  person 
bringing  such  action  for  indemnity  has  settled 
the  claim  or  has  been  served  with  process  in 
the  action  against  himself". 
We  can  find  out  from  the  foregoing  provision  that  such 
64-Companion 
Colo 
iana  De  Seguros  V.  Pacific  Steam  NavigAt'iOn 
C.  0..  [1965)  1  Q.  B.  p  101;  F.  J.  J.  Cadwallader,  "COGSA  1971"(1972]  35 
M.  L.  R.  p  68,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Cadwallader,  COGSA  1971";  Astle,  p 
195;  Powles,  p  143. 415 
an  indemnity  action  may  be  commenced  even  after  the 
expiration  of  the  time  limitation,  if  it  is  brought 
before  the  proper  court  within  the  time  allowed  by  the 
law  of  the  court  seized  of  such  action65"  The  time 
allowed  under  the  Visby  Rules,  shall  not  be  less  than 
three  months. 
This  extension  for  time  limit  concerning  the  recourse 
action  has  raised  some  controversies  about  the  term  "has 
settled  the  claim".  It  has  however  been  suggested  that 
settlement  means  that  an  agreement  has  been  reached  or  a 
binding  arrangement  to  pay  been  intered  into,  but  no 
payment  made66. 
Also,  the  phrase  "time  allowed  by  the  law  of  the  court 
seized  of  the  case"  has  made  the  time-bar  in  his  case  be 
governed  by  the  general  period  of  limitation  by  the  local 
law  of  a  particular  country67. 
Thus,  English  Law  still  applies  a  six  years  delay  for 
suit  concerning  a  recourse  action,  when  the  party  is 
claiming  the  indemnity  against  a  third  person,  then  he 
must  bring  the  action  within  six  years  or  much  longer  if 
the  time  limitation  expires  before  he  has  settled  the 
65-Cadwallader,  COGSA  1971,  p  68;  Powles,  p  143;  Astle,  p  195. 
66-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  346;  Al-Jazairy,  p  295;  Compare,  John 
Maskell,  Messrs,  Norton,  Rose,  Botterell  and  Roche,  "The  Influence 
of  the  New  Rules  on  Contracts  of  Carriage",  Published  in  The. 
Hague/Visby  Rules  and  The  Carriage  of  Cnnda  by  Sea  Act.  1971., 
London,  p  Maskell,  1  at  p  Maskell  5,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Maskell, 
Contract  of  Carriage  ",  where  he  states: 
"I  myself  feel  that  actual  payment  will  have  to  be  made  before  the 
time  limit  commences". 
67-Maskell,  Contract  of  Carriage,  p  5. 416 
claim68. 
Finally,  the  Visby  Rules  by  virtue  of  Article  4  bis  (2] 
have  extended  the  defence  system  which  provides  for  the 
carrier  to  cover  his  servants  or  agents  as  follows: 
"If  such  an  action  is  brought  against  a  servant 
or  agent  of  the  carrier  {such  servant  or  agent 
not  being  an  indepependent  contractor),  such 
servant  or  agent  be  entitled  to  avail  himself 
of  the  defences  and  limits  of  liability  which 
the  carrier  is  entitled  to  invoke  under  this 
convention". 
The  servants  or  agents  will  then  protect  themselves  by 
the  Visby  Rules  defences  when  such  Rules  are  incorporated 
specifically  within  a  contract.  Otherwise,  where  the 
Rules  are  not  incorporated  in  a  contract,  the  voyage  will 
not  be  subject  to  the  Visby  Rules  and  consequently  the 
servants  or  agents  will  not  avail  themselves  of  the 
carrier's  defences69. 
The  same  result  is  reached  if  the  servants  or  agents 
act  fraudently  or  recklessly,  then  they  will  lose  the 
benefit  of  this  Article  by  virtue  of  Article  4  bis[4) 
which  refers  to  the  defences  under  the  convention 
including  the  time  limitation  for  suit7O. 
There  is  no  public  policy  opposed  to  the  inclusion  of 
the  one-year  time  limit  of  Article  3  (6]  of  the  Hague 
68-Cadwallader,  COGSA  1971,  p  68;  Boma  v.  Larsen(1966]  1 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  22. 
69-Maskell,  Contract  of  Carriage,  p  5. 
70-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  347;  Halsbury'a  Shipping  and 
Navigation,  p  549,  pars,  787. 417 
Rules  in  a  bill  of  lading7l,  but  there  is  public  policy 
preventing  the  carrier  from  having  or  inserting  in  a  bill 
of  lading  a  clause  shortening  the  time  limit  because  it 
would  be  contrary  to  the  Article  3  (81  of  the  Hague 
Rules,  which  does  not  allow  the  carrier  to  make  any 
agreement  or  insert  any  clause  which  relieves  or  lessens 
his  duties,  and  obligations  otherwise  than  as  provided  by 
the  Rules72. 
The  jurisprudence  in  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  are  however  identical  in  their  solution  concerning 
the  shortening  of  the  period  of  limitation  for  suit  by 
forbidding  such  an  agreement  or  clause  insertion  by  the 
carrier73. 
ii-UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  problems  and  difficulties  concerning  the  time  limit 
which  are  accompanied  with  the  application  of  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  have  been  discussed  extensively  at  the 
"UNICTRAL"  conference  and  eliminated  by  drafting  the 
Hamburg  Rules. 
71-South  Star  [1953]  A.  M.  C.  p  1304;  Church  Bay  [1957]  A.  M.  C.  p  16. 
72-Dor,  p  71. 
73-The  7aremho  [1942]  A.  M.  C.  p  544;  The  B  idjendick(1950]  A.  M.  C.  p 
1235;  Coventry  Sheppard  v.  Larrinag  Co.  (1942]  73  L1.  L.  Rep.  p 
256;  Compare,  Piazza  V.  Went  Coast  LinP[1951]  A.  M.  C.  p  1668,  where 
it  is  stated: 
"A  clause  providing  that  a  suit  for  freight  shall  be  subject  to  a 
six  month  time  limit,  can  be  considered  perfectly  valid",  Los  ie 
Bank  (1938]  A.  M.  C.  p  1033;  Dear  Ts_O  P_COrp.  V.  j,,  e  hach 
S.  S.  Co.  [1959)  A.  M.  C.  p  1839,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  six  months  bill  of  lading  limitation  period  and  notice  of 
claims  are  valid". 418 
The  limitation  period  for  suit  which  provides  by  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  has  enlarged  to  two  years74  by  virtue 
of  Article  20  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  as  Follows: 
"Any  action  relating  to  carriage  of  goods  under 
this  convention  is  time-barred  if  judicial  or 
arbitral  proceedings  have  not  been  instituted 
within  a  period  of  two  years". 
Thus,  the  ambiguities,  which  arose  under  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  concerning  the  arbitration  clause  have 
been  clarified  by  stating  that  the  limitation  period 
covers  both  judicial  and  arbitral  proceedings. 
Also,  Article  20  [2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  has  pointed 
out  the  commencement  of  the  limitation  period  and  removed 
all  the  disputes  which  arose  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
by  explaining  the  day  or  the  date  of  the  goods  delivery 
or  when  they  should  have  been  delivered75. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  explained  in  more  detail  which 
day  is  included  in  the  limitation  period  and  which  one  is 
not,  by  virtue  of  Article  20  (3)76,  where  it  is  stated 
74-Sweeney,  part  II,  p  349,  where  he  states: 
"At  the  conclusion  of  the  Plenary  Discussion  nine  states:  favoured 
the  "one  year  time  bar  (U.  S,,  U.  S.  S.  R,  Japan,  France,  Poland, 
Belgium,  Brazil,  Argentina,  and  U.  K.  )  while  six  states  favoured  the 
"two  years"  provision  (Australia,  Nigeria,  Singapore,  Norway,  India 
and  Hungary).  Accordingly  the  entire  topic  was  referred  to  the 
Drafting  Party". 
75-Article  20  (2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 
"The  limitation  period  commences  on  the  day  on  which  the  carrier 
has  delivered  the  goods  or  part  thereof  or,  in  case  where  no  goods 
have  been  delivered,  on  the  last  day  on  which  the  goods  should  have 
been  delivered". 
76-Article  20  [3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 419 
that  the  first  day  of  the  commencement  of  the  time-bar  is 
not  included,  whereas  the  last  day  of  the  period  is 
counted. 
The  extension  of  the  limitation  period  has  however  been 
allowed  expressly  by  the  Hamburg  Rules  in  Article  20 
[4]77,  where  it  is  stated  that  the  limitation  period  may 
be  extended  during  the  commencement  of  the  time-bar  by  a 
declaration  in  writing  to  the  claimant78. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  followed  the  Visby  Rules  by 
providing  a  special  provision  for  recourse  actions  and  by 
allowing  the  claimant  to  institute  his  action  even  after 
the  expiration  of  the  time  limit  which  is  restricted  to 
two  years.  If  the  consignee,  or  claimant,  has  a  right  to 
sue  the  ship  beyond  the  limitation  period,  then  the  ship 
may  sue  the  shipper  when  the  action  is: 
"instituted  within  the  time  allowed  by  the  law 
of  the  state  where  proceedings  are  instituted, 
However,  the  time  allowed  shall  not  be  less 
than  (90)  days  commencing  from  the  day  when  the 
person  instituting  such  action  for  indemnity 
has  settled  the  claim  or  has  been  served  with 
process  in  the  action  against  himself"79. 
"The  day  on  which  the  limitation  period  commences  is  not  included 
in  the  period". 
77-Article  20  [4]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  provides: 
"The  person  against  whom  a  claim  is  made  may  at  any  time  during  the 
running  of  the  limitation  period  extend  that  period  by  a 
declaration  in  writing  to  the  claimant.  This  period  may  be  further 
extended  by  another  declaration  or  declarations". 
78-Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  80;  Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  97. 
79-Article  20[5]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules, 
p  81. 420 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  however  removed  the  doubt 
created  by  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  concerning  the  time-bar 
where  it  is  stated  in  Article  20  [1]  that: 
"Any  action  relating  to  carriage  of  goods" 
This  phrase  covers  actions  by  the  carrier  and  by  the 
cargo  interests  whether  they  are  based  on  contract,  tort, 
or  otherwise80.  The  carriers  actions  then  against  the 
shipper  concerning  dangerous  goods  or  freight  would  be 
covered  by  the  provisions  of  the  Hamburg  Rules81. 
Moreover,  the  Hamburg  Rules  provide  a  special  rule  for 
the  servants  and  agents  who  can  avail  themselves  of  the 
defences  and  limits  of  liability  which  the  carrier  is 
entitled  to  invoke  under  this  convention  by  virtue  of 
Article  7  [2]. 
Thus,  the  time  limitation  for  suit  applies  to  servants 
and  agents  of  the  carrier  if  they  prove  that  they  acted 
within  the  scope  of  their  employment,  even  though  they 
acted  deliberately  or  recklessly  and  with  knowledge  that 
such  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  would  probably 
result. 
0 
80-Article  7  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
81-Article  8  (21  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 421 
iii-  THE  EFFECT  OF  DEVIATION  ON  THE  TIME 
LIMITATION 
There  has  been  long  argument  over  the  effect  of 
deviation  or  fundamental  breach  on  the  time  limit.  This 
argument  depends  upon  the  characterization  of  the 
deviation  and  its  effect82.  There  are  two  trends 
concerning  the  effect  of  deviation  on  the  one  year 
prescription. 
The  first  opinion  purports  to  deprive  the  carrier,  or 
the  shipowner,  of  the  benefit  of  the  one  year  limitations 
provision83.  This  trend  concentrates  on  the  argument  that 
an  unreasonable  deviation84  displaces  the  whole  of  the 
Rules  which  are  considered  as  a  part  of  the  contract" 
and  it  abrogates  the  contractual  stipulations  including 
the  time  limitation  for  suit. 
That  means  that  the  pre-existing  effect  of  deviation 
under  the  common  law  is  still  applicable86  under  the 
82-See  chapter  III,  for  more  detail  about  the  effect  of  deviation. 
83_C 
.  rro  Sales.  Corp.  v  Atlantic  Marine  Enters,  403  F.  Supp,  p  562 
{S.  D.  N.  Y.  1975};  [1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  375;  Astle,  p  310. 
84-Hellyer  v.  N.  Y.  K.  (19551  A.  M.  C.  p  1258,  where  it  is  stated: 
"A  claim  for  non-delivery  of  merchandise  is  not  to  be  equated  with 
an  unjustifiable  deviation  which  results  in  abrogating  the  contract 
of  carriage";  Franco  Steel  Corp  v.  N.  V.  Nederla  ;  dsch(19673  A.  M.  C. 
p  2440,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  fact  that  ocean  carrier  breached  its  bill  of  lading  contract 
by  carrying  cargo  on  deck  which  should  have  been  stowed  under  deck 
has  no  effect  on  COGSA's  one-year  time  for  suit  clause". 
85_1  Carver,  para,  550. 
86-Eastern  Tempest  (1928]  A.  M.  C.  p  70,  where  it  is  stated: 
"There  was  no  deviation  and  a  suit  for  damage  to  the  apples  brought 
after  the  period  specified  in  the  bill  of  lading  will  be 
dismissed". 422 
Hague/Visby  Rules87. 
The  same  result  has  been  reached  by  the  American  courts 
in  respect  of  fundamental  breach,  i.  e;  fraud  case. 
The  court  in  the  Commodity  Service  Carp.  v.  Furness 
Wit_h_y  &  Co88  held  that: 
"If  the  misdelivery  of  the  goods  was 
intentional,  then  there  was  a  fraud,  and  it  is 
submitted  that  the  whole  contract  would  have 
been  breached  under  such  circumstances  the 
carrier  could  not  have  the  benefit  of  the  one- 
year  period  for  suit". 
The  second  attitude  aims  however  to  apply  the  provision 
of  Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  in  cases  of 
deviation  as  well89.  Viz,  when  the  Rules  apply  ex 
proprio  vigore,  then  the  deviating  carrier  is  entitled  to 
87-Flying  Clipper[1954]  A  M.  C.  P  259  at  pp  262-63,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"There  is  nothing  in  the  history  of  the  Act  to  indicate  that 
congress  by  fixing  the  limitation  of  $500  intended  to  displace  the 
doctrine  of  unjustifiable  deviation  which  was  firmly  entrenched  in 
maritime  law". 
88-(1964)  A.  M.  C.  p  760;  The  new  York  Star  (1977)  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p 
445;  Insurance  company  of  North  America  V.  The  .  xmins  er,  127  F. 
Supp,  p  541,  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  1954),  where  it  is  stated; 
"Where  the  action  was  brought  after  the  COGSA  period  of  limitation 
had  expired,  on  facts  involving  cargo  shown  on  the  bill  of  lading 
but  in  fact  never  loaded.  It  was  held  that  this  was  a  fraudulent 
misrepresentation,  amounting  to  an  unreasonable  deviation  which 
precluded  reliance  on  the  COGSA  protections";  Tetley,  Marine  Claim, 
p  335;  Morgan,  p  489;  Compare,  Za_  ik-v.  United  Fru  o.  [1972) 
A.  M.  C.  p  1746. 
89-Hoyle,  p  200,  where  he  states: 
"This  time  limit  applies  to  actions  even  if  the  contract  is 
fundamentally  broken  by  a  deviation,  but  this  is  arguable,  and 
would  depend  on  the  circumstances" 423 
avail  himself  of  the  time  limitation  statutory.  This 
trend  attempts  therefore  to  clarify  the  ambiguity  of  the 
Rules  concerning  delay  for  suit  depending  upon  the 
meaning  of  the  term  "in  any  event"90. 
The  American  courts  have  made  that  quite  clear  in  The 
Franco  Steel  Corp.  v.  N.  V.  Nederlandsch91,  where  it  is 
held: 
"..  at  least  two  bases  upon  which  the  limitation 
should  be  held  effective: 
First,  that  the  language  "in  any  event"  clearly 
suggest  that  the  bar  is  to  apply 
notwithstanding  a  deviation  or  other  breach; 
and  Second,  that  a  statute  cannot  be  displaced 
by  a  deviation". 
This  argument  intends  thus  to  reject  the  pre-COGSA 
position  concerning  the  drastic  effect  of  unreasonable 
deviation  which  displaced  the  contract  of  carriage  and 
deprived  the  carrier  of  relying  upon  limitation  or 
exception  statutory. 
The  Seventh  Circuit  in  The  Herman  ýSchultte, 
92,  held 
that: 
"The  Congress  clearly  intended  to  modify  the 
pre-COGSA  law  by  enacting  the  phrase  in  any 
event". 
There  is  however  a  tendency  to  apply  Article  3  [6)  sub- 
para  (4)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  in  the  case  of 
unreasonable  deviation,  fundamental  breach,  or  fraud 
90-Whitehead,  pp  45-46;  Astle,  p  310. 
91-(1967]  A.  M.  C.  p  2440  at  pp  2455-56;  v.  North  nerman 
Llovd,  50  F.  Supp,  p  173  (N.  D.  Cal.  1943). 
92-Atlantic  Mutual  v.  Poseidon  119631  A.  M.  C.  p  665  at  p  669. 424 
cases  depending  upon  the  words  "whatsoever"  93  which  is 
added  by  virtue  of  the  Visby  Rules  as  follows: 
"...  the  carrier  and  the  ship  shall  in  any  event 
be  discharged  from  all  liability  whatsoever  in 
respect  of  the  goods". 
We  can  however  conclude  that  the  criterion  of  "privity 
or  Knowledge"  is  the  best  category  in  applying  the  time 
limitation  in  case  of  deviation  or  fundamental  breach94. 
Where  the  damage  resulted  from  an  act  or  omission  'of 
the  carrier  or  his  servant  or  agent  with  intent  to  cause 
damage,  or  recklessness,  and  with  knowledge  that  damage 
would  probably  result95.  The  carrier  or  his  servant,  or 
agent,  is  then  not  entitled  to  protect  himself  by 
provision  of  Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules9" 
93-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  346;  Compare,  Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  at 
p  175,  where  they  say: 
"The  addition  of  the  word  "whatsoever"  was  presumably  designed  to 
prevent  the  limitation  from  being  abrogated  through  carrier 
misconduct  such  as  unjustifiable  deviation,  and  would  have  been 
redundant  if  the  limitation  applied  "in  any  event"  and  regardless 
of  the  carrier's  fault". 
94-tty.  V.  ssel,  DuVal  &Co.  Inc(1953]  A.  M.  C.  p  2056,  where  it  is 
stated: 
"...  a  negligent  stranding  was  not  a  deviation,  and  the  time  for 
suit  clause  was  not  displaced". 
95-Article  3  [4]  of  the  Visby  Rules. 
96-Morgan,  p  490;  E.  T.  Dupont  De  Nemour5  v.  The  Mormacv 
_gm, 
493F.  2d, 
p  100(2d.  Cir.  1974,  Footnote,  98),  where  Judge  Timeberlake  States  that: 
"In  spite  of  the  absolute  terms  of  section  4(5)  of  COGSA...  it  is 
the  law  of  this  circuit  that  any  intentional  unjustifiable  or 
unreasonable  deviation  from  the  contract  of  carriage  will  deprive 
the  carrier  of  the  statutory  limitations  of  liability";  yearn  Sale 
Corp.  v.  Atlantic  Marine  Enter  r  ".  x(1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  375,  where  it 
is  stated: 425 
Otherwise  they  are  entitled  to  protect  themselves  by 
provision  of  time  limitation  for  suit97. 
We  turn  now  to  discuss  the  effect  of  the  deviation  on 
the  time  under  the  Hamburg  Rules.  These  Rules  have  dealt 
with  deviation  by  general  principle  of  liability  of  the 
carrier  in  these  Rules98  in  order  to  avoid  the 
complexities  which  arose  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  appear  to  adopt  a  somewhat  similar 
approach  to  the  Visby  Rules  without  specific  reference  to 
unreasonable  deviation.  The  Rules  only  provide  in  Article 
8  [1,2]  that  the  carrier,  servant,  or  agent  is  not 
entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the  limitation  of  liability 
provided  in  Article  [6],  when  such  carrier,  servant  or 
agent  committed  an  act  or  omission  with  intent  to  cause 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  or  acted  recklessly 
and  with  knowledge  that  such  loss,  damage  or  delay  would 
probably  result". 
One  can  find  out  that  such  deprivation  of  limitation  of 
"Cargo  damage  action  commenced  on  July  23,1969  was  timely  under 
COGSA  Sec.  3  (6).  If  the  fire  occurred  without  the  carrier's 
privity.  the  deviation  to  Honolulu  was  a  reasonable  one  and  the 
carrier  were  privy  to  the  fire's  cause,  the  carrier  would  be  guilty 
of  an  unreasonable  deviation  which  would  deprive  it  of  the 
protection  of  the  one-year  COGSA  limitation". 
97-Morgan,  p  493,  where  he  suggests  the  following  solution; 
[A  possible  solution  would  be  an  amendment  to  the  Rules,  holding 
the  carrier  deprived  of  the  protections  of  the  Rules  in  regard  to 
damage  to  cargo  resulting  from  ý"intentional  unjustifiable  or 
unreasonable  "breaches  of  the  contract  of  carriage,  including 
unreasonable  deviations"]. 
98-Article  5  (6]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
99-Pollock,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  9. 426 
liability  by  virtue  of  Article  8  (1,21  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules  is  not  concluded  the  time  limit  which  provided  in 
Article  [20]  of  the  Rules. 
Then  the  time  limit  is  still  applicable  even  if  such 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  resulted  from  an  act 
or  omission  of  such  carrier,  servant,  or  agent,  done 
intentionally  or  recklessly  and  with  knowledge  that  such 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  would  probably 
result100 
This  was  made  quite  clear  by  virtue  of  Article  8  [2] 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules  where  it  is  stated: 
"Notwithstanding  the  provisions  of  paragraph 
(2)  of  Article  [7)  " 
The  latter  article  expressed  the  defences  and  limits  of 
liability  which  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  invoke  this 
convention  and  consequently  his  servant  or  agent  is 
entitled  to  avail  himself  if  he  proves  that  he  acted 
within  the  scope  of  his  employment. 
100-Morgan,  p  493;  Al-Jazairy,  p  299. 427 
SECTION  THREE 
JURISDICTION  CLAUSES 
A  jurisdiction  clause  is  a  clause  which  intends  to 
choose  the  place  or  the  country  and  the  court  where 
proceedings  may  be  commenced  by  the  claimant101.  This 
clause  does  thus  not  regulate  the  laws  which  apply  to  a 
particular  dispute. 
The  following  points  concerning  the  jurisdiction  clause 
should  therefore  be  discussed: 
i-  Under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
ii-  Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
i-  UNDER  THE  HAGUE/VISBY  RULES 
The  Hague/Visby  Rules  do  not  contain  any  provision 
regulating  the  jurisdiction  for  the  handling  of  claims102. 
The  bill  of  lading  contains  a  jurisdiction  clause  which 
is  intended  to  take  advantage  of  local  laws,  or  to  seek 
appropriate  facilities  for  handling  and  defence  of  claims 
by  a  carrier103. 
Many  courts,  in  respect  of  a  jurisdiction  clause,  call 
for  staying  an  action  rather  than  dismissing  it.  This 
101-Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  9:  Al-Jazairy,  p  3001  Mankabady, 
The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  98;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  399. 
102-Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  9;  Al-Jazairy,  p  300;  Mankabady, 
The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  98;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  399. 
103-R.  E.  Beare,  "Forum  Shopping:  The  Effect  of  Conflict  of  Law  on 
the  Exercise  of  Cargo-Underwriter's  Subrogation  Rights",  Published 
in  the  Speakers  Papers  for  the  Bill  of  Lading  (I-n-nvont  ions 
Conference,  1978,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  Beare, 
1,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Beare,  Forum  Shopping". 428 
depends  on  the  ground  that  the  time  limit  for  suit  may  be 
expired  under  the  court  to  which  jurisdiction  is 
transferred  or  the  court  refusing  to  hear  such  a  case104' 
Thus,  prima  facie,  the  original  court  would  stay 
proceedings  instituted  in  its  jurisdiction  by  hearing 
such  a  case105. 
What  is  the  criterion  for  the  court  to  determine  the 
jurisdiction  clause  and  consider  it  valid? 
There  are  a  number  of  criteria  which  are  applied  by  the 
courts  in  considering  the  validity  of  the  jurisdiction 
clause.  Most  courts  endeavour  to  base  the  exercise  of 
their  discretion  on  the  criterion  of  "reasonableness"  in 
order  to  accept  or  refuse  the  jurisdiction  clause106. 
Then  what  constitutes  reasonableness? 
There  are  many  factors  constituting  a  reasonable 
jurisdiction  clause.  These  factors  concluded  from  the 
agreement  of  the  contracting  parties,  or  if  there  is  no 
allegation  that  the  court,  to  which  jurisdiction  is 
transferred,  would  not  provide  a  fair  traill",  or  the 
defendants  were  in  that  country  and  discussion  had  broken 
place  there8.  Whereas,  mere  inconvenience  or  additional  10 
104-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  392.1 
105-The  Fehmarn  [1957]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  551;  Astlos  p  315,  where  he 
quoted  (the  Gottingen  No.  21  case  which  the  court  held  that: 
"They  should  not  decline  jurisdiction,  as  to  do  so  would  be 
unreasonable  in  the  light  of  public  policy  expressed  in  the 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act". 
106-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  396;  Astle,  p  314;  The  A  dof  Warski, 
(1976]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  241. 
107_ßi  v.  Tinnu  m  [1958]  A.  M.  C.  p  2555;  The  A  hs+m  [1962]  A.  M.  C. 
p  999. 
108-The  Vestris  (1932]  43  Ll.  L.  Rep.  p  86. 429 
expense  is  not  the  test  of  reasonableness  109.  The  court 
will  thus  enforce  the  jurisdiction  clause  unless  the 
plaintiff  could  clearly  show  that  enforcement  would  be 
unreasonable  and  unjustllo 
Brandon,  J,  in,  The  Eleftheri  a111,  has  made  that  quite 
clear  when  he  said: 
"The  principles  established  by  the  authorities 
can,  I  think,  be  summarised  as  follows: 
1-Where  plaintiffs  sue  in  England  in  breach  of 
an  agreement  to  refer  disputes  to  a  foreign 
court,  and  the  defendants  apply  for  a  stay,  the 
English  court,  assuming  the  claim  to  be 
otherwise  within  the  jurisdiction;  is  not  bound 
to  grant  a  stay  but  has  a  discretion  whether  to 
do  so  or  not. 
2-The  discretion  should  be  exercised  by 
granting  a  stay  unless  strong  cause  for  not 
doing  so  is  shown. 
3-The  burden  of  proving  such  strong  cause  is  on 
the  plaintiffs. 
4-In  exercising  its  discretion  the  court  should 
take  into  account  all  the  circumstances  of  the 
particular  case. 
5-In  a  particular,  but  without  prejudice  to 
(4),  the  following  matters,  where  they  arise 
may  be  properly  regarded: 
"a"In  what  country  the  evidence  to  the  issues 
of  fact  is  situated,  or  more  readily  available, 
and  the  effect  of  that  on  the  relative 
convenience  and  expense  of  trail  as  between  the 
English  and  foreign  courts; 
"b"Whether  the  Law  of  the  foreign  court  applies 
and,  if  so,  whether  it  differs  from  English  Law 
109-Muller  v.  Swedish  American  Lin  4  Ltd  (19551  A.  M.  C.  p  1687. 
110-Zapata  off  Shore  C.  Q.  v.  The  Breman  &  ilnterwege`Reederei 
G.  M.  B.  H.  [1972]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  315  (U.  S.  Sup.  Ct}. 
111_(1969]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  237  at  p  242. 430 
in  any  material  respects; 
"c"With  what  country  either  party  is  connected, 
and  how  closely; 
"d"Whether  the  defendants  genuinely  desire 
trail  in  the  foreign  country,  or  are  only 
seeking  procedural  advantages; 
"e"Whether  the  plaintiffs  would  be  prejudiced 
by  having  to  sue  in  the  foreign  court  because 
they  would  (I)  be  deprived  of  security  for  that 
claim,  (II)  be  unable  to  enforce  any  judgment 
obtained,  (III)  be  faced  with  a  time-bar  not 
applicable  in  England,  or  (IV)  for  political, 
radical,  religious  or  other  reasons  be  unlikely 
to  get  a  fair  trail". 
We  can  however  say  that  the  criterion  of  reasonableness 
gives  prima  facie  validity  to  foreign  jurisdiction  clause 
and  puts  the  burden  of  proving  the  reasonableness  of  that 
jurisdiction  clause  on  the  plaintiff112.  That  indicates 
that  the  question  of  reasonableness  is  a  question  of  fact 
which  depends  upon  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  a 
particular  case113. 
It  should  be  noted  that  the  jurisdiction  clause  must  be 
clear  and  precise  in  order  to  apply  such  a  clause  in  a 
particular  country.  That  makes  the  jurisprudence  of  some 
countries  submitting  that  the  jurisdiction  clause  is  null 
and  void  because  the  ambiguity  of  such  a  clause  does  not 
permit  the  parties  to  ascertain  which  court  is  the  proper 
one114. 
112-Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  102;  MuIlAr  v.  Swedish  Amerj-can 
Lines  Ltd  (1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1687. 
113-r  f-h_raa  [1969]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  237. 
114-Tetley,  marine  Claim,  p  392;  Al-Jazairy,  p  302;  Dundee  d  V. 
Gilman  &  o,  1Australia)Pty  Ltd(1968)  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  394 431 
Any  change  in  the  jurisdiction  of  a  particular  case 
should  however  not  cause  any  inconvenience  to  the  parties 
by  losing  rights  which  they  have  already  acquired  in  the 
original  court;  i.  e;  there  is  prejudice  to  suit  in 
England,  while  the  delay  for  suit  in  Poland  had 
expired.  115 
Such  an  inconvenience  may  emerge  from  contravening 
Article  3  (81  of  the  Hague  Rules  by  relieving  the  carrier 
from  duties  or  obligations  or  lessening  such  liability 
which  provided  in  this  convention. 
For  instance,  when  the  jurisdiction  clause  is  to  be 
allowed  to  transfer  the  case  or  dispute  to  a  country 
which  has  neither  adopted  nor  incorporated  the  Hague 
Rules,  then  such  a  clause  will  be  null  and  void.  If  the 
jurisdiction  clause  is  not  in  conflict  with  Article  3  (8) 
of  the  Hague  Rules,  then  it  will  be  valid. 
Scrutton  L.  J.  in,  Maharani  Woollen  Mil  s.  Co.  v.  Anchor 
X116  has  made  that  quite  clear  when  he  said: 
{Australia  Supreme  Court  of  New  South  Wales,  Court  of  Appeal),  where 
it  is  stated: 
"The  law  of  a  particular  country  was  the  proper  law  of  the  contract 
did  not  mean  that  there  had  been  a  submission  to  the  jurisdiction 
of  the  courts  of  that  country";  The  Media  (1931]  41  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  80 
at  p  82. 
115-Brandon,  J,  in,  The  Adolf  Warski  (1979)  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  107  at 
p  114,  where  he  states: 
"It  should  often  be  reasonable  unless  real  prejudice  to  the 
defendant  is  clearly  proved  to  make  such  enforcement  subject  to  a 
condition  that  the  defendant  should  waive  reliance  on  the  time  bar 
if  he  can  lawfully  do  so;  or  alternatively,  if  such  waiver  is  not 
permissible,  to  refuse  a  stay". 
116_[1927]  29  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  169. 432 
"Now  the  liability  of  the  carrier 
to  remain  exactly  the  same  unde 
The  only  difference  is  a  question 
where  shall  the  law  be  enforced? 
read  any  clause  as  to  procedure 
liability". 
appears  to  me 
r  the  clause. 
of  procedure- 
and  I  do  not 
as  lessening 
The  jurisprudence  of  the  United  Kingdom  and  the  United 
States  concerning  the  validity  of  the  jurisdiction 
clauses  arrived  at  the  same  conclusions,  but  on  different 
grounds117. 
So  far  as  the  United  Kingdom  jurisprudence  is 
concerned,  when  the  jurisdiction  clause  provides  that  the 
disputes  should  be  settled  in  the  United  Kingdom,  then 
such  a  clause  is  considered  valid118. 
otherwise,  when  the  jurisdiction  transfers  the  disputes 
to  the  foreign  courts,  then  such  clauses  would  be  settled 
according  to  the  principles  of  the  "convenience"  and  the 
"reasonableness"  according  to  the  surrounding 
circumstances  of  a  particular  case119. 
117-Beare,  Forum  Shopping,  p  5,  where  he  states: 
"Similar  attitudes  and  tests  are  adopted  in  the  English  and 
Canadian  courts,  although  the  impression  seems  to  be  that  the 
courts  in  the  United  States  are  less  likely  to  stay  an  action". 
118-Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  99. 
119_Ele  h_r;  a  [1969]  1  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  237  (Admiralty  Division); 
Makefi  l  (1976]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  29;  Aldof  Warski[1976]  2  Lloyd's. 
Rep.  p  241,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Although  the  court  might  be  more  willing  to  grant  a  stay  where  a 
clause  was  reasonable  than  where  it  was  not";  Sergio  M.  Carbone  & 
Fausto  Pocar,  "  Conflict  of  Jurisdictions,  Carriage  by  Sea  and 
Uniform  Law",  Published  in  Studies  on  the  Revision  of  the  Brussels 
Convention  on  the  Rills  of  Lading,  Universita  of  Di  Genova,  Facolta 
'Di  Economica  E,  Commercio,  p  315  at  p  325,  hereinafter  cited  as 433 
Whereas,  the  jurisprudence  of  the  United  States  has 
fluctuated  in  considering  the  validity  of  the 
jurisdiction  clause.  The  United  States  jurisprudence 
rejected  any  jurisdiction  clause  which  displaced  the 
jurisdiction  of  the  United  States'  courts120. 
This  attitude  has  been  changed,  by  the  American  Courts, 
by  granting  exclusive  jurisdiction  to  foreign  courts  on 
the  basis  of  "reasonableness"121  and  "convenience"122. 
Finally,  the  admiralty  court  has  jurisdiction  to  stay 
the  whole  action,  whether  such  action  be  founded  in 
contract  or  in  tort123.  Whereas,  the  admiralty  court  has 
no  jurisdiction  of  a  tort  committed  by  a  cargo  checker  on 
a  pier124. 
"Carbone  &  Pocar";  Al-Jazairy,  p  303. 
120-Wood  &  SalickInc  v.  Companie  General  Transatlan 
_ique, 
43F.  2d, 
pp  941-42  (2d.  Cir.  1930);  carbon  Black  Export  nn  v.  The  SS.  Monrosa, 
254  F.  2nd,  p  297  (5th.  Cir.  1958);  dussa  Corp.  v.  SS"Ra  o  g,  377 
F.  2nd,  p  200  (2nd.  Cir.  1967);  Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  101. 
121-Kranger  v.  Pennsylvania  Rail  0.,  174  F.  2d.  p  2556  (2  Cir.  1949); 
Muller  v.  Swedish  American  Lines  Ltd(1955]  A.  M.  C.  p  1687;  Zapa 
, 
Off-Shore  Company  V.  The  Breman  &  Unterweser  Reederei  M. 
Chapa  rral},  (1971]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  348  at  p  351  (U.  S.  Sup.  Ct). 
122-Indussa  Corp.  v.  anborg  (1967]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  101,  (U.  S.  Ct. 
of  App);  Northern  Assurance  Co.  Ltd.  V.  M.  V.  Caspian  Career  (1977] 
A.  M.  C.  p  421,  where  it  is  held: 
"A  clause  requiring  disputes  to  be  settled  in  the  Tokyo  District 
Court  was  involved  under  Section  3  (8]  of  the  United  States 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  sea  Act,  1936,  since  the  clause  "lessens  the 
carrier's  liability";  Beare,  Forum  Shopping,  p  5;  Carbone&Pocar,  p  331. 
123:  Maýjell  (1976]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  29;  Selim  &  Kazas  v.  I3aviera 
Aznar  S.  A.  ET.  Al  [1976]  A.  M.  C.  p  673  at  p  674. 
124_Srrohmeyer  &  Arpe  Company  v.  American  Line  S_S  snrg(193$ý 
A.  M.  C.  p  875. 434 
ii-UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  working  group  of  UNCITRAL  has  discussed  various 
viewpoints  concerning  the  subject  of  jurisdiction  in 
cargo  damage  disputes. 
The  first  view  was  against  the  suggestion  of  adding  a 
jurisdiction  clause  to  the  Rules.  The  second  approach 
supported  the  idea  that  all  the  foreign  jurisdiction 
clauses  should  be  null  and  void.  The  third  view  was  in 
favour  of  the  insertion  of  a  provision  in  the  Rules  which 
governed  the  jurisdiction  clause  by  the  general  criteria 
which  emerged  from  the  extensive  practice  over  the 
question  of  the  jurisdiction  clause  under  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules  due  to  the  absence  of  a  specific  provision  which 
regulates  such  a  clause  or  supplies  any  guidance  which 
gives  validity  to  the  clause.  The  fourth  view  supported 
the  trend  which  supplies  a  specific  provision  by  giving 
several  alternative  places  by  which  a  claim  may  be 
broughtl25. 
These  different  views  have  been  extensively  discussed 
and  debated  by  the  Working  Group,  and  the  next  in  Article 
(21]  of  the  Draft  Convention  was  adopted  by  the  Hamburg 
Rules  which  provides  that  the  plaintiff126  or  the  claimant 
125_Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  104;  Sweeney,  Part  If  p  95. 
126-Sweeney,  Part,  I,  p  101,  where  he  states: 
"The  United  States  also  opposed  the  use  of  the  word  "Plaintiff"  as 
inappropriate  in  the  context  of  the  purpose  for  which  these  rules 
were  being  drafted.  "plaintiff"  would  mean  either  the  cargo 
interest  or  the  carrier  interest,  whereas  the  true  purpose  of  the 
provision  was  to  replace  choice  of  law  and  choice  of  forum  clauses 
in  bills  of  lading  limiting  the  effective  remedies  for  the  cargo 435 
has  the  option  to  bring  an  action  in  any  court  of  the 
following  places: 
"a"The  principal  place  of  business  or,  in  the  absence 
thereof,  the  habitual  residence  of  the  defendant;  or 
"b"The  place  where  the  contract  was  made,  provided  that 
the  defendant  has  there  a  place  of  business,  branch  or 
agency  through  which  the  contract  was  made,  or 
"c"The  port  of  loading  or  the  port  of  discharge;  or 
"d"The  agreed  or  designated  place  in  the  contract  of 
carriage  by  sea.  127 
"e"The  place  where  the  vessel  has  been  arrested.  128 
The  plaintiff  has  broadly  the  same  choice  of  forum  in 
case  of  arbitral  proceedings. 
129  Respecting  judicial  or 
arbitral  proceedings,  the  claim  may  be  brought  to  a  place 
other  than  mentioned  above  when  the  contracting  parties 
so  agree  after  the  dispute  has  arisen.  130  The  action  might 
be  removed  to  another  jurisdiction  within  the  meaning  of 
Article  (21]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  according  to  the 
interest". 
127-Article  21  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
128-Article  21  (2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Sweeney,  Part,  I,  p  75, 
Footnote,  45,  pp  97-98,  where  he  states: 
"Some  delegates  opposed  the  provision  of  the  In  Rem  Jurisdiction, 
For  instance,  France,  believed  the  In  Rem  problem  to  be  solved  by 
the  1952  C.  M.  I.  convention  on  the  Arrest  of  Vessels  "International 
Convention  Relating  to  the  Arrest  of  Seagoing  Ships,  May  10,1952", 
Also,  Norway  objected  to  any  In  Rem  attachment  at  places  other  than 
the  states  listed  in  subparagraph  l(a),  (c),  and(d)of  the  proposal  A. 
129-Article  22  [3]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
130-Article  21  (5]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules, 
p  9;  Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  81;  William  Tetley,  "The  Hamburg 
Rules-A  commentary",  (1979]  1  LMCLQ,  p1  at  p  8,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Tetley,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 436 
request  of  the  shipowner  and  the  claimant  must  remove  the 
action,  when  the  defendant  is  obliged  to  furnish  security 
sufficient  to  ensure  payment  of  any  judgement  that  may 
subsequently  be  awarded  to  the  claimant  in  the  action131. 
It  is  to  be  noted  that  there  is  no  new  action  between 
the  same  parties  on  the  same  grounds  where  a  suit  has 
been  instituted  in  a  court  competent  under  Article  21 
(1,2)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules,  or  where  a  judgement  has  been 
delivered  by  such  a  court,  unless  the  judgement  is  not 
enforceable  in  the  country  in  which  the  new  proceedings 
are  instituted132. 
Although  the  enforcement  of  a  judgement  or,  the  removal 
of  a  an  action  to  a  different  court  within  the  same 
country,  or  to  a  court  in  another  country  is  not  to  be 
considered  as  starting  a  new  action. 
Many  commentators  have  however  criticized  the 
jurisdiction  provision  which  provides  by  the  Hamburg 
Rules  on  the  grounds  that  there  are  many  places  mentioned 
as  a  competent  court,  within  the  meaning  of  Article  (21) 
of  the  Hamburg  Rules  which  would  replace  them  by  another 
courts  for  being  identical  with  those  where  legal 
proceedings  may  be  brought  according  to  the  basic 
principles  of  law  upheld  by  the  courts  of  all 
131-Article  21  (2]  (a)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
132-Article  21  [4]  {a)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Murray,  The  Hamburg 
Rules,  p  81,  where  he  states; 
"The  doctrines  of  collateral  estoppel  and  res  judicata  are 
implicitly  recognized  by  the  provision  of  the  Article  21  (4]  {a}  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules". 437 
countries.  133  For  instance,  the  place  where  the  contract 
was  made  and  "the  port  of  loading"  are  usually,  indicated 
to  the  same  place  because  the  bill  of  lading  is  normally 
issued  at  the  port  of  loading.  134 
We  should  although  note  that  the  Rules  require  that  a 
court  which  exercises  the  jurisdiction  under  Article  [211 
must  be  "competent"  according  to  its  national  law.  That 
does  not  mean  that  the  Hamburg  Rules  refer  to  the  rule  of 
"forum  non  convenience".  Accordingly,  the  court  competent 
within  the  meaning  of  the  Article  [21)  can  exercise  its 
discretion  to  refuse  to  hear  such  a  case  on  that 
ground.  135 
Therefore,  the  contracting  parties'  right  to  choose  one 
or  more  forums,  as  an  additional  option  to  the  choice  of 
forums  indicated  in  the  Rules,  is  not  absolute,  but  it 
133-D.  C.  Jackson,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  and  Conflict,  of  Laws", 
Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea, 
Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  221  at  p  230,  hereinafter  cited 
as  "Jackson,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
134-Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  105;  Al-Jazairy,  p  313;  Sergio 
M.  Carbone  &  Riccardo  Luzzatto,  "Arbitration  Clauses,  Carriage  by 
Sea  and  Uniform  Law",  Published  in  The  Studies  on  the  Revision  at 
the  Brussels  Convention  on  Bills  of  Lading,  1974,  p  353  at  p  385, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Carbone  &  Luzzatto,  where  they  criticise  the 
jurisdiction  option  to  institute  the  action  in  the  place  where  the 
contract  was  made,  but  on  another  ground  by  saying  that: 
"The  principles  adopted  in  various  national  legal  system  with  a 
view  to  determining  the  moment  and  place  of  making  contracts  vary 
considerably  under  many  aspects  in  accordance  with  more  general 
concepts  of  the  theory  of  juridical  negotiation  and  it  is  equally 
well  known  how  divergent  may  be  the  solutions  accepted  by  various 
national  legal  system  as  to  determination  of  fundamental  norms 
where  by  the  place  of  concluding  a  contract  is  to  be  ascertained". 
135-Jackson,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  234. 438 
must  be  selected  as  a  competent  or  proper  forum  according 
to  the  principle  of  the  reasonableness  and  subordinated 
to  a  condition  of  equality  of  the  parties.  136 
SECTION  FOUR 
BURDEN  OF  PROOF 
Where  the  cargoes  have  arrived  in  a  damaged  condition 
without  showing  specifically  the  cause  of  the  damage, 
then  a  situation  of  real  controversy  about  who  bears  the 
responsibility  of  such  damage  will  emerge.  137 
This  makes  the  contracting  parties  defend  themselves  by 
any  available  excuse.  For  example,  the  consignee 
endeavours  to  show  that  the  damage  was  caused  by  the 
misconduct  or  negligence  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants, 
i.  e;  where  the  vessel  has  deviated  from  the  contracted  or 
customary  voyage,  intentionally  without  any  reasonable 
reason  or  permission  from  the  shipper;  or  where  the  goods 
were  badly  stowed  or.  improperly  ventilated. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  carrier  rebuts  such  argument  by 
saying  that  damage  was  caused  by  inherent  vice  of  the 
goods.  138 
136-Carbone  &  Pocar,  p  339. 
137_Hlack,  H.  C.  Law  Dictionary  (St.  Paul,  Minnesata:  West  Publication 
Company,  1957),  p  246,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Black's  Dictionary", 
where  he  stated  the  meaning  of  the  burden  of  proof  as: 
"The  necessity  or  duty  of  proving  affirmatively  a  fact  or  facts  in 
dispute  on  an  issue  raised  between  the  parties  in  a  cause";  Walker, 
The  companion  to  Law,  p  904,  where  he  defines  the  word  onus  of 
proof  or  burden  of  proof. 
138-Diamond,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  10. 439 
Then,  the  burden  of  proof  is  a  very  important  element 
in  deciding  the  proximate  cause139,  which  is  considered  as 
a  source  of  uncertainty  and  as  a  matter  of  diversity 
between  the  contracting  parties  especially  in  case  of 
deviation  . 
140 
I  will  therefore  discuss  the  principles  of  burden  of 
proof  under  these  headings: 
i-  Burden  of  Proof  Under  the  Hague  Rules. 
ii-  Burden  of  Proof  Under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
i-BURDEN  OF  PROOF  UNDER  THE  HAGUE  RULES 
There  is  no  general  theory  of  proof  set  out  in  the 
Hague  Rules141.  That  does  not  mean  that  there  is  not  a 
particular  provision  dealing  with  the  burden  of  proof. 
The  burden  of  proof  in  an  action  for  damages  against  a 
carrier  is  on  the  claimant.  He  must  establish  that  the 
loss  of  or  damage  occurred  while  the  cargoes  were  in  the 
carrier's  charge;  the  physical  extent  of  such  loss  or 
damage  and  the  actual  monetary  value  of  the  loss  or 
damage.  142 
Once  the  claimant  has  made  his  claim  clear,  then  the 
carrier  must  prove  the  course  of  the  loss  and  whether  he 
has  a  right  to  invoke  one  of  the  valid  immunities 
139-Green  Wood,  p  800. 
140-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/  Rev-1/  p  44. 
141-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  pp  47,54. 
142-Halsbury's  Shipping  &  Navigation,  para,  450,1199;  Bonham- 
Cart-er  v.  Hyde  Park  Hotel  Ltd  (19481  64  T.  L.  R.  p  177;  Jbv. 
Curtin[1971)  3  ALL  E.  R.  p  1208. 440 
stipulated  in  the  COGSA  or  in  the  bill  of  lading.  143  There 
are  a  number  of  cases  which  indicate  that  the  carrier's 
failure  to  deliver  the  cargoes  in  spite  of  the  arrival  of 
the  vessel,  or  the  short  delivery  and  delivery  in  a 
damaged  condition144,  may  be  considered  as  evidence  of 
breach  of  contract  by  the  carrier  and  consequently  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  had  occurred  while  the 
goods  were  in  his  charge145.  That  does  not  establish  prima 
facie  wilful  misconduct  against  the  carrier146,  but 
probably  of  negligence. 
147 
The  carrier  can  however  protect  and  free  himself  from 
the  responsibility  by  showing  that  the  goods  were  not 
shipped  on  his  vessel148  in  case  of  non-delivery  or  that 
the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  occurred  while  the 
goods  were  not  in  his  charge.  149 
If  the  carrier  wants  then  to  seek  the  protection  of  the 
immunities  conferred  upon  the  carrier  by  the  COGSA  or  the 
Rules.  The  burden  of  proof  is  on  the  carrier  to  show  that 
the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  occurred  without 
143-rabre  S.  A.  V.  Mondial  United.  Coro(19631  A.  M.  C.  p  946,  -  Scow 
Steelweld  fCapsizingl(1968]  A.  M.  C.  p  2064;  TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1/p  9. 
144-Kimball,  p  228;  Cleton,  p  S. 
145-Scrutton,  19th,  ed,  1984,  p  220. 
146-smith  v.  r.  W.  RY.  [1922]  A.  C.  p  178. 
147-7he  Roberta  (1938]  60  L1.  L.  R.  p  84. 
148-Scrutton,  19th,  ed,  1984,  p  220;  Chung  Hwa  Steel  Products 
Trading  Co.  Ltd.  v.  Gen  Line,  Ltd,  (19353  51  Ll.  L.  R.  p  248. 
149-Ciano  [1947]  A.  M.  C.  p  1477,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  carrier  having  failed  to  prove  either  that  the  damage  did  not 
occur  aboard  the  vessel  or  that,  however  it  occurred,  it  was  not 
due  to  or  contributed  to  by  the  fault  of  the  carrier,  the  libellant 
is  entitled  to  recover". 441 
the  carrier's  actual  fault  or  privity  nor  the  fault  or 
neglect  of  the  carrier's  agents  or  servants.  150 
Whereas,  if  there  are  two  contributing  causes  of  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo,  one  of  these  causes 
constituting  unseaworthiness  by  a  failure  of  the  carrier 
to  exercise  due  diligence,  and  one  for  which  the  carrier 
is  entitled  to  exempt  himself  from  liability  by  the 
exceptions  of  Article  4  (2]  of  the  Hague  Rules.  The  onus 
of  proof  is  upon  the  carrier  to  prove  what  part  of  damage 
was  caused  by  the  excepted  peril.  151 
For  instance,  if  he  proves  that  he  exercised  due 
diligence  to  make  the  vessel  seaworthy  but  in  spite  of 
that  some  loss  or  damage  was  caused  to  the  cargo,  then  he 
will  be  entirely  exempted  by  virtue  of  Article  4  (2]  of 
the  Hague  Rules.  152  Otherwise,  if  he  fails  to  prove  his 
diligence,  then  he  will  be  responsible  for  the  whole  of 
153  the  damages  sustained,  unless  he  can  show  the 
proportion  of  damage  attributable  to  the  excepted 
peril.  154  We  can  say  that  the  burden  of  proof  rests  upon 
150-Article  4  [2]  {9)  of  the  Hague  Rules;  Cw  ner9  of  Cargo  of  City 
of  Barada  v.  Hall  Line  -td,  [1926]  42  T.  L.  R.  p  717;  Astle,  p  81. 
151_Ceyýlon  Go  vernment  v.  Chandrts(1965]  3  ALL  E.  R.  p  48;  (1965]  2 
Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  204;  Halsbury's  Shipping  &  Navigation,  Par  a,  448, 
Footnote,  2. 
152_x,  Gerber  &  Co.  v.  S.  S.  Sabine  Howald  &  0,  [1971]  A.  M.  C.  p  539. 
153_SmYi  th,  Ho  gg  &Co.  Lid,  v.  Black  Sea  &  Bal  tic  General  In  -R[  1940  ] 
A.  C.  p  997. 
154_Astle,  p  81;  Clarke,  pp  189-190;  Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  126; 
Al-Jazairy,  pp  97-98;  Lord  Summer,  in,  t  he  Gonifx  M+t  erd  V. 
Canadian  Gove  rnment  Merchant  Marine  (1929]  A.  C.  p  223  at  p  241; 
Compare,  The  Vallescura,  293  U.  S.  p  296;  119343  A.  M.  C.  p  1573, 
where  it  is  stated: 442 
the  carrier  to  show  that  neither  his  actual  fault  or 
p  rivity155  nor  neglect  of  his  agents  or  servants156 
contributed  to  the  loss  or  damage157,  or  to  bring  himself 
within  any  exception  exonerating  him  from  liability  which 
the  law  otherwise  imposes  on  him.  158 
If  the  carrier  cannot  protect  himself  by  one  of  the 
catalogue  of  the  exceptions  contained  in  the  COGSA  or  the 
Rules,  then  he  is  liable  for  the  unexplained  damage 
despite  the  facts  that  the  vessel  was  seaworthy,  the 
goods  were  stowed  perfectly  and  the  hold  was  in  good 
Condit  ion 
. 
159 
When  the  shipowner  or  the  carrier  has  proved  that  the 
loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo  resulted  from  one  of  the 
excepted  perils160,  the  shipper  or  the  consignee  must 
refute  all  the  carrier's  evidence  in  order  to  recover 
such  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  by  showing  that  the 
real  cause  of  the  loss  was  not  covered  by  the  exception 
"...  the  carrier  must  bear  all  the  damages  even  though  it  has  been 
established  that  those  damages  were  in  part  caused  by  occurrences 
for  which  it  is  excepted  from  liability". 
155-Celestial  [1962)  A.  M.  C.  p  1965,  where  it  is  stated: 
"The  carrier  remains  liable  if  its  negligence  concurred  in  causing 
the  loss". 
156-owners  of  Cargo  of  city  of  Baroda  v.  Hill  Line.  Ltd(1926]  42 
T.  L.  R.  p  717. 
157-Article  4  [2)  (q)  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules;  Astle,  pp  162,325. 
158_Vallsecura  [1934]  A.  M.  C.  p  1573;  Westinghouse  v.  r,  on  ie  Luken 
(1982]  A.  M.  C.  1477;  shickshinny(1942]  A.  M.  C.  p  910;  Virgin  Islands 
Corp 
,  v.  Merwin  Ltge  Co,  [1958]  A.  M.  C.  p  294;  Sweeney,  Part,  It  III. 
159_a  rge  E.  Pickett  [1948]  A.  M.  C.  p  453;  Levationo  CO,  v.  S.  S. 
Pr-se  nt  Haves  [1964]  A.  M.  C.  p  1247 
160_  ui,  (1940]  A.  M.  C.  p  1299. 443 
of  Article  4  [2]  of  the  Hague  Rules,  i.  e;  where  the 
unseaworthiness  or  unjustifiable  deviation  caused  such 
loss  or  damage  to  the  cargo. 
161 
Thus,  if  the  shipper  cannot  make  a  prima  facie  case  to 
that  effect  then  the  shipowner  will  be  protected  by  one 
of  the  excepted  perils.  That  does  not  mean  that  the 
carrier  cannot  rely  on  the  exception  clauses,  unless  he 
proves  absence  of  negligence  on  his  part.  The  carrier  or 
the  shipowner  has  then  a  right  to  exempt  himself  from 
liability  by  an  excepted  peril  or  excepted  cause  and  he 
may,  in  such  a  case,  have  to  give  evidence  excluding 
causation  by  his  negligence. 
162 
Another  source  of  uncertainty  has  however  arisen  in 
cases  of  deviation.  There  is  a  heavy  burden  of  proof  upon 
the  carrier  because  he  has  access  to  the  facts  concerning 
the  goods  and  the  whole  contracted  venture.  The  burden 
rests  upon  the  carrier  to  prove  what  was  the  contractual 
route  or  the  customary  course  of  the  voyage;  the 
criterion  of  reasonableness  of  the  deviation;  that  the 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  took  place  while  the 
vessel  was  on  the  contractual  route163;  and  that  the  loss 
161-Scrutton,  19th,  ed,  1984,  p  220;  Hunt  &  Winter  Bow  v. 
B.  R.  S.  (1962]  1  Q.  B.  p  617;  The  Citta  Di  Me-ma  na,  169  Fed.  Rep,  p 
472  (1909  S.  D.  N.  Y.  ),  where  it  is  stated: 
"Where  damage  to  cargo  was  prima  facie  within  the  exceptions  in  the 
bills  of  lading,  the  burden  is  on  the  shipper  to  establish  that  the 
goods  are  removed  from  the  operation  of  such  exception  because  of 
the  carrier's  negligence". 
162-Lord  Pearson,  in,  Alhacora  S.  R.  L.  v.  WestCottt  &  Laurance 
Line,  Ltd  (1966)  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  53  at  p  64. 
163_TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1/  p  44. 444 
or  damage  to  the  cargo  was  caused  by  justifiable 
deviation  or  that  such  loss  or  damage  could  occur  even  if 
the  vessel  had  not  deviated.  164 
Whereas,  the  consignee  or  claimant  must  prove  the 
deviation  or  the  unreasonable  change  in  course  of 
maritime  voyage  and  that  loss  or  damage  was  caused  by  and 
a  result  of  deviation.  165 
The  method  or  procedure  of  the  proof  is  established  by 
having  surveyors  examine  the  goods  on  board  the  vessel 
and  inspect  the  cargo  there.  The  surveyors  are  obliged  to 
issue  a  certificate  about  the  survey  concerning  the 
condition  of  the  goods  and  what  happened  during  that 
survey. 
Then,  what  is  the  legal  situation  if  the  carrier 
refuses  permission  to  the  surveyors  or  the  consignee  to 
attend  on  board? 
The  Rules  do  not  expressly  oblige  the  carrier  to  give 
permission  to  the  consignee  to  attend  on  board166.  We  can 
conclude  such  permission  from  Article  3  [6]  of  the  Hague 
Rules  as  following: 
"In  the  case  of  any  actual  or  apprehended  loss 
or  damage  the  carrier  and  the  receiver  shall 
give  all  reasonable  facilities  to  each  other 
for  inspecting  and  tallying  the  goods". 
164-George  W.  Burns,  "An  Analysis  of  Common  Carrier  Liability  for 
Special  Damages",  (1968]  7  Transportation  Journal,  p  11  at  p  20, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Burns,  Common  Carrier  Liability  for  Special 
Damages". 
165-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  356;  Scrutton,  19th,  ed,  1984,  p  220. 
166-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  263. 445 
Mere  certificates  and  surveys,  however,  are  not  enough 
to  discharge  a  carrier's  obligation  for  proper  stowage. 
The  United  States  Court  has  made  that  quite  clear  in  the 
"Anthony  IIi167,  where  it  is  stated: 
"That  certificates  issued  by  port  warden  and 
Canadian  Government  surveyors  were  not 
sufficient  to  discharge  carrier's  obligation 
for  proper  stowage  because  carrier  could  not 
delegate  that  duty;  and  that  those  certificate 
did  not  preclude  findings  of  negligence".  168 
We  can  say  that  the  survey  report  constitutes  only  one 
item  of  evidence  against  the  carrier169  that  the  damage 
was  caused  to  the  cargo  while  they  were  in  his  charge, 
especially  where  such  survey  took  place  on  board  the 
carrying  vessel. 
Thus,  the  question  of  the  carrier's  legal  liability  for 
the  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  is  beyond  both  the 
port  authority  and  the  power  of  the  surveyor,  170 
ii-  BURDEN  OF  PROOF  UNDER  THE  HAMBURG  RULES 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  removed  the  confusion  of 
applying  the  general  pattern  of  proof  in  COGSA  cases 
under  the  Hague  Rules  by  adopting  the  principle  of 
presumed  fault  or  neglect,  in  all  cases  of  loss  or  damage 
167_[1966]  2  Lloyd's.  Rep.  p  437  at  op  438. 
168_W-st  Kyska  [1946]  A.  M.  C.  p  997. 
169_TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  7;  Interntat-e  Steel 
Corp.  v.  5..,,,:.. 
Crystal  Gem  (1970]  A.  M.  C.  P  617,  where  it  is  stated: 
"Even  where  cargo  has  not  actually  been  repaired,  damages  may  be 
based  on  marine  surveyor's  estimates  of  depreciation  predicated  on 
examination  of  only  part  of  the  cargo". 
170_Edouard  Materne  v.  S.  S.  Leerdam  119561  A.  M.  C.  p  1977  at  p  1978. 446 
to  the  cargo,  on  the  part  of  the  carrier171.  That 
indicates  that  where  the  occurrence  which  caused  the 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  took  place  while  the 
goods  were  in  the  carriers  charge,  the  carrier  can  escape 
from  liability  in  the  case  of  proving  that  he,  his 
servants  or  agents  took  all  measures  that  could 
reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the  occurrence  and  its 
consequences. 
172 
The  common  understanding  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  has  made 
this  issue  quite  clear  by  imposing  the  burden  of  proof  on 
the  carrier.  The  Rules  of  burden  of  proof  in  respect  to 
certain  cases  are  modified  by  the  provisions  of  the 
conventions  depending  upon  the  surrounding  circumstances 
of  a  particular  case.  173 
These  exceptions  on  the  Rules  of  burden  of  proof,  which 
is  generally  imposed  against  the  carrier,  is,  in  fact,  in 
the  case  of  carriage  of  live  animals.  According  to  these 
exception  the  carrier  will  not  be  liable  for  loss,  damage 
ore  delay  in  delivery  resulting  from  any  special  risks 
inherent  in  that  kind  of  carriage  or  if  he  can  prove 
compliance  with  any  special  instructions  given  by  the 
shipper.  174 
However,  the  problems  which  have  arisen  under  the  Hague 
Rules,  where  two  contributing  causes,  such  as  fault  of 
171-Wilson,  p  141;  A1-Jazairy,  p  99. 
172-Article  5  [1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
173-Annex  [2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
174-Article  5[5]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Pollock,  p  8;  Wilson,  pp  142-43. 447 
the  carrier  combined  with  an  exception  to  cause  loss, 
damage,  or  delay  in  delivery,  may  be  clarified  under  the 
Hamburg  Rules  by  providing  that  the  carrier  shall  be 
liable  "only  to  the  extent  that  the  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery  is  attributable  to  his  fault". 
The  carrier  can  then  escape  from  the  liability  of  loss, 
damage  or  delay  in  delivery  when  he  establishes  the 
proportion  of  the  loss  attributable  to  other  factors. 
Otherwise,  if  he  fails  to  discharge  this  burden  of  proof, 
he  will  be  liable  for  the  entire  loss  of  or  damage  to  the 
cargo  resulting  from  such  causes175. 
The  method  of  proof  is  outlined  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  by 
authorising  the  surveyors  to  examine  and  inspect  the 
goods  on  board  the  vessel  in  certain  cases,  such  as  in 
case  of  fire  on  board  the  ship  affecting  the  goods. 
The  surveyors  have  a  right  to  investigate  the  cause  and 
circumstances  of  the  fire  according  to  the  shipping 
practices  in  a  particular  case. 
At  the  same  time,  they  are  obliged  to  issue  a  report 
after  the  damages  have  been  itemized  and  valued  in 
general  and  the  surrounding  circumstances  which  combined 
during  that  survey  in  particular176.  The  surveyor's  report 
shall  be  made  available  on  demand  to  the  carrier  and  the 
17-5-Article  5  [7]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules;  Wilson,  pp  144-45;  Al- 
Jazairy,  pp  103-104;  Guido  Alpa  &  Francesco  Berlingieri,  "The 
Liability  of  the  Carrier  by  Sea:  Present  Regulation  and  Prospects 
of  Reform",  Publish  in  the  Studies  on  the  Revision  of  the  Brussels 
Convention  on  Bills  of  Lading,  1974,  p  69,  Universita  Di  Genova, 
Facolta'  Di  Economia  Ecommercio,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Alga  & 
Berlingier,  The  Liability  of  the  Carrier  by  Sea". 
176-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/Rev.  1,  p  7. 448 
claimant177. 
We  can  however  conclude  that  the  Hamburg  Rules  have  put 
the  carrier  under  a  heavy  burden  of  proof  to  show  and 
prove  that  neither  he  nor  his  agents  or  servants  caused 
the  loss,  damage  or  delay  in  delivery  by  their  fault  or 
neglect178. 
We  can  not  deny  then  that  the  carrier  is  in  a 
disadvantaged  position  by  imposing  a  burden  on  him  to 
show  that  the  relevant  occurrence  did  not  occur  while  the 
cargoes  were  in  his  charge,  or  he  took  all  the  reasonable 
measures  that  could  reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the 
179  occurrence  and  its  consequences. 
177-Article  5  [4]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
178-Report  Cleton,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  Diplomatic  Conference", 
Publish  in  The  Hamburg  Rules  A  One-Day  Seminar,  Organized  by 
Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  1978,  London,  Cleton,  p1  at  p  Sr 
hereinafter  cited  as"  Cleton,  The  Hamburg  Rules";  Pixa,  p  456. 
179-These  principles  have  defined  in  the  Hague  Rules  by  a  long 
catalogue  of  exceptions  under  Article  4  (2]J  Diamond,  The  Hamburg 
Rules,  p  12;  Sweeney,  Part.  ].,  p  111-117. 449 
CONCLUSION 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  significant  impact  on  the 
procedure  of  the  action  for  lost  or  damaged  cargo  in  many 
aspects. 
First: 
The  period  for  giving  notice  has  been  slightly 
enlarged  from  three  days,  as  provided  in  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules,  to  fifteen  days  in  case  of  latent  damage.  This 
written  notice  must  be  given  within  sixty  consecutive 
days,  in  case  of  delay,  after  the  day  when  the  goods  were 
transferred  to  the  consignee. 
Second: 
The  sanction  for  not  giving  notice  is  still  the 
same,  which  does  not  affect  the  right  of  the  contracting 
parties  to  bring  suit  against  the  carrier  within  the  time 
limit  for  suit  in  the  Rules. 
Then,  the  effect  of  not  giving  such  written  notice  is 
considered  prima  facie  evidence  of  discharging  the 
carried  goods  in  sound  condition  as  stated  in  the  bill  of 
lading. 
Viz,  we  can  consider  such  written  notice  as 
"disciplinary  measure"  to  investigate  the  claim  and  all 
evidence  which  is  available  to  the  carrier  at  the  port  of 
discharge. 
Third: 
The  time  limit  for  suit  has  extended  to  two  years, 
it  is  one  year  in  the  Hague  Rules.  This  time  limit,  which 450 
covers  both  judicial  and  arbitral  proceedings  during  the 
two  years  period  under  the  Hamburg  Rules,  was  a 
controversial  issue  under  the  United  States  and  the 
United  Kingdom  COGSA  and  case  law. 
American  courts  adopted  the  viewpoint  that  the  COGSA 
one  year  limit  does  not  apply  to  arbitration  proceeding180 
The  expansion  to  two  years  under  the  Hamburg  Rules 
represents  a  great  advantage  to  shippers  and  cargo 
interest  because  it  gives  the  claimant  additional  time  to 
collect  all  evidence  which  proves  his  case,  or  to  decide 
whether  or  not  to  sue  the  carrier. 
181  Consequently,  the 
extension  of  the  limitation  period  will  increase  the 
frequency  of  claims  and  that  will  increase  the  cost  of 
shipowners. 
182 
The  New  Rules  are  however  seemingly  less  favourable  to 
the  shipper  because  the  carrier  never  loses  the 
limitation  period  even  in  the  case  of  loss,  damage,  or 
180-Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  80. 
181-Honour,  p  248;  A.  Diamond,  "The  Division  of  Liability  as 
Between  Ship  and  Cargo  (in  so  far  as  it  affects  Cargo  Insurance) 
Under  the  New  Rules  Proposed  by  UNCITRAL"  [1977]  1  LMCLQ,  p  39  at  p 
51,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Diamond,  UNCITRAL";  Tetley,  The  Hamburg 
Rules,  p  14. 
182-W.  R.  A.  Brich  Reynardson,  M.  A.  Messrs.  Thos.  R.  Miller  &  Son, 
"The  Implications  on  Liability  Insurance  of  the  Hamburg  Rules", 
Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules,  A  One-Day  Seminar,  Organised  by 
Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  Ltd,  1978,  Reynardson,  p1  at  p  4, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Reynardson";  Sassoon  &  Cunningham,  p  185, 
where  they  said: 
"The  Hamburg  provision  is  formulated  as  a  time-bar  rather  than  as  a 
discharge  from  liability.  This  change  may  prove  beneficial  to  cargo 
interests  in  areas  not  related  to  the  carriage  of  goods,  for 
example.  bankruptcy". 451 
delay  in  delivery  resulted  from  an  act  or  omission  done 
with  intent  to  cause  such  loss,  damage,  or  delay,  i.  e; 
unreasonable  deviation,  fraud.  etc.;  or  recklessness  and 
with  knowledge  that  such  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in 
delivery  would  probably  result.  183 
Fourth: 
Due  to  the  absence  of  a  particular  provision  on 
jurisdiction  provided  by  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  the  court 
of  most  countries  in  exercising  their  discretion  may 
accept  or  refuse  jurisdiction  according  to  Article  3  (81 
of  the  Hague  Rules.  184 
That  makes  the  situation  more  complicated  because  the 
choice  of  forum  or  fora  may  be  more  important  than  many 
of  the  express  terms  of  the  contract  and  may  indeed  be 
determinative  of  the  outcome.  185 
The  legal  situation  of  the  jurisdiction  under  the 
Hamburg  Rules  is  thus  much  better  than  under  the  Hague 
Rules  by  providing  several  alternative  places  by  which 
action  may  be  brought  and  supplying  the  same  choice  of 
fora  concerning  the  arbitral  proceedings.  186 
These  provisions  aim  to  achieve  a  balance  between  the 
carrier  and  the  cargo  interests  by  allowing  the  shipper 
or  the  cargo-owner,  and  any  person  who  is  authorized  by 
him,  to  bring  his  action  in  any  court  provided  by  the 
183-Morgan,  p  493. 
184-TD/B/C.  4/ISL/6/REV.  1/  p1  at  p  50. 
185-Learned  Judge,  in,  The  Trs18r  (19331  A.  M.  c,  p  919;  Compare, 
Al-Jazairy,  p  316. 
186-Shah,  p  25. 452 
Hamburg  Rules  as  the  proper  forum  in  such  action187. 
Finally: 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  clarified  the  general 
pattern  of  proof  by  applying  the  principle  of  presumed 
fault  or  neglect  on  the  part  of  the  carrier  in  the  case 
of  lost  or  damaged  disputes.  This  is  then  another 
disadvantage  imposed  on  a  carrier  to  show  that  the  loss, 
damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  occurs  while  the  goods  were 
not  in  his  charge  or  he  took  all  the  reasonable  measures 
to  avoid  the  relevant  occurrence  and  its  consequences. 
187-Carbone  &  Pocar,  p  339;  Compare,  Jackson,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p 
234,  where  he  states: 
"The  carrier  will  not  always  be  the  defendant  and  more  important, 
it  leaves  it  open  to  a  court  to  deny  a  plaintiff  in  one  of  the 
other  places  the  exercise  of  the  jurisdiction  in  that  place". 453 
CHAPTER  SIX 
THE  IRAQI  LEGAL  SYSTEM  CONCERNING  THE  LIABILITY  OF 
THE  CARRIER,  COMPARED  WITH  EGYPTIAN  JURISPRUDENCE 
IN  CERTAIN  POINTS 
The  legal  system  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier,  in 
respect  of  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea,  is  a  most 
controversial  issue  'which  raises  many  difficulties  in 
solving  the  problems,  whether  in  the  International 
Conventions  or  in  National  Laws,  of  the  contracting 
parties  or  non-contracting  parties.  The  Iraqi  Draftsman 
endeavoured  to  unify  all  the  rules  governing  the 
transportation  in  uniform  text  by  issuing  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Lawl 
We  have  to  point  out,  therefore,  that  the  general 
principles  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  in  fact  apply  to 
all  types  of  carriage  having  regard  to  particular 
circumstances  of  a  particular  sort  of  transport,  by 
providing  a  separate  provision  for  transport  by  Air, 
Road,  and  Sea. 
Article  [3]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law2  makes  this 
quite  clear  by  providing: 
"The  principles  of  this  law  apply  to  all  types 
of  transport  whatever  the  character  of  the 
carrier  in  practicing  his  business,  taking  into 
account  the  principles  of  the  International 
Convention  of  which  Iraq  is  a  part.  " 
1-Law  80/83  issuing  the  "Transport  Law"  is  published  in  the 
offical  Gazette  2953/83  [effective  8  February  1984]. 
2-Quotations  from  the  Iraqi  and  Egyptian  Codes  in  this  chapter 
are  my  own  translation  from  the  original  Arabic. 454 
I  will  thus  shed  some  light  on  the  principles  of  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  in  general,  and  the  maritime 
carrier  in  particular,  under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
compared  with  Egyptian  jurisprudence  in  the  relevant 
points. 
The  following  points  should  then  be  discussed: 
Section  one:  Basis  of  the  Liability  of  the  Carrier 
According  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
Section  two:  Limitation  of  the  Liability  of  the 
Carrier. 
Section  three:  Procedures  of  Action  for  Lost  or  Damaged 
Cargo. 455 
SECTION  ONE 
BASIS  OF  THE  LIABILITY  OF  THE  CARRIER  ACCORDING 
TO  THE  IRAQI  TRANSPORT  LAW 
The  general  principles  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
purport  to  introduce  the  best  services  in  transporting 
passengers  and  carrying  goods  by  providing  a  just  balance 
between  the  obligations  of  the  contracting  parties  which 
emerge  from  the  carriage  contract.  3 
Also  the  Iraqi  law  aims  to  regulate  transportation  in 
order  to  participate  in  the  inquiry  of  the  national 
development  plans.  4  In  order  to  enforce  such  principles 
then  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  is  founded  on  the  following 
bases: 
1.  To  unify  all  the  rules  which  govern  carriage; 
2.  to  dominant  the  object  of  the  legal  relationship  on 
the  contractual  relationship; 
3.  to  ensure  that  the  socialist  sector  is  leading  and 
directing  the  carriage  activity.  5 
I  will  discuss  therefore  the  following  points: 
i-Basic  Elements  of  the  Liability  of  the  Carrier 
under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
ii-Recovery  of  losses,  Damages  and  Delay  in  Delivery. 
iii-Immunities  of  the  Carrier. 
3-Article  [1]  para  [1,2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
4-Article  [1]  para  [3]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
5-Article  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  law. 456 
i-  BASIC  ELEMENTS  OF  THE  LIABILITY  OF  THE  CARRIER 
UNDER  The  IRAQI  TRANSPORT  LAW 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  general  principles  for 
the  liability  of  the  carrier.  6  These  principles  consider 
the  carrier's  liability  as  an  "obligation  of  result"  and 
not  as  an  "obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence".  7 
Article  46[1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  makes  this 
quite  clear  when  it  provides  : 
"The  carrier  ensures  the  safety  of  the  goods 
during  the  performance  of  the  carriage  contract 
and  is  liable  for  all  damages  caused  to  the 
cargo.  The  carrier  would  not  be  exempted  from 
the  liability  which  occurs  from  the  loss8  of, 
or  damage  to  the  goods,  or  delay  in  delivery, 
unless  he  proves  that  such  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery,  has  occurred  by  force 
majeure,  inherent  vice  in  the  goods  or  the 
fault  of  the  consignor  or  the  consignee.  " 
6-I  have  explained  the  general  principles  of  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  under  the  International  Convention  such  as,  The  Hague/Visby 
Rules  and  The  Hamburg  Rules.  Therefore,  I  will  not  become  involved 
in  an  extra  explanation  of  these  principles  which  are  set  forth  in 
Chapter  II,  and  IV. 
7-Talib  Hussan  Musa,  The  Commercial  Contract  tinder  the  Iraqi 
Cnnmernial  yaw,  (vol  1,  lst.  ed,  1973),  Baghdad,  p  53,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Musa,  The  Commercial  Contract;  Majid  H.  AL-Anbaki,  Tragi 
Transport  Law.  the  Rules  and  the  Principles,  Baghdad,  1984,  p  226, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "AL-Anbaki,  Iraqi  Transport  Law". 
8-The  literal  translation  for  the  word  "loss"  which  is  mentioned 
in  the  Arabic  text,  is  "destruction  of  the  thing".  Whereas,  the 
meaning  of  that  word  in  French  means  "loss"  which  is  actually  used 
in  the  Hamburg  Rules.  I  rather  use  therefore  word  "loss"  than 
"destruction  of  the  thing"  which  is  not  understandable  in  United 
Kingdom  jurisprudence. 457 
That  means  that  the  Iraqi  Law  constitutes  the  carrier's 
liability  on  the  principles  of  "trust"  by  taking  over  the 
goods  carried.  The  carrier's  liability  is,  however,  a 
contractual  liability  which  emerges  from  the  carriage 
contract. 
The  carrier  is  liable  when  he  has  violated  his 
contractual  obligation  in  relation  to  the  loading, 
handling,  stowage,  custody,  care  and  discharge  of  the 
goods  in  the  sound  condition  stated  in  the  bill  of 
lading,  whether  such  violation  has  been  committed  by  the 
carrier,  or  his  agents,  or  servants,  within  the  scope  of 
their  employment,  unless  he  proves  that  such  loss  was 
caused  by  force  majeure,  inherent  vice  in  the  goods,  or 
the  fault  of  the  shipper,  consignor,  or  consignee.  9  We 
can  characterise,  therefore,  the  carriers  liability, 
which  emerges  from  the  carriage  contract,  as  "an 
obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence".  10 
The  current  trend,  however,  in  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law, 
concerning  the  period  of  the  carrier's  liability, 
supports  the  idea  which  believes  that  the  carrier's 
liability  commences  from  the  moment  the  goods  are  in  the 
carrier's  charge  and  ceases  at  the  moment  the  goods  are 
delivered  to  the  consignee.  11 
9-M.  S.  AL-Sharkawi,  The  Maritime  Law,  1978,  p  270,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "  AL-Sharkawi,  The  maritime  law" 
10-Compare,  Ahmed  Hussni,  Maritime  Cann  tjon,  1980,  p  35, 
hereinafter  cited  "Hussni,  Maritime  Cassation.  " 
11-Article  27  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  extends  the  liability 
of  the  carrier  to  commence  from  the  time  the  carrier  has  taken  over 
the  goods,  until  the  time  he  has  delivered  the  goods. 458 
Article  [27)  para  [11  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has 
adopted  such  attitude  by  providing: 
"The  carrier's  liability  commences  the  moment 
the  carrier  has  taken  over  the  goods  and  ceases 
when  he  has  delivered  them  to  the  consignee, 
according  to  the  rules  of  the  law.  "12 
On  the  other  hand,  Article  131  [1)  of  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Law  provides  the  same  principles  in  more  detail 
as  follows: 
"The  carrier's  liability  commences  when  the 
goods  are  in  his  charge  and  ceases  when  he  has 
delivered  them  to  the  consignee  at  the 
destination,  or,  has  put  them  under  the  control 
of  the  consignee,  according  to  the  contract  or 
the  law,  or  when  he  has  delivered  them  to  the 
authorized  body.  " 
Consequently,  we  can  reveal  that  the  principles  of  the 
Iraqi  Law  concerning  the  carrier's  liability,  differ  from 
the  basic  elements  founded  under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules 
which  extend  only  to  the  "maritime  stage  or  course". 
Viz,  the  carriers  liability  commences  from  the 
beginning  of  the  voyage,  and  ceases  at  the  end  of  the 
voyage,  by  discharging  the  goods  from  the  vessel.  That  is 
what  is  called  the  "tackle  to  tackle"  period13  when  the 
carrier's  liability  extends  only  for  that  period  unless 
the  carrier  has  agreed  to  extend  such  a  period  of 
liability  during  his  control  of  the  goods  fat  the  port  of 
loading  or  discharge]. 
12-Article  27  [1)  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
13-Tetley,  Marine  Claim,  p  256;  see  chapter  I1. 459 
The  attitude  of  the  Egyptian  courts  concerning  the 
period  of  the  carrier's  liability  is  however  the  same  as 
that  of  the  Hague  Rules 
14 
which  restrict  the  liability  of 
the  carrier  to  the  maritime  course  or  stage  by 
establishing  a  construction  which  provides  that  the  loss 
of  or  damage  to  the  goods  is  assumed  to  have  taken  place 
during  the  maritime  stage15  unless  the  carrier  proves 
otherwise.  16 
Accordingly,  the  Egyptian  court  of  cassation  held  on 
11th,  February,  196017  that: 
"it  is  quite  clear  from  the  preparatory 
measures  of  the  International  Convention  For 
The  Unification  of  certain  Rules  of  Law 
Relating  To  Bills  of  Lading  and  Protocol  of 
Signature,  BRUSSELS,  25/8/1924  that  if  the 
goods  carried  are  lost  or  suffer  some  loss  or 
damage  and  it  is  difficult  to  fix  the  date  of 
such  loss,  whether  it  happens  before  the 
loading  or  after  the  discharge,  or  during  the 
maritime  course,  then  the  damage  presumably 
14-Egypt  adopted  the  Hague  Rules  by  the  law  No.  18  of  1940  and 
have  been  enforced  since  29th,  1944;  See  Hussni,  Maritime 
Cassation,  p  91;  Sameha  Al-Kalubi,  The  Maritime  Law,  1982,  p  287, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law". 
15-M.  K.  Taha,  Principles  of  maritime  Law,  1974,  p  287,  hereinafter 
cited  as  "Taha,  Maritime  Law,  where  he  states: 
"Limiting  the  Rules  to  the  maritime  stage  is  against  the  doctrine 
of  the  unity  of  the  contract  of  transport  which  starts  with  taking 
over  the  goods  by  the  carrier  and  ends  with  delivery  of  the  goods 
to  the  consignee". 
16-Ahmed  Hussni,  The  International  Maritime  Carriage  for  the  Goods 
and  the  Perils  of  the  Sea  According  to  th  ague  /Vi  sby  Rut  e5  ed 
the  Hamburg  Rules  1978,1980,  p  35,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Hussni, 
Maritime  Carriage" 
17-DDECC,  Year,  11th,  Case,  124/25  of  11  February  1960;  Egyptian 
Court  of  Cassation,  Case  452/42  of  20  June  1977,  Year  28th,  p  1452. 460 
has  taken  place  during  the  maritime  stage. 
Namely,  the  period  which  expires  only  between 
the  loading  and  discharge  of  the  goods,  unless 
the  carrier  proves  that  the  loss  has  taken 
place  during  the  operations  prior  to  the 
loading  or  subsequent  to  the  discharge". 
Whereas,  those  principles  under  the  Iraqi  law  are 
similar  to  the  principles  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  because 
the  New  Rules  extend  the  scope  of  the  carrier's  liability 
to  cover  the  entire  period  during  which  the  carrier  is  in 
charge  of  the  goods,  at  the  port  of  loading,  during  the 
carriage  and  at  the  port  of  discharge. 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  aims  however  to  extend  the  scope  of 
the  period  of  the  carrier's  liability  to  cover  all  the 
different  operations  of  loading,  discharge,  and  custody 
of  the  goods  in  the  carrier's  warehouse,  which  are  deemed 
to  be  necessary  for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea.  18 
Then  the  carrier's  supervision  or  control  of  the  goods 
is  to  be  considered  as  a  factorial  element  in  deciding 
whether  the  goods  are  in  the  carrier's  charge  or  not.  The 
only  restriction,  however,  has  been  imposed  by  the 
Hamburg  Rules,  that  the  place  of  taking  over  is  limited 
to  the  port  of  loading.  19 
On  the  other  hand,  the  Iraqi  Law  purports  to  widen  the 
scope  of  the  carrier's  liability  by  applying  the  Rules  at 
the  moment  of  taking  over  the  goods  by  the  carrier  and 
placing  them  under  his  supervision  or  his  control.  20 
18-Article  (4)  para  (1)  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
19-Article  [4]  para(1]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
20-Article  (131)  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides: 461 
we  turn  now  to  discuss  the  basic  duties  of  the  carrier, 
under  the  Iraqi  Transport  law,  which  are  divided  into 
three  categories. 
1-Prior  to  the  Voyage. 
2-During  the  Voyage. 
3-Subsequent  to  the  Voyage. 
1-PRIOR  TO  THE  VOYAGE 
According  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  the  carrier 
should  take  into  account  the  following  procedures  before 
the  vessel  has  sailed  for  a  given  voyage. 
A-Acceptance  of  the  Requests  of  the  Loading  and 
Preparation  of  the  Goods  for  Shipping. 
B-Seaworthiness  of  the  Vessel. 
A-ACCEPTANCE  OF  THE  REQUESTS  OF  THE  LOADING  AND 
PREPARATION  OF  THE  GOODS  FOR  SHIPPING. 
The  carrier  is  bound  to  accept  all  the  requests  of 
loading  which  are  within  the  capacity  of  his 
transportation.  The  carrier  can  nevertheless  refuse  such 
requests  where  the  existing  space  in  the  vessel  is  not 
sufficient  for  carriage  and  stowage  of  such  goods  in 
safety,  or  were  these  goods  are  out  of  his  transportation 
field,  i.  e;  where  the  carrier  is  used  to  carrying  grain, 
wheat,  flour,  etc.  and  he  receives  a  request  of  loading 
is  for  transportation  of  oil,  which  needs  a  special 
"For  the  purpose  of  para  (11  of  this  Article,  the  meaning  of  taking 
over  the  goods  by  the  carrier  is  to  put  the  goods  under  the 
supervision  and  control  of  the  carrier". 462 
vessel  provided  particularly  for  such  purpose,  he  may 
refuse  the  request. 
If  the  carrier  discovers,  however,  that  these  requests 
of  shipment  are  within  his  ability,  then  he  has  to  accept 
them  and  consider  the  following  conditions: 
1-The  date  of  the  request,  i.  e,  if  there  are  many 
orders  for  shipment  he  will  be  obliged  to  give  the 
priority  to  the  first  order; 
2-The  priority  is  for  goods  which  are  necessities, 
e.  g.,  wheat,  flour,  grain  ...  etc.  21 
B-SEAWORTHINESS  OF  THE  VESSEL 
The  carrier  is  obliged  to  supply  a  seaworthy  ship  in 
design,  structure,  equipment  and  with  a  sufficient  and 
competent  crew,  in  order  to  render  the  vessel  fit  for 
carrying  the  goods  to  the  destination  undertaken  by  the 
contract  of  carriage.  The  obligation  to  make  the  vessel 
seaworthy  becomes  an  obligation  to  exercise  due  diligence 
by  furnishing  the  vessel  to  make  it  seaworthy. 
The  criterion  for  seaworthiness  is  then  "due  diligence" 
which  is  clearer  than  the  phrase  "reasonable  diligence" 
or  "all  reasonable  means".  22 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has,  however,  established 
general  rules  for  seaworthiness  by  providing  an  Article 
[29]  para  [1]  which  states: 
"The  carrier  is  bound  to  carry  the  goods  by 
reliable  method  of  transport". 
21-Article  (26]  para  1  and  2  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
22-Cadwallader,  Seaworthiness,  p  3. 463 
This  paragraph  has  raised  numerous  difficulties  for 
many  reasons: 
1-The  meaning  of  seaworthiness  is  subsumed  under  the 
general  rule  of  the  carrier's  liability  without 
restricting  or  mentioning  the  specific  meaning  of 
seaworthiness  in  the  maritime  voyage. 
2-It  does  not  mention  the  nature  of  the  obligation  of 
the  "reliable  method  of  transport"  whether,  the  intention 
is  to  "exercise  due  diligence"  or  "all  reasonable  means" 
or  whether  it  means  to  "exercise  an  absolute  obligation". 
3-Also  it  does  not  provide  the  precise  moment  of  the 
seaworthiness,  whether  it  is  required  before  and  at  the 
beginning  of  the  voyage,  as  stated  in  the  Hague  Rules,  or 
through  the  course  of  maritime  voyage,  as  provided  in  the 
Hamburg  Rules,  by  stating  the  term  "reasonable 
measures". 
23 
Whereas,  the  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  on  30th 
January  196424  held  that: 
"The  carrier  cannot  avoid  the  responsibility 
resulting  from  loss  of,  or  damage  to  the 
goods,  unless  he  proves  that  he  exercised  due 
diligence  in  making  the  ship  seaworthy  before 
the  commencement  of  the  voyage". 
We  can  deduce,  however,  from  the  foregoing  discussion, 
that  seaworthiness  is  an  objective  rule  and  not  a 
subjective  one,  that  it  could  be  exercised  by  the 
23-Article  (51  para  (1?  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
24-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  case  119/29  of  30  January  1964, 
Year  15th,  p  154;  Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage,  p  46. 464 
shipowner  or  by  those  whom  he  employs  for  that  purpose. 
It  is  not,  therefore,  an  absolute  obligation,  but  it  is  a 
relevant  term25  which  depends  upon  the  nature  of  the 
contemplated  contracted  voyage,  the  goods  carried  and 
their  stowage.  26 
2-DURING  THE  VOYAGE 
There  are  many  duties  imposed  on  the  carrier,  either 
prior  to  the  maritime  course  of  voyage  or  when  the  goods 
are  in  his  charge,  i.  e;  loading,  handling,  stowage, 
carrying,  and  caring  for  the  goods  properly  and 
carefully. 
These  basic  duties  endeavour  to  make  the  ship  fit  for 
the  purposes  of  a  particular  voyage  by  following  the 
carriage  contract  and  the  instructions  of  the  shipper  or 
consignor,  which  have  been  fixed  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
The  following  points  should  therefore  be  discussed: 
1-Proper  Care  of  the  Goods. 
2-Contemplated  Voyage. 
1-PROPER  CARE  OF  THE  GOODS 
The  carrier's  obligation,  which  emerges  from  the 
carriage  contract  is  to  load  the  cargo  properly  and 
carefully.  It  can  be  said  that  the  performance  of  the 
contract  of  carriage  is  to  commence  from  the  moment  of 
loading. 
25-Longley,  p  43;  Poor,  p  166;  Compare,  Astle,  p  53;  Clarke  p  125. 
26-Astle,  pp  59-60;  Villareal,  p  773;  Hyun,  pp  17-19. 465 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has,  nevertheless,  adopted  a 
different  viewpoint  by  providing  that  the  scope  of  the 
i 
period  of  the  carrier's  liability  commences  from  the 
moment  that  the  goods  are  in  the  carrier's  charge,  and 
ceases  at  the  moment  the  goods  have  been  delivered  to  the 
27 
consignee. 
The  carrier  is  obliged  to  load  the  cargo  under  deck, 
unless  there  is  an  agreement  or  law  which  authorized  the 
consignor  to  load  the  cargo  on  deck.  Consequently,  the 
consignor  will  be  responsible  for  all  loss  of,  or  damage 
to,  the  cargo,  or  delay  in  delivery,  resulting  from 
carrying  out  these  duties. 
Article  [30]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  makes  this 
quite  clear  by  providing: 
"1-The  carrier  is  bound  to  load,  and  handle  the 
goods  and  pay  all  the  required  expenses,  unless 
the  consignor  or  other  person  has  carried  out 
these  duties,  according  to  the  agreement,  the 
law,  or  the  instructions,  in  which  case  the 
latter  is  responsible  for  all  the  damages 
resulting  therefore". 
2-if  the  carrier  accepts  to  perform  the 
transportation  without  reservation,  then  the 
loading  and  handling  are  presumed  to  be  done 
under  his  supervision  till  it  is  proved 
otherwise". 
There  are  many  methods  for  the  operations  of  loading, 
handling,  and  stowing  the  goods  carried,  depending  upon 
the  nature  of  the  goods,  the  contracted  voyage,  the 
27-Article  [27]  para  (1]  and  Article  (131]  pars  (1)  of  the  Iraqi 
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capacity  of  the  vessel  and  the  custom  and  usage  of  the 
stowage  of  particular  goods  which  applies  in  a  particular 
port. 
The  carrier  should  however  deal  with  the  goods  properly 
and  carefully  from  the  moment  the  goods  are  in  his 
charge,  whether  at  the  beginning  of  loading  or  throughout 
the  voyage,  until  discharge  and  delivery  of  the  goods  to 
the  consignee28,  or  during  the  carrier's  custody  of  the 
goods  where  he  has  agreed  to  keep  them  in  his  warehouse. 
Consequently  the  carrier  will  be  liable,  under  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law,  for  the  loss  or  damage  to  the  goods 
in  connection  with  their  custody,  care,  and  handling 
prior  to  the  loading  and  subsequent  to  the  discharge  from 
the  ship. 
The  Iraqi  Law  does  not  provide  a  specific  provision  as 
a  criterion  for  dealing  with  goods  carried,  but  it  is 
subsumed  under  the  general  rules  of  the  carrier's 
liability. 
The  words,  "properly  and  carefully"  which  are  used  by 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  are  a  quite  clear  criterion  for 
28-Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage,  pp  78-79,  where  he  states  the 
decision  of  the  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  in  case  235/42  of 
25  December  1978  [unpublished]as  follows: 
"The  carrier  is  bound  to  deliver  the  goods  carried  in  the  same 
condition  as  stated  in  the  bill  of  lading";  Iraqi  Court  of 
Cassation  held  in  case  764/82  of  17  June  1982  that: 
"The  carrier's  receipt  of  the  goods  without  reservation  means  that 
he  has  received  the  goods  in  goods  condition.  Therefore  he  is 
obliged  to  deliver  them  in  the  same  state,  otherwise  he  is 
responsible  to  compensate  the  shortage  and  damage  which  has 
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showing  the  degree  of  the  undertaking  of  care  required 
for  the  cargo  by  the  carrier  throughout  the  voyage.  This 
criterion  is  considered  as  a  reasonable  measure  to 
exercise  due  diligence  to  avoid  any  loss  or  damage  to  the 
cargo. 
Iraqi  Law  adopted  however  a  material  criterion  for 
taking  over  the  goods  and  consequently  exercising  due 
diligence  by  taking  reasonable  measures  throughout  his 
undertaking  which  begins  before  loading  and  ceases  at  the 
moment  the  goods  have  been  delivered  to  the  authorized 
person. 
29 
These  measures  commence  from  the  moment  of  taking  over 
the  goods  by  the  carrier,  which  is  clarified  by  article 
[131]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  where  it  is 
provided  that  the  meaning  of  taking  over  the  goods  by  the 
carrier  is  to  put  the  goods  under  his  supervision  and 
control. 
30 
This  attitude  is  in  the  shipper's  interest  rather  than 
the  carrier's  interest.  Developing  countries  have 
struggled  for  a  long  time  to  get  rid  of  the  Hague"Rules, 
which  were  imposed  upon  them  before  they  gained  their 
independence,  and  created  new  international  trade 
transactions. 
I  will  discuss  thus  the  following  points: 
29-Article  [132]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
30-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  in  case  452/42  of  20  June 
1977,  Year  28th,  p  1452  that: 
"The  obligation  of  the  carrier  is  expired  by  actual  delivery"; 
Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage,  p  77. 468 
A-Stowage  of  the  Goods  on  Deck. 
B-Dangerous  Goods. 
C-Live  Animals. 
A-STOWAGE  OF  THE  GOODS  ON  DECK 
The  carrier  is  bound  to  stow  the  goods  properly  and 
carefully  in  accordance  with  the  contract  of  carriage  and 
the  nature  of  the  goods,  especially  when  certain  goods 
need  specific  considerations  in  stowage,  e.  g.,  timber 
cargo,  railway  engines...  etc. 
Therefore  the  carrier  must  stow  the  goods  under  deck  in 
order  to  avoid  damage  to  the  goods  unless  there  is  an 
agreement  or  the  nature  of  the  goods  authorized  the 
carrier  to  carry  and  stow  them  on  deck.  31 
Article  (135]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  explains  in 
detail  the  rules  of  stowage  on  deck  as  follows: 
1-The  goods  must  be  shipped  in  the  provided  places  in 
the  vessel,  but  the  goods  are  allowed  to  be  shipped  on 
deck  in  the  following  cases: 
a-where  there  is  an  express  agreement  which  is  fixed  by 
writing  in  the  bill  of  lading  or  any  documents  which 
are  considered  as  evidence  for  the  contract  of 
carriage. 
b-If  by  the  nature  of  the  goods  determines  they  can  be 
shipped  on  deck. 
c-If  the  transportation  has  been  fulfiled  according  to 
31-Article  (1]  pars  [c]  of  the  Hague  Rules  provides  the  meaning  of 
"deck  cargoes"  as  follows: 
Cargo  which  by  the  contract  of  carriage  is  stated  as  being  carried 
on  deck  and  is  so  carried". 469 
statutory  provision. 
2-If  the  goods  are  shipped  on  deck  according  to  the 
para  [1]  of  this  Article,  then  the  carrier  is  not  liable 
for  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  goods,  or  delay  in 
delivery  resulting  from  transporting  the  goods  by  such  a 
method. 
Therefore,  the  Iraqi  Law  has  clarified  the  meaning  of 
stowage  by  providing  a  common  standard  for  carrying  the 
goods  by  the  vessel  and  providing  instances  where  the 
goods  are  allowed  to  be  carried  on  deck.  It  has  provided 
the  sanction  for  carriage  on  deck  unless  otherwise 
agreed. 
The  carrier  will  therefore  be  liable  for  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  goods,  or  delay  in  delivery  resulting  from 
improper  stowage,  or  stowage  of  the  goods  otherwise  to 
the  agreed  method  of  stowage  for  the  goods  carried.  32 
If  improper  stowage  however  combines  with  the  excepted 
peril  of  sea  to  produce  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in 
delivery,  then  he  has  to  show  that  such  loss,  damage,  or 
32-Article  [44]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  provides 
that: 
"The  carrier  will  be  liable  for  the  damages  occurred  to  goods  which 
are  stowed  on  deck  without  a  written  consent  from  the  cargo-owner". 
On  the  other  hand,  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  adopted  a  different 
viewpoint  according  to  the  Hague  Rules  which  was  adopted  by  Egypt 
since  29th,  May  1944  as  follows: 
"The  Rules  do  not  apply  to  goods  carried  on  deck  according  to  the 
Article  (1)  para  [c]  of  the  Hague  Rules  which  provides  that  the 
Rules  do  not  apply  to  the  cargo  which,  by  the  contract  of  carriage, 
is  stated  as  being  carried  on  deck  and  is  so  carried";  see,  Hussni, 
Maritime  Cassation,  p  91  where  he  states  the  decision  of  the  Court 
of  Cassation  held  on  17  May,  1966. 470 
delay  in  delivery  has  occurred  from  the  peril  of  the  sea 
in  order  to  avail  himself  of  the  exception. 
If  the  carrier  cannot  thus  separate  loss  or  damages  to 
the  goods  or  he  cannot  show  the  proportion  of  the  loss  or 
damage  caused  by  his  fault  or  neglect  or  that  of  his 
servants  or  agents,  then  the  carrier  will  be  liable  for 
all  the  loss  of,  'or  damage  to,  or  delay  in  delivery 
occurring  to  the  goods. 
These  principles  have  been  adopted  by  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Law  in  Article  [139]  which  is  the  same 
principle  as  Article  [5]  para  [7]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules 
concerning  the  contributing  causes. 
B-DANGEROUS  GOODS 
The  consignor  expressly  undertakes,  under  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Law,  to  mark  or  label  dangerous  goods, 
according  to  the  custom  or  usage  and  the  regulations  of 
the  maritime  international  organization.  33 
The  consignor  must  therefore  declare  to  the  shipowner, 
or  the  carrier,  the  dangerous  character  of  the  goods  in 
order  to  take  proper  precautions  if  necessary. 
If  the  consignor  has  not  declared  to  the  carrier  the 
facts  about,  or  the  character  of,  the  dangerous  goods, 
then  he  will  be  liable  for  any  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in 
delivery  resulting  from  shipping  such  goods,  34  unless  the 
carrier  has  not  taken  the  required  measures  to  avoid  the 
33-Article  [621  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
34-Ibid. 471 
consequences,  especially  when  he  knew  or  should  have 
known  the  nature  of  the  dangerous  goods.  35 
If  the  carrier  has  however  discovered  the  nature  of  the 
dangerous  goods  shipped  on  his  vessel  without  his  consent 
or  knowledge  then  he  has  a  right  to  avoid  the  possible 
and  imminent  danger  by  unloading  such  goods  or  destroying 
them  without  binding  him  to  pay  any  compensation  for  such 
damage.  36 
It  is  assumed  that  the  dangerous  goods  should  be  known 
to  the  carrier  when  the  character  of  such  goods  are  fixed 
in  the  bill  of  lading  or  any  documents  which  indicate  the 
nature  of  such  goods.  37 
When  the  carrier  has  agreed  to  ship  dangerous  goods,  or 
the  nature  of  such  goods  was  known  to  him  and  he  has 
taken  all  the  required  measures  to  avoid  such  danger, 
then  he  has  a  right  to  unload,  or  destroy  such  goods 
without  paying  any  compensation  especially  when  the 
dangerous  goods  become  an  actual  danger  and  form  a  threat 
to  life  and  property.  38 
C-LIVE  ANIMALS 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law39  has  adopted  the  attitude  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules40  concerning  live  animals  excluded  from 
the  Hague  Rules  by  Article  [11  para  [c). 
35-Ibid. 
36-Article  [62]  par, 
37-Article  [102]  of 
38-Article  [138]  of 
39-Article  (1341  of 
40-Article  (5]  para 
3  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
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The  carrier  under  the  Iraqi  Law  is  liable  for  loss, 
damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  respecting  the  carriage  of 
live  animals,  unless  he  proves  that  he  has  complied  with 
special  instructions  given  to  him  by  the  consignor.  41 
If  the  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  has  taken 
place  even  when  the  carrier  complied  with  the 
instructions  of  the  consignor,  then  such  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery  resulting  from  special  risks42  is 
inherent  with  that  kind  of  carriage.  43 
The  carrier  is,  however,  not  liable  for  loss,  damage, 
or  delay  in  delivery  unless  the  consignor  proves  that 
such  consequences  resulted  from  fault  or  neglect  on  the 
part  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants.  44 
2-CONTEMPLATED  VOYAGE 
Article  (64]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
provides  general  principles  concerning  any  special 
instructions  given  to  the  carrier  by  the  consignor.  The 
aim  of  this  Article  is  to  regulate  the  legality  and 
timing  of  the  consignor's  instructions. 
When  the  carrier  then  has  taken  over  the  goods,  the 
consignor  in  fact  has  a  right  to  issue  instructions  to 
the  carrier  respecting  the  goods,  for  example  not  to 
commence  with  the  transportation  of  the  goods  or,  to  stop 
41-Article  (134]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
42-Special  risks  associated  with  live  animals  are  those  of  death 
and  injury. 
43-Article  (134]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
44-Article  [134]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 473 
the  transportation  and  to  deliver  them  to  the  consignor 
or  to  send  them  to  another  person  or  place  which  is  not 
fixed  by  the  carriage  contract.  45 
On  the  other  hand,  the  consignor  has  no  right  to  give 
any  instructions  concerning  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
where  the  goods  have  arrived  at  the  destination  and  the 
consignee  has  demanded  their  delivery,  or  the  notice  has 
been  given  to  the  consignee  for  delivering  the  goods.  46 
The  carrier  is  not,  however,  bound  to  fulfil  the 
instructions  of  the  consignor  unless  the  latter  still 
holds  the  bill  of  lading. 
When  the  bill  of  lading  has  been  transferred  to  another 
holder  then  consequently  all  the  rights  of  the  goods 
would  be  transferred  to  the  new  holder. 
In  this  case  the  carrier  must  not  follow  the 
instructions  of  the  consignor,  but  he  must  apply  the 
instructions  of  the  consignee  or  the  holder  of  the  bill 
of  lading  who  becomes  the  owner  of  the  goods.  47  The 
consignor  is,  notwithstanding,  obliged  to  compensate  the 
carrier  for  all  expenses  and  damages  which  occur  by 
reason  of  performing  those  instructions.  48 
If  the  carrier  then  has  changed  the  voyage  or  deviated 
from  the  contemplated  voyage,  without  notification  from 
the  shipper  or  consignor,  that  might  expose  the  carrier 
to  the  responsibility  for  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
45-Article  [64]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
46-Article  [64]  para  [3]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
47-A1-Anbaki,  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  p  89. 
48-Article  (64]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 474 
goods  and  delay  in  delivery  which  occurred  from  changing 
the  voyage  or  deviation. 
I  will  discuss  therefore  the  following  points: 
A-Deviation. 
B-Change  of  Voyage. 
A-DEVIATION 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  does  not  adopt  the  Hamburg  Rules, 
but  adopts  the  attitude  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  as  far 
as  the  deviations'  principles  are  concerned.  The  Iraqi 
Transport  Law  provides  a  specific  provision  which 
regulates  the  general  principles  of  deviation  and 
constitutes  a  reasonable  deviation  in  the  course  of 
maritime  voyage. 
Deviation  is  a  deliberate  departure  from  the 
contemplated  course  of  voyage  which  constitutes  a 
different  venture  from  that  voyage,  and  causes  loss  of, 
or  damage  to,  the  goods  without  reasonable  reason. 
The  concept  of  deviation  however  implies  that  an 
additional  risk  of  loss,  or  damage  to,  the  goods  results 
from  deviation.  Otherwise,  if  there  is  no  loss  or  damage 
occurring  from  deviation,  then  the  doctrine  of  deviation 
is  not  applicable. 
Any  change  or  modification  in  the  agreed  course  of 
voyage  then  is  to  be  considered  as  an  unreasonable 
deviation  when  it  causes  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
cargo.  Whereas,  mere  premeditated  intention  to  deviate 
amounts  to  nothing,  unless  it  is  actually  carried  into 475 
effect. 
The  relevant  provisions  concerning  reasonable  deviation 
in  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  are  Article  (17]  and  [140]. 
Article[17]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  states  that: 
"1-The  carrier  is  not  liable  for  damage 
resulting  from  delay  in  transport,  or  deviation 
from  the  particular  route,  caused  by  assisting 
any  person  who  was  ill,  injured,  or  in  a- 
disaster,  unless  it  is  proved  that  he  or  his 
auxiliaries  committed  wilful  misconduct  or 
gross  negligence".  49 
"2-(a]Wilful  misconduct  means  every  act  or 
omission  committed  by  the  carrier  or  his 
auxiliaries  with  intent  to  cause  damage; 
[b]Gross  negligence  means  every  act  or  omission 
committed  recklessly  by  the  carrier  or  his 
auxiliaries  with  knowledge  that  damage  would 
probably  result.  " 
This  Article  indicates  that  the  causal  relationship 
must  be  shown  between  deviation  and  loss  of,  or  damage 
to,  the  cargo  in  order  to  apply  the  doctrine  of 
deviation.  Also,  it  explains  that  the  relationship  must 
be  shown  between  the  emergency  circumstances  and  the 
disaster  which  forced  the  vessel  to  depart  from  the 
contractual  voyage  to  assist  people  in  jeopardy. 
It  seems  to  me  that  the  criterion  used  by  the  Iraqi  Law 
to  define  wilful  misconduct  concerning  the  liability  of 
the  carrier  or  his  servants  or  agents  is  a  subjective 
intention  by  providing  a  term  "with  intent  to  cause 
damage".  In  this  case  then  it  must  prove  that  the  carrier 
has  done  something  wrong. 
49-I  prefer  to  use  "gross  negligence"  than  "gross  fault". 476 
Whereas,  the  term  "recklessly",  which  is  used  in 
explaining  gross  negligence,  is  a  subjective  realisation 
implying  a  deliberate  disregard  on  the  part  of  the 
carrier  of  the  consequences  of  his  conduct. 
These  criteria  under  Iraqi  Law  nevertheless  have  the 
same  effect  in  considering  whether  the  carrier  is  liable 
or  not,  50  especially.  when  the  Iraqi  Draftsman  provides  in 
Article  [17],  [140]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  that  the 
carrier  is  liable  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo 
resulting  from  deviation  or  delay  in  transport  in  the 
case  of  the  carrier,  or  his  servants  or  agents  committing 
wilful  misconduct  or  gross  negligence. 
51 
If  there  is  a  reasonable  reason  to  excuse  a  deviation 
from  the  contemplated  voyage  it  should  not  arise  out  of 
circumstances  deliberately  planned  nor  from  gross 
negligence.  Deviation  then  from  the  agreed  course  of  the 
voyage  should  be  commensurate  with  circumstances  of 
necessity  or  emergency  which  will  justify  a  ship 
deviating  from  the  proper  course. 
50-The  majority  of  Egyptian  textwriters  have  adopted  the  same 
viewpoint  which  indicates  that  gross  negligence  must  have  the  same 
effect  as  wilful  misconduct;  See  A.  J.  D.  Awad,  "The  Limitation  of  the 
Maritime  carrier's  Liability  According  to  the  Brussels  Convention"; 
A  J,  Year  35th,  No.  7,  pp  1416-1419,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Awed, 
The  Limitation  of  the  Carrier's  Liability";  A.  R.  Salim,  "The 
Exception  Clauses  of  Liability  According  to  the  Bills  of  Lading 
Convention",  A  Thesis  Approved  for  Ph.  D  Degree,  Cairo  University, 
1956,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Salim,  The  Exception  Clauses". 
51-Article  (169]  para  (3],  Article  (2291,  and  Article  [170]  pars 
[3]  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Code;  The  Iraqi  Court  of  Cassation,  119681 
JICCD,  p  484  "19  June,  1967";  The  Iraqi  Court  of  Cassation,  JICCD,  p 
513,  "17  December  1967.  " 477 
Article  [140]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  makes  this 
quite  clear  where  it  states  that: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable  for  damage  resulting 
from  measures  to  save  life  or  from  reasonable 
measures  to  save  property,  unless  it  is  proved 
that  he  or  his  auxiliaries  committed  wilful 
misconduct  or  gross  negligence". 
it  is  clear  from  this  Article  that  a  deviation  would 
not  be  reasonable  merely  because  it  was  convenient  to  the 
carrier  or  the  shipowner. 
The  carrier  must  act  with  prudence,  skill,  and  care  by 
taking  measures  to  save  life  or  reasonable  measures  to 
save  property  whether  in  avoiding  dangers  or  in 
mitigating  the  consequences  of  such  disaster.  The 
shipowner  or  the  carrier  is  however  bound  to  consider 
what  would  be  contemplated  reasonably  by  the  contracting 
parties  and  in  the  interest  of  all  concerned,  i.  e;  cargo- 
owner,  shipowner,  shipper,  consignee.  etc. 
Article  [31]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides 
general  principles  respecting  the  carrier's  liability  by 
regulating  geographical  deviation  as  follows: 
"In  accordance  with  the  principles  of  Article 
[17]  of  this  law,  the  carrier  ought  to  follow 
the  agreed  route,  otherwise  he  must  take  the 
shorter  route  and  he  has  a  right  to  deviate 
from  a  particular  route  or  follow  a  longer  one 
if  there  is  any  necessity". 
That  means  that  Iraqi  law  has  confined  the  concept  of 
deviation  as  the  Egyptian's  jurisprudence  does.  52 
52-Article  1381  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Law;  The  Mixed  Commercial 478 
B-CHANGE  OF  VOYAGE 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  does  not  contain  any  provision 
which  regulates  the  change  of  voyage,  or  indicates  the 
differences  between  the  change  of  voyage  and  deviation. 
It  seems  to  me  that  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  for  this 
purpose,  is  identical  with  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the 
Hamburg  Rules. 
There  is  a  specific  meaning  for  change  of  voyage  which 
is  different  from  deviation. 
Change  of  voyage  is  however  where  the  vessel  entirely 
relinquishes  the  intention  to  proceed  on  the  agreed 
voyage  after  embarkment.  On  the  other  hand,  deviation  is 
a  change  in  the  customary  or  contemplated  course  of 
voyage  but  has  not  been  lost  sight  of.  53 
3-SUBSEQUENT  TO  THE  VOYAGE 
Where  the  vessel  arrives  at  the  port  of  destination, 
then  the  carrier  is  obliged  to  take  part  in  discharging 
the  cargoes  from  the  vessel  and  delivering  them  to  the 
consignee  or  any  person  authorized  by  him. 
The  following  points  then  should  be  discussed: 
A-Discharging  the  Goods. 
B-Delivering  the  Goods. 
Court  of  Alexandria,  28  April,  1930  p  272;  Hussni,  Maritime 
Carriage,  p  81;  Falih,  p  448. 
53-See,  chapter  [1]  section  [3)  for  more  detail. 479 
A-DISCHARGING  THE  GOODS 
The  term  "discharge"  is  used  by  the  Iraqi  Draftsman  in 
a  different  context  to  the  term  "delivery".  Iraqi 
Transport  Law  intends  by  providing  "discharge  of  the 
goods  at  the  destination"  that  the  discharge  is  a 
material  operation  which  ends  when  the  carrier  has 
discharged  the  goods  from  the  vessel. 
Article  (34]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  that: 
"The  carrier  is  bound  to  discharge  the  goods  at 
the  destination  and  pay  all  the  required 
expenses  unless  the  consignee  or  other  person 
has  carried  out  this  duty  according  to  the 
agreement,  or  law,  or  regulations,  then  in 
this  case  the  latter  is  responsible  for  the 
damages  resulting  from  the  discharge". 
The  carrier  is  obliged  to  discharge  the  cargo  properly 
at  its  destination,  otherwise  he  will  be  liable  for  loss 
of,  or  damage  to,  the  goods  resulting  from  improper 
discharge. 
The  contracting  parties,  according  to  Article  [1341, 
are  at  liberty  to  conclude  any  agreement  for  the  manner 
of  discharge,  or  for  who  is  going  to  take  responsibility. 
Viz,  the  consignee  may  be  obliged  to  discharge  the  goods 
from  the  vessel  and  consequently  he  will  be  liable  for 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods  resulting  from  the 
discharge. 
An  agreement  between  the  contracting  parties  however  to 
exempt  the  carrier  from  the  discharge  expenses  does  not 
mean  that  the  carrier  has  escaped  from  his  duty  to 480 
discharge  the  goods  at  their  destination.  Consequently 
the  carrier  will  be  liable  for  any  loss  or  damage  which 
occurs  to  the  cargo.  54 
B-DELIVERING  THE  GOODS 
Delivery  is  a  legal  operation  whereby  the  carrier  has 
delivers  the  goods  in  his  charge  to  the  consignee  or  any 
authorized  person  and  then  the  carriage  contract  ends. 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  does  not  define  delivery  or 
what  constitutes  proper  delivery.  The  carrier  is  however 
specifically  obliged  to  deliver  the  goods  under  the  Iraqi 
Law  which  endeavours  to  classify  delivery  into  two 
categories,  i.  e;  actual  and  constructive  delivery. 
Article  (35]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  that: 
"The  carrier  is  actually  bound  to  deliver  the 
goods  to  the  consignee  or  constructively  at  the 
agreed  place". 
Delivery  must  be  made  in  accordance  with  the  usage,  or 
the  law  of  the  port  of  destination,  or  the  agreement 
between  the  contracting  parties,  if  any.  55  A  proper 
delivery  is  where  the  carrier  has  delivered  the  cargoes 
to  a  safe  place,  i.  e;  a  covered  warehouse. 
Iraqi  Law,  therefore,  defines  constructive  delivery  by 
54-Iraqi  Court  of  Cassation,  case  341/81  of  20  February  1983. 
55-Al-Kalubi,  The  Maritime  Law,  p  259,  where  she  states  that: 
"The  carriage  contract  elapses  with,  delivery  of  the  goods  to  the 
consignee,  unless  there  was  an  agreement  against  that  which  is 
affirmed  by  the  bill  of  lading";  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case 
423  of  November  1974,  Year  25th,  p  1210. 481 
Article  [35]  as  follows: 
"The  delivery  to  authorized  bodies,  or  to  the 
custodian,  who  is  appointed  by  the  court,  is 
considered  a  constructive  delivery". 
The  authorized  body  is  defined  by  Article  X891  of  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  as  a  "custom  authority". 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  has  its  own  viewpoints  regarding 
the  meaning  of  "delivery"  which  differs  from  the  Iraqi's 
attitude  by  saying  that  delivery  means  the  actual 
delivery  which  ends  the  contract  of  carriage  and  the 
obligation  of  the  carrier  by  delivering  the  goods  in  good 
state  to  the  consignee,  or  any  person  authorized  by  him. 
Whereas,  delivery  to  the  "custom  authority"  is  considered 
as  an  "illegal  delivery",  because  it  is  not  deemed  an 
authorized  body  appointed  by  the  consignee.  The  contract 
is  therefore  still  valid  until  the  carrier  delivers  the 
goods  in  sound  condition  to  the  consignee.  56 
The  carrier's  failure  however  to  deliver  the  cargo 
after  discharge  violates  its  obligation  under  both  Iraqi 
and  Egyptian  jurisprudence  by  not  having  a  proper 
delivery.  The  carrier  is  therefore  liable. 
56-Egyptian  Court  of  Caseation,  case  654/40  of  12  April  1976,  Year 
27th,  p  922;  Al-Kalubi,  The  Maritime  Law;  Hussni,  Maritime 
Cassation,  pp  38-39,  Where  he  states  number  of  unpublished 
decisions  of  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  which  confirmed  that  the 
"delivery"  should  be  actual  delivery  to  the  consignee  or  any  body 
or  person  authorized  by  him". 482 
ii-RECOVERY  OF  LOSSES,  DAMAGES,  AND  DELAY  XN 
DELIVERY 
The  liability  of  the  carrier  under  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law,  which  emerges  from  the  carriage  contract  might  arise 
in  cases  of  loss,  or  damage  to  the  goods  as  well  as  from 
delay  in  delivery,  is  the  same  principles  as  Article  [5] 
para[l]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules.  Whereas,  liability  under 
the  Hague/Visby  Rules  is  only  in  respect  of  loss  of,  or 
damage  to  the  goods. 
The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to  the 
cargo,  or  delay  in  delivery,  whether  prior,  during  or 
subsequent  to  the  course  of  the  voyage,  while  the  goods 
are  in  his  charge.  That  does  not  mean  that  the  carrier  is 
liable  for  any  loss  of  or  damage  to  the  cargo  resulting 
from  the  carriage  adventure,  wilful  misconduct,  fraud  or 
gross  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  consignor  or 
consignee  or  his  servants  or  agents  while  the  goods  were 
under  their  supervision  and  custody  during  the  course  of 
carriage.  57 
I  will  discuss  then  the  following  points: 
1-Losses. 
2-Damages. 
3-Delay  in  Delivery. 
4-Measures  of  Damage. 
57-Article  (47]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 483 
1-LOSSES 
The  carrier  is  obliged  to  deliver  the  goods,  which  are 
in  his  charge,  in  sound  condition  and  in  the  same  number 
of  packages  or  quantity  or  weight.  If  the  statement  of 
condition  and  quality  or  quantity  is  not  precisely 
accurate,  then  the  carrier  is  liable  for  such  loss  of  the 
cargo. 
When  the  carrier  issued  however  a  clean  bill  of  lading 
without  reservations  which  states  that  the  goods  were 
"received  in  apparent  good  order  and  condition",  then  he 
must  offer  some  evidence  to  show  that  the  goods  were  not 
in  good  order  and  condition  when  shipped.  Otherwise  he 
will  be  liable  for  any  partial  or  total  loss  caused  to 
the  cargo. 
Article  [,  36]  para  (2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
explains  the  general  principles  concerning  the 
constructive  loss  which  is  similar  to  Article  [133] 
except  that  the  period  which  considered  the  loss  is 
constructive.  58 
Article  [133]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  defines 
constructive  loss  as  follows: 
"....  the  goods  may  be  treated  as  lost  if  they 
have  not  been  delivered  to  the  consignee  or  he 
has  not  been  given  a  notice  for  their  delivery 
within[60]  consecutive  days  following,  the 
expiry  time  of  delivery". 
This  period  concerning  the  constructive  loss  commences 
5$-Within  [45]  consecutive  days. 464 
on  the  expiry  time  of  delivery,  or  where  no  goods  have 
been  delivered,  on  the  expiry  time  on  which  the  goods 
should  have  arrived  at  their  destination  by  a  prudent 
carrier  in  the  same  circumstances  where  no  day  of 
delivery  has  been  fixed  previously-59 
Is  the  carrier  liable  when  the  quality  of  the  goods  are 
replaced  by  better  quality  goods? 
The  Iraqi  court  of  cassation  expressed  this  on  August 
2,197160  by  saying: 
"If  the  carrier  has  delivered  the  goods  carried 
to  the  consignee  by  replacing  the  quality  of 
the  material  with  better  quality  material,  i.  e; 
wool  instead  of  tarpaulin,  then  the  carrier 
accordingly  is  not  liable  for  paying  any 
compensation  to  the  consignee  because  such 
goods  are  more  valuable  than  the  actual  goods 
which  indicate  that  the  replacement  might 
benefit  the  suppliers". 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  contains  however  a  specific 
provision  which  regulates  the"Trade  losses  in  Transit"or 
what  is  called  in  French  "Freinte  de  route"  by  saying  in 
Article  (44]  para  [1]  that: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable  for  shortage,  whether 
in  weight  or  size,  sustained  from  the  nature  of 
the  goods  during  the  course  of  carriage.  " 
The  recovery  of  the  "Trade  Losses  In  Transit"  and  the 
measure  of  such  recovery  should  be  based  upon  the  rules 
of  liability  which  is  constituted  under  Iraqi  Law  on  the 
59-Article  (88]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
60_(1973]  JI  C  CD,  pp  81,82. 485 
principles  of  "trust". 
These  principles  have  put  the  burden  of  proof  on  the 
carrier  to  show  that  such  losses  resulting  from  the 
nature  of  the  goods,  namely  from  reasons  beyond  the 
carrier's  hand  or  supervision  and  control,  i.  e; 
condensation,  staining-etc. 
This  indicates  that  "Trade  Losses  In  Transit"  is  not  an 
obligatory  consequence  of  maritime  course  of  voyage,  but 
is  simply  an  allowance  given  to  the  carrier  in  order  to 
escape  from  such  consequences. 
Egyptian  Law  does  not  define  a  particular  method  for 
measuring  the  recovery  of  losses  caused  to  the  cargo 
resulting  from  a  normal  minor  loss  "Trade  Losses  in 
Transit".  It  refers  therefore  to  the  custom  of  the  port 
which  has  developed  over  the  years  as  a  result  of  the 
nature  of  the  given  goods,  e.  g.  grain,  oil...  etc. 
Accordingly  the  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation61  on  June, 
3,1974,  held: 
"When  the  court  adopted  the  5%  of  the  exception 
from  customs  duty  as  a  percentage  for  measuring 
the  trade  losses  in  transit,  then  there  was  no 
contradiction  and  it  does  not  imply  any 
violation  of  the  law". 
This  means  that  the  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  has 
adopted  a  criterion  which  constitutes  the  5%  of  the 
shortage  resulting  from  the  trade  losses  in  transit  as  a 
maximum  for  compensation  of  such  losses.  62  If  the 
61-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case  292/37  of  3  June  1974,  Year 
25th,  p  967;  Al-Kalubi,  Mariti  me  Law,  p  264;  Hussni,  Mar  itime 
Cassation,  p  138. 
62-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  in  case,  71/37  of  30  march 486 
percentage  of  the  losses  exceeds  5%  of  the  trade  losses 
in  transit  fixed  by  the  law  of  customs  duty,  then  the 
carrier  will  avail  himself  by  5%  of  such  losses,  but  he 
is  still  liable  to  recover  the  other  losses  which  exceeds 
the  mentioned  percentage.  63 
2-DAMAGES 
The  carrier  is  liable  for  damage  caused  to  the  cargo 
while  the  goods  are  in  his  charge  whether  during  the 
course  of  the  voyage  or  in  the  warehouse.  Viz,  the 
carrier  is  obliged  to  pay  full  compensation  to  the 
consignee  or  cargo-owner  while  the  goods  are  under  his 
supervision  and  control,  unless  he  proves  that  he  or  his 
servants  or  agents  took  all  measures  that  could 
reasonably  be  required  in  dealing  with  the  goods  or 
avoiding  the  accumulation  of  the  consequent  damages.  64 
Physical  damage  may  however  be  caused  to  the  cargo 
partially  or  totally,  depends  upon  the  purpose  for  which 
the  goods  are  prepared. 
If  the  goods,  therefore,  are  not  worthy  or  are 
worthless  and  cannot  be  used  for  the  purpose  for  which 
they  are  prepared,  then  the  carrier  will  be  liable  for 
recovering  such  damages  whether  partially  or  totally. 
1972,  Year  23  rd  ,p  590,  that: 
"According  to  the  custom  of  the  port  concerning  the  oil  is  that  the 
carrier  will  be  exempted  by  It  percentage  of  the  shortage  resulting 
from  the  trade  losses  in  transit". 
63-Ali.  Al-barodi,  The  Principles  of  the  Maritime  Law,  1983,  pp 
175-176,  hereinafter  cite  as  "Al-barodi,  Maritime  Law". 
64-Article  (133)  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 487 
The  clean  bill  of  lading  is  a  factorial  matter  in 
considering  the  burden  of  proof  concerning  damages.  If 
the  bill  of  lading  is  clean  it  presumes  that  the  carrier 
has  received  the  goods  in  the  sound  condition  in  which  he 
is  bound  to  deliver  them  to  the  consignee.  Otherwise,  if 
the  goods  are  in  bad  condition,  then  the  consignee  can 
receive  the-goods  with  reservation  or,  issue  a  protest 
against  the  carrier. 
in  this  case  the  burden  of  proof  is  easy  because  the 
consignee  can  prove  that  damage  took  place  while  the 
goods  were  in  his  charge. 
On  the  other  hand,  when  the  bill  of  lading  is  not 
clean,  then  the  task  of  the  consignee  to  show  the  damages 
caused  to  the  cargo  is  difficult  because  he  has  to  prove 
that  the  goods  carried  were  received  by  the  carrier  in  a 
good  condition  and  the  causal  connection  between  the 
damage  and  the  reservations,  if  any,  at  the  moment  of 
loading  or  when  the  goods  were  under  the  supervision  or 
control  of  the  carrier.  65 
3-DELAY  IN  DELIVERY 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  contains  a  specific  provision 
for  delay  in  Article  [32),  [36]  para  [1]  which  adopts  the 
same  trend  as  the  Hamburg  Rules  by  providing  special 
provisions  for  delay  in  delivery. 
Unlike  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  which  contain  no  express 
provision  for  delay  in  delivery.  Such  an  obligation  could 
65-A1-Anbaki,  Iraqi  Transport  Law  ,p  240. 488 
be  implied  into  Article  (3]  para  [2]  of  the  Hague/Visby 
Rules.  66 
Article  [132]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  that 
the  carrier  is  to  be  liable  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to, 
the  goods  resulting  from  delay  in  delivery,  unless  the 
carrier  or  his  servants  or  agents  took  all  measures  that 
could  reasonably  be  required,  having  regard  to  the 
circumstances  of  the  case. 
Article  [36]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
defines  what  is  to  constitute  delay  in  delivery  by 
saying: 
"delay  in  delivery  occurs  when  the  goods  have 
not  been  delivered  at  the  time  expressly  agreed 
upon,  or  in  the  absence  of  such  an  agreement, 
on  the  expiry  of  the  time  on  which  the  carriage 
operation  would  be  required  of  a  diligent 
carrier,  with  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  case.  " 
This  Article  provides  two  possibilities  for  delay  in 
delivery. 
First:  Agreed  time  for  delivery  by  the  contracting 
parties. 
Second:  Reasonable  time  required  of  a  diligent 
carrier.  67 
66-Pollock,  The  Hamburg  Rules,  p  pollock  1. 
67-Article  (32]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has  expressed  this 
criterion  by  providing  that: 
"The  carrier  is  bound  to  deliver  the  goods  at  the  destination 
within  the  time  expressly  agreed  upon  or  within  the  time  which 
could  be  reasonably  required  with  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
the  transport". 489 
Damage  is  however  a  factorial  element  in  deciding  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  concerning  delay  in  delivery. 
As  far  as  delay  in  delivery  is  concerned  neither  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  nor  The  Hamburg  Convention  indicates 
to  damage  as  an  important  element  for  applying  the 
principles  of  the  carrier's  liability.  That  does  not  mean 
that  mere  delay  in  delivery  is  sufficient  in  constituting 
carrier's  liability. 
The  causal  connection  between  damage  and  delay  in 
delivery  should  be  shown  in  order  to  constitute  the 
carrier's  liability  to  pay  compensation  to  the  aggrieved 
party.  68  That  indicates  that  delay  in  delivery  does  not 
in  itself  constitute  damage. 
This  trend,  regarding  delay  in  delivery  differs  from 
the  criterion  for  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  goods 
which  establishes  a  damage  in  itself  and  is  based  on  the 
carrier's  liability  with  mention  to  the  causal  connection 
with  the  fault  or  neglect  of  the  carrier  or  his  servants 
or  agents. 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  has  applied  Article  (114)  of  the 
Egyptian  Maritime  Law,  concerning  the  Charterparty,  in 
the  case  of  delay  in  delivery.  69 
68-Muhsen  Chafik,  The  Rules  of  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  1Tha 
Hamburg  Rnleg,  19781,1984,  p  43,  hereinafter  cited  as  "Muhsen 
Chafik,  The  Hamburg  Rules";  Compare,  Al-Anbaki,  Iraqi  Transport 
Law,  p  241,  where  he  states  that: 
"Article  [321  and  [36]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  do  not 
indicate  to  damage  as  an  important  element  in  deciding  the 
carrier's  liability  because  mere  delay  in  delivery  is  a  damage  and 
it  is  enough  in  itself  to  constitute  the  carrier's  liability". 
69-A1-Sharkawi,  The  Maritime  Law,  p  272;  Al-Kalubi,  The  Maritime 490 
Drafting  provisions  of  Egyptian  Maritime  Law  provides 
in  Article  [2851  para  [11  the  same  principles  as  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  saying  that  the  carrier  is  liable  for 
delay  in  delivery,  unless  he  or  his  servants  or  agents 
took  all  reasonable  measures,  or  that  it  was  impossible 
for  them  to  take  such  measures  in  preventing  delay  in 
delivery  with  regard  to  the  surrounding  circumstances  of 
a  given  case. 
4-MEASURE  OF  DAMAGE 
Measure  of  damage  aims  to  establish  a  just  balance 
between  the  obligations  of  the  contracting  parties  by 
restoring  the  monetary  position  of  the  aggrieved  party  to 
the  same  position  as  if  the  contract  had  been  performed. 
The  measure  of  damages  in  respect  of  lost  or  damaged 
goods,  under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  when  the  liability 
of  the  carrier  is  not  limited,  is  different,  where  the 
value  of  lost  or  damaged  goods  are  fixed  on  the  face  of 
the  bill  of  lading,  from  those  goods  which  do  not  have 
their  value  fixed  on  the  face  of  the  bill  of  lading. 
Carriers  have  argued  about  the  value  of  the  goods  when 
the  value  of  such  goods  are  not  fixed  previously  on  the 
bill  of  lading  to  show  by  all  available  evidence  the  real 
value  of  the  disputed  issue.  7°  The  real  value  of  the 
goods  is  deemed  a  basic  standard  for  assessing  damages 
resulting  from  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  and 
consequently  in  considering  the  compensation  for  such 
damage. 
Law  p  275;  Al-Barodi,  The  Maritime  Law,  p  176. 
70-Article  [51]  para  (3]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 491 
In  the  case  of  the  value  of  the  goods  carried  not  being 
fixed  on  the  bill  of  lading,  the  measure  of  damages  then 
would  be  calculated  with  reference  to  the  value  of  these 
goods  at  the  place  and  time  of  arrival,  unless  the  law 
provides  otherwise.  71  That  indicates  that  the  measure  of 
damages  in  this  case  is  the  difference  between  the 
contract  price  and  the  market  value  of  the  goods  on  the 
date  when  they  should  have  been  delivered. 
If  there  is  however  a  partial  loss,  such  as  a  loss 
resulting  from  the  "Trade  Losses  in  Transit",  the  law 
then  allows,  in  this  case,  to  discount  a  percentage  of 
compensation  equal  to  the  losses  resulting  from  the  trade 
losses  in  transit.  72 
This  aims  to  prevent  the  carrier  from  recovering  more 
than  the  value  of  he  could  gain  if  the  goods  carried 
undamaged  or  without  partial  loss  and  consequently  to 
reach  a  just  result  for  paying  real  recovery  for  the 
damages  resulting  from  partial  loss  or  physical  damage.  73 
When  the  goods  carried  are  damaged  or  delayed  and  have 
lost  the  purpose  for  which  they  are  prepared.  The 
aggrieved  party  has  a  right  to  claim  for  full 
compensation  of  such  goods  as  a  total  damage  which  is 
constituted  on  the  value  of  the  goods  on  the  date  they 
should  have  been  delivered.  74 
As  far  as  the  recovery  of  total  loss  of  the  goods  is 
71-Article  (51]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
72-Article  (51]  para  [  2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
73-Ibid. 
74-Article  (53]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 492 
concerned  the  claimant  does  not  have  a  right  to  claim  for 
recovering  the  damages  resulting  from  the  total  loss  and 
delay  in  delivery.  75  Whereas,  in  a  case  of  partial  loss, 
the  carrier  may  claim  for  compensation  for  the  damages 
occurring  from  delay  in  delivery  by  measuring  and 
assessing  the  damage  which  has  occurred  only  to  the 
arrived  goods.  76  Recovery  of  the  damage  resulting  from 
delay  in  delivery  should,  however,  not  exceed  more  than 
the  value  of  the  total  lost  or  damaged  cargo.  77 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  contains  no  express 
provision  or  guidance  as  to  what  is  to  be  the  measure  of 
damages.  78  We  should  therefore  refer  to  the  general 
principles  of  the  Civil  Code.  These  principles  provide 
that  damage  is  an  important  element  in  assessing 
recovery,  and  that  what  constitutes  damage  is  a  matter  of 
law  which  should  be  considered  before  the  court  of 
cassation. 
79 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  adopts  however  a  viewpoint  which 
constitutes  the  carrier's  liability,  for  recovering  loss 
of  or  damage  to  the  goods,  on  the  market  value  of  selling 
such  goods  at  the  destination.  80 
75-Article  [52]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law;  Musa,  The 
Commercial  Contract,  p  52. 
76-Article  [52]  para  (2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
77-Article  [52]  para  (3]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
78-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case  173/41  of  17  April,  1975, 
Year  26th,  p  890. 
79-Egyptian  court  of  Cassation,  case  569/40  of  26  May  1975,  Year 
26th,  p  1078. 
80-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case  145/38  of  17  April  1973,  Year 
24th,  p  616;  Hussni,  Maritime  Cassation,  pp  82-84. 493 
iii-IMMUNITIES  OF  THE  CARRIER 
The  liability  of  the  carrier  is  based  on  the  principles 
of  "trust"  under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law.  This  differs 
from  the  principles  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the 
Hamburg  Rules  which  are  based  on  the  liability  regime  on 
the  presumed  fault  or  neglect. 
consequently,  the  carrier  is  liable  for  loss,  damage 
and  delay  in  delivery,  unless  he  proves  that  such  loss 
of,  or  damage  to,  the  goods  and  delay  in  delivery  results 
from  reasons  out  of  his  control,  or  supervision. 
The  Iraqi  transport  Law  regulates  the  carriers' 
exemptions  from  liability  by  Article  (461  para  (1]  which 
provides: 
"The  carrier  ensures  the  safety  of  the  goods 
during  the  performance  of  the  carriage  contract 
and  is  liable  for  all  damage  caused  to  the 
goods.  The  carrier  would  not  be  exempt  from  the 
liability  which  occurs  from  the  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  goods,  or  delay  in  delivery, 
unless  he  proves  that  such  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery  has  occurred  by  force 
majeure,  inherent  vice  in  the  goods,  or  the 
fault  of  the  consignor  or  the  consignee". 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  only  recognises  the  exemptions 
provided  by  the  Transport  Law  in  order  to  exonerate  the 
carrier  from  liability.  The  contractual  exonerations  are 
therefore  not  valid  because  the  principles  of  this  law 
are  considered  a  "public  order",  which  prohibits  all 
agreements  between  contracting  parties  which  are  contrary 
to  basic  principles  such  as  these. 494 
Article  (46)  para  [2)  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has 
confirmed  these  principles  by  saying: 
"Any  conditions  which  state  that  the  carrier  is 
exempt  from  liability  resulting  from  total  or 
partial  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  goods  and 
from  his  auxiliaries  action  is  deemed  void.  " 
Accordingly,  Article  (2591  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Code,  81 
which  allows  any  agreement  between  the  contracting 
parties,  is  not  applicable  in  this  case  because  there  is 
a  particular  provision82  which  confines  the  exemptions  as 
follows: 
1-Force  Majeure.  83 
81-Article  [259]  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Code  is  the  same  provision  of 
Article  [217]  para  [2]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code,  where  it  is 
stated  that; 
"The  debtor  may  by  agreement  be  discharged  from  all  liability  for 
his  failure  to  perform  the  contractual  obligation,  with  the 
exception  of  liability  arising  from  his  fraud  or  gross  negligence. 
The  debtor  may,  nevertheless,  stipulate  that  he  shall  not  be  liable 
for  fraud  or  gross  negligence  committed  by  persons  whom  he  employs 
for  the  performance  of  his  obligation". 
82-Article  (46]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
83-The  Iraqi  Court  of  Cassation  held  in  case  419/67  of  16  July 
1969  that: 
"When  the  weather  is  so  exceptionally  severe  that  it  is  not 
considered  as  a  force  majeure  or  an  extraordinary  nature  in  winter 
because  such  severe  weather  should  be  expected  at  that  time  of  the 
year.  The  carrier  is  therefore  liable  for  damages  to  the  goods 
resulting  from  such  an  accident  because  he  did  not  take  the 
required  measures  in  avoiding  such  consequences  and  save  the  goods 
carried";  It  is  also  held  in  case  196/78  of  19  December  1978  that: 
"the  tide  is  not  a  force  majeure  which  exempts  the  carrier  from 
liability  because  it  is  considered  as  an  expected  peril";  (19661 
DDECC,  Year  17th,  p  1129,  held  on  May,  17,1966,  where  it  is  stated 
that: 
"The  perils  of  sea  are  not  considered  an  exception  from  the 495 
2-Inherent  Vice.  84 
3-Consignor  and  Consignee's  Fau1t.  85 
Egyptian  Law  provides  that  the  carrier  is  entitled  to 
exempt  himself  from  liability  by  inserting  a  special 
clause  in  the  bill  of  lading  making  it  more  favorable  to 
him. 
Article  [217]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code86  makes  this 
clear  by  allowing  the  contracting  parties  to  conclude  any 
agreement  which  exempts  the  debtor  in  civil  cases,  or  the 
liability,  but  if  such  perils  of  sea  were  so  severe  that  the 
prudent  carrier  cannot  foresee  or  avoid  such  perils,  then  it  will 
consider  a  force  majeure  which  exempts  the  carrier  from  the 
liability";  Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  266. 
84-Article  (45]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  liable  for  damages  resulting  from  Inherent  Vice  in 
wrapping,  filling,  packing,  when  he  accepts  to  carry  the  goods  with 
the  knowledge  that  there  was  such  a  defect  in  the  goods.  The 
carrier  is  considered  to  have  known  the  nature  of  the  defect,  if 
such  a  defect  was  apparent  or  that  any  prudent  carrier  should 
discover  such  a  defect". 
85-Article  (1411  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  states: 
"The  consignor  is  not  liable  for  damage  sustained  by  the  carrier  or 
the  actual  carrier  or  for  damage  sustained  by  the  ship  unless  such 
damage  was  caused  by  the  fault  of  the  consignor  or  his 
auxiliaries.  Nor  is  any  auxiliary  liable  for  such  damage  unless 
caused  by  a  fault  on  his  part". 
86-Article  [217]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code  provides: 
"The  debtor  may  by  agreement  accept  liability  for  unforeseen  and 
for  cases  of  farce  majeure. 
The  debtor  may  by  agreement  be  discharged  from  all  liability  for 
his  failure  to  perform  the  contractual  obligation,  with  the 
exception  of  liability  arising  from  his  fraud  or  gross  negligence. 
The  debtor  may,  nevertheless,  stipulate  that  he  should  not  be 
liable  for  fraud  or  gross  negligence  committed  by  persons  whom  he 
employs  for  the  performance  of  his  obligation.  Any  clause 
discharging  a  person  from  responsibility  for  unlawful  acts  is 
void";  Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  270. 496 
carrier  in  maritime  cases,  from  all  liability  for  his 
failure  to  perform  the  contractual  obligation,  unless 
such  loss  or  damage  resulted  from  his  wilful  misconduct 
or  gross  negligence.  Also  he  may  stipulate  that  he  will 
not  be  liable  for  wilful  misconduct  or  gross  negligence 
on  the  part  of  his  servants  or  those  whom  he  employs  for 
the  performance  of  the  contractual  obligation. 
Article  [132]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  of,  or  damage 
to,  the  goods,  and  delay  in  delivery,  unless 
the  carrier  proves  that  he  or  his  servants  took 
all  measures  that  could  reasonably  be  required 
in  dealing  with  their  business,  regarding  the 
circumstances  of  the  case,  and  thereof  they 
ought  not  to  be  less  than  the  measures  taken  by 
a  prudent  man  in  avoiding  such  loss,  damage,  or 
delay  in  delivery  and  its  consequences". 
This  attitude  was  adopted  by  the  Warsaw  Convention" 
and  the  Hamburg  Rules"  which  aimed  to  consider  that  the 
carrier  is  liable  for  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
goods,  and  delay  in  delivery,  unless  the  carrier,  or  his 
servants  took  all  reasonable  measures  to  avoid  such 
damages,  or  that  it  was  impossible  for  him,  or  them,  to 
take  such  measures. 
87-United  Kingdom  Treaty  Series,  1967,  Nos:  51-111,  Treaty  Series 
No:  62  (1967]  p  14,  Article  (101  of  the  Protocol  to  Amend  the 
Convention  for  the  International  Carriage  by  Air,  Signed  at  Warsaw 
on  12  october  1929,  which  provides  that: 
"Paragraph  2  of  Article  (20)  of  the  Convention  shall  deleted". 
However,  Article  (20]  of  the  Warsaw  Convention  provides: 
"The  carrier  is  not  liable  if  he  proves  that  he  and  his  agents, 
have  taken  all  necessary  measures  to  avoid  damage  or  that  it  was 
impossible  for  him,  or  them,  to  take  such  measures". 
88-Article  (51  para  (1,2]  of  the  Hamburg  Rules. 497 
The  carrier  is  not  liable  then  for  such  loss,  damage  to 
the  goods,  or  delay  in  delivery  resulting  from  such 
measures  to  save  life  or  from  reasonable  measures  to  save 
property  at  sea.  89 
That  does  not  mean  that  the  carrier  shall  be  entitled 
to  avail  himself  of  Article  (140]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law  if  it  is  proved  that  such  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
goods  or  delay  in  delivery  resulted  from  wilful 
misconduct  or  gross  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  carrier 
or  his  servants  or  agents. 
If  the  carrier's  fault  or  neglect  or  that  of  his 
servants  or  agents  coincides  with  one  of  the  exceptions 
provided  by  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  to  cause  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  cargo  and  delay  in  delivery,  the  carrier 
then  must  prove  the  proportion  of  damage  which  occurred 
by  a  particular  exception  in  order  to  protect  himself 
from  liability.  Otherwise  he  will  be  responsible  for  such 
loss,  damage,  or  delay  in  delivery  resulting  from  the 
given  case.  90 
89-Article  (140]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
90-Article  [139]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 498 
SECTION  TWO 
LIMITATION  OF  THE  LIABILITY  OF  THE  CARRIER 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  deals  with  this  issue  in 
Article  150  (1)  and  (2),  which  provides  that  the  carrier 
is  entitled  to  limit  his  liability  for  damage  resulting 
from  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo,  as  well  as  for 
delay  in  delivery,  as  in  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
Three  conditions  are  specified  in  the  Iraqi  Law  for 
application  of  the  provisions  concerning  limitation  of 
liability  as  follows: 
1-The  transportation  should  be  between  Iraq  and  a 
foreign  country; 
kuýz 
2-The  value  of  the  goods  must  (not  been  declared  in  the 
bill  of  lading; 
3-Neither  the  carrier,  nor  his  servants,  or  agents, 
must  have  been  guilty  of  wilful  misconduct  or  gross 
negligence.  91 
The  purpose  of  the  provisions  for  limitation  of 
91-Article  [150]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  that: 
"1-The  limitation  of  the  liability  of  the  carrier  for  loss,  damage, 
or  delay  in  delivery  in  carriage  between  Iraq  and  Abroad  is  to  be 
in  accordance  with  the  provisions  of  the  rules  as  set  out  in  the 
schedule  of  this  law. 
2-The  carrier  shall  not  be  entitled  to  the  benefit  of  the 
limitation  of  liability  in  the  following  cases: 
"a"When  the  value  of  the  goods  has  been  declared  in  the  bill  of 
lading. 
"b"When  it  is  proved  that  he,  or  his  auxiliaries,  committed  wilful 
misconduct  or  gross  negligence".;  [1961]  DDECC,  Year  12th,  p  557, 
where  the  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  that: 
"The  carrier  is  not  entitled  to  avail  himself  of  the  limitation  of 
liability  when  he  personally  committed  fraud  or  gross  negligence. 
Viz,  the  carrier  shall  avail  himself  of  the  limitation  provisions 
even  his  servants  or  agents  committed  fraud  or  gross  negligence.  " 499 
liability  which  are  set  forth  in  the  Iraqi  Law  purports 
to  protect  foreign  carriers  from  unlimited  liability  in 
respect  of  a  particular  package  or  packages  of 
unexpectedly  high  value,  and  to  preclude  the  carriers 
from  lessening  their  liability  otherwise  than  stated  in 
this  law. 
Therefore,  in  order  to  clarify  the  general  principles. 
concerning  limitation  of  liability,  the  following  points 
should  be  discussed: 
i-Concept  of  "Per  Package  or  Unit". 
ii-Dual  System  of  Limitation. 
iii-Special  Drawing  Rights. 
i-CONCEPT  OF  "PER  PACKAGE  OR  UNIT" 
The  Iraqi  Law  does  not  define  the  term  "package"  as  set 
out  in  the  schedule,  but  it  does  give  an  explanation  of 
the  term  by  providing,  in  Article  [2]  Para  [a]  of  the 
schedule: 
"....  per  package  or  other  shipping  unit" 
Package  would  completely  include  goods  which  are  made 
up  for  facilitating  their  handling  during  transportation. 
The  shape,  size,  or  weight  of  the  cargo  has  no  effect  on 
the  determination  of  whether  the  goods  constitute  a 
package  or  not,  i.  e;  a  railway  wagon;  a  container;  and  a 
pallet,  have  all  been  held  to  be  packages. 
If,  however,  the  lost  or  damaged  cargo  does  not 
constitute  a  "package",  then  the  limitation  of  liability 500 
is  based  on  the  "other  shipping  unit"  which  has  a  wider 
meaning  than  "package"  and  may  be  extended  to  any  cargo 
which  is  not  shipped  in  packages,  e.  g;  a  yacht,  a  barrel, 
a  sack.  etc,  or  it  may  refer  to  the  "freight  unit"  or 
"commercial  unit".  92 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has  taken  into  account  the  new 
technological  advances  in  the  transportation  industry  by 
providing  specific  rules  for  the  "container  or  a  similar 
article  of  transport",  e.  g;  pallet...  etc. 
Article  [2]  para  [1]  of  the  schedule  of  this  law  has 
imposed  some  restrictions  on  considering  a  particular 
container  or  similar  article  of  transport  as  a  separate 
shipping  unit  as  follows: 
1-When  packages  or  other  shipping  units  are  enumerated 
in  the  bill  of  lading. 
2-Where  a  container  or  similar  article  of  transport  is 
owned  or  supplied  by  a  carrier  even  if  it  has  not  been 
enumerated  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
Otherwise,  the  container  or  any  similar  article  of 
transport,  including  its  contents,  will  be  considered  one 
package  or  shipping  unit.  93 
92-See  chapter  [2]  section  [2]. 
93-Article  [2]  para  (a]  of  the  schedule  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
provides  that: 
1-Where  a  container  or  similar  article  of  transport  is  used  to 
consolidate  goods,  the  package  or  other  shipping  units  enumerated 
in  the  bill  of  lading  are  deemed  packages  or  shipping  units, 
otherwise,  the  container,  including  its  contents  ,  are  deemed  one 
package. 
2-Where  the  carrier  supplies  a  container  or  similar  article  of 
transport  used  to  consolidate  goods,  the  package  or  other  shipping 501 
The  Egyptian  Drafting  law  has  adopted  the  same 
principles  as  the  Hamburg  Rules  as  far  as  the  meaning  of 
the  per  package  or  unit  is  concerned.  94 
ii-DUAL  SYSTEM  OF  LIMITATION 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has  adopted  a  mixed  system  of 
limitation,  which  is  based  on  either  the  "per  package  or 
other  shipping  unit"  or  on  a  certain  amount  "per  kilo  of 
gross  weight",  by  providing  in  Article  [2]  para  (a]  of 
schedule  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  that: 
"The  liability  of  the  carrier  for  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea  is  limited  to  an  amount  equivalent 
to  [1/250]  Dinar  per  kilogramme  or  [350/001 
Dinar  per  package  or  other  shipping  unit 
whichever  is  the  higher...  ". 
This  system  was  also  adopted  by  the  Egyptian  Drafting 
Law95  which  is  considered  a  flexible  criterion  for 
solving  the  dilemma  of  the  carrier's  limitation  of 
liability,  especially  when  the  weight  of  the  cargo  is 
unknown,  or  the  cargo  is  not  packed  in  a  container  or 
other  "article  of  transport",  e.  g;  oil,  grains. 
The  trend  of  the  Iraqi  Law,  however,  favours  the 
shipper,  or  consignor  by  including  the  phrase: 
"whichever  is  the  higher". 
Meaning  that  the  claimant  may  recover  the  higher  amount 
units  even  when  not  enumerated  in  the  bill  of  lading  are  considered 
separate  shipping  units". 
94-Hussni,  Maitime  Cassation,  p  103. 
95-Ibid,  p  103. 502 
of  the  limit  of  liability  for  lost  or  damaged  goods  i.  e, 
the  limit  based  on  the  weight  of  the  goods  or  the  limit 
based  on  the  package  or  other  shipping  unit. 
The  method  of  calculating  the  amount  of  limit  of 
liability  for  lost  or  damaged  cargo  is  different  from  the 
method  of  calculating  the  limit  of  the  carrier's 
liability  for  delay  in  delivery. 
Limitation  of  liability  concerning  lost  or  damaged 
cargo  is  based  upon  a  mixed  system  which  is  equivalent  to 
[1/250)  Dinar  per  kilogramme  or  (350/00)  Dinar  per 
package  or  other  shipping  unit.  96 
On  the  other  hand,  the  baseline  in  calculating  the 
limitation  amount  of  the  carrier's  liability  for  delay  in 
delivery  is  based  on  the  amount  of  freight  which  is 
equivalent  to  two  and  a  half  times  the  freight  payable 
for  the  delayed  goods.  97  Compensation  for  the  delayed 
goods  must  not  exceed  the  total  freight  payable  for  the 
goods  carried  under  the  contract  of  carriage  of  goods  by 
sea.  98 
Under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  however,  the  contracting 
parties  have  a  right  to  conclude  any  agreement  for 
limiting  the  carrier's  liability  to  an  amount  exceeding 
those  provided  for  in  the  schedule  to  this  law.  99 
96-Article  (2]  para  [a]  of  the  schedule  to  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law.  ' 
97-Article  [2]  para  (b]  of  the  schedule  to  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law. 
98-Ibid. 
99-Article  (3]  of  the  schedule  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 503 
In  contrast,  the  Egyptian  Drafting  Law  does  not  allow 
for  the  carriers  to  limit  their  liability  by  less  than 
the  amount  fixed  in  the  law  otherwise  it  would  be  against 
public  policy.  100  Egyptian  Civil  Code  allows  however  the 
contracting  parties  to  fix,  in  advance,  an  amount  of 
damages  either  in  the  contract  or  in  a  subsequent 
agreement-101 
The  validity  of  the  limitation  agreement  will  be 
governed  by  the  following  conditions: 
1.  The  claimant  must  have  suffered  some  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  cargo.  102 
2.  The  judge  may  reduce  the  amount  when; 
"a"  The  amount  fixed  was  grossly  exaggerated; 
"b"  The  principal  obligation  has  been  partially 
performed  . 
103 
3.  Where  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  exceeds 
the  amount  of  limitation  of  liability  fixed  by  the 
contract,  the  claimant  cannot  recover  the  amount  of  any 
loss  of  or  damage  in  excess  of  the  limitation  amount, 
unless  it  is  proved  that  the  carrier  has  committed' 
fraud  or  gross  negligence. 
104 
However,  Iraqi  jurisprudence  will  apply  a  limitation 
clause  when  it  is  stated  in  the  bill  of  lading  in  quite 
100-Article  [281]  para  [cj  of  the  Draft  Proposal  For  Egyptian 
Maritime  Law;  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  ,  case  569/40  of  26  May 
1975,  Year  26th,  p  1078;  Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  pp  274,309. 
101-Article  [223]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code. 
102-Article  [224]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code. 
103-Ibid. 
104-Article  [225]  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code;  Al-Sharkawi,  Maritime 
Law,  p  276;  Al-Barodi,  Maritime  Law  p  182. 504 
clear  language  in  a  form  which  is  different  from  the  rest 
of  the  bill  of  lading.  105  It  is  not  to  be  applied  when 
there  is  any  ambiguity  or  lack  of  clarity  in  the 
limitation  clause.  106 
iii-SPECIAL  DRAWING  RIGHTS 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  has  adopted  the  Special  Drawing 
Rights  (SDR)  as  the  monetary  unit  for  calculating  the 
limits  of  liability,  in  order  to  achieve  uniformity  and 
avoid  problems  of  fluctuation  and  devaluation  in 
currencies  which  might  result  from  having  the  limits 
expressed  in  terms  of  any  national  currency  dependent 
upon  the  rate  of  exchange  with  gold,  the  franc,  or  the 
dollar. 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  adopts  the  attitude  of  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  in  calculating  the  limitation  of 
liability. 
Article  [4]  of  the  schedule  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law 
explains  in  more  detail  the  calculation  of  Special 
Drawing  Rights  in  terms  of  the  Iraqi  Dinar  by  stating: 
"The  Iraqi  Dinar  equals  (2.1/9]  two  and  a  ninth 
times  of  the  Special  Drawing  Right  which  is 
certified  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund. 
Reevaluating  the  amounts  of  limitation  in  the 
case  of  the  difference  between  the  exchange 
rate  of  these  Special  Drawing  Rights  and  the 
Iraqi  Dinar  exceeding  the  percentage  of  25% 
105-Iraqi  Court  of  Caseation,  Administrative  Committee,  case 
283/Transport  /83/84  of  4  January  1984  [unpublished]. 
106-Iraqi  Court  of  Cassation,  Administrative  Committee,  case  753/ 
Transport/  83/  84  of  18  January  1984  [unpublished). 505 
(shall  be  effected]  by  issuing  a  regulation 
from  the  Central  Bank  of  Iraq  and  publishing  it 
in  the  Iraqi  Gazette"-. 
It  can  be  concluded  from  the  technical  analysis  of  this 
Article  that  it  is  considered  redundant,  because  the 
rates  of  exchange  with  Special  Drawing  Right  fluctuate, 
up  and  down,  depending  on  the  valuation  of  the  currencies 
which  are  considered  the  basis  for  calculation  of  the 
value  of  the  Special  Drawing  Right. 
It  can  therefore  be  said  that  the  Iraqi  Draftsman  could 
provide,  in  Article  (2]  para  [a]  of  the  schedule  to  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  that  the  Special  Drawing  Right  should 
be  basis  for  calculating  the  limitation  of  liability, 
with  a  reference  to  the  Central  Bank  of  Iraq,  which  is 
responsible  for  issuing  regulations  for  calculating  the 
value  of  the  Special  Drawing  Right  in  terms  of  the  Iraqi 
Dinar.  Those  regulations  could  be  published  in  the 
gazette,  with  a  reference  to  the  position  of  the 
International  Monetary  Fund  concerning  Special  Drawing 
Rights. 506 
SECTION  THREE 
PROCEDURES  OF  ACTION  FOR  LOST,  OR  DAMAGED 
CARGO 
Under  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  the  carrier  is  obliged 
to  recover  all  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  as 
well  as  delay  in  delivery.  The  contractual  liability  of 
the  carrier  gives  the  aggrieved  part,  i.  e;  the  consignor 
or  consignee  who  suffered  some  loss  of,  damage  to,  the 
cargo  or  delay  in  delivery,  a  right  to  institute  an 
action  against  the  carrier  for  recovering  such  losses. 
Also,  when  the  goods  carried  are  covered  by  insurance 
the  insured  party  has  a  right  to  compensate  such  losses 
from  the  insurer  according  to  the  insurance  contract.  An 
insurer  who  indemnifies  the  insured  against  such  losses 
caused  to  the  cargo  may  be  subrogated  to  the  insured's 
right  against  the  carrier,  or  a  third  party,  whose 
negligence  caused  the  loss  depending  upon  the 
conventional  or  legal  subrogation. 
The  defendants  in  these  cases  may  however  be  the 
carrier,  actual  carrier  or  the  agent  (attorney)  according 
to  the  power  of  the  attorney  in  transportation  which 
defines  in  Article  [83)  para  [2)  of  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law  as  follows: 
"Power  of  attorney  is  a  contract  whereby  an 
attorney  binds  himself  to  perform  a  juridical 
act  on  behalf  of  a  carrier". 507 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  extends  the  consequences  of  the 
power  of  attorney  in  transportation  to  cover  all  affairs, 
or  services,  of  the  social  sector  or  any  authorized  body 
in  transportation  which  act  on  behalf  of  a  carrier107  by 
giving  the  facilities  for  or  assistance  to  the  carrier  in 
performing  the  contract  of  carriage.  The  agent  (attorney) 
is  however  not  liable  in  this  case  for  the  consequences 
of  the  decision  or  any  authority  against  the  carrier  or 
actual  carrier. 
The  carrier  or  the  actual  carrier  is  responsible  for 
paying  compensation  to  the  innocent  party  resulting  from 
their  breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage.  108 
On  the  other  hand,  the  agent  (attorney)  is  bound  under 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  to  take  all  measures  that  could 
reasonably  be  required  to  enable  the  consignee,  or  any 
person  authorized  by  him,  to  obtain  an  insurance  from  the 
carrier  for  recovering  all  losses  resulting  from  the 
breach  of  contract.  109 
The  following  points  should  therefore  be  discussed  in 
order  to  reveal  the  procedures  of  the  action  for  lost,  or 
damaged,  cargo  as  well  as  delay  in  delivery  under  the 
Iraqi  Transport  Law  and  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Law. 
i-Competent  Court. 
ii-Notice  of  Loss  or  Damage. 
iii-Limitation  of  Actions. 
107-Article  [83]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
108-Article  [84]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law;  Al-Anbaki,  Iraqi 
Transport  Law,  pp  51-52. 
109-Article  [85]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 508 
i-COMPETENT  COURT 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  does  not  provide  any  specific 
provision  dealing  with  the  jurisdiction  of  the  court 
concerning  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  occurring 
during  the  course  of  the  transportation.  * 
The  Iraqi  Procedural  Law  provides  in  Article  (371  many 
options  for  the  plaintiff  in  instituting  his  action  as 
follows: 
1-The  habitual  residence  of  the  defendant;  or 
2-The  principal  place  of  the  defendant's  business,  or 
the  place  of  any  branch  or  agency  through  which  the 
defendant  runs  his  business;  or 
3-The  place  where  the  contract  was  made  or  executed;  or 
4-Any  additional  place  designated  for  that  purpose  by 
the  contracting  parties. 
110 
The  court  of  the  first  instance  has  however 
jurisdiction  to  hear  the  cases  of  loss,  damage,  and  delay 
in  delivery  because  it  has  universal  jurisdiction  over 
all  commercial  and  civil  cases111  without  any  limitation 
to  the  amount  of  the  claim. 
112 
If  there  is  nevertheless  a  dispute  between  two  parties 
in  the  public  sector,  or  between  a  party  in  the  public 
sector  with  the  private  sector  then  the  administrative 
court113  will  be  competent  to  hear  all  disputes  whether 
they  are  commercial  or  civil. 
110-Al-Jazairy,  p  309. 
111-Article  [29]  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Procedural  Law. 
112-Article  [31]  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Procedural  Law. 
113-Article  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Administrative  Law,  No.  140  of  1971. 509 
Any  appeal  against  the  judgement  of  the  court  of  the 
first  instance  with  limited  jurisdiction  would  be  made  to 
the  court  of  Appeal.  It  is  however  up  to  the  appellant  to 
elect  the  course  of  appeal  concerning  the  judgement  of 
the  court  of  the  first  instance  with  unlimited 
jurisdiction  either  by  appealing  to  the  Court  of  Appeal 
and  after  that  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  or  by  making  it 
directly  to  the  Court  of  Cassation.  On  the  other  hand,  if 
there  is  an  appeal  against  the  judgement  of  the 
Administrative  Courts,  then  these  should  be  made  directly 
to  the  Court  of  Cassation,  which  will  be  heard  by  special 
bench  of  the  Court  of  Cassation  called  "Administrative 
Causes  Panel".  114 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  however,  does  not 
contain  any  particular  provisions  concerning  the 
jurisdiction  problems.  115  Also,  there  are  no  maritime 
tribunals  in  Egypt  with  jurisdiction  over  maritime 
actions. 
Maritime  actions,  therefore,  must  be  brought  to  the 
Egyptian  competent  courts  in  accordance  with  Articles  29 
and  30  of  the  Egyptian  Procedural  Law  which  confine  the 
jurisdiction  to  the  Egyptian  Courts,  116  especially  when 
114-Bayed  Hassan  Amin,  Middle  ist  Legal  5ystnmm,  1985,  pp  230-31, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Amin,  Legal  Systems". 
115-Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  274;  Mahmoud  Kamel,  "Some  Now  Trends 
of  Practice  and  Procedure  in  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law", 
(1963]  1  Al-Qanoun  Wal  Iqtisad,  Year  33  rd,  p  329  at  p  344, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Kamel,  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law", 
where  he  states  that: 
"In  commercial  matters  in  Egyptian  "Mixed"  law,  the  commercial 
tribunals  were  independent  having  a  specific  separate  competence". 
116-These  principles  are  identical  to  the  principles  of  the  Iraqi 510 
the  defendant  has  a  habitual  residence  in  Egypt,  or  the 
action  deals  with  assets  existing  in  Egypt  or  concerns 
obligations  which  have  been  created  or  enforced  or  ought 
to  be  enforced  in  Egypt. 
The  carriers  may  attempt  to  avoid  a  particular 
jurisdiction  because  they  believe  that  courts  or 
jurisprudence  may  operate  against  their  interest  by 
inserting  a  jurisdiction  clause  in  the  bill  of  lading. 
Egyptian  Law  and  jurisprudence  admit  that  such  a 
jurisdiction  clause,  which  avoids  the  Egyptian  Court  from 
hearing  such  cases,  would  be  null  and  void  because 
Egyptian  jurisdiction  is  a  part  of  public  policy.  117 
The  Egyptian  ordinary  tribunals  have  then  jurisdiction 
over  the  maritime  action  according  to  the  sum  involved  in 
a  given  case.  There  are  two  Summary  Tribunals  which  are 
competent  to  hear  commercial  disputes  only,  including 
maritime  cases.  These  tribunals  have  been  established  in 
Cairo  and  Alexandria  according  to  the  order  of  the 
Minister  of  Justice.  The  decision  which  is  delivered  by 
the  summary  tribunals  may  be  appealed  against;  then  such 
an  appeal  will  be  considered  by  the  commercial  chambers 
of  the  Tribunals  of  the  First  Instance.  118 
Law  which  Article  (29]  of  the  Iraqi  Civil  Procedural  Law  provides 
that  : 
"The  civil  courts  authority  govern  all  the  natural  and  artificial 
persons  included  in  the  government  and  it  has  universal 
jurisdiction  over  all  disputes  unless  expressly  provided  otherwise 
by  a  law". 
117-Al-Sharkawi,  The  Maritime  Law,  p  310. 
118-Kamel,  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  p  346. 511 
ii-NOTICE  OF  LOSS  OR  DAMAGE 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides  specific  rules  in 
Article  (69]  para  [1]  respecting  the  notice  for  loss  of, 
or  damage  to,  the  cargo  as  follows: 
"The  consignee  is  bound  to  fix  his  reservations 
concerning  the  condition  of  the  goods  if  he 
revealed  that  the  goods  have  suffered  a  partial 
loss,,  'or  damage,  and  a  notice  must  be  given  in 
writing  to  the  carrier  within  1301  consecutive 
days  after  the  day  the  goods  were  actually 
handed  over  to  him". 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  purports  to  clarify  this  by 
providing  such  an  article  that  when  the  notice  of  loss, 
or  damage,  has  been  given  to  the  carrier,  then  the  goods 
carried  have  suffered  loss  or  damage  while  in  his  charge. 
Failure  to  give  a  notice  concerning  the  lost  or  damaged 
cargo  does  not  affect  the  right  of  the  innocent  party119 
to  bring  suit  within  two  years,  as  provided  in  Article 
[87)  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
The  notice  must  be  given  in  writing  and  disclose  the 
nature  of  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo.  Whereas,  such 
a  notice  need  not  be  given  where  a  joint  survey  or 
inspection  has  taken  place  by  the  contracting  parties,  or 
their  agents,  which  is  deemed  as  an  equivalent  to  such  a 
notice.  120 
119-Last  proviso  of  Article  [69]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law  provides: 
"....  failure  to  give  such  notice  is  prima  facie  evidence  that  the 
consignee  has  received  the  goods  in  good  condition  as  described  in 
the  bill  of  lading". 
120-Article  [69]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides: 512 
The  consignee  need  however  not  give  such  a  notice  to 
the  carrier,  but  the  notice  which  have  been  given  to  the 
actual  carrier  or  to  a  person  acting  on  the  carrier's  or 
the  actual  carrier's  behalf  including  the  master,  or  the 
officer,  in  charge  of  the  vessel  is  considered  to  have 
been  given  to  the  carrier  and  vice  versa.  121 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  has  applied  the  Hague  Rules, 
which  were  adopted  by  Egypt  on  May  29,1944  to  the 
carriage  by  sea  cases  regarding  formal  or  substantive 
conditions,  122  when  such  cases  arose  between  a  carrier  and 
a  consignor  or  a  holder  of  the  bill  of  lading  or  any 
similar  document  of  title,  in  so  far  as  such  a  document 
relates  to  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  and  is  issued  in 
one  of  the  contracting  states  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
An  application  of  the  Hague  Rules  whether  ex  proprio 
vi  gore  or  by  an  agreement  between  the  contracting  parties 
that  excludes  the  principles  of  Articles  274  and  275  of 
the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law123  from  applying  to 
the  action  concerning  the  lost,  or  damaged,  cargo  because 
these  principles  of  the  aforesaid  articles  are  not  a  part 
of  public  policy  even  though  it  is  deemed  as  a  formal 
procedure.  124 
"if  the  state  of  the  goods  at  the  time  they  were  handed  over  to  the 
consignee  has  been  the  subject  of  a  joint  survey  or  inspection  by 
the  parties,  notice  in  writing  need  not  be  given  of  loss,  or 
damage,  ascertained  during  such  a  survey  or  inspection". 
121-Article  [148]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
122-Hussni,  Maritime  Cassation,  pp  88-89. 
123-Al-Barodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  231. 
124-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case  304/47  of  11  February 
1980(unpublished). 513 
The  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation125  has  made  that  quite 
clear  where  it  held  on  February  27,1975  that: 
"The  principles  of  Articles  274  and  275  of  the 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  are  considered 
as  a  part  of  the  procedural  rules  which  are 
governed  by  the  law  of  the  judge  in  accordance 
with  Article  [221  of  the  Civil  Code.  126  It  is 
not  deemed,  nevertheless,  as  a  part  of  the 
public  policy,  then  the  contracting  parties 
have  a  right  to  lessen  or  increase  the  period 
of  limitation  provided  by  the  aforesaid 
articles  or  apply  the  periods  provided  in 
foreign  law". 
The  aim  of  the  notice  in  the  case  of  lost  or  damaged 
cargo,  under  Egyptian  jurisprudence,  purports  to  show 
that  the  goods  have  suffered  loss  or  damage  while  in  the 
carrier's  charge. 
Failure  to  give  such  notice  before  or  at  the  time  of 
the  removal  of  the  goods  into  the  custody  of  the 
consignee,  or  any  person  authorized  by  him,  is  considered 
prima  facie  evidence  that  the  goods  carried  were  handed 
over  to  the  consignee  in  the  same  condition  as  described 
in  the  bill  of  lading.  Also,  such  failure  does  not  affect 
the  right  of  the  innocent  party  to  bring  suit  within  one 
year. 
The  notice  must  be  given  in  writing  and  indicate  the 
125-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation,  case  240/40  of  27  February  1975 
[unpublished) 
126-Article  (221  of  the  Egyptian  Civil  Code  provides: 
"Principles  of  competence  of  courts  and  all  questions  of  procedure 
are  governed  by  the  law  of  the  country  in  which  the  action  is 
brought,  or  in  which  the  proceedings  are  taken". 514 
general  nature  of  the  goods  and  particular  loss  of  or 
damage  to  the  goods.  Where  loss,  or  damage,  is  not 
apparent,  then  notice  must  be  given  within  three  days  of 
delivery  of  the  goods.  127  Any  notice  given,  however, 
before  handing  over  the  goods  is  not  deemed  as  a  notice 
according  to  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law.  128 
iii-LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS 
According  to  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  the  time  limit 
for  suit  concerning  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  as 
well  as  delay  in  delivery  is  two  years. 
An  action  relating  to  partial  loss  of,  or  damage  to, 
the  goods  shall  be  time-barred  if  proceedings  have  not 
been  instituted  within  two  years  from  the  date  of  the 
delivery  of  the  goods  by  the  consignee  and  notification 
in  writing  concerning  the  condition  of  the  goods  has  been 
given.  129 
On  the  other  hand,  an  action  relating  to  the  total  loss 
of  the  goods,  or  delay  in  delivery,  shall  be  time-barred 
if  proceedings  have  not  been  instituted  within  two  years 
from  the  expiry  of  the  time  expressly  agreed  upon  for 
delivery  or,  in  the  absence  of  such  an  agreement,  on 
which  the  goods  should  have  arrived  at  their  destination 
by  a  diligent  carrier  with  regard  to  the  circumstances  of 
127-Article  (3]  para  (6]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
128-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  ,  case  305/32  of  24  January  1967, 
Year  18th,  p  176;  It  is  also  held  in  case  877/47  of  21  April  1980 
[unpublished];  Hussni,  Maritime  Cassation,  pp  111-112. 
129-Article  (87]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 515 
the  case.  130  The  limitation  period  is  however  procedural 
and  not  substantive  rules. 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  aims,  nevertheless,  to  show  that 
the  time  is  not  considered  as  a  part  of  public  policy131 
by  providing: 
1-The  expiry  of  a  time  limit  is  barred  by  the 
contractual  remedy,  but  does  not  extinguish  the  right. 
The  judge  is  not  entitled  then  to  dismiss  the  action 
automatically  without  asking  such  a  demand  from  the 
disputed  parties. 
2-An  agreement  between  the  contracting  parties  may 
extend  the  time  limitation  provided  by  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Law.  132 
3-The  limitation  period  is  a  time  of  prescription,  but 
not  a  prescription  extinctive,  the  time  limitation 
therefore  does  not  run  in  the  case  of  interruption  or 
stoppage.  133 
The  carrier  is  not  entitled,  however,  to  avail  himself 
of  the  prescriptions'  provisions  provided  in  the  Iraqi 
Transport  Law  when  he,  or  his  servants  or  agents 
committed  fraud  or  gross  negligence.  134 
130-Article  (88]  para  [1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
131-Compare,  Al-Anbaki,  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  p  272. 
132-Article  [93]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  provides: 
"The  time  limit  provided  in  this  chapter  may  be  extended  by  an 
agreement  in  writing  ". 
133-Iraqi  court  of  Cassation  held  on  August  8  1973,  (19763  I  JJ, 
No.  2,  p  205,  where  it  is  stated  that: 
"The  ratification  of  the  existing  shortage  in  the  goods  is 
interrupted  the  time  limitation". 
134-Article  [91]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 51  6 
The  provision  purports  to  protect  the  interests  of  the 
innocent  party,  i.  e;  the  consignor,  consignee,  shipper, 
or  any  holder  of  the  bill  of  lading,  and  prevent  the 
carrier  benefitting  from  his  own  or  his  servants'  or 
agents'  wilful  misconduct. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  time  limit  under  the  Egyptian 
law  is  a  controversial  issue  because  the  rules  of  the 
time  limit  in  the  maritime  commercial  law  are  in 
contradiction  with  those  principles  provided  for  in 
Brussels  Convention  for  Unification  of  Certain  Rules  of 
Law  Relating  to  Bill  of  Lading  (The  Hague  Rules).  135 
Thus,  it  is  desirable  to  amend  the  Egyptian  Maritime 
Commercial  Law  by  adopting  the  principles  of  the  Hague 
Rules  as  mere  rules  applying  in  cases  of  dispute 
concerning  the  time  limit. 
This  proposed  amendment  will  unify  the  principles  of 
the  time  limit  and  avoid  all  the  ambiguities  which  arise 
from  applying  a  dual  system  of  the  time  limit  under  the 
Egyptian  Law. 
The  principles  of  time  limits  for  suit  under  the 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  however,  do  not  apply 
to  inland  navigation  which  are  similar  to  those 
principles  provided  in  the  Hague  Rules  of  not  applying 
the  Rules  to  inland  navigation.  136 
The  time  limit  under  the  Egyptian  jurisprudence  is  then 
divided  into  two  categories: 
1-Limitation  of  Actions  under  the  Egyptian  Maritime 
135-Al-Barodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  183. 
136-Kamel,  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  pp  339-340. 517 
Commercial  Law.  137 
2-Limitation  of  Actions  Under  the  Hague  Rules.  138 
1-LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS  UNDER  THE  EGYPTIAN 
MARITIME  COMMERCIAL  LAW 
Article  (274]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law 
provides139  that  the  carrier  is  entitled  to  make  a  plea 
for  non-admission  of  the  action,  which  is  brought  against 
him  concerning  the  loss  of  the  goods  when  the  goods  have 
been  handed  over  to  the  consignee  and  he  has  not  given  a 
notice  from  the  moment  of  the  delivery  of  the  goods. 
Also,  an  action  shall  be  inadmissible  when  it  brought 
against  the  charterers  for  damage  done  if  the  shipmaster 
delivered  the  goods  and  received  his  freight  without  any 
protest. 
Article  (275]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial 
Law140  adds  that  the  notices  and  actions  shall  be  null  and 
137-Articles  271,  274,  and  275  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial 
Law. 
138-Article  [3]  para  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
139-Kamel,  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  p  339,  where  he  states 
the  text  of  the  Article  [274]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial 
Law  as  follows: 
"Shall  be  inadmissible  any  actions  against  the  shipmaster  for 
damage  suffered  by  the  goods  shipped  if  delivery  thereof  was  made 
without  any  protest,  all  actions  brought  against  the  charterers  for 
damage  done  if  the  shipmaster  delivered  the  goods  and  received  his 
freight  without  any  protest,  all  actions  for  making  good  the  damage 
caused  for  boarding  in  a  place  where  the  shipmaster  may  bring  an 
action  if  he  had  not  lodged  a  claim". 
140-Kamel,  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  p  339,  where  he  states 
the  text  of  the  Article  (275]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial 
Law  as  follows: 518 
of  no  effect  if  the  notices  are  not  given  within  [48] 
hours  and  are  not  followed  by  bringing  an  action  to  the 
court  within  (31]  days  from  that  date. 
The  scope  of  this  pleading  is  confined  to  the  partial 
loss  of  or  damage  to  the  goods.  The  carrier  is  therefore 
not  entitled  to  retain  such  a  plea  concerning  total  loss 
or  delay  in  delivery.  141 
The  Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held,  in  case  of  delay 
in  delivery,  that  when  the  goods  have  not  arrived  at 
their  destination  in  time,  then  the  liability  of  the 
carrier  is  ascertained  without  any  need  to  inspect  the 
goods  carried  within  a  specific  period.  142 
The  characterization  of  the  plea  for  non-admission  of 
action  is  considered  as  a  substantive  condition  in 
accordance  with  Articles  274  and  275  of  the  Egyptian 
Maritime  Commercial  Law,  but  not  a  formal  condition  which 
is  allowed  to  dismiss  the  action  according  to  the 
Procedural  Law.  143 
Consequently  an  order  for  dismissal  of  action, 
according  to  such  a  plea,  must  be  made  during  the 
interlocutory  proceedings  and  is  not  allowed  to  be  made 
at  the  conclusion  of  the  trial  or  at  the  court  of 
"These  protests  and  claims  are  null  and  of  no  effect  if  they  were 
not  lodged  and  notified  within  forty  eight  hours  and  if,  within 
thirty  one  days  from  their  date,  no  legal  proceedings  followed". 
141-Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  pp  277-278;  A1-Barodi,  Maritime  Law, 
pp  183-184. 
142-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  on  April  30th,  1968,  year 
19th,  p  891. 
143-Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  280. 519 
cassation  for  the  first  time. 
It  is  also  not  deemed  as  a  part  of  public  policy.  The 
judge  is  therefore  not  entitled  to  dismiss  the  action  by 
himself  without  asking  that  the  defendant,  144  and  the 
contracting  parties  may  give  up  such  a  right  expressly  or 
impliedly,  i.  e;  where  the  contracting  parties  stipulated 
in  the  carriage  contract  or  at  the  delivery  of  the  goods 
or,  when  the  carrier  promised  to  compensate  the  consignee 
or  the  shipper  for  all  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
goods. 
The  Alexandria  court  of  the  first  instance145  has, 
however,  ruled  out  the  application  of  the  plea  for  non- 
admission  of  action,  which  emerges  from  Articles  274  and 
275  of  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  in  a  case  when 
the  facts,  which  caused  damage  to  the  cargo,  are  known  to 
the  carrier,  or  were  made  known  to  him,  or  should  have 
been  known  to  him,  because  he  has  enough  time  to  collect 
the  evidence  and  defend  his  interests  against  any  action 
which  might  arise. 
Article  [271]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law, 
however,  provides  that  the  action  respecting  the  delivery 
of  the  goods  is  time  barred  within  a  year  from  the 
arrival  of  the  vessel. 
The  one  year  provision  of  the  time  limit  for  the 
plaintiff  to  bring  suit  under  Article  [2711  of  the 
144-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  on  May  4th,  1971,  No.  468,  Year 
36th,  p  594. 
145-Alexandria  Court  of  the  First  Instance  held  on  March  4th,  1968, 
February  26th,  1967,  and  January  29th,  1968,  where  they  stated  by 
Al-Baroodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  186. 520 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  applies  in  the  case  of 
total  loss  or  delay  in  delivery  and  when  the  carrier  does 
not  exercise  his  right  to  plea  for  non-admission  of 
action,  or  the  court  does  not  operate  this  plea  and 
accepts  the  suit  against  the  carrier.  146 
This  limitation  period  commences  from  the  day  of  the 
arrival  of  the  vessel  at  its  destination.  If  any  accident 
takes  place  during  the  course  of  the  voyage,  then  the 
time  of  prescription  runs  from  the  day  when  the  vessel 
should  have  arrived  according  to  the  customary  course  of 
voyage. 
147  It  is  however  submitted  to  the  general 
principles  of  the  interruption  in  accordance  with  Article 
(273]  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law. 
Though  the  action  is  time  barred,  the  plaintiff  has  a 
right  to  ask  the  court  to  make  the  carrier  swear  that  he 
has  performed  his  obligations  completely  in  transporting 
the  goods  in  accordance  with  Article  [272]  of  Egyptian 
Maritime  Law.  148 
2-LIMITATION  OF  ACTIONS  UNDER  THE  HAGUE  RULES 
As  far  as  the  time  limit  is  concerned,  under  Egyptian 
jurisprudence,  the  Hague  Rules  would  be  applied  in  cases 
of  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  relating  to  bill  of  lading  or 
any  similar  document  of  title. 
The  time  limit  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  is 
therefore  one  year  from  delivery  of  the  goods,  or  the 
146-Al-Barodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  189. 
147-A1-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  281. 
148-Al-Barodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  190;  Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law,  p  281. 521 
date  when  the  goods  should  have  been  delivered.  149 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  extends  the  Hague  Rules  only  to 
the  maritime  course.  The  carrier's  liability,  therefore, 
begins  from  the  commencement  of  the  voyage  and  cease  at 
the  end  of  the  voyage  by  discharging  the  goods  from  the 
vessel. 
Whereas,  Article  (2711  of  the  Egyptian  Maritime 
Commercial  Law  applies  to  the  disputes  which  arise  before 
loading  or  after  discharging  the  goods  carried  which 
emerge  from  breaching  the  contract  of  carriage  by  not 
performing  the  obligations  of  such  a  contract  partially 
or  totally.  150 
Consequently,  the  beginning  of  the  period  of  the  time 
limit  under  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  is  different 
from  that  provided  in  the  Hague  Rules  by  saying  that  the 
time  limit  commences  from  the  day  of  the  arrival  of  the 
vessel  at  the  agreed  destination. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  criterion  of  delivery151  is  an 
important  factor  in  deciding  the  beginning  of  the  time 
limit  as  mentioned  before.  152 
If  the  carrier,  therefore,  wants  to  avail  himself  of 
the  time  limit  for  suit  either  in  the  Hague  Rules  or 
Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law,  then  he  has  to  show 
149-Article  [3]  para  [6]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
150-Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage,  p  132. 
151-[1958]  39  AJ,  p  636,  where  it  is  stated  the  decision  of  the 
Alexandria  Court  of  First  Instance  held  on  January  26th,  1958. 
152-Al-Sharkawi,  The  Maritime  Law,  p  311;  Hussni,  Maritime 
Carriage,  p  132. 522 
evidence  that  the  loss  of  or  damage  to,  the  goods 
occurred  during  a  particular  stage  of  transport,  i.  e; 
during  the  maritime  course  or  before  or  after  the 
maritime  stage,  in  order  to  decide  which  rules  are 
competent  as  far  as  the  time  limit  is  concerned.  153 
Otherwise,  it  would  be  considered  that  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  goods  occurred  during  the  course  of  the 
maritime  voyage,  unless  the  carrier  proves  that  such  loss 
or  damage  has  taken  place  before  loading  or  after 
discharging  the  goods  from  the  vessel.  154 
The  carrier  is  however  not  entitled  to  lessen  the 
period  of  the  time  limit  for  suit  by  inserting  special 
terms  in  the  contract  of  carriage  because  it  would  be 
contrary  to  Article  (3]  para  (8]  of  the  Hague  Rules. 
By  contrast,  the  carrier  may  extend  the  period  of  time 
limit  in  accordance  with  Article[5]  of  the  Hague  Rules.  155 
The  principles  of  interruption  or  stoppage  in  the  Civil 
Code  would  be  applied  on  the  time  limit  for  suit.  156 
The  confession  of  the  carrier,  which  admits  that  the 
cargo-owner  has  a  right  to  compensation  and  the  carrier 
is  therefore  responsible  for  recovery  of  the  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  cargo,  would  interrupt  the  time  limit.  157 
153-Egyptian  Court  of  Caseation  held  on  February  11th,  1960,  Year 
11th,  p  126. 
159-Egyptian  Court  of  Caseation  held  on  February  11th,  1960,  Year 
11th,  pp  126,137. 
155-Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage,  p  131. 
156-Egyptian  Court  of  Cassation  held  on  April  20th,  1968,  Year  19th, 
p  891. 
157-A1-Barodi,  Maritime  Law,  p  233. 523 
CONCLUSION 
We  can  conclude  from  the  foregoing  discussion  that  the 
principles  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  are  similar  to  the 
principles  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  as  far  as  the  carrier's 
liability  is  concerned. 
For  instance,  by  extending  the  carrier's  liability  to 
cover  the  entire  period  whether  prior  to  the  voyage  or 
during  and  subsequent  to  the  voyage  while  the  goods  are 
in,  his  charge  and  cease  at  the  moment  the  goods  have  been 
delivered  to  the  consignee,  158  or  by  adopting  the  Special 
Drawing  Rights  and  the  way  of  calculation  of  the  amount 
of  the  limitation  of  liability  for  loss  resulting  from 
loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  as  well  as  delay  in 
delivery. 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  however,  on  some  occasions 
differs  from  the  principles  of  the  Hague  and  the  Hamburg 
Rules  concerning  the  basis  of  the  carrier's  liability  by 
establishing  the  liability  system  on  the  principles  of 
"trust  i'  . 
159 
By  contrast,  the  principles  of  presumed  fault  or 
neglect  has  been  implied  by  the  Hague  Rules  and  expressed 
by  the  Hamburg  Rules.  160 
On  the  other  hand,  Egyptian  jurisprudence  has  adopted 
the  attitude  of  the  Hague  Rules  by  providing  that  the 
158-Article  [27]  para  [1]  and  (131]  para  [2]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport 
Law. 
159-Article  [46]  para  (1]  of  the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 
160-Article  [3,4]  of  the  Hague  Rules  and  Article  [5]  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules. 524 
scope  of  the  carrier's  liability  is  confined  to  the 
maritime  course.  Viz,  the  scope  of  the  carrier's 
liability  begins  from  the  commencement  of  the  voyage  and 
ceases  at  the  end  of  the  voyage,  that  which  is  called  the 
"tackle  to  tackle"  criterion,  unless  the  carrier  has 
agreed  to  extend  his  liability  beyond  the  maritime  stage. 
All  this  can  be  said  with  confidence.  As  a  result  of 
recent  developments,  neither  the  traditional  Shari'a  Law 
nor  the  Ottoman  Law  of  Maritime  Commerce  1863  apply  to 
the  laws  governing  the  system  of  the  foreign  maritime 
carrier. 
161 
The  Ottoman  Commercial  Law  was  displaced  in  Egypt  and 
Iraq  respectively  as  far  as  the  liability  of  the  carrier 
is  concerned. 
Modern  legislation  is  modelled  on  Egyptian  Law  by 
ratification  of  the  Hague  Rules  since  May  29th,  1944. 
Also,  the  Egyptian  Draftsman  attempts  to  embody  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  in  the  Final  Draft  Proposal  For 
Egyptian  Maritime  Law.  In  the  subsequent  Iraqi  Law  has 
embodied  the  principles  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  in  the 
national  law  by  legislation  of  the  Transport  Law  in  1983. 
Iraqi  and  Egyptian  jurisprudence  have  broadened  their 
horizons  however  by  looking  beyond  traditional  Islamic 
Law  and  adopting  the  principles  of  the  International 
161-Compare,  Al-Jazairy,  pp  68,73,123,272,291,  where  he  states: 
"Ottoman  Law  of  Maritime  Commerce  is  in  force  in  Iraq  which  was 
enacted  in  1863  when  Iraq  was  colonized  by  Ottoman  Empire". 
Whereas,  the  Ottoman  Law  of  Maritime  Commerce  was  displaced  as  far 
as  the  liability  of  the  carrier  is  concerned  in  1983  by  enacting 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law. 525 
Convention. 
Shari'a  Law  is  being  consistently  eroded  by  the 
dictates  of  modern  principles  of  maritime  law,  which 
provided  in  the  International  Convention,  162  in  Egypt  and 
Iraq  respecting  the  liability  of  the  maritime  carrier. 
The  principles  of  maritime  law  have  however  applied 
even  in  the  Shari'a  Law  countries,  163  e.  g.  Qatar  which 
gives  priority  to  maritime  law  and  the  general  principles 
of  the  Civil  Law  and  consequently,  in  the  absence  of  a 
specific  provision  that  the  court  may  apply  the 
principles  of  the  International  Conventions  even  Qatar 
itself  does  not  subscribe  to  such  a  convention.  164 
The  Qatar  Court  of  Appeal  in  1975  declared:  165 
"Whereas  no  maritime  law  has  been  promulgated 
in  Qatar  one  should  turn  to  general  provisions 
of  Qatar  Civil  Law,  and  after  perusing  articles 
from  it  we  find  it  stipulates  that  "in  the 
162-W.  M.  Ballantyne,  Legal  Development  in  Arabia,  1980,  p  66, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "ballantyne,  Legal  Development  In  Arabia" 
where  he  states  : 
"Commercial  and  business  law  in  this  area  will,  in  my  view, 
continue  to  develop  along  the  lines  of  the  continental  system,  the 
Shari'a  Law  will  inevitably  continue  to  be  eroded  in  this  respect 
and  play  less  and  less  of  a  role  in  commercial  relations;  and  the 
common  law  system  will,  with  the  exception  perhaps  of  some 
increasingly  isolated  instance,  become  extinguished";  See  also, 
Noel  Jr  Coulson,  Commercial  Law  in  the  Gulf  States,  1984,  pp  91-93, 
107-108,  hereinafter  cited  as  "coulson,  Commercial  Law  in  the 
Gulf". 
163-Saudi  Arabia,  Bahrain,  Kuwait,  Oman,  Qatar,  and  The  United  Arab 
Emirates. 
164-Deborah  Ann  Rice,  Maritime  Legislation  in  the  Arabian  Gulf 
States,  [1985]  1ALQ,  p  69  at  71. 
165-Qatar  Court  of  Appeal  ,  case  15/94  of  January  1975. 526 
absence  of  an  applicable  legal  provision  the 
judge  shall  adjudicate  according  to  custom. 
Special  Custom  shall  prevail  over  general 
custom.  Should  there  be  no  custom  the  principles 
of  the  Islamic  Shari'a  shall  apply".  And 
whereas  it  is  not  questionable  that  there  is  no 
special  or  local  custom  in  the  state  of  Qatar, 
or  the  port  of  Doha,  the  opinion  of  the  First 
Instance  Court  to  apply  the  general  principles 
of  maritime  assistance  and  salvage  emanating 
from  international  customs  codified  in  the 
Brussels  Convention  of  1910  is  correct" 
The  general  aim  of  the  comparative  study  of  Iraqi  and 
Egyptian  jurisprudence  is  then  to  reveal  that  both  apply 
the  Rules  of  International  Convention  either  by  adopting 
these  conventions  or  embodying  the  principles  of  the 
Rules  in  their  own  national  law. 
The  Iraqi  and  Egyptian  courts,  to  some  extent,  intend 
to  benefit  from  the  precedents  and  experience  of  the 
United  Kingdom  and  United  States,  particularly  in  the 
field  of  the  legal  system  concerning  the  carriage  of 
goods  by  sea  because  both  countries  apply  the  Rules  of 
the  International  Convention  and  they  have  tremendous 
experience  respecting  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea. 
Any  attempt  therefore  to  establish  a  bridge  of  joint 
understanding  for  the  principles  of 
sea  would  be  helped  by  all  countries 
developing,  solving  their  problems, 
International  trade,  through  United 
the  Committees  which  specialise  in 
law,  i.  e;  UNACTAD,  UNCITRAL.  etc. 
carriage  of  goods  by 
either  developed  or 
which  arise  from  the 
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FINAL  CONCLUSION 
Classification  of  deviation  into  geographical  and  non- 
geographical  deviation  is  very  important  in  explaining 
the  context  of  deviation's  terminology  within  the  law  of 
carriage. 
This  trend  of  classification  has  however  little  impact 
on  the  characterization  of  the  effect  of  deviation, 
especially  when  we  found  that  geographical,  or  non- 
geographical  deviation  which  has  occurred  during  the 
course  of  the  maritime  voyage,  or  quasi-deviation  which 
has  taken  place  outside  the  scope  of  the  maritime  voyage, 
viz,  the  port  of  departure  or  the  port  of  discharge,  has 
the  same  impact  on  the  contract  of  carriage. 
Any  diversion,  therefore,  which  occurs  during  the 
carriage  course  is  deemed  deviation  and  it  is  immaterial 
to  inquire  the  type  of  deviation  as  geographical,  non- 
geographical  or  even  quasi-deviation. 
A  useful  classification  of  the  deviation  is  however 
possible  by  adopting  the  criterion  of  reasonableness 
which  is  contended  to  define  what  is  fundamental,  and 
what  is  not  fundamental  deviation.  This  criterion  is 
based  on  the  interests  of  the  contracting  parties  and 
whether  they  benefit  by  the  deviation  or  not  by 
considering  the  nature  of  the  adventure,  the  contemplated 
voyage  and  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  the  given 
case  at  the  time  deviation  took  placer, 
1-Per  Lord  Atkin,  in,  The  Foscolo  Manac  n"  V.  Staff  Linn  Ltd. 528 
The  "reasonableness",  then,  cannot  arise  out  of 
circumstances  deliberately  planned  nor  from  gross 
negligence.  A  causal  connection  should  be  shown  between 
unreasonable  deviation  and  the  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
cargo,  otherwise  the  carrier  will  not  be  liable  for  such 
loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo2. 
Wilful  or  intentional  misconduct  is  an  essential 
element  in  considering  what  is,  and  what  is  not, 
unreasonable  deviation.  Any  intentional  deviation  from 
the  contract  of  carriage,  whether  by  changing  the  course 
of  the  voyage  or  breaching  the  contract  of  carriage  by 
stowing  the  goods  on  deck,  whereas,  the  contract 
stipulated  that  the  goods  carried  should  be  stowed  under 
deck,  is  deemed  an  unreasonable  deviation3. 
By  contrast  the  carrier  is  liable  for  any  loss  of,  or 
damage  to,  the  cargo  resulting  from  wrongful  stowage  on 
deck  which  is  classified  as  lack  of  proper  care  according 
to  Article  3  (2]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA.  On 
the  other  hand,  an  error  in  the  navigation  or  management 
of  the  vessel  which  is  committed  by  the  master  is  not 
sufficient  to  be  considered  as  a  deviation,  but  might  be 
deemed  as  a  navigational  error  which  will  exempt  the 
carrier  from  liability  according  to  Article  4  (2]  (a)  of 
(1931)  41  L1.  L.  Rep.  p  165  (H.  L}. 
2-Tetley,  marine  Claim,  p  356;  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  180;  Mobile 
gains  &  Supply  Coro.  v.  M.  V.  Bang  arKakoli,  No,  81-7704  (S.  D.  N.  Y.  13 
June  1984). 
3-This  trend  is  the  attitude  of  the  United  States  jurisprudence 
which  has  extended  the  concept  of  deviation  to  cover  any  variation 
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the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA. 
Any  exaggeration  in  the  drastic  effect  of  an 
unreasonable  deviation  should  however  be  isolated  from 
the  scope  of  the  responsibilities  which  are  provided  in 
Article  3  [2]  of  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  COGSA 
concerning  the  carrier's  duty  to  load,  handle,  store, 
carry,  keep,  and  discharge  the  goods  properly  and 
carefully4. 
It  is  also  important  to  keep  in  mind  the  distinction 
between  the  characterization  of  unreasonable  deviation 
and  its  effect  on  the  bill  of  lading  and  on  insurance 
policy5. 
Under  marine  insurance,  any  variation  or  increase  of 
the  insured  risks  is  actually  an  unreasonable  deviation 
which  displaces  the  insurance  policy6. 
Whereas,  mere  variation  of  the  insured  risk  is  not 
deemed  deviation  in  the  law  of  carriage,  but  violation  of 
the  contract  is  so  serious  that  it  goes  to  the  root  of 
that  contract  then  it  invalidates  all  the  exemption 
clauses  in  the  bill  of  lading  and  deprives  the  carrier  of 
all  the  benefits  granted  by  the  contract  of  carriage  when 
deviation  has  taken  place  with  intent  to  cause  damage  or 
recklessly  with  knowledge  that  damage  would  probably 
4-Tetley,  marine  Claim,  p  356;  Gilmore  &  Black,  p  182,  Compare, 
Roger,  p  182,  Footnote,  135. 
5-Knauth,  p  251;  sarpa,  p  147. 
6-Robert  H.  Brown,  Marine  Insurance,  (5th,  ed,  vol,  I,  1986),  p  99, 
hereinafter  cited  as  "Brown,  Marine  Insurance",  where  he  states: 
"No  action,  such  as  avoidance  of  contract  is  required  of  the 
underwriter;  the  effect  of  deviation  being  automatic";  Knauth,  p  251. 530 
result7. 
The  notion  of  deviation  is  then  based  on  a  rule  of 
substantive  law  rather  than  a  rule  of  construction 
because  unreasonable  deviation  is  an  infringement  or 
breach  of  the  contract  of  carriage  which  emerged  from  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules  or  COGSA.  8 
That  indicates  that  delay  occurring  in  the  course  of 
the  maritime  voyage,  even  though  unreasonable,  does  not 
amount  to  as  serious  a  breach  of  the  contract  as 
deviation  and  there  is  some  differece  between  them 
whether  in  context  or  in  effect  on  the  contract  of 
carriage.  9 
The  carrier  is  liable  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the 
cargo  resulting  from  delay  in  delivery  depending  on  the 
basis  of  the  commercial  purpose  of  the  venture  which  is 
frustrated  by  the  carrier's  negligence  to  begin  the 
contemplated  voyage  with  utmost  dispatch. 
The  carrier's  failure  constitutes  then  a  breach  of  the 
contract  but  it  does  not  go  to  the  root  of  the  contract. 
Consequently  the  contract  is  still  subsisting  and  valid 
but  the  delay  in  delivery  will  be  actionable  unless  there 
is  an  agreement  between  the  contracting  parties  to  the 
contraryl0. 
The  purpose  of  the  Hague  Rules  is  however  aimed  at 
7-Tetley,  Selected  Problems  of  Maritime  Law,  p  56;  Tetley,  Marine 
Claim,  p  354;  Gilomre  &  Black,  p  180. 
8-Compare,  Mills,  The  Future  of  Deviation,  p  596. 
9-See  chapter  one  section  (IV). 
10-Knauth,  pp  261-265;  2  Carver,  pars,  1205,  p  890. 531 
making  a  compromise  between  the  interests  of  the  carrier 
and  the  shipper,  namely  the  developed  and  developing 
countries.  This  purpose  has  been  substantially  directed 
in  favour  of  the  cargo-owners  rather  than  the  carriers 
under  the  Hamburg  Rules  by  establishing  a  "balanced 
allocation  of  risk  between  cargo-owners  and  carriers". 
This  policy  of  International  Conventions  has  reflected 
in  rather  elaborate  provisions  on  the  basis  of  the 
liability  regime  which  is  still  based  on  the  principles 
of  presumed  fault  or  neglect  and  not  of  strict  liability. 
The  Hamburg  Rules  have  rearranged  the  principles  of  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  in  order  to  fit  the  interests  of 
the  shippers  and  the  cargo-owners. 
For  instance,  by  creating  a  new  system  for  the 
carrier's  immunity  rather  than  a  long  list  of  exception 
clauses  which  are  provided  by  the  Hague  Rules  or; 
Expanding  the  scope  of  the  carrier's  liability  to  cover 
the  entire  period  during  which  the  carrier  is  in  charge 
of  the  goods  or,  to  cover  the  carriage  of  live  animals 
and  the  stowage  of  the  goods  on  deck  whether  such 
liability  emerges  from  physical  or  non-physical  damage 
such  as  in  the  case  of  delay  in  delivery  of  the  goods 
carried.  Whereas,  the  period  of  liability  under  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  is  limited  to  the  maritime  stage  only 
and  the  carrier's  liability  is  excluded  from  applying  on 
the  carriage  of  live  animals  or  the  stowing  of  the  goods 
on  deck  or; 
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to  two  years  and  giving  the  claimant  a  right  to  institute 
his  action  to  the  contempt  courts  of  six  different 
places.  Under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules,  the  time  limitation 
for  suit  of  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo  is  one  year 
and  these  Rules  do  not  provide  any  provision  concerning 
the  jurisdiction  clause  for  the  handling  of  claims1l. 
The  insurance  policies  purport  to  cover  any  loss,  or 
damage,  caused  to  the  cargo  insured  even  though  the 
carrier  is  liable  for  such  loss,  or  damage.  That  does  not 
mean  that  the  liability  regime  is  replaced  with  cargo 
insurance.  Many  cases  in  the  practical  field  have  shown 
that  some  loss  of,  or  non-physical  damage  to,  the  cargo 
is  not  covered  by  the  cargo  insurance  and  the  cargo 
insurers  have  no  duty  to  indemnify  them,  i.  e;  delay 
warranties  even  if  the  delay  is  caused  by  an  insured 
risk;  economic  loss  such  as  a  market  loss  or  any 
consequential  loss  resulting  from  delay  in  delivery. 
The  liability  system  is  very  important  in  considering 
who  is  responsible  for  loss  of,  or  damage  to,  the  cargo 
and  determining  whether  the  cargo-owner  may  recover 
compensation  or  bear  the  loss  himself.  It  also  determines 
the  right  of  recourse  of  the  insurer  against  the  carrier 
especially  in  the  case  of  "overlapping  insurance".  the 
liability  regime  is  then  an  essential  element  in 
considering  the  responsibility  of  the  carrier  concerning 
the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea. 
The  question  now  may  arise  about  the  effect  of  the 
11-Chandler,  pp  233-289. 533 
moderate  increase  in  the  level  of  the  liability  system 
which  is  adopted  by  the  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  marine 
insurance  industry. 
The  main  issue  for  modern  writers,  in  regard  to  the 
liability  of  the  carrier  under  the  Hamburg  Rules,  is  the 
deletion  of  the  exceptions  of  nautical  fault  and  fire 
which  are  deemed  as  privileges  for  shipowners,  or 
carriers,  under  the  Hague  Rules.  The  Hague  Rules  provide 
however  that  any  losses  of,  or  damages  to,  the  cargo 
caused  by  nautical  fault  or  fire  are  recoverable  from 
cargo  insurers  with  whom  these  losses  ultimately  remain 
because  there  is  no  legal  way  authorising  the  cargo 
insurers  to  recover  these  losses  from  the  carriers 
according  to  the  catalogue  of  the  Hague  Rules' 
exceptions. 
On  the  other  hand,  the  cargo  insurers  have  a  right  to 
exercise  recourse  against  the  shipowners  under  the  legal 
system  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  which  provides  a  general 
standard  for  the  carrier's  liability  depending  on  the 
principles  of  presumed  fault  or  neglect  without 
mentioning  a  particular  exception  merely  saying  that  the 
carrier  is  obliged  to  take  all  measures  that  could 
reasonably  be  required  to  avoid  the  occurrence  and  its 
consequences. 
This  trend  endeavours  to  prove  that  any  change  in  the 
level  of  the  carrier's  liability  will  affect  the  marine 
insurance  industry  on  the  one  hand  and  the  sharing 
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total  volume  of  premiums  on  the  other  hand.  That 
indicates  that  the  net  payments  of  cargo  insurers  will  be 
less  and  the  premium  volume  will  be  reduced  accordingly 
under  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
By  contrast,  the  net  payments  and  the  premium  of  the  P 
&I  Clubs  will  increase.  Besides,  this  encourages  the 
carriers  to  impose  a  higher  freight  on  the  shipper  than 
the  increase  in  the  liability  insurance  cost. 
Consequently,  the  shippers  or  cargo-owners  would  pay  more 
for  their  goods  in  freight  than  they  would  save  from  the 
decrease  in  the  premium  volume  of  the  cargo  insurance12. 
This  viewpoint,  which  is  based  on  the  economical  level 
in  considering  the  impact  of  the  increase  in  the  level  of 
the  carrier's  liability  under  the  Hamburg  Rules,  is 
debatable  and  highly  questionable. 
First  of  all,  we  should  avoid  any  misunderstanding 
concerning  the  attitude  of  the  Hamburg  Rules  towards 
cargo  insurance.  These  Rules  neither  dislodge  the  need 
for  cargo  insurance  in  the  form  of  insured  bills  of 
lading,  nor  reduce  the  advantages  for  the  cargo-owner  or 
shipper  of  establishing  an  insurance  policy  which  aims  to 
reach  quicker  settlements  of  claims  on  a  commercial 
basis  . 
Secondly,  the  fears  of  increasing  the  cost  of  insurance 
and  the  freight  rates,  resulting  from  the  tightening  up 
of  the  carrier's  liability  by  being  careful  and  prudent 
in  dealing  with  the  goods  while  they  are  in  his  charge, 
12-Selvig,  pp  311-313. 535 
did  not  materialize  under  the  Warsaw  Convention  and  would 
not  be  raised  in  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  under  the 
Hamburg  Rules  because  the  developed  countries  have 
exaggerated  in  evaluating  the  effect  of  the  liability 
regime  of  the  new  Rules  and  these  Rules  would  not  be 
effective  on  the  insurance  industry  which  is  competitive 
and  dependent  on  international  transactions. 
Thirdly,  the  high  standard  of  care  of  the  maritime 
carrier  in  dealing  with  cargo  which  provides  by  the 
Hamburg  Rules  might  reduce  overall  insurance  costs, 
whether  in  cargo  insurance  or  P&I  Clubs,  'by  taking 
greater  care  in  order  to  avoid  loss,  damage,  or  delay  in 
delivery. 
Finally,  any,  shift  in  risk  allocation  from  cargo 
insurance  to  carrier's  liability  would  be  particularly 
detrimental  to  the  interests  of  developing  countries13, 
especially  when  the  developing  countries  realize  that  the 
freight  rates  will  never  go  up  because  they  are 
established  by  the  liner  conferences  which  are  dominated 
by  the  shipowners  of  "developed  countries"  and  they  fix 
the  freight  rates  with  the  competitive  market.  Therefore 
the  carriers  would  be  able  to  accommodate  the  new  system 
of  liability  created  by  the  Hamburg  Rules. 
I  am  then  inclined  to  the  attitude  which  intends  to 
increase  the  level  of  the  carrier's  liability  in  favour 
of  the  shippers  or  cargo-owners  which  would  help 
developing  countries  in  improving  their  international 
13-Shah,  pp  11-18. 536 
trade  with  developed  countries  on  the  basis  of  equal 
bargaining  power,  equitable  reciprocity  and,  justice, 
taking  into  account  the  relevant  economic  effect  of  the 
carrier's  liability  on  the  insurers  or  p&I  Clubs,  which 
might  not  be  effective  on  the  marine  insurance  companies 
especially  when  they  act  according  to  the  competitive 
market. 
however,  these  general  principles  of  maritime  law 
concerning  the  liability  regime  have  some  connection  with 
principles  regulating  other  methods  of  transportation, 
i.  e;  Air,  Road,  and  Rail.  This  kind  of  harmonization 
between  the  traditional  modes  of  carriage  has  responsed 
to  the  rapid  technological  development  and  encouraged  the 
international  community,  under  the  supervision  of  the 
United  Nations,  to  emerge  a  new  convention  on 
"International  Multimodal  Transport  of  Goods".  This 
convention  has  created  a  multimodal  transport  which 
intends  to  carry  the  goods  by  at  least  two  different 
modes  of  transport  on  the  basis  of  multimodal 
transport14. 
The  Iraqi  Draftsman  has  made  a  good  effort  by  issuing 
the  Iraqi  Transport  Law  which  unifies  all  the  principles 
governing  different  modes  of  transport  in  uniform  text 
and  considering  the  surrounding  circumstances  of  a  given 
mode  of  transport  by  providing  a  separate  provision  for 
these  modes  of  transport,  i.  e;  Air,  Sea,  Road,  Rail  and 
14-Article  1  [1]  of  the  United  Nations  Convention  on  International 
Multimodal  Transport  of  Goods. PAGE 
MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL 538 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Acomb,  Robert  B.  Jr.,  Damages  R  oyerabl  e  in  ariti￿me 
Matters  ,  Chicago,  1984,  Cit 
.  "Acomb,  Damages 
Recoverable". 
Al-Anbaki,  Majid  H.  K.,  "Passing  of  Property  in  C.  I.  F.  & 
F.  O.  B.  Contracts",  A  Thesis  Approved  for  Ph.  D  Degree, 
Glasgow  University,  1978,  Cit.  "Al-Anbaki,  C.  I.  F.  & 
F.  O.  B.  ". 
The  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  The  Rules  an 
Principlesr  Baghdad,  1984,  Cit.  "Al-Anbaki,  Iraqi 
Transport  Law". 
Al-Barodi,  Ali.,  Principles  of  Maritime  Law,  Alexandria, 
1983,  Cit.  "Al-Barodi,  Maritime  law". 
Al-Jazairy,  Hashim  R.,  "The  Maritime  Carrier's  Liability 
under  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  Hamburg  Rules",  A  Thesis 
Approved  for  the  Degree  of  Ph.  D.  Faculty  of  Law, 
University  of  Glasgow,  1983,  Cit.  Al-Jazairy. 
Al-Sharkawi,  M.  S.,  The  Maritime  Law,  Cairo,  1978,  Cit. 
"Al-Sharkawi,  The  Maritime  Law". 
Al-kalubi,  Sameha.,  The  Maritime  Law,  Cairo,  1982,  Cit. 
"Al-Kalubi,  Maritime  Law". 
Alpa,  Guido,  &.  Berlingier,  Francesco.,  "The  Liability  of 
the  Carrier  by  Sea:  Present  Regulation  and  Prospects  of 
Reform",  Published  in  the  Studies  on  the  Revision  of  the 
Brussels  convention-  on  Bills  of  Lading,  1974,  p  69, 
Universita  Di  Genova,  Facolta,  Di  Economia  E  Commercio, 
Cit.  "Alga  &  Berligieri,  The  Liability  of  the  Carrier  by 539 
Sea". 
Amin,  Sayed  Hassan.,  Middle  East  Legal  Sylt  mss  Glasgow 
1985,  Cit.  "Amin,  Legal  Systems". 
Anton,  A,  E.,  Private  International  Law,  A  Treatise  from 
t.  lie  standpoint  of  Scots  Law,  Edinburgh,  1967,  Cit. 
"Anton,  Private  International  Law" 
Armstrong,  Timothy  J.,  "Packaging  Trends  and  Implications 
in  the  Container  Revalution",  [1981]  12  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com, 
p  427,  Cit.  "Armstrong,  Packaging  Trends". 
Astle,  W. E.,  Shipowner's  Cargo  Li_nbilitjes  and  immunstes, 
London,  1967,  Cit.  "Astle". 
Shipping  and  the  Law,  A  Practical  Review  of 
t  Hague  Rules  and  as  Amended  by  theme  Brussels  Protocol, 
London,  1968,  Cit.  "Astle,  Shipping  Law" 
Atiyah,  P.  S.,  Accidents,  Compensation  and  the  Law, 
{2nd,  ed,  1975},  London,  Cit.  "Atiyah,  Compensation  and  the 
Law". 
Negligence  and  Economic  ,  ass,  1967,83  L.  Q. 
R.  p  248,  Cit.  "Atiyah,  Economic  Loss". 
Awad,  A.  J.  D.,  "The  Limitation  of  the  Maritime  Carrier's 
liability  According  to  the  Brussels  Convention",  AJ,  Year 
35th,  No.  7,  pp  1416-1419,  Cit.  "Awad,  The  Limitation  of  the 
Carrier's  Liability". 
Ballantyne,  W.  M.,  Legal  Development  in  Arabia,  London, 
1980,  Cit.  "Ballantyne,  Legal  Development  in  Arabia". 
Barclay,  Cedric.,  "Technical  Aspects  of  Unseaworthiness", 
(19751  3  LMCLQ,  p  288,  Cit.  "Barclay". 540 
Bartle,  Ronald.  r  Introduction  to  Shipping  Tom,  2nd.  ed, 
1983,  Cit.  "Bartle". 
Basnayaka.,  "Origins  of  the  1978  Hamburg  Rules",  [19791 
27  Am.  J.  Comp.  Law.  p  353,  Cit.  "Basnayaka". 
Beare,  R.  E.,  "Forum  Shopping:  The  Effect  of  Conflict  of 
Law  on  the  Exercise  of  Cargo  Underwritings'  Subrogation 
Rights",  Published  in  the  Speakers'  paw  for  h  pill 
Qf  Lading  Conventions  .  onf  .  ren  _Q, 
Organized  by  Lloyd's  of 
London  Press,  1978,  New  York,  Beare  1,  Cit.  "Beare, 
Forum  Shopping". 
Bes,  J.,,  Chartering  and  _Shipping 
Term`,  1975,  vol.  I. 
Cit.  "Bes". 
Bissell,  Tallman.,  "The  Operational  Realities  of 
Containerization  and  their  Effect  on  the  Package 
Limitation  and  the  On-Deck  Prohibition:  Review  and 
Suggestions",  [1970-71]  45  Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  902,  Cit. 
"Bissell". 
Bristow,  L.,  "Gold  Franc-Replacement  of  Unit  of  Account", 
[1978)  1  LMCLQ,  p  31,  Cit.  "Bristow,  Gold  Franc". 
Brown,  Robert  H.,  Marine  ?  nsuurance,  Principles  and  Basic! 
p  ra  c_  .;.., 
{  5th,  ed,  vol,  I,  1986),  London,  Cit.  "Brown, 
Marine  Insurance". 
Bucknll,  T.  T.  &  Longley,  J.  Charles,  Lord  Tenterden.,  A 
Treatise  of  the  Law  Relative  to  Merchant  Ship's  acid 
Seamen,  Published  in  Abbott's  Law  of  Merchant  Ship  and 
Seamen,  13th,  ed,  London,  Cit.  "Abbott". 
Buloco,  Lucienne  Carasso.,  Conseg  uni1  DAma  es  and  the 
Duty  to  Mitigate  in  New  York  Maritime  A  r}ýltrar  ,  Cit. 541 
"Bulow,  Consequential  Damages" 
Burke,  John.,  Jowitt's  Dictionary  of  English  Taw,  vol, 
II,  Cit.  "Burke". 
Burns,  George  W.,  "An  Analysis  of  Common  Carrier 
Liability  for  Special  Damages",  [1968]  7  Transportation 
Journal,  p  11,  Cit.  "Burns,  Common  Carrier  Liability  for 
Special  Damages". 
Cabaud.,  "Cargo  Insurance"  (1971]  45  Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  988, 
Cit.  "cabaud". 
Cadwallader,  F.  J.  J.,  "Charterpart  ies-Distribution  of 
Functions-Shipowner  and  Charterer"  Published  in  the  Occan 
Chartering  Organised  by  the  UNCTAD  Secretariat,  London, 
1977,  p  94,  Cit.  "Cadwalider,  Charterparties". 
"COGSA  1971",  (1972]  35  M.  L.  R.  p  68,  Cit. 
"Cadwallader,  COGSA  1971". 
,  "English  Shipping  Cases",  1970,  (1970-71]  2  J. 
Mar.  L.  Com.,  Cit.  "Cadwallader,  English  Shipping  Cases, 
1970". 
"English  Shipping  Cases-1972",  [1973-741  5  J. 
Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  407,  Cit.  "Cadwallder,  English  Shipping 
Cases-1972". 
"Incorporating  Charterparty  Causes  Into  Bills 
of  Lading",  Published  in  the  Speaker's  Papers-for  thp. 
Bill  of  Lading  Conventions  Conferenn_P,  Organized  by  the 
Lloyd's  of  London,  NewYork,  1978,  Cit.  "Cadwaller,  Bills 
of  Lading". 
"Seaworthiness-An  Exercise  of  Due  Diligence, 
Published  in  the  Speaker's  Papers  for  the  Bill  of  Lading 542 
Conventions  Conference",  Organized  by  Lloyd  of  London 
Press  in  New  York,  1978,  p  3,  Cit.  "Cadwallader, 
Seaworthiness". 
Carbone,  Sergio  M.  &  Luzzatto,  Riccardo.,  "Arbitration 
Clauses,  Carriage  be  Sea  and  Uniform  Law",  Published  in 
the  Studies  on  the  Revision  of  the  Brussels  Convention  on 
Rills  of  Lading,  Universita  Di  Genova,  Facolta  Di 
Economia  E  Commercio,  1974,  p  353,  Cit.  "Carbone  & 
Luzzatto". 
Carbone,  sergio  M.  &  Pocar,  Fausto.,  "Conflict  of 
jurisdictions,  Carriage  by  Sea  and  Uniform  Law", 
Published  in  the  Studies  on  the  Revision  of 
-the 
Rrussels 
Convention  on  Bills  of  Lading,  Universita  Di  Genova, 
Facolta  Di  Economia  E  Commercio,  p  315,  Cit.  "Carbone  & 
Pocar". 
Chafik,  Muhsen.,  The  Rules  of  the  carriage  of  Goods  by 
,  {The  Hamburg  Rules,  1978},  1984,  Cit.  "Muhsen,  The 
Hamburg  Rules". 
Chamber's  Everyday  Dictionary,  1975,  Cit.  "Chambers". 
Chandler  III,  George  F.  "Comparison  of  COGSA,  the 
Hague/Visby  Rules,  and  the  Hamburg  Rules",  (19841  15  J. 
Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  233,  Cit.  "Chandler". 
Chandrahasan,  N.,  "Fundamental  Obligation  Theory",  [1979] 
5  Colombo  Law  Review,  p  115,  Cit.  "Chandrahasan". 
Chorley  &  Giles.,  Shipping  Law,  (7th,  ed,  19801  &  (8th, 
ed,  1987],  London,  Cit.  "Chorley  &  Giles". 
Chrispeels,  Erik;  &  Graham,  Thomas.,  "The  Brussels 543 
Convention  of  1924  {Ocean  Bill  of  Lading)  Further  Action 
Towards  Revision",  [1973]  7  Journal  of  World  Trade,  p 
692,  Cit.  "Erik  &  Thomas". 
Cigoj,  Stojan.,  "Legal  Relations  of  Stevedores  in 
Comarative  Law",  (1975]  3  LMCLQ,  p  296.  Cit.  "Cigoj". 
Clarke,  Malcolm  Alistair.,  Aspect  of  the  Hague  Rut  s, 
1976,  Cit.  "Clarke". 
Cleton,  Robert.,  "The  Special  Features  Arising  from  the 
Hamburg  Diplomatic  Conference",  Published  in  the  Hamburg 
Rules  A  one-Dav  Seminar,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London 
Press  Ltd,  1978,  London,  Cit.  "Cleton,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
Colinvaux,  Raoul.  carver's  Carriage  'y  Sei,  13th,  cad, 
1982,  Two  Volumes,  Cit.  "Carver". 
Coote,  Brian.,  Exception  Clauses,  Some  Aspects  of  the 
Relating  to  Exception  Clauses  in  Contracts  f  or  thn 
Carriage,  Bailment  and  Sale  of  Goods,  London,  1964,  Cit. 
"Coote". 
"The  Effect  of  Discharge  by  Breach  on 
Exception  Clauses",  [19701  C.  L.  J,  p  221,  Cit.  "Coote, 
Breach  on  Exception  Clauses". 
Coulson,  Noel  J.,  Commercial  Law  in  the  Gulf  Stag(---q, 
1984,  Cit.  "Coulson,  Commercail  Law  in  the  Gulf". 
Crutcher,  M.  Bayard.  "The  Ocean  Bill  of  Lading  as  Study  in 
Fossilization",  [1975]  45  Tul.  L.  R.  p  697,  Cit. 
"Crutcher". 
Davies,  J.  W.,  "Actions  in  Tort  for  Damaged  Cargo", 
[1985]  1  LMCLQ,  p  1,  Cit.  "Davies,  Damaged  Cargo". 
Debattista,  Chales.,  "Bill  of  Lading  as  the  Contract  of 544 
Carriage"  [19821  4  M.  L.  R.  p  652,  Cit  .  "Debattista,  Bill 
of  Lading". 
Denegre,  George.,  "Admiralty  Carrier  Owned  Shipping 
Container  Found  not  to  be  COGSA  Package"  (1981-82]  56 
Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  140,  Cit.  "Denegre,  Package". 
De  orchis,  M.  E.,  "The  Container  and  the  Package 
Limitation-the  Search  for  Predictability",  (1973-74]  5  J. 
Mar.  L  .&  Com,  p  251,  Cit.  "De  orchis,  The  Container  and 
the  Package  Limitation". 
Diamond,  A.,  "Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published 
in  the  Hamburg  Rules,  A  One  Day  Seminar,  Organised  by 
Lloyd's  of  London  Press  Ltd,  London,  1978,  Cit.  "Diamond, 
The  Hamburg  Rules". 
"The  Division  of  Liability  as  Between  Ship  and 
Cargo  {in  so  far  as  it  Affects  Cargo  Insurance}  under  the 
New  Rules  Proposed  by  UNCITRAL",  (1977]  1  LMCLQ,  p  39, 
Cit.  "Diamond,  UNCITRAL". 
"The  Hague/Visby  Rules",  Published  in  the 
Hague/Vi  sbyº  Rules  and  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  SeArt. 
1971,  Edited  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  London,  1977, 
Cit.  "Diamond,  The  Hague/Visby  Rules". 
Diplock,  Kenneth.,  Breach  of  the 
Contract  of  Carriage  by 
Goteborg,  1967,  Cit.  "Diplock,  Breach  of  the 
Contract". 
Dor,  Stephanes.,  Bill  of  Lading  Clauses  and  the 
International  Convention  of  Brussels,  1924.  {hajaL  R,  1  s) 
1956,  Cit.  "Dor". 
Egger,  N.  W.  Palmier.,  "The  Unworkable  Per-Package 545 
Limitation  of  the  Carrier's  Liability  under  the  Hague  (or 
Hamburg)  Rules",  [1978)  24  McGill,  L.  J.,  p  459,  Cit. 
"Egger,  The  Unworkable  Per-Package  Limitation". 
Rmer  i  aon  on  Insurance,  (1783),  vol  3,  Meredith's 
Translation  {1850},  Cit.  "Emerigon". 
Falih,  Abdul  Baki  A.,  "The  Statutory  Limitation  of  the 
Maritime  Carrier's  Liability  under  the  Hague  Rules,  Visby 
Rules  and  Hamburg  Rules",  A  Thesis  Approved  for  the 
Degree  of  Ph.  D,  Glasgow  University,  1980,  Cit.  "Falih". 
Falkanger,  T.,  "The  Risk  of  Delay-Affecting  the  Cargo", 
Published  in  the  Ocean  Chartering,  Organised  by  the 
UNCTAD  Secretariat,  London,  1977,  Cit.  "Falkanger". 
Farber,  Daniel  A.,  "Reassessing  the  Economic  Efficiency 
of  Compensatory  Damages  for  Breach  of  Contract",  [1980] 
66  Virginia  L.  Rev.  p  1443,  Cit.  "Farber,  Compensatory 
Damages  for  Breach  of  Contract". 
Friedell,  Steven  F.,  "The  Deviating  Ship",  [1981)  32 
Hastings.  L.  J.  p  1543,  Cit.  "Steven". 
Furmston.  M.  P.,  Cheshire  and  Fifootls  Law  of  Contrac'  , 
10th,  ed,  London,  1981,  Cit.  "Furmston". 
Gilmore,  Grant  &  Black,  Charles.,  The  'Law  of  Admiralty, 
2nd,  ed,  1975,  Cit.  "Gilmore  &  Black". 
Gorton,  Lars,  Ihre,  Rolf,  &  Sondevarn,  Arne.,  Shipbroking 
and  Chartering  Practice,  (2nd,  ed,  19841,  London,  Cit. 
"Gorton,  Ihre,  &  Sandevarn,  Chartering  Practice". 
Gorton,  Lars.,  The  Concept  of  the  Common  Carrier  in 
Ang  o-AmericanLaw,  Gothenburg,  1977,  cit.  "Gorton". 546 
Guest,  A.  G.,  Anson's  Law  of  Contract,  1979,  Oxford,  Cit. 
"Anson's  Law  of  Contract". 
"Fundamental  Breach  of  Contract"  [19611  77  Q. 
R.  p  98,  Cit.  "Guest,  Fundamental  Breach". 
g  ß1sbury's  Law  of  England.  Shipping  and  Navig  ion, 
{4th,  ed,  1983,  Vol,  431,  London,  Cit.  "Halsbury's 
Shipping&  Navigation" 
{loth,  ed,  vol  12,19751,  London  Cit.  "Halsbury, 
Damages". 
Hart,  H.  L.  A,  &  Honore,  Tony.,  Causation  in  the  Law, 
{2nd,  ed,  1985},  Oxford,  Cit.  "Hart&  Honore". 
Honour,  J.  P.,  "The  P.  &  1.,  Clubs  and  the  New  United 
Nations  Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea, 
1978",  Published  in  The  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Ca  rriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  Boston,  p 
239,  Cit.  "Honour,  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea". 
Hoyle,  Mark  S.  W.,  The  Law  of  International  Trade,  (Ist, 
ed,  19841,  London,  Cit.  "Hoyle". 
Huang,  Mao-Ching.,  "The  Impact  of  Containerization  on 
Carrier's  Liability  and  Rate  Regulations  in  International 
Liner  Shipping  with  Emphses  on  United  States,  Japaner 
Trade",  University  of  Washington,  1975,  Cit.  "Huang". 
Hussni,  Ahmed.,  Maritime  _assation,  1980,  Alexandria, 
Cit.  "Hussni,  Maritime  Cassation". 
The  International  Maritime  Carriage  fier  the 
Goods  and  the  Perils  Of  the-  Se_a  According  to  the 
Haau  _/ýVi 
by  Rules  and  the  Ham  big  Rules  (1978),  1980, 
Cit.  "Hussni,  Maritime  Carriage". 547 
Hutchinson,  Robert.,,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  C  rri  erg, 
{vol.  I  &  II  3rd,  ed,  1906},  Chicago,  S.  Matthews  and 
Dickinson,  Cit.  "Hutchinson,  vol.  I  &  Hutchinson,  vo1.  II". 
A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Carriers, 
I{ 
3rd,  ed, 
vol  III,  1906},  Chicago,  Edited  by  S.  Matthews  and  W. 
Dickinson,  Cit,  "Hutchinson,  vol  III". 
Hyun,  Song-Sang.,  Comparative  Study  on  Maritime  cargo 
Carrier's  Liability  in  Anglo-American  and  French  law, 
1970,  Cit.  "Hyun". 
Ivamy,  E.  R.  Hardy.,  Dictionary  of  shipping  Law,  1989, 
Cit.  "Ivamy,  Dictionary  of  Shipping  Law". 
Payne  &  Ivamy's  Carriage  of  Goods  bySgýa,  12th,  ed,  1985, 
Cit.  "Panye  &  Ivamy". 
Jackson,  D.  C.,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  and  Conflict  of  Laws", 
Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Gonda 
by  Sea,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  Leyden/  Boston,  1978, 
p  221,  Cit.  "Jackson,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
James,  Whitehead.,  "Deviation:  Should  the  Doctrine  Apply 
to  On-Deck  Carriage?  "  [1981)  26  Mar.  Law,  p  37,  Cit. 
"Whitehead". 
Jeraute,  Jules.,  French-Enqlizh  and  Fngl  ish-Frenneh 
Vnnabulary  of  Legal  Terms  and  Phrases,  Paris,  Librairie 
Generale  De  Droit  Et  De  Jurisprudence,  Cit.  " 
Kamel,  Mohamoud.,  "Some  New  trends  of  Practice  and 
Procedure  in  the  Eguptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law", 
[1983]  1  Al-Qanoun  Wal  Igtisad,  Year  33rd,  p  344,  Cit. 
"Kamel  Egyptian,  Maritime  Commercial  Law". 
Kendal,  Lord  Chorley  &  Bailhache,  C..,  T  Law-Of  Mara  n 548 
Insurance  and  Average,  London,  (1961,  vol  9)  ,  Cit.  tog 
Arnould". 
Kent,  James.,  Commentaries  on  American  Law,  7thr  cd, 
Vol,  3,1828,  Cit.  "Kent". 
Kimball,  John.  D.,  "Package  Limitation-A  Container  is  a 
"Package"  in  RE  TUG  DOROTHY  H",  [1980)  ii  J.  Mar.  L.  & 
Com,  p  370,  Cit.  "Kimball,  Package  Limitation". 
I 
"Shipowner's  Liability  and  the  Proposed 
Revision  of  the  Hague  Rules",  [1975]  7  JMLC,  p  217,  Cit. 
"Kimball". 
King,  Joseph  H.,  Jr.,  "Causation,  Valuation  and  Chance  in 
Personal  Consequences"  [1981)  90  Yale.  L.  J.  p  1353,  Cit. 
"King,  Causation". 
Klein,  Mark  P.,  "$500-Per-Package  Limitation  in  COGSA 
Inapplicable  due  to  Deviation;  on  Deck  Stowage  Construed. 
Encyclopaedia  Britannica,  Inc.  v.  S.  S.  HonKong 
Producer",  F.  2d  {2d.  Cir.  1969),  Cit.  "Klein,  $  500-  Per- 
Packag  Limitation" 
Knauth,  Arnold  W.,  The  American  Law  of  O  ean  Bills  of 
Lading 
r 
4th,  ed,  1953,  Cit.  "Knauth". 
Koushnareff,  Serge  G.,  Liability  of  Carriers  of  Goods  by 
,  1st,  ed,  New  York,  1943,  Cit.  "Kaushnareff". 
Lawson,  Richard.,  Exclusion  Clauses,  (2nd,  ed,  1983), 
London,  Cit.  "Lawson,  Exclusion  Clauses". 
Longley,  henry  N.,  Common  Carriage  of  Cargo,  1967,  New 
York,  Cit.  "Longley". 
Luksic,  Branimir.,  "Damages  of  Goods  from  Unknown  Causes 549 
in  Maritime  Transport",  (1982]  IL  Diritto  Marittimo,  p 
567,  Cit.  "Luksic,  Damages  from  Unknown  Causes" 
Mankabady,  Samir.,  "Comments  on  the  Hamburg  Rules", 
Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  on  t-hn  Carry  ago  nf  Goods. 
by  Sea,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  27,  Cit. 
"Samir  Mankabady,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
"The  Brussels  Bills  of  Lading  Convention: 
Deficiencies  and  Suggested  Reforms",  A  Thesis  Approved 
for  Ph.  D  Degree,  London  University,  1970,  Cit. 
"Mankabady,  The  Brussels  Bills  of  Lading  Convention". 
Maskell,  John;  Norton,  Messrs  Botterel,  Rose  &  Roche., 
"The  Influence  of  the  New  Rules  on  Contracts  of  Carriage 
of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971",  Published  in  the  Hague/Vichy 
Rules  and  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  At  11971 
,  Edited 
by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  Ltd,  London,  1977,  Cit. 
Maskell,  Contract  of  Carriage. 
McGilhrist,  N.  R.,  "Carriage  by  Air,  Wilful  Misconduct 
and  the  Warsaw  Convention",  (1977]  4  LMCLQ,  p  539,  Cit. 
"Mcgilhrist". 
McGregor,  Harvey.,  "Compensation  Versus  Punishment  in 
Damages  Awards",  [19651  28  M.  L.  R.  P  629,  Cit. 
"McGregor,  Damages  Awards". 
McMahon,  J.  P.,  "On  Deck  Stowage  of  Container  on 
Container  Ship  not  Unreasonable  Deviation",  [19731  4  J. 
Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  687,  Cit.  "McMahon". 
Mendelsohn,  Allan.  I.,  "The  Value  of  the  Poincare  Franc 
in  Limitation  of  Liability  Convention",  119731  5  J.  Mar. 
L&  Com,  p  125,  Cit.  "Mendelsohn,  The  Value  of  the 550 
Poincare  Gold  Franc". 
Mills,  C.  P.,  "The  Future  of  Deviation  in  the  Law  of  the 
Carriage  of  Goods",  [1983)  4  LMCLQ,  p  587,  Cit.  "Mills, 
The  Future  of  Deviation". 
Minnesata,  St.  Paul.,  Black,  Law  Di 
_t-ionary,  1957  Cit. 
"Black's  Law  Dictionary". 
Morgan,  H.  S.  Jr.,  "Unreasonable  Deviation  under  COGSA", 
[1978)  9  JMLC,  p  481,  Cit.  "Morgan". 
Morris,  John.,  chitty  on  Cony  a_  s,  vol.  I,  London,  1961, 
Cit.  "Chitty  on  Contracts". 
Murray,  D.  E.,  "The  Hamburg  Rules:  A  Comparative 
Analysis",  (1980]  12  Lawyer  of  the  Americas  (USA)  p  59, 
Cit.  "Murray,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
Musa,  Talib  Hussan.,  The  Commercial  Contract  under  the 
Iraqi  Commercial  Law,  (1st,  ed,  1973,  vol,  I),  Baghdad, 
Cit.  "Musa,  The  Commercial  Contract". 
Mustill,  Michael.,  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  11971,  x, 
Arkiv-for-sjorett,  vol,  II,  1972,  Cit.  "Mustill". 
Okeefe,  Partick  J.  &  Colinard  R.  J.,  "The  UNCITRAL  Draft 
Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea",  [1976]  10 
Journal  of  World  Trade  Law,  p  346,  Cit.  "Okeefe  & 
Colinard". 
Parsons,  Theophilus.  ,A  Treatise  on  Maritime  -L=,  vol,  I, 
1859,  Cit.  "Parsons". 
Parsons,  Theophilus.  A  Treatise  on  Maritime  La  ..,  (1859, 
vol,  II)  Boston,  Cit.  "Parsons,  Maritime  Law". 
Peyrefitte,  Leopold.,  "The  Period  of  Maritime  Transport 
Comments  on  Article  4  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in 551 
the  Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  s(-$,  Edited 
by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  Cit.  "Peyrefitte". 
Pixa,  Rand  R.,  "The  Hamburg  Rules  Fault  Concept  and 
Common  Carrier  Liability  under  U.  S.  Law",  119791  19 
Virgina  Journal  of  International  Law,  p  433,  Cit.  "Pixa". 
Pollock,  Gordon.,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg  Rules 
{part  II}"",  Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  A  One-Day 
Seminar,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London,  Ltd,  London 
1978,  Cit.  "Pollock,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
Poor,  Wharton.,  American  Law  of  Charterparties  and  can 
Bills  of  Lading,  2nd,  ed,  1978,  Cit.  "Poor". 
Posner,  Richard  A.,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law,  {2nd,  ed, 
1977},  Canada,  Cit.  "Posner,  Economic  Analysis  of  Law". 
Powell,  Raphael.,  The  Unreasonableness  of  the  Reasonable 
Men,  .  irr  n_  Legal  Problems,  1957,  Vol,  10,  Cit.  "Raphael 
Powell". 
Powles,  David  G.,  "Action  Without  Loss:  The  Consignor's 
Right  Against  the  Carrier",  [1977]  J.  B.  L.  p  132,  Cit. 
"Powles,  Action  Without  Loss". 
The  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971,119781 
J.  B.  L.  p  141,  Cit.  "Powles". 
Reynardson,  W.  R.  A.,  Brich,  Messrs  M.  A.,  Miller,  Thos. 
R.  &  Son.,  "The  Implications  on  Liability  Insurance  of 
the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  the  hamburg  Ru  its,,  A  One 
Day  Seminar,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  Ltd, 
London,  1978,  p  Reynardson,  1,  Cit.  "Reynardson". 
Rice,  Deborah  Ann.,  Maritime  Legislation  in-the  Arabian 552 
Gulf  States,  [1985)  1  ALQ,  p  69,  Cit.  "Rice". 
Richardson,  J.  W.,  "The  Hague/Visby  Rules-Carrier's  View, 
Published  in  the  Hague/Visby  Rules  and  the  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  Act  1971",  Edited  by  Lloyd's  of  London, 
London,  1977,  Cit.  "Richardson". 
Ridley,  Jasper.,  The  Law  of  Carriage  of  Conde  by  an 
Sea  and  Air,  6th,  ed,  1982,  Cit 
.  "Ridley". 
Roger,  J.,  "The  Law  of  Maritime  Deviation"  (1972.731  47 
Tul.  L.  R.  p  163.  Cit.  "Roger". 
Rose,  F.  D.,  "Deductions  from  Freight  and  Hire  under 
English  Law",  [1983)  1  LMCLQ,  p  33,  Cit.  "Rose". 
Salin,  A.  R.,  "The  Exception  Clauses  of  Liability 
According  to  the  Bills  of  Lading  Convention",  A  Thesis 
Approved  for  Degree,  Cairo  University,  1956,  Cit.  "Salim, 
The  Exception  Clauses". 
Sarpa.,  "Note  Deviation  in  the  Law  of  Shipping",  (19761 
11  J.  of  Intl  Law  &  Economic,  p  148,  Cit.  "Sarpa". 
Sassoon,  David  M.  &  Cunningham,  John  C.,  "Unjustifiable 
Deviation  and  the  Hamburg  Rules",  Published  in  the 
Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Seat  Edited  by 
Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  167,  Cit.  "Sassoon  & 
Cunningham". 
Schmeltzer,  Edward  &  Peavy,  Rober  A.,  "Prospects  and 
Problems  of  the  Container  Revolution",  (1969-19701  1  J. 
Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  203,  Cit.  "Schmeltzer  &  Peavy". 
Schollenberger,  David  K.,  "Risk  of  Loss  in  Shipping  under 
Hamburg  Rules"  [1981)  10  Denver  Journal  of  International 
Law  and  Policy  (USA)  p  568,  Cit.  "Schollenbergen,  The 553 
Hamburg  Rules" 
Una,  9th,  ed,  1985  Cit.  "Scrutton". 
Selvig,  Erling.,  "The  Hamburg  Rules,  The  Hague  Rules  and 
Marine  Insurance",  [1980-81]  12  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  Cit. 
"Selvig". 
"Unit  Limitation  and  Alternative  Types  of 
Limitation  of  Carrier's  Liability",  Published  in  Sj,  & 
Thy  u  res  on  the  Hague  Rues,  1967,  p  109,  Cit.  "Selvig, 
Unit  Limitation". 
Shah,  M.  J.,  "The  Revision  of  the  Hague  Rules  on  Bills  of 
Lading  Within  the  UN  System-Key  Issues",  Published  in  the 
Hamburg  Rules  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea,  Edited  by 
Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  p  1,  Cit.  "Shah". 
Sigmon,  Richard  R.,  Miller's  Law  of  Freight 
__Lass 
Damage  Claims,  4th,  ed,  Dubuque,  Iowa,  Cit.  "Sigmon, 
Miller's  Law". 
Silard,  Stephen  A.,  "Carriage  of  the  SDR  by  Sea:  The  Unit 
of  Account  of  the  Hamburg  Rules",  [1978]  10  J.  Mar.  L.  & 
Com,  p  13,  Cit.  "Silard,  The  Unit  of  Account". 
Simon,  Seymour.,  "Latest  Developments  in  the  Law  of 
Shipping  Container"  [1972-73]  4  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  443., 
Cit.  "Simon,  Latest  Developments". 
"The  Law  of  Shipping  Countries"  [1973-74]  5 
J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com  p  507,  Cit.  "Simon,  The  Law  of  Shipping 
Countries". 
Smith,  J.  Bond,  Jr.,  "Recent  Developments  in  the  Law  of 
Damages  for  Breach  of  Charter"  [1982]  13  J.  Mar.  L.  & 554 
Com,  p  313,  Cit.  "Smith,  Law  of  Damages  for  Breach  of 
Charter"  . 
Somerville,  Margaret  A.,  "A  Diagramatic  Approach  to 
Causation",  [1978]  24  McGill.  L.  J.  p  442,  Cit. 
"Somerville,  Causation". 
Stanton,  Captain  L.  F.  H.,  The  Law  and  Practice  of  Sea 
Transport,  Glasgow,  1964,  Cit.  "Stanton,  Sea  Transport". 
Stoltar,  Samuel.  Normal.,  "Elective  and  Preparatory 
Damages  in  Contract"  [1975]  91  L.  Q.  R.  p  68,  Cit. 
"Stoltar,  Damages  in  Contract" 
Sweeney,  Joseph  C.,  "Review  of  the  Hamburg  Conference", 
ng  Published  in  the  Sneaker's  Papers  for  the  bill  of  LA  ding 
Conventions  Conference,  New  York,  Organized  by  Lloyd's  of 
London  Press,  1978,  Cit.  "Sweeney,  Review  of  the  Hamburg 
Conference". 
"The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  {part  I}",  [1975-761  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p 
69,  Cit.  "Sweeney,  Part  I". 
"The  "UNCITRAL"  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage 
of  Goods  By  Sea,  (part  II)  ",  (1975-76]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com. 
p  327,  ci  t.  "Sweeney,  Part  II". 
"The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  sea  {part  III}"  [1975-76]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p 
487,  Cit.  "Sweeney,  Part  III". 
"The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  {part  IV}",  [1975-76]  7  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p 
615,  Cit.  "Sweeney,  Part  IV". 555 
"The  UNCITRAL  Draft  Convention  on  Carriage  of 
Goods  by  Sea  {part  V}"  [1977]  8  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com,  p  167, 
Cit.  "Sweeney,  Part  V"  Sykes,  J.  B.  The  Pocket  Oxford 
Dictionary,  1978,  Cit.  "Sykes,  Oxford  Dictionary". 
Taha,  M.  K.,  Principles  Of  Maritime  L,  a  ..  1974, 
Alexandria,  Cit.  "Taha,  Maritime  Law". 
Temperly,  R.  &  Vaughan,  F.  Martin.,  Carriages  of  1;  oods  by 
sea  Act  1924,4th,  ed,  1932,  Cit.  Temperly. 
Tetley,  William  &  Cleven.,  "Prosecuting  the  Voyage" 
[1970-71]  45  Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  810,  Cit.  "Tetley  &  Cleven". 
Tetley,  William.,  "Article  9  to  13  of  the  Hamburg  Rules", 
Published  in  the  Hamburg  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sen, 
Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady,  1978,  Boston,  p197,  Cit. 
"Tetley,  Hamburg  Rules". 
Marine  Cargo  Claims  , 
2nd,  ed,  1978,  Cit. 
r 
"Tetley". 
"Selected  Porbiems  of  Maritime  Law  Under  the 
Hague  Rules"  (1963]  9  Mc  Gill  L.  J.  p  53,  Cit.  "Tetley, 
Selected  Maritime  Problems". 
"The  Hamburg  Rules-A  Commentary"  (1979]  1 
LMCLQ,  p  1,  Cit.  "Tetley,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
Thede,  Robert  H.,  "Statutory  Limitations  (other  than 
Harter  and  COGSA)  of  Carrier's  Liability  to  Cargo 
Limitation  of  Liability  and  the  Fire  Statute"  119751  45 
Tul.  L.  R.,  p  959,  Cit.  "Thede,  Statutory  Limitation". 
Thomas,  Mr.  J.  L.,  "A  Legal  Analysis  of  the  Hamburg 
Rules,  Part  III",  Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rulon,  A  One 
Day  Seminar,  Organised  by  Lloyd's  of  London  Press,  Ltd, 556 
London,  1978,  Cit.  "Thomas,  The  Hamburg  Rules". 
Thomson,  J.  M.,  "Fundamental  Breach  in  Scots  and  English 
Law",  [1977]  Jur.  R.  p  38,  Cit.  "Thomson,  Fundamental 
Breach". 
Tiberg,  H.,  "The  Risk  of  Having  to  Pay  Additional  Freight 
and  Cost",  Published  in  the  Ocean  Chartering,  Practical 
Aspects,  Organised  by  the  UNCTAD  Secretariat,  (Athens/ 
Piraeus,  Greece).  1980,  Goteborg,  1982,  p  65,  Cit. 
"Tiberg". 
Tobolewski,  Aleksander.,  "The  Special  Drawing  Right  in 
Liability  Convention?  "[1979]  2  LMCLQ,  p  169,  Cit. 
"Tobolewski,  SDR". 
Todd,  Paul.,  Modern  Bills  of  Ladino,  1986,  London,  Cit. 
"Todd,  Bill  of  Lading". 
Trappe,  Johannes.,  "Hamburg,  The  Duties,  Obligations,  and 
Liabilities  of  the  Ship's  Agent  to  his  Principal"[1978)  4 
LMCLQ,  p  595,  Cit.  "Johannes". 
Villareal.  Dewey  R.  Jr.,  "The  Concept  of  Due  Diligence  in 
Maritime  Law"  (1971]  2  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com.  p  763,  Cit. 
"Villareal". 
Walker,  David  M.,  Law  of  Damages  inSootland,  Edinburgh, 
1955,  Cit.  "Walker,  Law  of  Damages". 
On  the  Scottish  Legal  System,  1981,  Cit. 
"Walker,  Scottish  Legal  System". 
principles  of  Scottish  Private  Law,  Oxford, 
i 
3rd,  ed,  1983,  vol,  II,  Cit.  "Walker,  Private  Law". 
, 
The  Law  of  Civil  Remedies  in  Snj  and, 
Edinburgh,  1974,  Cit.  "Walker,  Civil  Remedies". 557 
The  Law  of  Contracts  and  Related  Öb  iga  ionn 
j,  n  Scotland,  {lst,  ed,  1979},  {London,  2nd,  ed,  1985}  Cit. 
"Walker,  Contract". 
The  Law  of  Del  i  ct  in  Scotland,  Edinburgh, 
2nd,  ed,  1981,  Cit.  "Walker,  Delict". 
The  Oxford  Componionto  Law,  Oxford  1980. 
Cit.  "Walker,  Componion". 
Ward,  Les.,  "The  SDR  in  Transport  Liability  Conventions: 
Some  Clarification"  [1981]  13  J.  Mar.  L.  &  Com.  p  1,  Cit. 
"Ward,  The  SDR  in  Transport  Liability  Conventions". 
W;  bster's  Third  New  Intl.  Dictionary?  16th,  ed,  1971, 
Cit.  "Webster's". 
Wilford,  Micheal;  Coghlin,  Terence  &  Healy,  Nicholas  J., 
Time  Charters,  London,  1978,  Cit.  "Wilford,  Coughlin,  and 
Healy". 
Williams,  H.  B.,  "The  Limitation  of  Liability  Versus 
Direct  Action  Statutes"  [1975]  8  Vanderbilt  Journal  of 
Transportational  Law,  p  815,  Cit.  "Williams,  Limitation". 
Williston,  Samuel.,  A  Treatise  on  the  Law  of  Contract, 
{Revised,  ed,  vol,  IV,  1936)  New  York,  Cit.  "Williston". 
Wilson,  J.  F.,  "Basic  Carrier  Liability  and  the  Right  of 
Limitation",  Published  in  the  Hamburg  Rules  on  the 
Parr;  ge  of  Goods  by  Sea,  Edited  by  Samir  Mankabady, 
Boston,  1978,  p  137,  Cit.  "Wilson". 
Winter,  William  D.,  Marine  In  nce  it- 
- 
Princ  bl,  e,  s 
PraC  ice,  3rd,  ed,  1952,  Cit.  "Winter". 
Wood,  Elcarol  v.  Green.,  "Problems  of  Negligence 558 
Inloading,  Stowage,  Custody,  Care,  and  Delivery  of  Cargo; 
Errors  in  Management  and  Navigation;  Due  Diligence  to 
Make  Seaworthy"  [1971]  45  Tul.  L.  R.  p  790,  Cit.  "Green 
Wood". 
Wood,  George  F.,  "Damages  in  Cargo  Cases"  [1970-71]  45 
Tul.  L.  Rev.  p  932,  Cit.  "Wood,  Damages  in  Cargo". 
Yates,  David.,  Exclusion  Clauses  in  Contrac 
.  g,  London, 
1978,  Cit.  "Yates,  Exclusion  Clauses". 559 
TABLE  OF  CONVENTIONS  AND  DOCUMENTS 
1.  International  Convention  for  the  Unification  of 
Certain  Rules  of  Law  Relating  to  Bills  of  Lading  and 
Protocol  of  Signature,  Signed  at  Brussels  on  August  25th 
1924,  Known  as  the  "Hague  Rules". 
1.1  Protocol  to  Amend  the  International  Convention  for 
Unification  of  Certain  Rules  of  Law  Relating  to  Bills  of 
Lading  Signed  at  Brussels,  on  23rd  February  1968,  Known 
as  the  "Visby  Rules". 
1.2  Protocol  Amending  the  International  Convention  for 
the  Unification  of  Certain  Rules  of  Law  Relating  to  Bills 
of  Lading  (August  25,1924,  as  Amended  by  the  Protocol  of 
February  23,1968),  Brussels,  December  21,1979,  Known  as 
the  Brussels  Protocol  of  1979  to  the  Hague/Visby  Rules. 
2.  United  Nations  Convention  on  the  Carriage  of  Goods  by 
Sea,  1978,  Known  as  the  "Hamburg  Rules". 
3.  Convention  for  the  Unification  of  Certain  Rules 
Relating  to  International  Carriage  by  Air,  Signed  at 
Warsaw  on  12th  October  1929,  Known  as  "Warsaw 
Convention". 
3.1  Protocol  Modifying  the  Warsaw  Convention,  Signed  at 
the  Hague  on  28th  September  1955. 
3.2  Guadalajiara  Convention  1961,  Convention, 
Supplementary  to  the  Warsaw  Convention  for  the 
Unification  of  Certain  Rules  Relating  to  International 
Carriage  by  Air  Performed  by  a  Person  other  than  the 560 
Contracting  Carrier,  Signed  at  Guadalajara  on  18th 
September  1961. 
3.3  Guatemala  Protocol  1971,  Protocol  to  Amend  the 
Warsaw  Convention  of  1929  as  Amended  by  the  Hague 
Protocol  of  1955,  Signed  at  Guatemala  City  on  8th  March 
1971. 
3.4  Montreal  Additional  Protocols  1975. 
4.  United  Nations  Convention  on  International 
Multimodal  Transport  of  Goods,  Signed  at  Geneva  on  24th 
May  1980. 
5.  Second  Report  of  the  Secretary-General  on 
Responsibility  of  Ocean  Carriers  for  Cargo:  Bills  of 
Lading,  (Document  A/  CN.  9/  76/  Add  1.  part  3,  Para,  III. 
6.  United  Nations  Conference  on  Trade  and  Development/ 
Geneva/  Bills  of  Lading,  Report  by  the  Secretariat  of 
UNCTAD,  New  York,  1971. 561 
TABLE  OF  STATUTES 
1.  Bill  of  Lading  Act  1855. 
2.  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  of  the  United  Kingdom  on 
August  25th  1924. 
3.  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  of  United  Kingdom  1971, 
23rd  June  1977. 
4.  Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  of  United  States  1936. 
5.  Egyptian  Civil  Code  1948,  No.  131  of  1948. 
6.  Egyptian  Civil  Procedural  Law,  No.  13  of  1968. 
7.  Egyptian  Maritime  Commercial  Law  1883. 
8.  Harter  Act,  1893. 
9.  Iraqi  Administrative  law,  No.  140  of  1977. 
10.  Iraqi  Civil  Code  1951. 
11.  Iraqi  Civil  Procedural  Law,  No.  83  of  1969. 
12.  Iraqi  Commercial  Code  1970,  Law  No.  1490  of  1970. 
13.  Iraqi  Transport  Law,  No.  80  of  1983. 
14.  Iraqi  Working  Paper  for  Legal  System  Reform,  No.  35 
of  1977. 
15.  Marine  Insurance  Act  1906. 
16.  Merchant  Shipping  Act  1894. 
17.  Merchant  Shipping  Act  1979. 
18.  Merchant  Shipping  Act  1981. 
19.  Merchant  Shipping  {Liability  of  Shipowners  and 
others}  Act  1900. 
ýi 
COW 
v eM 